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Abstract 
The subject of this thesis is financial globalisation in historical perspective, and its key 
contribution is to demonstrate the J-curve as an alternative depiction of financial 
globalisation since the classical Gold Standard period.  As a preliminary and essential 
step, some definitions and clarifications on globalisation are provided in a literature 
review.  Then, fundamental issues are considered to assess financial globalisation, so that 
both the goals and the boundaries of the thesis are clearly stated.  
Throughout the historical period in debate, there were two waves of financial 
globalisation: the first one occurring during the 1870-1914 period, and the second 
lasting from the end of the Bretton Woods agreements until the present day.  The 
dominant approach in economics asserts that the degree of commercial and financial 
integration corresponds over time to a U-shaped pattern, i.e. markets presented high 
levels of integration during the forty years before WWI. Then, this integration 
collapsed in the years between the wars, recovering gradually after the Bretton Woods 
agreements until it reached again in the 1990s the same pre-1914 level of integration. 
The thesis approaches this model focusing on the financial side. Then, according to the 
U-curve, contemporary financial globalisation is not unprecedented. This thesis 
proposes an alternative view. In contrast to the mainstream U-curve, the empirical data 
provided indicates that today’s financial integration is unprecedented and more 
pervasive in some key financial markets than it was during the pre-1914 era. 
The empirical evidence provided proposes that a J-shaped pattern is a more appropriate 
way to interpret how financial markets have evolved since the late 19th century.  The J-
shape suggests that in some financial achieved a huge surge from the 1990s to 2005, 
surpassing the previous level of integration. So, in these markets, contemporary 
financial globalisation is unprecedented from the 1990s onwards. The J-curve does not 
mean that all financial markets became more globalised during the late 20th century in 
comparison to the Gold Standard era, but only some that presented the U-shape from 
1870 to 1995. Qualitative aspects of the J-curve are examined.  The different 
institutional frameworks underlying each historical period are discussed revealing that 
new institutional arrangements, policy changes, technological advances in ICT and a 
wide range of financial innovations are the key driving forces that have spurred today’s 
financial globalisation to higher levels than in the past.  Finally, the last chapter 
assesses the key macroeconomic implications of this new era for the world economy. 
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1. General overview and motivation 
 
From time to time along the history of economic thought particular themes have 
attracted special attention and gained wider recognition from the scientific community.  
Some of them have been on the agenda of scholars worldwide for decades but others 
have been neglected for various reasons after earlier years of investigation. For 
instance, during the 1960s and 1970s, the wide-ranging monetarism-Keynesian 
controversies were the number one debate within academia.  This was developed in an 
attempt to explain a new economic phenomenon, stagflation, which occurred in most of 
the developed world. Academics were concerned with how to solve the disruptive 
combination of stagnation (slow economic growth and rising unemployment) and 
inflation. Meanwhile, the debate on how to finance development in rich and poor 
countries occupied the research agenda of economists. In the mid-1970s and 1980s 
many scholars were striving to solve the problems raised by enduring high inflation in 
various countries (and hyper-inflation, as was the case in Latin America).  Since the 
1990s, globalisation has become a buzzword in academia.   
Globalisation and financial globalisation, its most contentious aspect, have increasingly 
stimulated the interest of scholars from within and outside economics. Empirical and 
theoretical literature quickly developed in different and more and more specialised 
strands to deal with the issues and repercussions related to the increased global 
commercial and financial connectivity developed over time.   
The current increased use of the term globalisation does not mean that the phenomenon 
is actually new.  Considerable literature has flourished, suggesting that the occurrence 
of greater global connectivity involving many areas of human activity and social 
interaction has occurred at times in history since a century (or even centuries) ago. 
Since then, international integration has grown significantly in a number of ways, 
shaping a non linear historical process, receiving different taxonomies and depictions. 
Nevertheless, most scholars have discussed the causes and consequences of 
globalisation based on what has taken place in the last few decades, normally starting in 
the late 1970s.  
Although the term currently used to represent contemporary global integration is new, 
the phenomenon has precedents in history.  Globalisation is not an exclusive occurrence 
of the capitalism of the late 20th century. There is arguably a growing consensus 
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amongst scholars that it began when the Gold Standard promoted a monetary 
integration of many countries in the late 19th century.  In this sense, a well-quoted 
indicator such as merchandise exports as a percentage of world GDP is usually 
mentioned to illustrate the historical development of globalisation since it shows the 
tendency to internationalisation of the world economy.   
According to Findlay & O’Rourke (2001:46), in 1820, merchandise exports as a share 
of world GDP was only 1 per cent. As the 19th century drew to a close, this ratio 
presented higher values but retreated after World War II, i.e. it rose from 4.6 per cent in 
1870 to 7.9 per cent in 1913, but accounted for only 5.5 per cent in 1950.  In 1973 this 
percentage was 10.5 per cent, twice as much as its 1950 level, rising to 17.2 per cent in 
1998 (Maddison 2001:363).  Thus, the 1870 ratio of exportations in the world economy 
had approximately quadrupled by the end of the 1990s. This increasing movement of 
international transactions reflects the rapid global transformations that have taken place 
during the modern era.  
Needless to say, this indicator represents just one single hint that larger and more 
intricate occurrences are taking place underneath. Globalisation issues (in its various 
aspects and dimensions) have been high on the agenda of the New Millennium, 
whereas economic and political isolationism have become unfashionable and 
increasingly hard to sustain.   
Focusing on the current episode, the impacts promoted by the wave of liberalisation 
that occurred over the last quarter of the 20th century is one central argument frequently 
mentioned and emphasised as an important pillar of the contemporary event.  Starting 
in key developed countries in America, Europe and Asia, and spreading to many 
developing nations during the 1980s and the 1990s, commercial and capital market 
liberalisation have been hotly debated as a key element responsible for spurring global 
market integration. During these years, free market policy advice dominated the 
international economic and political scenario. As a result, liberal measures influenced 
domestic policy worldwide (but especially in developing and emerging countries) in 
various ways and intensities. These nations implemented a great deal of reforms 
following those liberalising policies. As a whole, they lowered the barriers to the 
international trade of goods, opened their capital accounts and liberalised their domestic 
financial markets, significantly strengthening global financial and commercial 
integration.  
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Multi-national companies and credit institutions took advantage of decreasing state 
regulations in different sectors and developed a variety of strategies (joint ventures, 
mergers, acquisitions, inter-firm alliances, subcontracting arrangements, outsourcing, 
new financial products, etc) to overcome national frontiers, aiming to reach remote and 
wide markets. Accordingly, over the past few decades, these corporations have 
significantly increased their ability to operate in different cultures and transcend ethnic 
divisions in order to achieve their investment goals on a global scale.   
Nevertheless, the stance supported in this thesis is that globalisation (the current and the 
former episodes) is (and were) a phenomenon of multiple causes. The liberalisation 
policy was just one of those, but in fact many other institutional, political and economic 
changes, and successive technological innovations resulting from the information 
technology revolution, are on the basis of the recent process of higher and extensive 
global market connectivity. On this matter, a couple of other key determinants can be 
alluded to just to briefly illustrate the case: more advanced semiconductors, fibre optics 
and the Internet have radically cut the costs of transmitting information and drastically 
expanded global telecommunications; the sharp decrease in the cost of international 
shipping (especially in the air and ocean freight transportation sector); a series of 
breakthroughs in computer science and its applications to productive and financial 
activities; international finance becoming central to support the range of production 
activities around the globe; changes in the global power structure towards a liberal 
right-wing economic model, etc.   
As a matter of fact, the debate on globalisation has been much wider and more 
multifaceted than discussed within economics. Its causes and effects are not only 
confined to economic aspects but also involve many different aspects combining 
political, institutional, cultural, ecological, technological, spatial and sociological 
dimensions. Evoking these and other aspects, globalisation has therefore become a 
multidimensional theme and an interdisciplinary topic within academia, that is to say, a 
considerable challenge for any scientist to approach.  
As an academic subject, globalisation has been vigorously scrutinised from a variety of 
angles and thus multiple facets of it have emerged.  This detailed examination has led 
many scholars from different fields of research to engage in further investigation. 
Accordingly, as authors strive for attention, economists and other scientists have been 
studying an extensive range of topics proposing a variety of taxonomies.  They have 
been claiming different definitions, causations, dimensions, historical precedents and 
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periodisations, theoretical approaches, empirical measures, suggesting numerous 
consequences, and eventually proposing an array of policy prescriptions to deal with its 
disruptive or/and beneficial outcomes.  In current literature, all of these argumentations 
are entwined to a certain extent. In the words of Keohane & Nye Jr. (2000:107): “the 
division of globalism [read globalisation] into separate dimensions is inevitably 
somewhat arbitrary”.  
One of the main economic dimensions of globalisation concerns the financial aspects of 
the phenomenon. Broadly speaking, financial globalisation is the progressive 
integration of the domestic financial markets of most countries into one (Arestis & 
Basu 2002a), and it is the core topic of this thesis.  Financial globalisation is also not a 
recent phenomenon. In this thesis, the contemporary occurrence and the Gold Standard 
era will be discussed. Since financial activity, past and present, is widely pervasive, i.e. 
involves large structural linkages and interactions amongst markets, other institutions 
and agents, several characteristics of the historical context in these two periods will be 
taken into account in order to accomplish the key research purpose proposed by the 
thesis. 
 
2. Key arguments 
 
While the general outcomes of globalisation are currently one of the most debated 
topics on the international political and economic agenda, financial globalisation is its 
most untamed dimension.  It has been changing the conventional behaviour of markets 
as a whole, creating new ways for domestic economic policies (sometimes because the 
international political pressures, creating a “one-way” economic policy for some 
countries), and redefining the global financial architecture.  
Both globalisation and financial globalisation have produced an impressive amount of 
literature in recent years.  However, this thesis does not intend to discuss all aspects of 
financial globalisation, but rather some specific ones related to the process of global 
financial integration from a historical perspective, i.e. the classical Gold Standard era 
and the period following the end of the Bretton Woods agreements in 1971 to the 
present day.   
There is a body of literature suggesting that there were two waves of financial 
globalisation from the classical Gold Standard period up to 1995.  The key premise for 
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this makes use of the U-shaped pattern to describe this phenomenon during the two 
waves. The U-shaped pattern states that global (trade and) financial integration was 
very high from 1870 to 1914, collapsed between the wars, and then gradually returned 
to pre-1914 levels. In a few words, the essential message proposed by the U-curve is 
that nothing new has happened in terms of global financial (and commercial) 
integration in comparison with the 1870-1914 period.   
However, analysing the historical financial data, I noticed that after 1995, global 
financial integration was unprecedented for some key markets.  That is to say, the U-
pattern properly described the financial globalisation phenomenon for 1870-1995, but 
this depiction becomes inadequate for the representation of the post-1995 period.  
Updating the time series for the period between mid-1990s and early 2000s, another 
shape occurs and seems to be more appropriate for representing cross-border financial 
activity.  After organising the empirical evidence collected, I concluded that the process 
of financial globalisation since the Gold Standard resembles more that of a J-curve than 
a U-pattern.  
Up to this point, it is important to state clearly the core objectives to be pursued by this 
thesis, and its central argument. There are three central objectives.  Firstly, to propose 
an alternative view of the development of the two waves of financial globalisation 
which began in the 1870s.  Secondly, to scrutinise the institutional aspects of financial 
globalisation underlying these ages and, finally, evaluate the key macroeconomic 
consequences of the contemporary financial globalisation.   
The central argument of the thesis and its main original contribution is the rejection of 
the mainstream claim that the global financial markets followed the U-shaped pattern in 
favour of a J-shaped pattern.  That means, the integration of the current episode of 
financial globalisation is unprecedented and significantly higher than the former one.   
 
3. Methodology 
 
As can be seen above, empirical evidence plays an important role as a methodological 
tool to substantiate the J-shaped proposal.  However, the establishment of this 
proposition goes beyond gathering this sort of evidence inasmuch as it also requires a 
qualitative explanation of the phenomenon. Authors have developed different 
interpretations and methods to deal with the complexity of the subject based on diverse 
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theoretical approaches, empirical tests and econometric models. However, many of 
them overlook the role played by the institutional aspects of financial market 
integration from a historical perspective.   
The J-curve shows that the degree of financial integration increased between the first 
and second eras, so that the second episode became more prominent than the first. 
Therefore, financial globalisation did not progress steadily toward the same point in 
time, so it can be considered a path-dependent process.  Hence, in this thesis, the 
analysis of the two historical eras of financial globalisation is considered to be an 
evolutionary process of financial market transformations, which is surrounded by 
institutional changes.  In other words, the historical context and the particular 
institutional, social, cultural and technological conditions of each one of them will be 
examined to describe the dynamics of the two financial globalisation episodes. 2  
More precisely, the explanation for the J-curve must deal with the problem of the 
historical specificity, since its crucial underlying determinants took place at different 
times in history. As I have said, the J-curve involves two episodes of financial 
globalisation that took place at different moments in history. More than half a century 
separates the end of the first era from the beginning of the second. The analysis of the 
evolution of these phenomena requires both specific empirical data and specific 
investigation of each historical context in the dimensions mentioned in the previous 
paragraph. A specific historical analysis means that history matters in the sense that the 
changes that occurred throughout time are crucial to explaining why current integration 
now is higher than in the past. 
In this thesis I will use a historical method to deal with the historical specificities that 
takes into account the importance of the role played by the evolution of institutions, 
developed by Geoff Hodgson (2001, 2002a, 2007), one of the scholars who have been 
developing the old institutionalist theory.   
Institutionalism is a multidisciplinary research programme opposite to neoclassicism3 
and related to evolutionism (Hodgson, 1998:168 and 1993:19) and other non-
                                                 
2 William Dugger (1990) asserted that one of the six (arguably) unifying characteristics of institutionalist 
authors who followed both John R. Commons and Thorstein Veblen is what he called “the evolutionary 
approach to social provisioning.” According to him (p. 427) “the evolutionary approach means the 
historical approach, the study of change and process through historical epochs, the study of social process 
and continual change, the study of the dynamic interaction between technology and institutions, and 
between progress and cultural lag.”  
3 Samuels shows the common points between the research programme of institutionalist and evolutionist 
scholars (1995:576): “All have an interest in topics that are institutionalist in substance and have no 
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mainstream schools such as the post-Keynesianism.4 The underpinnings of the so-called 
“old” North American institutionalism are attributed to Thorstein Veblen, John 
Commons, and Wesley Mitchell. Its basic notional element lays on the concept of 
institution understood as habits, rules and its evolution.  The constitution of an 
“economic theory with institutions” derived from the theoretical effort to understand 
the human activity through the examination of the human interaction in its cultural 
context.  In doing so, institutions and the evolutionary nature of the economic process 
would define different types of economic systems (Hodgson, 1998:168), thus a “general 
institutionalist theory” should indicate how to develop specific or varied analyses 
related to particular phenomena. It poses the problem of historical specificity, which is 
defined by Hodgson (2007:122), in this way: 
It first acknowledges the fact that there are different types of socio-economic 
system, in historical time and geographic space. The problem of historical 
specificity addresses the limits of explanatory unification in social science: 
substantially different socio-economic phenomena may require theories that are 
in some respects different. If different socio-economic systems have features in 
common then, to some extent, the different theories required to analyse different 
systems might reasonably share some common characteristics. But sometimes 
there will be important differences as well. Concepts and theoretical frameworks 
appropriate for one real object may not be best suited for another. The problem of 
historical specificity starts from a recognition of significant underlying 
differences between different objects of analysis. One theory may not fit all. 
 
The explanation of the essential argument proposed by the J-curve fits this sort of 
analysis. Based on the definition above, there are three key reasons to taken into 
account when considering Hodgson’s take on the problem of historical specificity.  
First, because the analytical scope underlying the J-curve is inherently focused on 
“different socio-economic systems, in historical time and geographic space”.  Second, 
history matters in the J-curve proposal because there are significant underlying 
                                                                                                                                              
particular interest in contributing to the neoclassical paradigm. Some are specialists in particular areas of 
study, such as evolutionary analysis, organisation theory, and technology. These subjects require, as they 
see it, modes and methods of analysis often quite different from, though not necessarily totally in conflict 
with, neoclassical approaches to their subject. These modes and methods of analysis are more congruent 
with those of the US institutionalists, although they sometimes use tools and concepts originally 
developed by neoclassicists, such as transaction costs.” 
4 According to Samuels (1995:576): “Intellectually close to institutional economics are Post Keynesian 
economists working in the fields of monetary and macroeconomics. Many of them are associated with or 
have published in the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics but many have published in JEI [Journal of 
Economic Issues], ROPE [Review of Political Economy], and Challenge, as well as this journal 
[Cambridge Journal of Economics].” 
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differences between the objects of analysis.  Then the interpretation of the J-curve 
“must explore the particularities of the past” (Hodgson, 2007:112). 
The third point worth emphasising is the little scientific significance of a single general 
theory to interpret different historical socio-economic phenomena, given that one 
theory may not fit all the issues that may be raised.  For instance, the last chapter aims 
to evaluate the consequences of the second wave of financial globalisation to the world 
economy.  On this account, the post-Keynesian author Hyman Minsky developed an 
influential theory concerning the nature of capitalist instability not necessarily within 
the hard core of the institutionalist approach but intellectually related to it as asserted 
by Samules (1995).  Minsky’s theory will be important to clarify the relationship 
between financial development and economic performance.   
In summary, the interpretation proposed to investigate the J-curve is focused on the 
specific characteristics and underlying institutions of each era. I will look for stylised 
facts of the macroeconomic system, aiming to disclose the structural basic features and 
specific groups of embedded institutions that can explain the nature and the evolutive 
process of cross-border capital movement throughout the historical period. This 
analysis does not linger merely on statistics, but aims to explain the institutional scope 
and the causal processes of the financial integration in both eras. 
The problem of historical specificity is considered even in one of Hodgson’s definitions 
of institutionalism and institutions.  Hodsgon (1998:168) states that: “The core ideas of 
institutionalism concern institutions, habits, rules, and their evolution. However, 
institutionalists do not attempt to build a single, general model on the basis of those 
ideas.  Instead, these ideas facilitate a strong impetus toward specific and historically 
located approaches to analysis.”5  The theoretical and methodological elements 
summarised in this section will be the basic premises for the interpretation of the 
historical aspects of financial globalisation.  
 
Having said that, it is important to mention at the end of this section that one of the 
main implications of the J-curve model is to call attention to the fact that “something” 
                                                 
5 Hodgson (2003:163) presents another definition that adds other essential characteristics of institutions: 
“Institutions are durable systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social 
interactions. Language, money, systems of weights and measures, table manners, firms (and other 
organizations) are all institutions. In part, the durability of institutions stems from the fact that they can 
usefully create stable expectations of the behaviour of others. Generally institutions enable ordered 
thought, expectation and action, by imposing form and consistency on human activities. They depend 
upon the thoughts and activities of individuals but are not reducible to them.”  
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new and unprecedented related to the behaviour of the global financial system must 
have happened in the world financial scenario from the mid-1990s onwards.  In my 
point of view, this “something” should be understood as a historical process closely 
related to the numerous developments in the world of finance caused by economic, 
institutional, political, social and cultural transformations. In other words, tracking the 
evolution of institutions would provide useful insights to reinforce the validity of the 
empirical evidence gathered to sustain the J-curve hypothesis.  
The evolution of institutions designates the time, catching hold of public and private 
sentiment, leading us to understand the mind of the era, revealing key aspects of the 
phenomenon that have been neglected in several historical investigations.  Therefore, 
scrutinizing the globalisation of finance through the lense of the role played by 
institutions in the process of the development of global financial integration, this thesis 
offers a different angle of examining the phenomenon that may complement one of the 
sides of the research on this subject.   
 
4. The structure of the thesis 
 
To present the J-curve and deal with its implications for the debate on financial 
globalisation in a historical perspective, this thesis is divided into six chapters.  
Following this introduction, chapter two provides a literature review on globalisation.  
Ten years ago, a survey like that already would be considered a challenge even for 
experienced researchers. For a researcher writing in 2007 it demands a careful 
bibliographical selection due to the enormous volume of literature produced recently.  
Nonetheless, the chapter aims to set out some core issues spanning the literature. Then, 
in its first part, the chapter presents the definition of globalisation, the debate on myth or 
reality, its periodisation and the macroeconomic measures that have been used in 
academia to describe globalisation (and financial globalisation too).  Its second part is 
dedicated to present the three theoretical interpretations on globalisation, i.e. the hyper-
globalists, the sceptical and the transformationalists. 
An important observation must be done as for the discussion about the definition of 
globalisation. Jan Aart Scholte (2001:613) affirms that the evidence of globalisation are 
much more noticeable in the recent experience than the previous globalisation episode 
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occurred during the Gold Standard period.  Accordingly, this topic is discussed based 
on the characteristics of contemporary globalisation.  
The debate carried out in this chapter can be well summarised by these words of the 
Austrian-American economist Fritz Machlup (1941:30).  He pointed out that “criticism 
and polemics are ingredients which can make a discussion interesting”. This statement 
accurately characterises the literature review on globalisation presented in chapter two.  
While chapter two discusses what globalisation means, the first part of chapter three is 
dedicated to scrutinising outstanding key aspects on financial globalisation. Afterwards, 
the chapter presents empirically the J-curve as an alternative to the mainstream U-
shaped pattern to represent financial globalisation in historical perspective. More 
precisely, the chapter explore the historical statistical data on stocks of foreign assets 
and outward FDI and find another shape different to the conventional one. Aiming to 
establish statistically the J-shaped proposition, chapter three is not focused on 
qualitative explanations on the J-curve.  Although the discussion in this chapter do not 
to provide qualitative explanations, the statistical data shows that the second wave of 
financial globalisation is historically unprecedented in the markets researched.   
The difference in the degree of global financial integration between the two eras can be 
interpreted in many ways.  Chapter four proposes an explanation focused on the 
institutional change underlying the two eras.  It suggests that behind the J-curve lie 
institutional and technological changes that are take into account to explain the unequal 
level of integration throughout the Gold Standard to now.  In other words, the chapter 
scrutinises how the institutional arrangements and the technological transformations of 
the two eras contribute to the explanation of the J-curve.  
In summary, the key message proposed by the J-curve is that the global financial 
activity in the current era is unprecedented for certain key financial markets where 
scholars found the “nothing is new” scenario. The advent of this new era has 
consequences for both developed and developing countries, although these effects have 
not spread uniformly. So that chapter five investigates the key macroeconomic 
implications of this novel age for the world economy. The debate on the impacts of 
financial globalisation is discussed in different strands of the literature.  This chapter 
aims to piece together evidence collected from different authors and then to interpret 
the results according to two different theoretical approaches summarised in the 
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beginning of the chapter.  Finally, chapter six draws the main conclusions reached by 
the thesis.  
Therefore, historical examination, empirical data and theoretical interpretation are ever 
present in the thesis.  In the introduction of his History of Economic Analysis (1954) 
(published posthumously by Elisabeth B. Schumpeter), Joseph A. Schumpeter reasoned 
that the economic facts should be addressed by arguments that reconcile theory, history 
and empirical evidence.  This research looks to bring together these three elements in 
order to examine the financial globalisation phenomenon that marked two eras of the 
modern capitalist history.   
At the end of this introduction, the main limitations of this study are outlined. This 
thesis involves two major difficulties: 1. To deal with long period of analysis that is 
marked by a paucity of data. For this reason series of data are often incomplete, 
variables are heterogeneous, and comparisons of historical periods and/or geographic 
areas are problematic; and, 2. To discuss general aspects of a phenomenon that involves 
the world economy, and that has been widely studied worldwide.  To tackle these 
issues, some measures were in place. For example, in order to gather the data needed it 
was necessary to conciliate historical time series that were not available in statistical 
yearbooks, or in specialised books, and on the Internet. Additionally, the analysis of the 
data required readings of different (frequently opposed) theoretical and historical 
approaches.  But despite of these efforts, it was inevitable to reach general conclusions 
without however focusing on certain countries (or regions) in great detail.  
It is worth emphasising however that this thesis is not supposed to be a case study. As 
suggested by its title, the aim of the analysis is to scrutinise the dimensions, 
preconditions and consequences of the recent and unprecedented surge in the global 
financial activity. In the end, a wide picture of the historical aspects and the 
repercussions of the financial globalisation are presented, and the conclusions reached 
may invite critical revisions and amendments.  I also hope that my research will 
stimulate researchers to consider the necessity of examining the institutional 
underpinnings and the effects of current financial globalisation in specific countries or 
regions at great length.   
Last but not least, when I started to write this thesis, I decided to write the word 
globalisation with s to follow the British English spelling.  At the time I concluded this 
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thesis, I realised that both the –zation and –sation spellings are in current use in British 
English.    
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II. THE GLOBALISATION DEBATE 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the past two decades, the debate on globalisation has elbowed its way right to the 
top of economic, social and political agendas worldwide. Globalisation has also 
acquired a wide-reaching audience in academic circles during this period.6  Never 
before has a phenomenon produced such an extensive range of debates, concerns, 
policy changes, controversies, convergences, dissensions and even passions (Rogalski 
1997) to such a broad group of people, and in such a short time. The globalisation 
theme itself is now globalised. Due to the rapid transformations in many areas of the 
human life and its ambiguous consequences throughout the last decades, some have 
associated globalisation with the end of mankind’s ideological evolution, the end of 
renewable natural resources, the end of the state, even the end of the world, and this has 
promoted alarmists claims in certain sectors of society.  Nevertheless, fashionable 
interpretations about the theme are not the main goal of this chapter.  
The overall picture on the globalisation literature provided in Appendix 2 points to an 
increased interdisciplinary audience outside economics and at its borders with other 
disciplines.  The term globalisation can be used with different meanings and, as with 
any controversial theme, the phenomenon has been studied within different theoretical 
and empirical frameworks. Numerous authors have dealt with the diversity of issues 
that have arisen, creating areas of agreement and controversy.  However, it is also not 
the objective of this chapter to put together and to sum up many definitions and 
taxonomies on globalisation. The chapter aims to address scholarly contributions of 
economists and other social scientists on key aspects of the globalisation debate, 
intending to gain a better understanding of the core concepts and theories involved.  
Therefore, this chapter is more focused on presenting the general concepts than to 
examine the historical context.  The study of the historical specificities of each one of 
the two eras will be done in chapter four. 
In doing so, this chapter further aims to underpin the subsequent work in this thesis.  
Accordingly, the assessment of key features of globalisation as proposed below can add 
a better understanding of financial globalisation. There are reasons for this. For 
                                                 
6 Appendix 2 provides a broad view of the groundbreaking scholars, and the groundwork of the 
globalisation debate between the 1970-2005 period.   
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instance, the concepts of enmeshment and interconnectedness presented in this chapter 
will be included in the definition of financial globalisation displayed in the next one.  
Furthermore, as a whole, globalisation is considered a situation of higher integration 
between markets of several countries scattered around the world. Therefore, the 
understanding of what globalisation means should appreciate how diverse markets 
work in a context of global integration. In an autarkical world, markets behave 
differently from the way they behave in a global open economy. For this reason, it is 
important to understand the intricate framework underlying globalisation (causes and 
effects) in order to explore and understand financial globalisation.  That is by 
investigating the key issues of globalisation, the chapter also aims to reveal important 
specific aspects (as mentioned above) related to financial globalisation. Thus, it paves 
the way for the debate in the next chapter.   
Amongst many of the matters in vogue, some core questions can be raised in order to 
explore the cornerstones of the globalisation debate, such as: What does globalisation 
mean? When did it start?  Is it a reality in course or a rhetoric discourse of global elites? 
How can it be measured? This chapter aims to present a literature review on these key 
subjects. 
This chapter starts with a brief contextualisation of the emergence of globalisation in 
the contemporary era.  The next section is divided into four parts aiming to discuss the 
aspects of the globalisation debate proposed above. In this way, as a preliminary and 
essential step, the definition of globalisation will be the first topic to be considered. 
This section will then deal with its periodisation, the myth or reality question and 
globalisation measurements, respectively. Section three represents an examination of 
three theoretical interpretations of globalisation. The fourth section draws the main 
conclusions.   
 
2. Embedded globalisation  
 
First of all, it is worth noting that this thesis is concentrated in the economic aspects of 
globalisation (and financial globalisation) in historical perspective. According to the 
historical interpretation adopted in the thesis, I acknowledge the existence of various 
historical episodes of globalisation throughout the centuries of human interaction. 
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However the historical scope and the research hypothesis of the thesis is concentrated 
in two historical eras, namely, the classic Gold Standard and the period following the 
end of the Bretton Woods agreements up to the present time. Both episodes are 
important to the argument developed in this thesis, but the study of the definition of 
globalisation will be focused on the developments of the current period. There are 
specific historical reasons for that. 
It does not mean that the evidence of economic globalisation before WWI was less 
important but that some characteristics in the current episode better reveal what 
globalisation means in its current denotation. These core characteristics are related to 
the geo-political scenario and the intricate economic transformations in course after 
WWII. Jan Aart Scholte (2001:617) pointed out historical circumstances that marked 
the 1950s and the 1960s, which played a key role in the present-day process of 
globalisation.  Even recognising that “more tangible and sustainable manifestations of 
globalisation” occurred during the late 19th century, he asserted that these 
“manifestations” became even more “tangible and sustainable” after the 1950s. The 
ensuing decades manifested many events and inventions that spurred the growth of 
global linkages, spreading and accelerating the worldwide integration of markets, 
people and so on in an unprecedented way in history.  
Commercial jets, satellites and intercontinental missiles all arrived on the scene at 
this time [from the late 1950s].  The first transoceanic telephone cable was laid in 
1956 and transborder direct dialling first became available in 1963.  Radio and 
television receivers became household items the world over mainly after 1960, 
while the forerunner of the internet was set up in 1969. … Transborder 
production processes and associated intra-firm trade were practically unknown 
before 1940s and most global products gained their transborder markets from the 
1960s onwards.  In the era of finance, the first Eurodollar deposits appeared in the 
early 1950s, the first Eurocurrency loan in 1957, the first Eurobond in 1963, the 
first financial derivatives in 1972 and the first transborder electronic link between 
stock exchanges in 1985.   
 
In the above quotation, Scholte mentions fourteen cutting-edge innovations that 
appeared between the 1950s and 1980s. Half of these are closely connected with 
technological developments in telecommunications and the media, while the others are 
related to new micro and macroeconomic (institutional) arrangements. As a matter of 
fact, there could be many more items on this list, but the point is that their 
repercussions spurred the global connectivity in productive, commercial and financial 
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markets to unparalleled levels in history. Altogether, they provided resources for 
intercontinental mass transportation of people, goods, thoughts and information in real 
time, roads for conducting financial transactions worldwide; they also provided 
infrastructure for military rivalries and conflicts between nations. Consequently, a 
significant transformation occurred in the global connectivity in comparison to the 
interwar period and the Gold Standard era. An unmatched global scenario has been 
created.   
Gradually, but at the same time increasingly, the key events mentioned above (and 
many of their repercussions) strengthened the interconnectivity between both developed 
and developing economies. Therefore, the term was coined when the process of supra-
territorial enmeshment gained momentum. These more robust manifestations of a 
globalised world may be one of the reasons that explain the appearance of the word 
globalisation in contemporary times rather than during the early stage of 19th century 
capitalism.7  
Due to these more vigorous manifestations occurring throughout the present time, 
globalisation became deeply embedded in contemporary society after the 1980s. Hence, 
I call the current experience the embedded globalisation era. This means that the global 
interconnectedness that has been developed during these recent decades has become a 
permanent and noticeable feature of contemporary society, and is historically unique.  
Even in this preliminary stage of the debate there is not a single episode of globalisation 
throughout history; rather there are different historical forms. In fact, section 2.2 of this 
chapter presents a summary of different historical manifestations of globalisation since 
ancient times (see also Table 1).  Globalisation is a historically determined process that 
is impelled by several complex causing factors.  The current episode is more pervasive 
and deep than the other previous manifestations due to the current historical 
circumstances (that will be examined in this chapter and in chapter four).  These 
singular historical conditions make the embedded globalisation era more suitable for 
surveying the globalisation concept. Moreover, this study presents other important 
related concepts that will be reviewed in the following chapters.  
The term embedded globalisation does not mean that the current episode corresponds to 
an “ideal” or “ultimate” globalisation stage. What it does mean is that globalisation is 
                                                 
7 Appendix 1 presents a diachronic study of the word globalisation.  
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deeply embedded in present society due to the more dense and extensive network of 
global connectivity developed over these past few decades involving economic, 
political, technological, and institutional aspects.  The interaction of the changes in 
these spheres has created new institutions and changed the old ones, transforming post-
modern society and promoting a more intense globalisation in comparison with that of 
Victorian times.   
 
3. Key aspects of the globalisation debate 
 
3.1. Definition 
 
In December 1996, Anthony Giddens delivered a speech at the United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) Conference on Globalization and 
Citizenship.  His opening sentence was both revealing and provocative: “There are few 
terms that we use so frequently but which are in fact as poorly conceptualized as 
globalization.”  That statement may have been correct in 1996, but after over a decade 
of intense research, the definition of the term has been scrutinised thoroughly by 
thinkers from several disciplines. As Scholte (2002:5) pointed out “today the concept of 
globalization is deployed across disciplines, across the world, across theoretical 
approaches, and across the political spectrum.”  It does not mean that all controversies 
concerning the subject have been solved; it means that there are currently a n umber of 
alternatives (complementary or not) that argue the theme academically.  
Although it is true that globalisation is a well-defined concept currently, this debate 
cannot be taken for granted. Anyone looking into its definition is confronted with a 
series of puzzles. Globalisation evokes many phenomena simultaneously and, as a 
result, it can be defined in different ways since it has different meanings and 
approaches, depending on the point of view of the analyst. Scientific endeavour has 
grown substantially recently (Appendix 2), and experts in economics, history, 
sociology, political science, geography and others, have provided scientifically accurate 
thoughts on its description. For this reason, any attempt to provide a general and a 
single definition, a definitive approach or a unique interpretation about what 
globalisation means will be avoided as it is not pointing to something singular but 
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plural. Hence, the section intends to present the general approach relating to the topic 
and to contrast different viewpoints instead of attempting to grasp an alleged 
consensual meaning.8   
As a multidimensional and multidisciplinary subject, the word itself implies multiple 
associations, and then accepts contributions from different areas.  The following 
paragraphs present a bird’s-eye view of globalisation in what are arguably its main 
dimensions.  The section addresses its definition as an invitation to scrutinise many 
other intricate aspects of the academic debate on globalisation. Scholte (2002:3) 
correctly asserted that “knowledge of globalization is substantially a function of how 
the word is defined. Thus, every study of globalization should include a careful and 
critical examination of the term itself.” In the section, contributions from scholars with 
different backgrounds are welcomed, but it would be impossible to survey the existing 
literature dealing with it. A swift review of the literature would suffice to identify the 
core aspects of the phenomenon.  
At least three aspects have been frequently included in the numerous definitions of 
globalisation available in the current literature, namely: the possible causes, the scope 
and the thickness of the phenomenon.  The biggest disagreements and controversies on 
the subject are located in these points since they involve the subjective interpretation of 
what are the main driving forces behind the phenomenon, and the impact of their 
transformation over the status quo ante.   
Economists and other social scientists suggest that globalisation is defined as a process 
of growing integration of national economies tending to constitute a worldwide market 
for goods, services, labour and capital.  In this way, Harris (1993:755) pointed out very 
accurately: “To economists globalization is generally thought of as the increasing 
internationalization of the production, distribution and marketing of goods and 
services.” Thus, for many writers the phenomenon is most visible as a process of global 
                                                 
8 Reich (1998:2) described an example of this difficulty.  He reported that at a symposium held at the 
University of Pittsburgh in 1996, recent developments of globalisation were discussed by five 
distinguished scholars, in areas such as finance, technology transfer, transnationalism, multilateralism, 
and regionalism. “All the speakers systematically presaged their commentaries by suggesting that, while 
they had no idea what globalization was, they could address descriptive and analytic questions in their 
own areas of speciality.  The audience participants as the symposium (an informed group of scholars and 
practitioners, numbering over seventy) candidly admitted that they could provide no better insight in 
addressing this definitional issue. In fact there is not only disagreement on the definition of globalization; 
there is also no clear consensus on whether the term ‘globalization’ is employed as a historical epoch, a 
process, a theory, or as a new paradigm.  Its meaning remained unspecified.” 
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commercial, productive, migrating or financial integration.  It embodies a wide scope of 
markets and interconnection of national economies on an international scale caused by 
a range of policy, institutional, social and technological changes.  More precisely, it 
encompasses the erosion of a number of tariff (or other institutional) barriers, the drop 
in transportation costs, technological improvements in telecommunications and 
microelectronics, and the development of new competitive strategies by banks, non-
banking institutions and multinational corporations (outsourcing, maquiladoras, 
mergers and acquisitions for instance).  
Jeffrey Frankel (2000:2) highlighted the importance of technological and policy 
changes as core aspects of current globalisation.  According to him, there are two major 
drivers of economic globalisation in the post war period, which are associated with an 
international policy change: the reduced costs to transportation and communication in 
the private sector, and reduced policy barriers to trade and investment on the part of the 
public sector.  The quotation below summarises the broad picture he painted to support 
his assertion.  Despite his description is now a bit out of date, it is still an enlightening 
historical depiction of key elements that spurred the process of global market 
integration during the period.  
Technological progress and innovation have long been driving the costs of 
transportation and communication steadily lower. In the post-war period we have 
seen major further cost-saving advances, even within ocean shipping: 
supertankers, roll-on-roll-off ships, and containerized cargo. Between 1920 and 
1990 the average ocean freight and port charges per short ton of U.S. import and 
export cargo fell from $95 to $29 (in 1990 dollars). An increasing share of cargo 
goes by air. Between 1930 and 1990, average air transport revenue per passenger 
mile fell from $0.68 to $0.11. Jet air shipping and refrigeration have changed the 
status of goods that had previously been classified altogether as not tradable 
internationally. Now fresh-cut flowers, perishable broccoli and strawberries, live 
lobsters, and even ice cream are sent between continents. Communications costs 
have fallen even more rapidly. Over this period the cost of a 3-minute telephone 
call from New York to London fell from $244.65 to $3.32. Recent inventions 
such as faxes and the internet require no touting. 
 
Jan Kregel (1994) was one of the first voices amongst economists who proposed a 
notional concept of the progressive evolution of firms towards a global organisation.  
He identified three sequential prior stages that firms had passed to reach the “truly” 
globalised level.  These stages are known as international, multinational and 
transnational.  
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The first stage occurred during the 1960s when foreign trade expanded faster than 
domestic output growth. In response, firms took advantage of the wide range of 
opportunities abroad, selling their marginal domestic product to foreign markets.  This 
is what he called the internationalisation of markets.  Then, the greater importance 
acquired by the exports to the development of the global economy, and also the 
formation of economic trade blocs such as the EEC, spurred firms on to the second 
stage of global integration.  Therefore, firms moved from the international to the 
transnational arena. This means that, instead of increasing their exportations 
continuously, firms strategically decentralised the production process by building 
industrial plants in foreign markets.  This decentralisation was meant to distribute 
“different stages of production to different national facilities to produce final products 
which are assembled and sold in specific targeted national markets” (Kregel 1994:30).  
Finally, the period of globalisation is reached when firms have constituted an integrated 
and flexible process of production and distribution around the world. In Kregel’s words 
(1994:30) “the final step in the process of ‘globalisation’ comes as firms consider 
specific national markets as part of a single undifferentiated world or global market in 
which a single product line may be sold.” More simply, transnational corporations have 
decentralised the final assembly process, spread it to different countries according to 
the availability of raw materials and semi-finished goods, and sold the output through 
an integrated global distribution system, reaching the world as a whole. In this stage, 
truly globalised transnational firms use “raw materials and half-finished goods from 
producers in a wide range of countries, with the final assembly process decentralized 
across a number of regional centres producing a unified product” (p. 30).   
Kregel did not mention it explicitly in his 1994 piece, but these “regional centres” were 
inspired by the factories run by US companies (maquiladoras) in Mexico, but can also 
be the special economic zones (SEZ) founded in the early 1980s in China, which 
subsequently spread around the world.  Most recently, the creation of the WTO played 
an important role in stimulating this process of corporate globalisation because the 
reduction in tariffs imposed (sic) on developing countries eliminated the costs and 
encouraged a wider integration of formerly dispersed production chains.9   
                                                 
9 Clarification of what the author meant with the term “regional centres producing a unified product” was 
obtained through correspondence. I sent an email to Professor Jan Kregel on 10th September, 2007 saying 
that “You did not mention explicitly that these ‘centres producing a unified product’ are the special 
economic zones (SEZ) founded in the early 1980s in China. I think that your idea about these ‘centres’ is 
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In short, Kregel (1994) defines globalisation as a gradual process of increasing global 
interconnection led by firms as an adaptive process of their competitive strategies to the 
historical changes that have taken place in the world economy.  This adaptation 
determined the change in their scope in such a way that they can be considered the 
vehicle of globalisation.   
One of the most illustrative examples of this corporate strategy of the global 
commodity chain nowadays is the production of the “global Barbie” referred to by 
Giddens (2006). The most profitable toy in history created by the US-based Mattel 
Corporation is made from oil extracted and refined into ethylene in Saudi Arabia. Then 
the Chinese Petroleum Corporation (owned by the Taiwanese state) buys the ethylene 
and sells it to the Taiwanese Formosa Plastic Corporation, which converts the ethylene 
into the PVC pellets that will be shaped to make the Barbie’s body.  The pellets are 
shipped to one of four factories in Asia that make the Barbie (two in southern China, 
one in Indonesia and one in Malaysia).  The plastic mould injection machines that 
shape her body are made in the US and shipped to those factories.  Once she is 
moulded, her nylon hair comes from Japan, and her cotton dresses from China.  
According to Giddens (2006:58), “nearly all the material used in her manufacture is 
shipped into Hong Kong – one of the world’s largest ports – and then trucked to the 
factories in China”.   
Economists have been emphasising that contemporary economic policy, technological 
and institutional changes have been progressively overcoming the constraints of 
geography and gradually establishing a denser network of global linkages. The width of 
those changes may not be universal (Scholte 2002:8) or homogeneous but transnational 
connections have been purposely established and have been changing economic, social 
and political international affairs.  In a nutshell, globalisation is usually associated with 
a process of the integration of national economies into a wider (global) sphere 
involving their productive and financial markets.  
                                                                                                                                              
different from the free trade zones but I was speculating whether the modern free zones are compatible or 
can even be considered as an unfolding of the transnational firms’ strategies you described.”  He replied 
to me on 14th September, 2007 with this answer: “No, I was thinking more in general of the inbound 
reexport zones in Mexico, then regular maquiladoras, as well as the now more famous Chinese and 
Indian SEZs. But even more important was the reduction in tariffs imposed on developing countries with 
the creation of the WTO.  This eliminated the costs of integrated geographically dispersed production 
chains -- costs that had previously led transnationals to locate in developing countries inside their ISI 
[Import Substitution Industrialization] tariff walls.” 
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One of those economists is Michael D. Bordo.  He has written scholarly papers 
touching on various aspects concerning the debate on globalisation.  Bordo (2002:20) 
proposed the following definition of globalisation: “I define globalization as the 
increasingly close international integration of markets for goods, services and factors of 
production, labour and capital.”  He emphasised the role played by the WTO (GATT 
until 1994) spurring the process of global integration through the continuous reduction 
of non-tariff barriers and protection, mainly since the post WWII period.10  In general, 
his analysis is supported by extensive data and econometric tests and he focuses on 
changes that have been occurring in world trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
cross-border financial capital flows.  In his latest articles, he has been expressing his 
concerns about the growing importance of financial markets as the key driving force of 
modern globalisation (Bordo 2000, Bordo, Eichengreen & Irwin 1999).  
Similarly, Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz (2002:9) states that globalisation means the 
closer integration of countries and people, made possible by technological 
developments and institutional changes.  In the passage below, he highlights the 
importance of actual and new institutions to the progression of contemporary global 
integration.  In his words:  
Globalization is the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world 
which has been brought about by enormous reduction of costs transportation and 
communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, 
services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders.  
Globalization has been accompanied by the creation of new institutions that have 
joined with existing ones to work across borders. … Globalization is powerfully 
driven by international corporations, which move not only capital and goods 
across borders but also long-established international intergovernmental 
institutions (Italics original). 
 
The role played by institutions, technological developments in various areas and policy 
issues have been emphasised currently not only by Stiglitz but by many others 
(aforementioned and not) as important aspects driving forward the process of global 
integration.  However, instead of integration, some scholars (Held et al 1999) have used 
another term to illustrate different aspects of current globalisation, which is 
enmeshment. The noun enmeshment comes from the verb enmesh used to describe a 
                                                 
10  Bordo (2002:22) stated: “Successive rounds of tariff negotiations from 1947 to the present have 
virtually eliminated tariffs on manufactured goods in advanced countries.  The WTO, which succeeded 
GATT in 1994, is currently engaged in reducing non-tariff barriers and protection in areas not covered by 
GATT.”  
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situation when someone or something is caught or entangled as in a net, and which is 
not easy to escape from. Applied to globalisation, some scholars prefer to use it instead 
of the general and arguably vague term integration because enmeshment involves the 
formation of a network that intertwines markets, institutions, companies, private agents, 
governments, contracts, agreements, etc, and all apparatus underlying the diverse 
dimensions of globalisation.  
Scholars have also been using another term close to enmeshment but more related to the 
effects that the (in progress) deep global interaction have been empowering companies 
and institutions to develop partnerships and facilities worldwide.  This term is 
interconnectedness. According to Duvall (2001:786), interconnectedness is “a 
condition in which otherwise separate social units are linked together through material 
exchanges and information flows.  The interlinkage is such that occurrences in one unit 
have effects on others: consequences of actions and decisions are transmitted beyond 
the unit in which they are taken.  In that respect, units are interconnected.”  Thus, 
interconnectedness has been used in the globalisation literature to express the notion 
that economies are not only integrated, but interdependent, i.e. decisions taken in 
certain countries or markets affected others and can result in a domino effect if this 
level of interconnectedness is high. In the sense defined above, countries are 
interconnected when their policy decisions reciprocally affect each other.  It is worth 
noting that Duvall (2001) asserted that the term is meaningful and serves as a 
necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition to describe integration, interdependence and 
globalisation.  
In a nutshell, the words enmeshment and interconnectedness have been preferred of 
integration to illustrate globalisation more precisely. While enmeshment emphasises the 
network aspect established by globalisation, interconnectedness also highlights another 
characteristic, which is the interdependence between economies entangled in the 
globalisation network. Therefore, despite being connected, these two terms cannot be 
used interchangeably since they complement each other to describe the global interface 
of things and people across the globe. They will be used in this thesis to emphasise 
these aspects (networking and interdependence) that are not explicit when the term 
global integration is used as a synonym of globalisation.  
In a broad sense, both terms aim to highlight the importance of the network of 
international linkages that globalisation involves. In the most competitive economies, 
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goods, services, and financial assets are no longer targeted at local markets, but at the 
wider global marketplace, i.e. the degree of interdependency has increased 
significantly. This “wide thread” includes international law, regulatory organisations, 
vested interests, non vested interests, economic policy reforms, a large range of 
multilateral institutions, ideology, non-profit organisations, highly profitable 
speculative activities, global technological partnerships and programmes and many 
other aspects connected to the globalised affairs. The consequences of this enmeshment 
and interconnectedness could be either good or bad.  The terms simply underline two 
important features of the phenomenon: connectivity and interdependence.  
To illustrate their applicability, the terms interconnectedness and enmeshment could be 
used by Kregel to describe the third stage of his taxonomy which is the globalisation 
phase.  Just to refresh the memory, Kregel (1994:30) affirmed that in a global economy, 
transnational firms consider specific national markets as part of a “single 
undifferentiated … global market in which a single product line may be sold”.  Thus, 
“truly” globalised transnational firms use “raw materials and half-finished goods from 
producers in a wide range of countries, with the final assembly process decentralized 
across a number of regional centres producing a unified product”. The corporate 
strategy of transnational firms promotes narrow interconnection among countries, and 
then it becomes increasingly difficult for a nation to avoid changing or being affected 
by the economic policy of others. More and more countries have become involved in 
the production and commercialisation of goods, assets and services as part of the new 
capitalism. Therefore, a strong interdependence and interconnection amongst countries 
has developed.  
The expression new capitalism above does not mean that globalisation represents a 
more advanced system in terms of promoting something like a global welfare state.  It 
means that since the barriers to commercialising goods and assets in this new phase 
have been lowered, transnational corporations have commanded their productive 
activities through a wide network of facilities distributed around the world, searching 
for increased profitability.  In fact, left wing Canadian writer Naomi Klein has just 
published her new book in which, among many other complaints about the effects of 
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globalisation in developing nations, she classified new capitalism as “disaster 
capitalism”.11 
Robert Keohane & Joseph S. Nye Jr. (2000) suggested that at the turn of the 
millennium, the word globalisation would replace the word interdependence, which 
was used to discuss matters of world politics during the 1980s and 1990s. They 
suggested that globalisation and interdependence have many meanings and both 
concepts are meant to cover a variety of phenomena from economics to politics and so 
on. In fact, they disagree with the current usage within academia of the word 
“globalisation”. According to them, globalism is more appropriate because it means “a 
condition that can increase or decrease”.  Their definition of globalism is “a state of the 
world involving networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances.” (Keohane 
& Nye 2000:105).  In agreement, Giddens (2006:50) also emphasises this reciprocal 
dependence as a salient characteristic that defines globalisation.  He states that 
“globalization refers to the fact that we all increasingly live in one world, so that 
individuals, groups and nations become interdependent.”   
British political theorist David Held (2001:427) describes present globalisation as a 
spatial phenomenon that interlinks communities, but transforms core dimensions of 
human life such as power, criminal, financial and environmental aspects. 
Globalization is fundamentally a spatial phenomenon; it lies on a spectrum with 
the local and national at one end, and the (supranational) regional and global at 
the other. It is about the stretching of connections, relations and networks 
between human communities, an increase in the intensity of these, and a general 
speeding up of all these phenomena. Globalization denotes transcontinental or 
interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and power. It is, in short, 
about the interconnections between different regions of the world - from the 
cultural to the criminal, the financial to the environmental - and the ways in 
which they change over time. 
 
Globalisation is not simply an amalgamation of markets, but a process of ongoing 
intercontinental enmeshment of people bringing transformations in culture, language, 
habits and traditions, as well as changing the world in many other dimensions, such as 
geography, politics, economic and legal systems, corporate oligopolies, formal 
institutions, and technology. In this sense, globalisation is an institutionalised concept. 
Its dynamic historical progress involves institutions in general and its evolution, and 
                                                 
11 Klein, N. (2007) The shock doctrine: The rise of disaster capitalism. New York, Metropolitan Books. 
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has been changing many areas of human life. In accordance, Perraton (2003:38) pointed 
out: 
Globalisation can be conceived as a process, or a set of processes, which 
embodies a transformation in the spatial organisation of social relations 
engendering a shift in the spatial reach of network and systems of social relations 
to transcontinental patterns of human organisation, activity and the exercise of 
social power.  More specifically … [it is] the emergence of global product and 
financial markets and the international organisation of business.  
 
Perraton’s definition includes an important novel contribution in comparison to the 
other authors summarised.  He identifies three specific features of the phenomenon: the 
emergence of global product, of global financial markets, and the international 
organisation of business.  Arguably he is referring to them because in his opinion they 
are the most salient feature of the regime.   
Taking into account the explanations summarised above, in this thesis the phenomenon 
is not considered a process of adding previously isolated countries or regions into a 
larger space of interaction, formed and fed by the interface of numerous dimensions, 
constituting a system that is mutually correlated.  Globalisation is a process (“or a set of 
processes”) in continuous transformation running across the spheres of human 
interaction, subject to the action of evolutive institutions, contradictions, advances and 
retreats. That means that in addition to the productive, commercial and financial 
dimensions, its technological, cultural, and legalistic aspects will be considered here, 
and briefly presented below. 
 
a) Some core dimensions of globalisation outside economics 
 
A key feature related to the current of globalisation is the advent of numerous advanced 
technological breakthroughs and devices for commuting information and data 
worldwide.  Over the past three decades, deep transformations in information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) have gained momentum. They have changed the 
nature of human interaction, affecting corporations, governments, institutions, cross-
country cultural differences and the everyday life of ordinary people.  One of the major 
achievements of this revolution is that these technological innovations have created an 
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enormous potential for transmission of information in real time and at unprecedented 
speed, reaching areas of the world hitherto considered remote.   
Indeed, the most remarkable technological progresses of the 20th century were the 
developments in ICTs.  The most significant technologies created in both areas 
respectively were communication via satellites and fibre optic cables (including 
submarine cables), and also the development of computer-based information systems, 
chiefly software applications, and computer hardware. The Internet is one of most 
successful results of the interaction between telecommunications and computation, so 
that nowadays it is virtually impossible to expand the development of 
telecommunications without computational support.  These technologies have allowed 
the traffic of a great amount of data (based on the exponential capacity of fibre optics), 
covering continental distances through the use of satellites. As is well-known, there are 
other technologies of data transmission based on copper wires and broadcasting, but the 
amount of information they once transmitted and the range of these transmissions 
cannot be compared with the performance of the satellite and optical fibre. 
Certainly, an isolated change does not make a revolution.  Rather, these new 
technologies have interacted with each other and developed in parallel to the digital 
revolution. The digital revolution is sweeping all analogue media before it, allowing 
unparalleled success in long distance data transmission.  Digital communication works 
by converting electronic signals (data, voice, music) into digital (binary) code.  Digital 
data transmission can be broadcast through fibre optics and satellites, controlled by 
computers. This technology vastly reduces the potential for signal corruption during 
transmission by weather conditions, and other problems that can interfere with the 
quality of reception.  As a result, the volume of information exchanged is not only 
much greater than the analogue system but is also much more reliable.  The 
technological advances resulting from ICT devices have been making use of digital 
technology (and vice versa) and providing a massive exchange of data transmission 
worldwide.   
The figure below demonstrates the evolution of a family of scientific developments in 
digital communication technology, which emerged from the 1980s.  Integrated Services 
Digital Network (ISDN), Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) and cable modem are different 
technologies used to send or receive information, data, etc., via telephone and 
computers.  Both ISDN and DSL are signal modulation systems: ISDN transmits data 
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digitally, resulting in very clear transmission quality; DSL provides digital data 
transmission over the wires of a local telephone network; cable modem is an electronic 
device that makes possible the transmission of data to or from a computer via telephone 
or other communication lines in long distance (for instance cable TV).  The figure 
plotted below shows the quick adherence to the digital system in OECD countries since 
the early 1990s.  In 1991, the magnitude of standard analogue and digital paths 
respectively were in use evenly in those countries, whereas in 2005, the figures changed 
dramatically to 417 and 1,113 accesses respectively (ISDN and DSL lines, cable 
modem and mobile subscribers).   
 
Figure 1. Telecommunication access paths in OECD countries: 1991-200512 
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Source: Source: OECD Key ICT Indicators [available at: www.oecd.org/sti/ICTindicators] 
* Total communication access paths = Standard analogue access lines + ISDN lines + DSL + 
cable modem + mobile subscribers.      
        
Internet, satellites, computer systems and fibre optics revolutionise modern 
telecommunications, providing a high-quality and low-cost service of data transmission 
for users who have access to the sophisticated equipment. Companies, banks, central 
banks, stock markets and households can interact electronically at any time, twenty four 
hours a day, seven days a week, carrying out a wide variety of productive, commercial 
and financial activities.   
The payoffs from such breakthroughs have been enormous.  By satellite, data 
transmission between telephones and computers is almost instantaneous in virtually any 
                                                 
12 This figure is based on data in Appendix 3. 
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part of the world, and as a result the use of these technologies in productive, 
commercial and financial activities has been extensive.  But there is a crucial difference 
between the uses of these technologies in such activities. The nature of financial 
activity does not involve the same formal and bureaucratic proceedings as commercial 
ones. That means that the time to conclude a transaction is the key determinant variable 
that differentiates both activities. The time required to conclude a financial deal is much 
less than what is necessary in a commercial transaction. Consequently, the time of re-
contraction is also much less. In this way, applications of ICT in finance and 
accounting have been encouraging better processing and easier dissemination of 
information than in other globalised activities, so one can conclude that its potential to 
increase is higher. 
The World Wide Web (www) has changed the lifestyle and working environment of 
people all over the world. Communication through the internet has been an icon of 
global integration, not only for searching for and exchanging information but also 
through the use of internet telephony provided by companies such as Skype, Google 
Talk, Yahoo! Messenger and MSN Messenger, to mention only the most well-known 
enterprises. These companies allow the broadband user to call landlines in any country 
via computer devices at a very low cost in comparison to traditional telephone 
companies.  A broadband circuit costs typically around £15 to £20 a month, a speaker 
microphone and headset approximately £10.  Once the users have acquired these basic 
devices there is no additional cost for the calls to places around the world covered by 
these companies.  Even if the user wishes to make a call to a traditional telephone 
landline, the cost is only around 1-2 pence per minute within Europe and 15 pence to 
mobiles in the UK (Talk’07:5). The providers mentioned above also allow 
local/international calls and teleconferences between computers with broadband 
connections. They also provide communication services on wireless or wired internet 
service provision without additional costs or any value-added tax (VAT) charge for 
broadband users.    
Technological developments have become increasingly enmeshed in contemporary 
society, and have been affecting a wide range of areas, from medicine to sports, from 
culture to finance. Progress in this field has made a profound impact on global 
integration, both positive and negative since ambiguities are inherent in any process of 
technological change. Nevertheless, it is worth emphasising that technology is not a 
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panacea or a “free lunch”, and it is also not capable of bringing the world to Utopia.  As 
a matter of fact, ICTs are distributed unevenly worldwide. More recently, prompted by 
the uneven geographical diffusion of ICTs and the Internet, multilateral institutions 
such as the UN, the World Bank and the OECD have turned their attention to the 
inequalities of access to information.  This is the well-known topic of Digital Divide.13  
The problem promoted by the digital divide is not only geographical but social 
(DiMaggio et al., 2004). Technology per se is one important dimension of globalisation 
but it has neither an even worldwide spread nor the capacity to eliminate social 
inequalities, conversely it has been widening the gap between rich and poor nations. 
Hence, reducing the digital divide is often considered as a major political matter in the 
world (digital) economy. 
Changes in international law have also played an important role in the current process 
of globalisation. This dimension can be seen through the development of multilateral 
agreements in a variety of areas such as trade, finance, human rights, property rights, 
international crime, environment, terrorism, money laundering, etc.  From the end of 
WWII to the 1960s, these issues had mostly lain within domestic jurisdiction, i.e. 
domestic states were dealing with some of these issues isolatedly.  However, the idea of 
nation-state sovereignty has greatly changed since those days.  
The erosion of nation-state autonomy, especially in the wake of the contemporary 
liberalisation era, has transformed international law from the “law of the state” to the 
“law of the international community”.  The increased international connectivity in 
various areas, (including especially the rapid growth of internet business) has also 
brought to light a variety of legal issues that have been solved through adjustments in 
the former established legal apparatus.  In other words, most of the aforementioned 
prominent legal matters such as international trade, finance, human rights, business 
                                                 
13 Rallet & Rochelandet (2007:694) define Digital Divide as follows: “The speech on Digital Divide 
starts at the early nineties with the distinction between Information haves and Information have-nots. The 
debate in the field of telecommunications is not a new one as it takes root in the problem of universal 
service in the USA and the telephone gap1. It has then been extended to gaps in computer equipment 
rates, Internet access inequalities and more recently to broadband networks inequalities. In addition, the 
debate which was initially restricted to OECD countries, now involves all countries by adding a new 
dimension to international inequalities as far as economic development is concerned. From the early 
nineties, American studies on the Digital Divide emphasize the risks linked to the exclusion of some 
social groups from ICTs. But the Digital Divide phrase itself would have been evoked in 1995 by Long-
Scott (1995) who showed the risks of excluding the poorest people and minorities from communication 
technologies with regard to the participation in democratic life.” 
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crime and terrorism are no longer domestic concerns, but concerns of the international 
community.   
These changes have urged the necessity to codify some rules to deal with a variety of 
problems raised. These rules have been addressed by the establishment of new 
regulations, codes, international conventions and multilateral agreements to adapt 
previous international law in order to deal with the new judicial status quo. The absence 
of international regulation and multilateral agreements in the light of these 
developments could lead the global society to a chaotic state. All these procedures, put 
into operation by legal institutions, are an indication of the striking transformations 
caused by the recent surge of globalisation.   
Culture is another dimension that has been changing considerably under the current 
globalisation. Mostly spurred by the rapid progress in commuting information, 
globalisation has been promoting greater international cultural exchange, which can be 
seen in music concerts of all types, in science, art, and even in the dialogue between 
religious groups that had historically kept their distance from one another due to their 
different doctrines (this is referred to as ecumenism).  
Language plays a key role in the globalisation of culture. As English is the predominant 
world language, the aforementioned aspects (especially music, films and science) have 
been widely spread around the world, influencing (not eliminating) these cultural 
activities in many countries.  English became the world language primarily as a result 
of colonisation and the huge British Empire both in the Indian sub-continent and 
Africa.  In those days, French was the language used in the diplomatic service but 
became marginalised by the growth of English over the years.   
Although both France and Germany were themselves colonists, their Empires in the late 
19th and early 20th century were not as widespread as that of Britain, particularly in 
Africa.  These areas used English not only as their second language, but also their first 
language or common language.  That happened because of the numerous 
languages/dialects spoken, so that the only language common to all was English.  After 
WWII, the US became a great power, spreading its culture to Latin America and also to 
South East Asia because of their involvement in WWII.   Of course, there are more 
Chinese speakers in the world than speakers of other languages, but China has never 
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played such an economically and politically significant role in world affairs as Britain 
did before WWI and the US has played since WWII.  
It is worth emphasising that all the databases researched in Appendix 2 are primarily 
English language references. As a matter of fact, English has become the common 
language through which scientists from many disciplines have chosen to communicate 
their thoughts, achievements and criticisms. Therefore, nowadays, English-language 
journals and books are preferred as a vehicle for exchanging scientific knowledge.  This 
fact reinforces the accuracy of the evidence displayed in the aforementioned appendix.  
The scientific evidence presented below is evidence of the point made above. The 
British Linguist David Crystal has researched the rise of English as a global language 
since the end of WWII.  Crystal (2003:111) presents evidence to the fact that English is 
currently a global medium of communication of the world’s scientific knowledge, 
especially in areas such as science and technology.  More research could provide the 
same evidence in economics but there is no reason to think that the picture described 
below is much different or less significant in economics or in most other social science 
fields.  
A 1980 study of the use of English in scientific periodicals showed that 85 per 
cent of papers in Biology and physics were written in English at that time, 
whereas medical papers were same way behind (73 per cent), and papers in 
mathematics and chemistry further behind still (69 per cent and 67 per cent) 
respectively.  However, all these areas had shown a significant increase in their 
use of English during the preceding fifteen years – over 30 per cent, in the case of 
chemistry, and over 40 per cent, in the case of medicine – and the figures twenty 
years further on would certainly be much higher.  This can be seen even in a 
language-sensitive subject such as linguistics, where in 1995 nearly 95 per cent of 
the 1,500 papers listed in the journal Linguistics Abstracts were in English.  In 
computer science, the proportion is even higher.     
 
Another example is the development of computer software and the number of sites on 
the internet written in English. According to Robertson & Scholte (2007:714) 68 per 
cent of Web pages were in English in 2004.  This figure is huge when compared with 
sites in Japanese (7 per cent), German (6 per cent), Chinese (4 per cent), or French (3 
per cent).  It clearly shows that not all the users who visit Web sites in English are 
native speakers, which is an additional indication of the role played by English as a 
world language, shaping a distinct cultural aspect of contemporary society.   
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3.2 Chronology 
 
The debate on globalisation chronology is strongly related with its definition.  If we had 
a general and unique definition of the term, its periodisation would be probably general 
and unique too.  However, as it was argued in the section above, there is a myriad of 
definitions, thus the debate on its chronological aspects also have several different 
interpretations. 
Most scholars who address globalisation from a historical perspective recognise three 
major starting points for the onset of the phenomenon: from the 15th century, in the last 
quarter of the 19th century, or from the last quarter of the 20th century.  Furthermore, 
David Held et al (1999), Scholte (2001, 2002) and Robertson & Scholte (2007) have 
mentioned that some writers also consider that the new term globalisation describes 
historical tendencies that can be traced back to ancient times even before the Middle 
Ages.   
Norman Gall & Rubens Ricupero (1997) asserted that globalisation started with the 
expansion of the European mercantilist system following the so-called Age of 
Discovery from the early 15th century to the early 17th century.  According to them, 
starting in Western European countries, maritime expansion hailed the onset of a truly 
world economy since it promoted long-distance commercial linkages between Europe 
and several regional economic areas spread over all the continents.  Those commercial 
routes, and the deep transformations in production, transport and communications they 
promoted, characterised the beginning of the globalisation era, which was consolidated 
in the 19th century under Britain’s economic dominance.  
Contrasting with this view, K. O’Rourke & J. Willimanson (2002:24) found evidence 
of globalisation in the 1820s in terms of trade price convergence. However, Bordo, 
Eichengreen & Irwin (1999:3) and Bordo (2002:21) assert that the first age began circa 
1870, encouraged by the British Gold Standard regime, and the second after the 1980s, 
which was based on the worldwide spread of liberalisation and deregulation policies, 
spurred by the technological revolution in telecommunications systems.  More 
precisely, Eichengreen and Bordo (2002:3) mentioned Charles Goodhart’s viewpoint 
saying that the first age of globalisation occurred when the transatlantic telegraph cable 
was laid between England and North America in 1866, because it revolutionised the 
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intercontinental trade of assets. “Financial markets are markets in information; by 
speeding transatlantic communication, the advent of the cable in the 1860s thus 
transformed their operation”.  
This is the general perspective that is largely found in the literature.  Considering the 
alternative periodisation sustained by some scholars about the ancient roots of 
globalisation, two examples could be preliminarily mentioned to illustrate the 
phenomenon during this earlier period. First, one can recall the outstanding economic, 
political and social achievements of Alexander (Alexander the Great), king of 
Macedonia during the years 336–323 BC, who was the conqueror of Greek city-states, 
and the Persian Empire from Asia Minor and Egypt to India.  Likewise, Justinian I 
(Justinian the Great), Byzantine emperor during the 527–565 AD, who extended the 
boundaries of the Greek-speaking Roman Empire of the Middle Ages far beyond its 
extension of that time.   
The title the Great was awarded not only because of the extraordinary geographic 
expansion they promoted despite the logistic resources of the time, but also because the 
territorial increase of their empires introduced and encouraged important changes to 
over-distant areas in diverse aspects of human society such as: overseas trade, civil law 
and judicial practices, administrative and political reforms, culture (especially in 
sciences, arts and language), religious practices and doctrines, military tactics of 
conquest war, to name but a few of the most important aspects.  In fact, this could be 
one of the possible meanings related to globalisation, that is, a historical process of 
territorial expansion headed in general by one nation (followed by others afterwards), 
which end up promoting great transformations to a larger extent, spreading them out 
over long distances and to a wide range of aspects, eventually changing societies from 
one state of affairs to another.  This may be a more inclusive approach on globalisation 
in historical perspective.  
This seems to be the approach proposed by Held et al (1999) in the book Global 
transformations, although they search the roots of the phenomenon through a historical 
inquiry that dates back many years before the two examples mentioned above.  The 
authors extensively studied the chronology of globalisation and distinguished seven 
historical forms of the phenomenon divided into four subsequent eras.  The eight 
chapters of the book are dedicated to presenting in great detail the main characteristics 
of these different forms of globalisation, hence it is impossible to make an outline of 
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the arguments developed by them within the scope of this section.  However, since it is 
a unique contribution to the debate, table 1 shows synthetically the historical division 
they proposed and it is followed by a brief outline of the main characteristics of each 
phase.   
 
Table 1. Chronology of historical forms of globalisation 
 Historical forms of globalisation  
Periodisation Political Military Financial Production Migration Cultural Environmental 
A) Pre-modern  
1) Pre-1500         √ √ √ 
B) Early modern, circa 1500-1850  
1) Early modern (14th-18th century) √ √      
2) Early modern approx. 1500-1760    √ √  √ 
3) Early modern approx. 1500-1850      √  
4) Early modern Pre-industrial 
Revolution   √     
C) Modern, circa 1850-1945  
5) Modern (late 19th-early 20th 
century) √ √ √ √    
6) Modern approx. 1760-1945     √  √ 
7) Modern approx, 1850-1945      √  
D) Contemporary, 1945 to date  
1) Contemporary approx. 1945 on √ √   √ √ √ 
2) Contemporary Bretton Woods 
period (1945 to 1973)   √ √    
3) Contemporary approx. 1973 on     √ √       
Source: Adapted from Held et al (1999: 80, 135, 222, 272, 306, 364, 392) 
 
Held et al (1999) propose that globalisation is not a recent phenomenon but a historical 
process that has been progressively disclosed in diverse forms throughout history. 
Therefore, there is not one but various forms of globalisation that change over time. 
They selected the most salient characteristics in each period and demonstrated how the 
development of human relations promoted an increasing enmeshment of economic, 
social, cultural and political activities across countries. In this way, they explain the 
emergence of various periods of globalisation based on the study of human interaction 
since ancient times.  
As presented in the table above, Held et al (1999) proposed a fourfold periodisation of 
globalisation: pre-modern (pre-1500), early modern (circa 1500-1850), modern (circa 
1850-1945) and contemporary (1945 to date). Each form of globalisation reflects the 
spatio-temporal conditions of the time. The first form of globalisation lasted thousands 
of years since human interaction and the emergence of any long distance activity was 
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severely restricted by the limited technology of transport and communication.  As a 
result of the development of adequate knowledge and equipment, the transformation 
process became faster, more intense and with greater scope.   
The pre-modern period began with the formation of agrarian centres in Eurasia, Africa 
and the Americas around 9,000 to 11,000 years ago.  Without a doubt, the targets of the 
global interactions and consequently the social and infrastructural transformations were 
strictly limited by the technology available.  The main characteristics of this age of 
globalisation were interregional or inter-civilisational encounters within Eurasia, since 
Oceania and the Americas remained autonomous civilisations.  The key sources of 
globalisation at this time were political and military empires, world religions and the 
migratory movements of both nomadic people and farming societies.  Due to transport 
limitations, long distance trade between regions and civilisations was less intensive. 
Political, military or cultural interaction was far more difficult to establish, hence this 
era is described as a form of “thin globalisation”.  
During the early modern era, globalisation progressed, motivated mainly by the 
European ultramarine conquests and the demographic, environmental and 
epidemiological flows between Europe, the Americas and Oceania. European 
innovation and expansion resulted more from the importation and adaptation of 
Eurasian technologies than on the development of indigenous innovations. European 
expansion in this era was not truly global but was significantly located in the Americas 
and Oceania. Political and military relationships and the formation of European global 
empires reinforced the channels of interconnection between continents. In addition, 
great trading companies related to the new empires (British East India Company, 
Hudson Bay Company and British Royal Africa Company) gave birth to new forms of 
economic globalisation.   
This modern globalisation period marked the onset of industrialisation and the 
enormous progress of military weapons, naval technologies and increasingly powerful 
state institutions.  Accordingly, the intensity of intercontinental relationships increased 
significantly in terms of trade, investment and human migration.  During this era, 
European power stretched to almost all areas of the globe. 
Finally, Held et al consider contemporary globalisation as a distinctive historical form 
of globalisation in terms of economics, politics, law, governance, military affairs, 
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cultural linkages and human threats, in contrast to the allegation supported by sceptics 
who argued that current globalisation represents a return to the 19th century patterns. 
“This era has experienced extraordinary innovations in the infrastructures of transport 
and communication, and an unparalleled density of institutions of global governance 
and regulation” (Held et al 1999:425). The contemporary era represents a historically 
unique confluence of certain key aspects such as the Bretton Woods collapse in the 
early 1970s, the OPEC oil crises, the flow of petrodollars into international banking 
institutions, combined with new telecommunications infrastructures and a global wave 
of global neoliberal deregulation from the 1980s onwards.  These factors encouraged a 
surge in global trade, investment and financial flows especially between North 
America, Western Europe and Asia.   A detailed discussion of these aspects will be 
found in Chapter five.  
      
3.3 Myth or reality 
 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, one of the meanings of the word myth is 
“ideas or beliefs about something that someone considers imaginary, fictitious or 
impossible”.  To illustrate this, one can consider two experts in front of an art picture in 
a museum.  One considers that it is really not art at all; while another looking at the 
same picture becomes astonished by such a stunning masterpiece.  Likewise, the 
authors quoted below (and others) are experienced researchers who have been looking 
at the same world, raising and questioning the evidence but reaching contrasting 
conclusions about the reality of the phenomenon.  
For some scholars, globalisation is more than a phenomenon in its due course, “it is the 
way we now live” (Giddens 2002:19).  Scholars who think that globalisation is now a 
reality and who think that its progress had produced improvements in the economic and 
social conditions in most countries have been labelled as radicals.  Differently, I will 
use the term critics to refer to authors who believe that recent globalisation represents a 
new and unprecedented phase in the history of capitalism, but that claim a critical 
position to the possible positive effects of globalisation.  
Similarly, in my opinion, there are two groups with two claims approaching 
globalisation as a myth.   These authors are called the sceptics. They reason that 
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globalisation is a myth because the empirical evidence proves that the bulk of 
commercial, productive and financial activities is heavily concentrated in only a few 
countries, i.e., Western Europe, North America and Japan (the Triad).  Consequently, 
the domestic income of most economies does not come from their external activities.  
Therefore, the use the term is political-ideological, promoted especially by global 
corporations interested in encouraging liberal economic policies worldwide, mainly in 
developing countries that had adopted protectionist policies based on state-oriented 
development programmes. As a result, to use the word globalisation is not only a 
semantic mistake but an inaccurate analytical interpretation.  The word is then empty of 
meaning and for this reason cannot be used to describe the state of arts in international 
affairs.   
Other sceptics believe that globalisation is a myth because the current level of market 
integration is not unprecedented, i.e., a similar ratio of trade and financial flows by 
GDP was already attained during the Belle Époque period. On this account, nothing 
new is happening in the contemporary international scenario. It is important to 
recognise that some sceptics (Hirst & Thompson, 1996) uphold both points of view, 
this one and the interpretation presented in the previous paragraph.  As most current 
writers are critics, this section provides more space for the arguments developed by 
scholars who treat it as a myth.   
As mentioned before, sceptics consider globalisation to be local or even regional, but 
not a global event. By this they mean the word itself bears the meaning of worldwide 
integration, but in reality the most significant amount of cross-border transactions reach 
and benefit only a small number of countries and do not represent a multicontinental 
phenomenon. The contemporary surge in massive international flows of trade, foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and speculative capital can be deceptive since it is heavily 
concentrated in a handful of developed countries (most of which belong to the Triad), 
and does not represent a conclusive indication of “true” globalisation.  
Hirst & Thompson (1996) are two of the foremost sceptical authors who consider 
globalisation to be a myth. They developed a critical analysis towards the conventional 
interpretation of globalisation proposed by apologists such as Kenichi Ohmae (1991, 
1995a, 1995b).  Hirst & Thompson’s propositions were quite influential in the 
development of the sceptic’s viewpoint by the late 1990s. They set out their criticisms 
in a number of ways in the book, so it would be impossible to summarise all their 
  58
arguments in this section. However, the key points of their reasoning must be 
addressed.  
An attempt to grasp the main conclusions of Hirst & Thompson (1996) may be 
summarised in two assertions: 1. current globalisation is not truly global; and 2. the 
mid-1990s international flows of goods, people, and capital have historical precedents 
going back to the late 19th century, which was nothing new.  What they consider new is 
the higher growth of world FDI from the 1980s until the early 1990s compared to the 
performance of world trade in the same period, especially in industrialised countries. 
The widespread deregulation of capital controls throughout that time is the one of the 
main reasons that encouraged such performance. Moreover, conventional scholars hold 
that FDI had played a more important role than trade in terms of international 
integration throughout that period but they disagree with this opinion. Then Hirst & 
Thompson raise a key point of their analysis based on the interpretation of the table 
below. 
  
Table 2. Investment flows and populations: 1981-91 
 Population Investment flows, 1990-91 
Total world 5,292,195 100  
A  
USA and Canada 275.865  
EC and EFTA 357.767 14 75 
Japan 123.460  
B  
Ten most important developing 1,519,380 29 16.5 (66% of total flows to 
C  
Nine most important developing 758.820 14  
A + B 43 91.5 (approx.) 
A + C 28  
    A: Singapore, Mexico, China, Brazil, Malasya, Hong Kong, Argentina, Thailand, Egypt, Taiwan. 
    B: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong.  
 Source: World Population Prospects, 1990, UN, 1991 various tables; China Statistical Yearbook,    
1991, table T3.3; Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1991, p. 5. table 1; TNCs and 
Integrated International Production, UN, 1993, np. 255, annex table 4. Extracted from Hirst & 
Thompson (1996:68) 
 
Table 2 shows the amount of investment flows and population rates during 1981-91 for 
three groups of countries: A. USA, Canada, EC and EFTA, and Japan (representing the 
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“Triad countries”); B. The ten most important developing countries in terms of FDI 
flows; and C. The nine most important developing countries plus the nine main Chinese 
coastal provinces.  Throughout this period, 75 per cent of all FDI was invested within 
the Triad countries, which account for only 14 per cent of the world population.  In 
contrast, 16.5 per cent of FDI was allocated to the ten major developing countries, 
which account for 29 per cent of the world population.  Therefore, this quick look at the 
table is enough to conclude that during the period considered, the FDI flows were 
highly concentrated in just a few developed countries.  
In fact, this concentration is higher because the ten “B” countries (i.e., almost a third of 
the world population) received 66 per cent of all non-Triad flows. Adding the 
population to the amount of FDI invested in A and B, one can conclude that 43 per cent 
of the world population received 91.5 per cert of FDI flows in this period.  As FDI in 
China is highly concentrated in the coastal provinces, Hirst & Thompson add the 
population and the investment of A and C.  Then the same 91.5 per cent of FDI flows 
was allocated to 28 per cent of the world population. As a result, only 8.5 per cent of 
global FDI was invested in a ratio that involves 57 to 72 per cent of the world 
population.   
Despite the authors’ acknowledging that the Chinese data are not quite reliable, the 
argument they made based on the table above is the data showing a high concentration 
of investment in a few countries and therefore it is not really global.  Furthermore, this 
kind of geographical distribution creates a situation of severe inequality in terms of 
spreading the possible benefits of this type of investment.  This is evidence that a key 
alleged aspect proposed by the radicals concerning globalisation is not sustainable, nor 
has it brought the expected benefits in terms of boosting income, employment, and 
output.  The sceptical meant that the consequences of FDI cannot be felt everywhere 
since B and C countries achieved small shares in comparison to the industrial 
economies. Consequently, judging by the time period in question, the world amount of 
FDI could be considered local at most, contemplating mainly the Triad countries.   
This table is only a part of their arguments, but it plays an important role in Hirst & 
Thompson’s argumentation developed in Globalisation in Question. However, the 
inference presented above cannot be understood in isolation.  Another important part of 
Hirst & Thompson’s analysis concerns the importance of domestic firms for internal 
economic development, and the role played by the nation-states. According to them, 
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national markets are preponderant relative to external markets in the sense that 
domestic demand absorbs a predominant portion of production (goods and services) 
and is responsible for the creation of most domestic employment. As a result, the 
decision process of companies (including the multinationals) is decided predominantly 
from their countries of origin. For this reason, many of them cannot be considered 
“transnational” but national companies that develop external economic activities. 
Additionally, despite recognising that nation-states have lost rooms for intervention 
over the last decades of the 20th century, Hirst & Thompson assert that nation-states are 
still able to control domestic economic performance and also enforce domestic 
development programmes.   
In short, according to Hirst & Thompson’s viewpoint, the growth in current 
international economic activities cannot be thought of as a genuine process of 
globalisation, but rather a myth. In their opinion, the allegation of globalisation was 
aimed mainly at establishing neo-liberal economic policies and to reduce the 
development initiatives from nation-states - especially in developing countries - in 
favour of the commercial and political interests of the Triad countries.  All things 
considered, it is worth noting that their argumentation was developed circa 1996, and 
consequently the data presented in a variety of tables and figures do not cover the 
second half of the 1990s. 
In the same year, Bairoch & Kozul-Wright also presented a paper bearing sceptical 
arguments.  The table below claims that current globalisation is not a new historical 
phase in cross-border trade activity.  As can be seen in table 3, Western developed 
countries, the US and Western European economies reached two peaks over the 1870-
1992 period: the first one in 1913 and the second in 1992.  This indicates that the level 
of commercial integration in 1992 is not new in comparison to the Gold Standard 
period.  Once again, the figures are outdated, i.e. they cover only the very beginning of 
the 1990s.  
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Table 3. Merchandise exports as a percentage of GDP, 1870-1992 (Three year 
annual average, except for 1950) 
Year Western developed countries United States Western Japan 
1870 … 5.4 13.6 …
1890 11.7 6.7 14.9 5.1 
1913 12.9 6.4 18.3 12.5 
1929 9.8 5.0 14.5 13.6 
1938 6.2 3.7 7.1 13.0 
1950 7.8 3.8 13.4 6.8 
1970 10.2 4.0 17.4 9.7 
1992 14.3 7.5 21.7 8.8 
 Source: Bairoch & Kozul-Wright (1996), extracted from Bairoch (1996:176, 179). 
 
Alfred Kleinknecht & Jan ter Wengel (1998) made an analysis of the integration 
process in developed countries focusing on the regional integration of the European 
Union (EU).  They examined data of exports and imports by region from origin to 
destination covering the 1960-1995 period. They presented the exports of EU countries 
towards other EU countries (as a percentage of GDP), and then compared the exports of 
EU countries to non-EU countries.  The authors observed high volumes of transactions 
among EU countries and much lower volumes between EU and non-EU economies.  
Accordingly, they concluded that there is a closer integration (read: “globalisation”) 
between all EU countries in terms of trade but not between the EU and the rest of the 
world.  
Based on those results, Kleinknecht & Wengel used the term Europeanisation to 
describe the robust commercial integration that existed between European countries 
during the period in question.  According to them, the relative importance of trade 
between European and non-European partners is modest, and has stagnated since 1960.  
From the viewpoint of these authors, if globalisation can be reduced to an 
Europeanisation phenomenon, it is a reality, at least in terms of trade.  If not, it is a 
myth. 
Hirst & Thompson (2003) supported Kleinknecht & Wengel’s (1998) conclusion. 
Based on the methodology developed in chapter three of their Globalization in 
Question (1996) (see especially table 3.3 on page 69), they re-elaborated and updated 
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the data of merchandise trade flows in terms of GDP in a book organised by Jonathan 
Michie in 2003.  The revamped table is reproduced below. 
 
Table 4. Merchandise trade flows as a percentage of originating Triad 
bloc/country GDP: 1998 
                            
To                     
North 
America 
Western 
Europe 
Japan 
(J) 
East Asian 
Traders 
J + EAT 
North America 3.8 2.0 0.7 1.1 1.8 
Europeana 
Economic Area
2.3 18.0 0.4 1.0 1.4 
Japan (J) 3.3 2.0 - 3.0 3.0 
East Asian 
Tradersb (EAT)
10.7 6.9 4.1 na na 
J + EAT 14.0 8.9 4.1 Na na 
Source: WTO Annual Report 2000, Volume II, International Trade Statistics, derived from various tables; 
World Economic Indicators 2000, World Bank, Table 4.2; Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2000. Extracted 
from Hirst & Thompson (2003:27) 
Notes: a European Economic Area (EEA) = EU + Switzerland, Turkey, Norway, Malta, Liechtenstein and 
states of the former Yugoslavia. 
b East Asian Traders (EAT): China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. 
na = not available. 
 
The figures show that in 1998 a small part of merchandise trade flows as a percentage 
of GDP of the main developed countries is destined to overseas areas of the globe, 
except for the EEA and Western Europe. According to Hirst & Thompson (2003), if the 
globalists were correct, the figures should be much higher because the chosen countries 
are the most technologically developed in the world and the leaders in terms of 
international trade. The top mark is reached exactly by the trade within the EEA and 
Western Europe, confirming the Europeanisation thesis presented above.  The “second 
best” mark was achieved by East Asian traders and North America but, even so, the 
value was almost half of that achieved by European economies.  All the other figures 
are very low and comparatively inexpressive.  These results strengthen the point of 
view that the alleged “globalisation” phenomenon is non-pervasive; conversely it is 
concentrated in local areas of the globe.  
On the other hand, other authors have taken into account the recent transformations in 
institutional and technological spheres, and updated some data pertaining to 
merchandise exports related to GDP, providing different argumentation.  According to 
them, the current configuration of global productive and financial enmeshment has 
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never before been experienced. There are some key arguments always mentioned in this 
respect, for instance, the emergence of technological progress in data transmission and 
telecommunications; multi-layered governance structures; the reconfiguration of 
political power in favour of liberalisation and deregulation policies; the wide range of 
financial innovations, and so on.   
Grazia Ietto-Gilles (1997:80) concludes that the international integration of large 
companies has been an increasingly progressive trend since the past decades and this 
upward tendency is likely to go on. Similarly, Susan Strange (1998:706) reasons that 
structural changes in course in the world economy have encouraged the growth of 
global trade and capital towards a global market configuration. Both seem to adhere to 
the propositions of the critical scholars presented above.  Likewise, Jonathan Perraton 
(2003:42) pointed out that international trade has reached unprecedented levels relative 
to output over the 1870-1998 period.  Table 5 shows the upward trend of trade relative 
to the output for the most developed countries between 1870 and 1998.   
 
Table 5. Export-GDP ratios, 1870-1998 
Merchandise exports as per cent of GDP (1990 prices) 
Year/country 1870 1913 1929 1950 1973 1998 
France 4.9 7.8 8.6 7.6 15.2 28.7 
Germany 9.5 16.1 12.8 6.2 23.8 38.9 
Japan 0.2 2.4 3.5 2.2 7.7 13.4 
UK 12.2 17.5 13.3 11.3 14.0 25.0 
United States 2.5 3.7 3.6 3.0 4.9 10.1 
World 4.6 7.9 9.0 5.5 10.5 17.2 
Source: Maddison (2000:363).  Extracted from Perraton (2003:42) 
 
Perraton concludes that trade-GDP ratios are clearly higher now in comparison with the 
Gold Standard age, which is opposed to the viewpoint that claims that “nothing is new” 
in current globalisation.  According to Table 5, the growth rate of trade for goods and 
services oscillated in cyclical movements during the period 1870-1950, but since then 
this growth was upright and in 1998 greatly surpassed in all countries the ratio reached 
in 1913.  
In order to highlight the tendency of the worldwide spread of trade from 1890 to 2000 
for selected developed countries, Perraton (2003) draws on the table below.  He uses 
the merchandise trade as a percentage of merchandise value-added.  Except in the case 
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of Britain, considered “anomalous”, the figures present a clear increase in the trade of 
goods related to output, especially in the US. This is evidence that at least in these 
countries, the “nothing is new” scenario cannot be confirmed.   
 
Table 6. Merchandise trade as percentage of merchandise value-added: 1890-2000 
Country/year 1890 1913 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
France 18.5 23.3 16.8 25,7 44.0 53.5 68.0 
Germany 22.7 29.2 24.6 31.3 48.5 57.8 78.5 
Japan 10.2 23.9 15.3 15.7 25.8 18.9 27.5 
Sweden 42.5 37.5 39.7 48.8 72.9 73.1 87.5 
United Kingdom 61.5 76.3 33.8 40.7 52.6 62.8 63.5 
United States 14.3 13.2 9.6 13.7 30.9 35.8 48.3 
Source: Feenstra (1998); World Bank, World Development Indicators data base; US Economic 
Report to the President, 1999.  Extracted from Perraton (2003:43) 
 
Still on the subject of the evidence of contemporary globalisation as a new scenario, 
Perraton (2003) considers “extraordinary” the growth of the FDI since the 1970s.  As 
Perraton (2003:50) observes:  “in the early 1970s the ratio of foreign exchange trading 
to world trade was around 2:1, by the early 1990s this ratio had risen to 50:1 and is 
around 70:1 today”. In this passage, he does not make comparisons between the current 
performance of the FDI and its performance in the early 20th century.  Nevertheless, the 
data he presents cannot be considered a mere historical coincidence, but rather an 
indication that an unusual growth has occurred worldwide in the 1990s, in this case, in 
terms of the volume of the FDI.  It can also be considered an invitation to put together 
the historical FDI data in order to assess whether this tendency is exclusive of the 1990s 
or if it has antecedents in the first globalisation age. This comparison will be conducted 
in the next chapter. In doing so, history can serve as a guide to discern better whether 
the contemporary era is unprecedented or if nothing is new. 
To sum up, this section does not aim to enter into a semantic debate, although it is in 
fact difficult to avoid mentioning some aspects related to the meaning of the word 
globalisation. Dictionaries of any language define the word global as “pertaining to the 
whole world, worldwide or universal”.  As the act of globalising or to make global, 
globalisation is understood literally by some scholars, whilst others prefer to identify 
the signs of the times as an indication of the best way to approach the topic.  In that 
case, the theoretical analysis made by Scholte (2002) is fruitful and clarifies this point. 
He points out that globalisation does not mean universalisation.  Globalisation could 
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not be associated with “experiences to people at all inhabited parts of the earth.”  
According to him, it leads the debate to a cul-de-sac because in that way globalisation 
is identified with cultural, economic, legal and political convergence, which he believes 
to be deceptive.  He does not deny that there has been substantial cultural destruction in 
recent times, but, in fact, globalisation has not gone that far.  Last but not least, it is 
worth mentioning that since Karl Marx’s classical exposition on the concentration and 
centralisation of capital, it is no wonder that capital in productive and financial spheres 
has been concentrated in some key countries. 
 
3.4 Measurement 
 
As asserted in the previous section, scholars from different backgrounds have been 
forwarding theoretical interpretations, collecting and (re)organising data and reporting 
the results as they strive to conduct their tests and prove their hypotheses.  Echoing 
Schumpeter (1954), they have been putting together theoretical approaches, empirical 
evidence and statistical indicators in order to reach scientific relevance. Accordingly, 
their efforts to achieve more robust results have been producing a broad theoretical and 
empirical argumentation on globalisation, also encouraging the creation of new forms 
to evaluate statistically the dimensions that the phenomenon has assumed.  Therefore, 
there is a wide variety of statistical information available, but the interpretation of this 
data varies significantly since the decision of which should be the most appropriate 
indicator to show the important changes is not straightforward (Sutcliffe & Glyn 2003).   
All indicators, from a macro to a microeconomic perspective have advantages and 
disadvantages, as in other fields of scientific research. Therefore, thus researchers 
should take some risks in order to present their assertions. Sudden unfortunate 
occurrences in the global scenario such as the financial crisis in East Asia impel authors 
to rethink their theoretical approaches and the evidence.  This section aims to present 
some critical points about the major indicators found in much of the globalisation 
literature.  
Economists have been assessing globalisation mostly in its commercial, productive and 
financial spheres.  Trade integration is commonly measured by the external trade 
divided by GDP. Global production has been addressed by data concerning mergers, 
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acquisitions, and foreign direct investment (FDI). As a result of the recent surges in 
global commercial and productive activities, foreign exchange markets became 
fashionable as a financial indicator that reflects the rise in global activity.  
Financial markets are another important sector to be considered.  They are formed by 
primary (newly issued securities) and secondary markets (trade of existing securities). 
Due to the important process of financial diversification after the 1980s, the range of 
financial assets grew dramatically and it would be somewhat difficult to present most of 
them. Nonetheless, there are some key ones that have been in frequent use for 
economists in their analysis that can be mentioned.  For instance, stock and bond 
markets have been taken into account to assess the financial activity in capital markets.  
Scholars have also been using the ratio of equity and debt flows, gross stocks of foreign 
assets and liabilities, cross-border transactions in bonds and equities, and FDI as a 
percentage of GDP to assess the amount of productive and speculative capital that has 
been traded amongst countries. In their 2004 book, Obstfeld & Taylor presented a range 
of indicators to assess what they believe are the main aspects of the globalisation of 
finance, such as: cross-border flows and stocks, savings-investment correlations, 
current account positions and asset price movements. 
Especially after the 1970s, derivative markets have been developing steadily as 
instruments for the management of financial risk.  Derivative markets are composed of 
future markets (options, futures and a wide range of underlying products), and over-the-
counter markets (OTC market, hedge funds, swaps, etc).  Insurance markets have been 
less quoted in the academic literature but they are also a part of global financial flows. 
Table 21 presents a variety of financial openness measures (de facto and especially de 
jure measures) developed throughout decades of research. All these data have been 
applied to a diverse historical and methodological perspective and for this reason the 
pictures provided by scholars diverge considerably.  
The indicators quoted above have been feeding the analysis presented in numerous 
books and articles with scientific bases for different examinations of the phenomenon 
but, as expected, they present pros and cons. A point in question is the indicator 
trade/GDP ratio. It shows the relative importance of foreign trade measured by the size 
of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP. Therefore, when trade growth is greater 
than GDP growth, it demonstrates the rising importance of trade, i.e. greater 
international trade integration (read globalisation). This indicator has been broadly used 
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for assessing a tendency of spreading world trade markets. Nevertheless, there are at 
least two major criticisms against this measure. One of these was made by Went 
(1997:41), who noticed that the service sector was largely non-tradable and much 
bigger than it was at the beginning of the last century.  For this reason, trade as a 
percentage of GDP can be underestimated.  
Another criticism was drawn from Sutcliffe & Glyn (2003). They criticise the 
convenience of this indicator calculated at constant prices. In order to make their claim 
clear, they present an example of trade-GDP ratios in the European economy during the 
period 1950-99.  In 1950, this ratio was 9 per cent while in 1992 it had reached 30 per 
cent.  At first glance, it would be reasonable to extrapolate from these figures that the 
participation of trade in production had grown three times during this period. This 
means, measured at constant prices, that a rising share of exports signifies that the 
volume of exports has grown faster than the volume of internal output and then the 
exports triplicate its importance in comparison to the output. However, this procedure 
exaggerates changes in the weight of exports in the economy “because the prices of 
exports rise systematically more slowly than do prices for output as a whole” (p. 63).  
This indicator would reflect the degree of trade integration more exactly if the prices of 
export and GDP presented a more regular behaviour during the period. Otherwise, it 
shows a misrepresentative measure of the reality, limiting their relevance.  An 
argument pointed out by Sutcliffe & Glyn is that labour productivity in the export 
sector is different compared to the economy as a whole. 
In their opinion, despite the fact that the current price of exports to GDP ratio is the best 
measure of this tendency, it must be corrected because the export content can 
exaggerate the value-added contribution to them.  Therefore, the import content should 
be subtracted before comparing exports at current price to GDP.  In doing so, they 
believe that this measure shows more appropriately the direct importance of 
international trade for the domestic economy. However, even this measure exaggerates 
the trade-GDP ratio at current price because it includes the import content of exports.  
That is why the authors elaborate another way to measure the impact of international 
competition within domestic economies named “imported penetration of the domestic 
market for manufactures” (see Sutcliffe & Glyn 2003:64, 65). 
As discussed above, globalisation is a multi-sided theme and can be measured in many 
other ways.  Apart from the most common indicators presented here, there are 
  68
indicators of labour markets, migration, technology, politics, environment, and culture. 
Among them, technological development has been a fashionable trend, currently well-
elaborated by multilateral institutions.  The progression of globalisation can no longer 
be understood without taking into account the widespread repercussions and 
applications of ICTs. Technological breakthroughs put into operation over the past 
three decades in processing, diffusion and transmission of information have greatly 
facilitated the progress of cross-border activities.  Especially in finance, agents are able 
to deal with a wide variety of short and long term contracts, and to move billions in 
many currencies through computers in just a few seconds.  
As Woodward (2003:311) pointed out: “Scientific advances in communications and 
technology have permitted political, social and economic processes to be organised on a 
global scale generating alternative forms of social organization.”14 These elements have 
been powerful driving forces in increasing the degree of enmeshment amongst 
countries, and have also been triggering the occurrence of speculative bubbles and the 
spread of crises through the contagion effect.  
Recently, multilateral institutions such as UNCTAD and the World Bank have been 
creating a range of ICT indicators.  Generally, they have provided indicators based on 
the access to those technologies by individuals, households and enterprises.  The 
possibilities of creating indicators in that area are enormous due to the abundance of 
applications of the technology in the most diverse international activities, and the 
cumulative process of development and consequently, the speed of technological 
improvements in the development of new products. Therefore, amongst the numerous 
combinations possible, these core indicators on ICT can broadly describe the magnitude 
of issues involved through the adoption of the ICTs, such as mobile phone subscribers, 
mobile phone penetration, number of internet users, internet penetration, internet 
penetration and website ownership, modes of internet access, broadband subscribers, 
broadband penetration, e-commerce, use of internet for e-business, component of ICT-
enabled services, impact of ICT on GDP growth, number of personal computers, 
personal computers penetration, e-commerce sales, internet sales and internet banking 
(see UNCTAD 2006).  
                                                 
14 About the effects of the communications and computational developments during the past two decades 
for the international capital-market integration see also James R. Lothian 2000, section 4.3. 
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As a matter of fact, UNCTAD reports present multiple variations of these ICTs since 
they can be classified by region, countries, level of development and gender.  Whatever 
the case may be, one should take into account that these indicators have been developed 
recently, and for this reason they have not been widely used in the literature on 
globalisation.      
Additionally, private institutions have been offering globalisation indicators with 
various methodological approaches.  On this account, there are two major indicators 
available: the KOF Index of Globalisation15 and the A. T. Kearney index.16 The former 
is calculated by the Swiss Institute for Business Cycle Research, aiming to measure 
what are considered the three main dimensions of globalisation: economic, social and 
political. The index encompasses an overall index of globalisation and sub-indices 
referring to “actual economic flows, economic restrictions, data on information flows, 
data on personal contact, and data on cultural proximity”. The latter is calculated by the 
global management consulting firm A. T. Kearney in association with Foreign Policy.  
They created the “Globalisation Index”, an annual study that aims to evaluate the extent 
to which the world’s most populated nations are becoming more or less globally 
connected using the traditional indicators of economic integration presented here, 
adding other variables such as political and personal contact variables.   
 
3. Three key theoretical interpretations about globalisation  
 
The review presented thus far has helped to consider the key premises that became 
noteworthy in different strands of present-day globalisation literature, as well as its 
dimensions, complexity and controversies. As concluded above, globalisation is an 
interdisciplinary subject that has been researched within various theoretical 
frameworks.  Consequently, the theme is too complicated and many-sided to be 
described by a single theoretical outlook. Important theoretical contributions have been 
made by scholars of social sciences such as Keohane (2000), Robertson (1992), and 
Scholte (2000, 2002) among others.  However, due to the purposes of this thesis, this 
section will consider the key approaches developed by scholars working in economics 
that have developed their thoughts based on different theoretical backgrounds.   
                                                 
15 Available at: http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch. 
16 Available at: http://www.atkearney.com/main.taf?p=5,4,1,116. 
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The globalisation debate amongst economists has been developed by the strong version, 
the sceptical school, and the transformationalist approach.17 In fact, some of the core 
ideas surrounding the theoretical debate on globalisation have already been presented in 
this chapter in section 2.1, thus this section will avoid repetitions and will concentrate 
in the important points that have not yet been studied. The radicals are known as the 
strong version (Hirst & Thompson 1996), or hyper-globalists (Perraton & Goldblatt 
1997), or even as the strong globalisation school (Rowthorn & Kozul-Wright 1998).  
Some other critical authors may be represented by the transformationalists.  This 
section aims to outline more precisely the main characteristics of these three theoretical 
approaches.    
A preliminary introduction to hyper-globalist thought can be grasped through the 
meaning of the prefix to the noun.  The prefix hyper means over, above, or beyond, 
usually expressing excess or exaggeration.  While the sceptics believe that the 
globalisation effects are concentrated in a few countries, the hyper-globalists believe 
the opposite, that is, that globalisation has produced significant economic changes in 
almost the entire world. Globalisation is seen as a definitive trend that has been 
changing once and for all the role of the nation-states and the typical power of trade 
unions in favour of the dominance of free market forces. For most authors, 
globalisation is a benign phenomenon that leads to the convergence of world incomes, 
institutions and political systems.  According to them, it affects heavily the economic 
status quo of developing and less developed economies. Therefore, if they open up their 
economies and practice “sound” macroeconomic policies, it will lead them to higher 
level of income and spur their economic growth.   
According to the hyper-globalists, the market itself is a more efficient mechanism of 
coordination than nation-states and, therefore, active public policies are not required (or 
welcome). In order to make globalisation work, a wide range of liberal political reforms 
such as deregulation, liberalisation, privatisation and restrictive monetary policy to 
guarantee price stability is encouraged, as was the case of the “monetarist 
counterrevolution” at the beginning of the 1970s (also called the end of the “Keynesian 
era”) and hastened after 1989.  As a result, the world economy has gradually become 
                                                 
17 Perraton & Goldblatt (1997) and Giddens (2002:8) identify two opposing groups of researchers in the 
debate on globalisation: the radicals and the sceptics.  However, Held et al (1999:10), Perraton (2003:37) 
and Giddens (2006:60) define another one, known as the transformationalist school, which is supposed to 
develop a critical approach to these two already established views.  
  71
one common marketplace capable of integrating productive activity, trade, services, 
labour and financial flows until it reaches the final (ideal) stage, in which national 
markets are replaced by global ones. Consequently, nation-states lose their autonomy in 
favour of multilateral organisations built on international rules. Nation-states are 
supposed to preserve carefully the stability of the key macroeconomic aggregates (the 
“fundamentals”), especially external accounts, in order to sustain the economic and 
institutional stability necessary to attract international capital. Accordingly, nation-
states invest less in social policies or undertake very little in this area.  In fact, the title 
of one of the books that support this thesis well summarises this argument in its title, 
which is The Borderless World (Ohmae 1991).  
By strengthening a global free market economy, countries have been able to develop 
their productive potential in terms of maximisation of their natural comparative 
advantages. This mechanism has increased competition and therefore the efficiency of 
markets, resulting in the convergence of a higher level of global growth.18  
Transnational companies play a relevant role in this free market context because they 
perform optimal outcomes in line with the world market and more efficiently than 
nation-states do.  For this reason, national policies and institutional governance are 
unnecessary.  
Some authors from this school describe globalisation as a process marked by periods of 
convergence and divergence in terms of living standards in different countries 
throughout time. They focus their analysis on the changes caused by the flow of capital 
and labour across national frontiers.  According to these authors, there is convergence 
in terms of living standards when countries promote an opening period for trade and 
capital flow, and divergence when this situation is reversed to periods of protectionism 
(which signifies de-globalisation). In this sense, there is a positive correlation between 
globalisation, free capital mass migration and income convergence. 
Globalisation or de-globalisation, convergence or divergence are measured in different 
ways, such as the changes in the GDP per worker or in terms of the factor price 
                                                 
18 Williamson (1996:279) defines convergence in the following way: “The critical bottom line for me is 
whether the living standard gap between rich and poor countries falls over time.  Convergence implies an 
erosion of this gap, at least in percentage terms.”  Likewise, Bordo (2002:25) defined convergence as 
“the ability of countries to reach the living standards, industrial structure, and productivity levels of the 
leading countries - Britain in the nineteenth-century and the U.S. in the twentieth.”  
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equalisation theorem (Heckscher-Ohlin Paradigm).19  This approach typically adopts a 
neoclassical view of international trade and international capital movements in which 
diminishing returns play a leading role.  The emphasis on trade and capital flows 
focuses attention on factor price convergence.  Population growth, capital formation 
and technical change were the main intertwined factors that caused the 
convergent/divergent state in the world economy.  
Conversely, the key point of the sceptics’ arguments is that globalisation is an 
exaggeration.  According to them, the globalisation debate is full of ideological 
arguments and in fact the world economy is far from being truly globalised (Went 
1997:51).  Accordingly, the term “highly (or strongly) internationalised” is preferred to 
“fully globalised”. It is widely recognised in the literature that Hirst & Thompson’s 
(1996) aforementioned book, Globalization in Question, is closely related to the 
appearance and development of this school.  A spate of scholarly books and articles 
followed their ideas, arguing against the reality of globalisation as supported by the 
hyper-globalists.  Some key arguments supported by the sceptics have already been 
given in section 2.3, so here only new key arguments will be displayed.    
The sceptics question the existence of a current globalisation process.  According to 
them, as a rule, most of the world’s economic activity (trade and finance) is developed 
nationally rather than being carried out through companies or banks localised abroad. 
The competitive performance of firms is determined substantially by processes 
occurring at a national level, i.e. decisions made by national economies dominate over 
those made at an international level.  In contrast, a globalised economy is characterised 
by different national economies articulated into the global system by international 
processes and transactions.  Much of the increased international activity (trade and 
capital flows) reflects decisions taken nationally, and the most powerful decisions are 
heavily concentrated in a small group of countries.  Consequently, the existing situation 
                                                 
19 According to Robert Rowthorn & Richard Kozul-Wright (1996:5): “This theory teaches that under free 
trade countries will specialize in those activities in which they have a comparative advantage.  Other 
things being equal, a country which is rich in a particular resource will export products whose production 
utilizes this resource intensively and import other products.  The resulting efficiency gains lead to a 
higher level of global welfare as well as to optimal resource use for each individual economy.  Moreover, 
according to traditional trade theory, even in the absence of capital and labour mobility, convergence of 
factor prices should accompany greater openness; workers of comparable skill will be paid the same in 
the developed and developing worlds and owners of capital will likewise obtain the same rate of return 
on their investments.” 
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in the global integration scenario is closer to the inter-national economy rather than a 
fully globalised one.   
Even recognising that the state’s abilities for governance have changed and weakened 
considerably, they believe that the role of the nation-states remains pivotal in providing 
legitimacy for supra-national and sub-national governance mechanisms. Global markets 
do not eliminate global inequalities and, as a result, additional public policies are 
necessary to bridge this gap. This is the alleged new historical role of the state.  In 
comparison to the period before the current surge of internationalisation, governments 
have less autonomy to operate their economic policies but state that there is not 
absolute loss of control over them.  
Cursory reading of the sceptical literature may conclude that they support an ascetic 
rejection of any change in the world economy in the last three decades. But this is not 
really what they mean. In the conclusion of Globalization in Question, Hirst & 
Thompson (1996:196) made a synthesis of their main arguments against the idea of the 
globalised world defined by the hyper-globalisation school: “We remain sceptical about 
the more extreme claims for economic globalisation, whilst at the same time accepting 
that the international economy has changed radically in structure and forms of 
governance from those that prevailed in the long boom from the early 1950s to the 1973 
oil crisis”.  
They recognise that asymmetries generated by liberalisation and deregulation may 
produce new global oligopolies and damage the nation-state autonomy and political 
sovereignty.  Therefore, unlike what the strong version suggests, there is a great 
tendency for decreasing in global (economic and political) actors and, consequently, an 
increase in the market shares of transnational firms, which means that the alleged 
globalisation promotes a more uneven world, instead of global convergence. To deal 
with this progressive unevenness, they claim that an international governance system 
must be an important instrument to be at the top of the world political agenda.   
According to the sceptics, not only are market forces impotent to govern the world 
economy alone, but the role of nation-states and of non-state actors remains important, 
acting as relevant institutional instruments of global governance, despite having less 
legitimacy to implement development policies. The power of nation-states weakens 
over time, but they do not disappear as an active actor capable of intervening in the 
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economic scenario and participating in international governance (Hirst & Thompson 
1996:191). 
On the contrary, because of the increased global integration, nation-states should be an 
effective agent in the governance structure to promote regional governance for the same 
reasons alleged by the globalists, albeit in the opposite direction.  Governments, not the 
market, have the role of harmonising social conflicts, and are able to mobilise, for 
instance, the military forces to protect the nation against external conflict and internal 
disorder. The political survival of private businesses depends on the successful 
performance of the nation-states in real activities of governance, instead of being the 
minimalist state proposed by globalists.  In the same way, one should remember that 
the state alone possesses a seat in key international organisations for the economic 
coordination of the world.  These are some examples to show that public forces and 
public instruments of governance presents a great advantage in relation to the private 
sector. 
In order to avoid the negative impacts of economic globalisation, global governance 
requires effective bodies to enforce regulations throughout a particular region or 
worldwide. Several United Nations (UN) agencies were created to monitor working 
conditions worldwide, resolving internal tensions thereby avoiding violent conflicts, 
preserving respect to human rights, pollution problems, etc (Brown 2003).  On the other 
hand, the responsibility for overseeing international trade remains largely with groups 
such as the WTO and GATT (Sinclair 2003) and that of regulating international finance 
with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Toye 2003). Nevertheless, 
possibilities for economic governance still remain, and there is still a role for nation-
states to play, especially in terms of creating ground conditions for effective national 
and international governance.  Therefore, governments remain an essential institution 
and retain their status as crucial structures of authority in world affairs.   
In summary, scepticals and hyper-globalists support antagonist theoretical 
interpretations concerning the core aspects of globalisation, disputing the character of 
the market and, consequently, the rationality of the necessary interventions.  However, 
advocates and foes alike share the assumption that the world economy has changed 
significantly since the 1970s and has veered towards a supranational system.  Hirst 
(Hirst & Held, 2002:4) maintained: “I’m not saying that nothing has changed. What I’m 
saying is that there are certain fundamental foundations which remain. Of course, today 
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supranational processes are stronger than they were before. But it is a mistake to over-
emphasise this.”  In the same way, non-radical authors like Sutcliffe & Glyn (2003:61) 
assert: “We do not question that globalisation in one of its meanings – the world-wide 
spread of capitalist relations in production and distribution – has been a major feature 
of the last 50 years.” 
The transformationalist view is expressed by the newer school that discusses 
globalisation from a theoretical perspective. The transformationalists’ essential 
philosophy points out that globalisation cannot simply be a synonym of trade and 
finance-led integration, but must be seen as an innovative interdisciplinary research 
programme combining history, law, sociology and other similar academic fields. 
Briefly, they conceive of globalisation as a historical process (or a “set of processes”) in 
dynamic transformation, which is still in the course of unfolding.  They emphasise that 
globalisation is a phenomenon in continuous motion since its developments involve a 
series of changes taking place through time.  These authors identify the general 
movement of the global economic system through the major international 
macroeconomic indicators such as global output, global financial markets and 
international business organisation.   
Perraton & Goldblatt (1997) and Perraton (2003) have key thoughts concerning the 
transformationalist approach.  Their description on globalisation may be better 
summarised by what they say globalisation is not. Globalisation is not a singular 
condition, a linear process or a final end-state.20  Moreover, they refute the radical and 
the sceptical interpretations.  According to them, for the hyper-globalisation school, 
global markets are now perfectly integrated, even for non-tradable goods and services. 
Conversely, sceptics have asserted that the recent developments of globalisation are far 
from being considered entirely integrated in the productive and/or financial sense.  
Although both interpretations are defending divergent viewpoints, sceptics and 
globalists use similar conceptions in terms of perfectly integrated international markets. 
According to the radicals, global markets are already integrated, while for others 
globalisation can only be real when this ideal situation is attained.  In other words, the 
                                                 
20 Held (Hirst & Held, 2002:2) supports this interpretation in the following way: “Globalisation is not an 
end state, or a single thing, any more than is democracy or industrialisation. These are processes, 
involving changing relations of human affairs - which means it is wrong to say that the local doesn’t 
matter any more. It matters in a different way. It is being re-contextualised in a more complex world of 
economics, politics, culture and migration.”    
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analyses of both schools fail by conceiving the phenomenon working in the same 
idealistic (extreme) situation.   
Transformationalists elaborate an alternative approach to describe globalisation using 
historical background and empirical evidence. Accordingly, globalisation must be 
understood as a systematic series of changes that moves social relations from the 
regional to the transcontinental (or interregional) level.  This process changes human 
organisation, shapes new institutions, and affects at least the seven aspects mentioned 
in Table 1 above, i.e. economic, political, cultural, military and environmental. In this 
sense, globalisation has different historical forms, multiple causes, and multiple 
equilibria.  
In the book Global Transformations  (1999) Held et al put together various aspects of 
political science, economic history and sociology to describe the past and current forces 
that have been changing the world and transforming societies, nation-states, 
multinational and supranational organisations, and social relations as a whole.  They 
recognise that globalisation is not just an economic matter, but a confluence of factors 
interpreted in a historical perspective which results in significant transformations of 
different globalisation regimes that have occurred since ancient times. The authors are 
interested in putting into context the nature of the global transformations, their causes 
and consequences for the social, political and economic tissue. Held et al., (1999:7) 
provide a good summary of the transformationalist theoretical interpretation with these 
words:   
At the heart of the transformationalist thesis is a conviction that, at the dawn of a 
new millennium, globalization is a central driving force behind the rapid social, 
political and economic changes that are reshaping modern societies and world 
order.  According to proponents of this view, contemporary processes of 
globalization are historically unprecedented such that governments and societies 
across the globe are having to adjust a world in which there is no longer a clear 
distinction between international and domestic, external and international affairs. 
… Globalization is conceived as a powerful transformative force which is 
responsible for a ‘massive shake-out’ of societies, economies, institutions of 
governance and world order.  In the transformationalist account, however, the 
direction of this ‘shake-out’ remains uncertain, since globalization is conceived as 
an essentially contingent of historical process replete with contradictions.  … 
Transformationalist accounts emphasize globalization as a long-term historical 
process which is inscribed with contradictions and which is significantly shaped 
by conjunctural factors.  Such caution about the exact future of globalization is 
matched, nonetheless, by the conviction that contemporary patterns of global 
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economic, military, technological, ecological, migratory, political and cultural 
flows are historically unprecedented. 
 
In short, this brief summary shows that theoretical literature on globalisation has 
evolved significantly in the past two decades. As explained in the previous chapter, by 
the early 1980s, notions of globalisation were developed without a definite pattern in 
several academic fields. However, in the 1990s, many researchers in social sciences 
shifted their focus to accomplish a systematic study of globalisation as a theoretical 
research.  
The list of publications is extensive but when dealing with the groundbreaking 
publications, it is worth mentioning that the mainstream view of globalisation was well 
summarised by Francis Fukuyama in his 1989 article The end of history?. In this 
controversial paper, he challenges the Marxist philosophy of history suggesting that the 
end of the Cold War marked the “triumph of the West”, “the total exhaustion of viable 
systematic alternatives to Western liberalism”, “the end point of mankind’s ideological 
evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of 
human government” (p. 1).21  The borderless world and The End of the Nation State 
written by Ohmae in 1991 and 1995, respectively, also present core elements of the 
hyper-globalist approach. Despite having written numerous books and articles, Ohmae 
has dedicated his career not to academia but to business and socio-political analyses, 
and as a public speaker and management consultant.  He worked for twenty-three years 
as a partner in McKinsey & Company Inc., an international management consulting 
firm and, for these reasons, he attracted the attention of the mass media and his words 
echo in the minds of current international market makers and global political 
leaderships.   
Fukuyama’s and Ohmae’s interpretation have been criticised, especially from the left-
wing segments within academia.  These critics were important to the debate because 
they led to the development of new interpretations of globalisation, although they were 
given less welcome in the wide circles of global marketing and the media.  
Accordingly, in 1996 Hirst & Thompson wrote Globalization in Question, detailing a 
systematic body of criticism to the hyperglobalist position. In 1999, Global 
                                                 
21 Fukuyama’s thesis about the end of history was developed further in the book: Fukuyama, F. (1992) 
The end of history and the last man. New York: Avon Books.  
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Transformations appeared, presenting key points developed by the transformationalist 
approach, which is one more school of thought in the globalisation debate that criticises 
the optimistic and the pessimistic globalists.  These scholars emphasise the intensity 
and the extensity of global flows in various areas outside economics, and in several 
ages in history. Numerous articles followed, pushing the understanding of globalisation 
one big step forward. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This chapter has displayed a panoramic view on some qualitative aspects surrounding 
the academic debate on globalisation.  It has addressed key issues such as its concept, 
periodisation, the debate on myth or reality, and its indicators. Despite the effort to 
present a concise and wide picture of the theme, the chapter naturally did not cover all 
the areas of the debate.  Nevertheless, the broad picture painted shows the essential 
thoughts that will be referred to in some degree in the rest of this thesis. Globalisation is 
a multi-faceted topic and has brought a relevant transformation in the organisation of 
contemporary society. It has influenced the policies of local authorities, transformed the 
spectrum of global power, changed the notion of space, the decisions of private 
investors, the behaviour of transnational corporations, the actions of multilateral 
institutions, and the social interactions of many people around the world. 
This chapter then presented a review of the three main theoretical approaches that have 
been used by economists to scrutinise globalisation. The theoretical debate involves 
three distinct groups of authors.  The first approach examined was that of the so-called 
hyper-globalists. They claim that actual global integration is thorough and, 
consequently, the production factors (capital, technology, and labour) are globally 
mobile, and the notions of national products, national industries and national 
corporations have become redundant.  Government intervention must be avoided since 
it distorts information embedded within the price system, thereby bringing about 
inefficient market functioning. Moreover, since globalisation has weakened the ability 
of governments to regulate economic activity and rule transnational corporations, the 
actual stage marks the end of the nation-states.  The sceptics are of the belief that, 
historically speaking, the present economic world order remains far from being closely 
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integrated, in addition to the fact that the actual net flows between major economies are 
similar to or even lower than a century ago.  
Finally, there are scholars known as transformationalists supporting a “third way” 
interpretation considering that the contemporary global economic position is much 
more intricate now than during the classical Gold Standard era, i.e. the levels of 
interconnectedness (read: interdependence) and enmeshment (read: networks of 
integration) are higher and have been reaching more countries than ever before.  
Consequently, business activity is now more embedded in regional and global 
networks, and the transnational economic flows are unprecedented in history.   
The chapter represents an essential role in this thesis.  The core aspects of globalisation 
studied lay the groundwork for the task ahead, which focuses on the debate on financial 
globalisation.  
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III. AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF FINANCIAL GLOBALISATION IN A 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: CONTRASTING THE U-SHAPED PATTERN WITH 
THE J-SHAPED PROPOSITION 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent globalisation literature, economists and economic historians have been 
comparing the growth of world trade with the expansion of global financial transactions 
relative to the world GDP, concluding that at particular times in history global financial 
activities have largely exceeded world trade. In fact, the growth of cross-border 
financial flows in certain markets during the last three decades of the 20th century has 
been much higher than other key macroeconomic aggregates, such as world GDP and 
world exports or imports. The increasing importance of international capital flows over 
much of the post-war period has brought the debate on the globalisation of finance to a 
prominent place in current academic literature.  
Recently, scholars have studied financial globalisation in a historical perspective, i.e., 
from the classical Gold Standard era until the 1990s - and have found the so-called U-
shaped pattern.  Researching the historical data referring to this period, I have found a 
different form, referred to in this thesis as the J-curve.  Therefore the main purpose of 
this chapter is to present empirically the J-curve as an alternative way to interpret 
financial globalisation in historical perspective.  
The J-curve not only differs in shape but it has a series of qualitative implications for 
the interpretation of the development of financial globalisation since the 1870s. 
However this chapter is not the place to discuss qualitative issues underlying the J-
shaped proposition.  Institutional arrangements, economic policies and other non-
quantitative aspects will be discussed in the next chapter. More precisely, this one has 
two core objectives: 1. to underline some key descriptive aspects of financial 
globalisation; and 2. to present data on international capital flows as the first step in 
constructing the research hypothesis of this research, which is an alternative way to 
interpret financial globalisation in a historical perspective.    
After this introduction, the second section examines some outstanding core 
characteristics of financial globalisation. Section 3 is divided into two subsections: the 
first one briefly presents the mainstream U-shaped pattern, and the second presents and 
interprets the statistical evidence proposed to establish the J-shaped curve.   
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2. Financial globalisation under debate 
 
As a first attempt to grasp the key aspects of the financial globalisation phenomenon, 
the term was searched for in dictionaries of economics. The results however were not 
promising.  The latest edition so far of the four-volume New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics edited by John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman in 1998, does 
not include an entry for it. The four listed entries that use the term financial (financial 
crisis, financial intermediaries, financial journalism, and financial markets) discuss a 
range of themes related to financial globalisation but they do not address the core 
aspects of the phenomenon surveyed in current specialised literature. Likewise, no 
direct reference could be found in the recent four-volume Encyclopedia of 
Globalization (2007).  Even close substitute terms such as financial integration or 
global financial integration were not found in both of the publications quoted above 
and in other specialised books.22   
There are many possible explanations for this deficiency.  Some may be purely 
commercial, i.e. possibly during the 1990s there were not enough commercial reasons 
to include a definition of the term in new editions. But there are other reasons, for 
example Scholte, one of the editors of The Encyclopedia of Globalization, affirmed that 
this entry was not included because the Encyclopedia had already provided other 
entries such as “offshore, IOSCO, hedge funds, G30, economic globalisation”, which 
arguably cover the meaning behind the term financial globalisation.23 
Whatever the case may be, the purpose of the first part of the chapter is not to speculate 
on the reasons why financial globalisation has not been included in the specialised 
                                                 
22 I found a definition of financial integration in: Jones, R. J. Barry (ed). (2001) Routledge Encyclopedia 
of International Political Economy. Routledge: London and New York.  However nothing similar was 
found in the dictionaries below: Greenwald, D. (ed) (1994). The McGraw-Hill  Encyclopedia  of 
Economics. New York: McGraw-Hill, second edition; Magill, F. N. (ed) (1997). International 
Encyclopedia of Economics. London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers; Newman, P., Milgate, M. & Eatwell, 
J. (eds) (1992). The new Palgrave dictionary of money and finance. London: Macmillan Press; Pass, C., 
Lowes, B. & Davies, L. (2005). Collins Dictionary of Economics. Glasgow: HarperCollins Publishers, 
fourth edition. 
23 This information was not published anywhere.  I sent an email to Professor Scholte on 7th June 2007 
asking him why financial globalisation was not included as a separate entry in the Encyclopedia. He 
replied to me on 11th June 2007.  This was his answer: “I think we decided that a separate entry on 
financial globalisation was not necessary after having various other entries on offshore, IOSCO, hedge 
funds, G30, economic globalisation, etc.” 
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dictionaries but to investigate the central aspects of the phenomenon based on the 
academic literature. With reference to globalisation, financial globalisation is also a 
multidimensional topic, therefore no one can expect to find a consensual description of 
it.  Additionally, it is worth emphasising that the same caveat made in the previous 
chapter on the definition of globalisation is also applied here: the descriptive analysis of 
financial globalisation will be focused on the characteristics of the recent episode. 
 
2.1 What does financial globalisation mean? 
a) The general approach 
 
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, expressive changes have 
occurred in cross-border capital flows, capital mobility and market connectivity.  
Various closely connected historically determined factors have been propelling current 
financial globalisation to higher levels of global financial enmeshment and 
interconnectedness. These factors have been affecting the nature, the magnitude and the 
timing of the phenomenon and they have been occurring essentially in economic, 
political, institutional and technological fields.   
The most salient could be summarised as: a) the growth of cross-border financial flows 
being much higher than the growth of world GDP or international trade; b) change in 
the regime of exchange rates, from fixed to floating; c) financial liberalisation and 
deregulation policies spread around the world, reaching major industrial economies in 
1970s and most developing economies from the 1980s; d) significant domestic and 
international structural changes in the banking system (off-shore facilities, merger and 
acquisitions, liquidations, bankruptcies); e) stringent competition between financial 
agents (banks and non-banking institutions);  g) development of numerous new 
products, markets and services (financial innovation); h) the appearance of new agents 
professionally managed by institutional investors; i) larger levels of interconnectivity 
amongst financial markets through ICTs.   
The linkages developed by the interaction of these elements have been tightening 
international financial market arrangements, creating new markets, new products, 
lowering home bias, accelerating the development of the disclosure practices and legal 
procedures of banking regulation and supervision. As a consequence, financial flows 
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have increased their global enmeshment.  These events are not exclusive to the present 
era but most of these characteristics can be found in today’s financial globalisation. 
Historically speaking, financial globalisation is a process that has not been linear, but 
has developed in waves surrounded by periods of booms and crises.   
The repercussions of all these factors over the global financial system have produced a 
rare consensus amongst economists, advocates and critics of globalisation alike.  
Notwithstanding their disagreements concerning the causal reasons of these changes, 
they have agreed that over the past decades, profound transformations in global finance 
have veered domestic markets towards a supraterritorial arrangement. Some call this 
globalisation, others use different names and taxonomies - but in general most authors 
agree that an impressive volume of money has been traded worldwide, and that 
contemporary financial activity has become complex and pervasive. Little consensus 
exists as to the correlation between this new international financial configuration and 
the occurrence of recent bubbles, panics and crises, but in fact the management and 
control of global financial affairs has become rather multifaceted.  It certainly requires 
an attentive and detailed study.  For this reason, scholars strive to describe the essential 
aspects of recent financial globalisation.  
Financial globalisation is generally described as being a process of the integration of 
domestic financial markets into one of global scope.  In other words, domestic markets 
keep their facilities based locally but modern electronic communication networks and 
computer based systems have allowed them to trade globally in a large variety of public 
and private assets and liabilities, currencies, commodities, a variety of financial 
services, instruments of risk management and the like. Since the scope of financial 
activities is wider, portfolio positions of public and private agents have become 
increasingly internationalised. Financial globalisation implies, however, the 
organisation of an increasingly interlinked network of markets that are able to negotiate 
products and services in larger areas of the world, and do so more quickly.   
In the previous chapter, Scholte (2002:8) asserted that globalisation might not be 
adequately described as internationalisation.  Similarly, some authors make a clear 
distinction between financial globalisation and financial internationalisation.  
Shirakawa, Okima & Shiratsuka (1997:2) claim that internationalisation describes a 
situation where certain external transactions increase, whereas globalisation 
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encompasses a collective tendency of financial market integration in each country 
towards a single world market.  
Despite sustaining in essence the same argument as the three Japanese economists 
above, Benjamin J. Cohen (1996:269) uses both terms interchangeably.  In his opinion 
“financial globalization (or internationalization) refers to the broad integration of 
national markets associated with both innovation and deregulation in the post-war era 
and is manifested by increasing movements of capital across national frontiers”.  
Despite this difference, which seems to be merely semantic, the authors follow the 
tendency of most economists and define financial globalisation as a process of 
universal integration of national markets.   
Similarly, Prasad et al (2003:2) have employed the concepts of financial globalisation 
and integration interchangeably, despite recognising that the former is, by definition, 
different from financial integration.   They have addressed the financial globalisation 
concept in this way:  
Financial globalization and financial integration are, in principle, different 
concepts. Financial globalization is an aggregate concept that refers to increasing 
global linkages created through cross-border financial flows. Financial integration 
refers to an individual country’s linkages to international capital markets. Clearly, 
these concepts are closely related. For instance, increasing financial globalization 
is perforce associated with increasing financial integration on average.  
 
Nevertheless, opinions diverge regarding the degree of integration of domestic markets.  
Arestis & Basu (2003:2) support the same viewpoint that financial globalisation is an 
ongoing process tending to integrate local markets into a single one.  However, they 
propose that the operation of a truly global financial market requires the establishment 
of a single currency managed by a single global monetary authority. This status would 
be achieved through the emergence and coexistence of various institutions designed to 
deal with possible inconsistencies created by such an open international financial 
system.  
Tobin (1999) alerts us of the difficulties to be surpassed for national monetary 
authorities to keep the stability of their currencies due to the frequent threats provoked 
by the globalisation of financial markets in the 1990s.  According to him, the key 
elements that have encouraged the phenomenon are “the liberalization and deregulation 
of international financial transactions” (p. 66).  Cohen (1996), quoted above, also 
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highlighted that extensive financial capital mobility encouraged by both innovation and 
deregulation has played an important role in today’s financial globalisation.  This 
opinion is shared by most scholars.   
The historical importance of domestic policies to adjust internal financial markets into a 
global shape has been remarkable. Over time, national economies have adjusted their 
fiscal and monetary policies in order to become part of a “global discipline”.  In both 
globalisation eras this policy adaptation (whether voluntary or not) played an important 
role in the process of the gradual international interconnectedness of a number of 
nations. The reasons for this vary greatly according to the historical moments and the 
historical specificities of each time. The increasing adherence to the “rules of the game” 
after the 1870s during the classical Gold Standard were determined by the 
circumstances surrounding that period, such as the political, economic and monetary 
dominance of Britain; the importance of central banks; political instabilities in Europe 
and the US concerning the bimetallic system, and so on. As will be discussed in the 
next chapter, a variety of policy changes were in place at that time and it spurred the 
developed and developing countries became more (but not evenly) internationally 
integrated.   
Moving to the second wave, after the 1980s, a sea change pushed the overwhelming 
majority of countries to adjust their domestic policies towards an open system.  One of 
the most outstanding examples of it was the large number of countries that liberalised 
the capital account of their balance-of-payment. This reveals once more that 
governments have followed intentionally and/or adapted involuntarily their policy 
stances to the pressures and decisions set up by the leading nations.  
Apart from the policy motives, various financial instruments were created and 
developed as alternatives to deal with the high macroeconomic instability that 
characterised the global economy during the period.  In the wake of this process, 
derivative instruments were created, such as futures, options and swaps aiming to 
minimise the risks in financial transactions and to create a potential return to the agents 
involved.  Derivative contracts are divided into two distinct groups: over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives are contracts traded directly between the two parties involved, hence 
they are not negotiated in a specific exchange market or through intermediaries.  The 
other group is the derivatives traded in specialised markets. Accordingly, financial 
market participants had also changed significantly by that time. Institutional investors 
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such as banks, credit unions, insurance companies, hedge, mutual and pension funds, 
executives or even professionals who had a certain amount of income were integrated 
as financial actors buying tailor-made assets in the marketplace.  
Financial globalisation is closely related to the development of new financial services 
(financial diversification). An augmented flow of money has been negotiated in an 
enlarged variety of financial operations, forming a wider (read: global) network of 
businesses.  This process of improvement and diversification of financial services is 
closely related to the historical specificity of contemporary capitalism.  During the 
1980s, but mainly in the 1990s, the world economy was marked by severe financial 
crises, which had spread rapidly across the world through contagion as never happened 
before in world’s financial history.  For this reason, banks, institutional investors and 
financiers have applied sophisticated techniques of financial engineering to develop 
varied products and services to accommodate this increasing volume of capital that 
searches for profitable opportunities and security.  
Microeconomic aspects have also encouraged intercontinental financial integration.  
For instance, multinational companies have been aggressively entered in increasingly 
larger financial positions and a growing number of employees have become 
shareholders through the intervention of institutional investors. They have begun to 
manage a broader range of securities, a variety of OTC derivatives, and a large amount 
of FDI.  Securitisation and derivative contracts are the main private institutional 
arrangements created by today’s financial globalisation.   For this reason, a policy 
maker like Alan Greenspan (2003) considered the present era as the most advanced 
stage of financial globalisation so far. 
Kregel (1996:55) and Tobin (2000:1001) emphasise a key characteristic that explains 
the rapid globalisation of the financial markets, which is the fact that there are no 
physical frontiers to be crossed by financial assets, but only national regulations.  Since 
these regulation barriers fell drastically throughout the last quarter of the 20th century, 
the process of globalisation was able to progress quickly. Due to their intangible nature, 
financial transactions do not involve physical transport costs, and that is why intangible 
assets are much easier and faster to globalise than commodities and labour (Kregel 
1996:55). In fact, transfer costs exist, but they are negligible nowadays in comparison 
to the past (see figure 2 below).  
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Figure 2. Standard rate for 3-minute call from New York City to London: 1927-99 
(in current dollars)24 
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In addition, the phenomenon in the current era has benefited greatly from other 
distinctive technological breakthroughs that have lowered the cost of 
telecommunications and have promoted a rapid international movement of highly liquid 
assets. Information and communication technologies have made the financial 
transactions “easy, fast and cheap” (Tobin 1999:1001).   
The process of financial globalisation entails not only the transport of assets and debts 
over long distances but also quotations of assets that can vary several times a day. 
Along with country-specific differences in terms of national regulations, imperfect 
information has been a barrier to the development of global financial transactions. 
Therefore, effective channels of data transmission are important to reduce the ever-
present problem of asymmetric information, spreading the relevant information 
required to guide private decisions as quickly and accurately as possible.   
Revolutions in telecommunications and computer technology have enabled the spread 
of information over long distances at an unprecedented speed. From 1970 onwards, 
satellite communication, (transoceanic) fibre optic cables, and the use of micro 
processing in manipulation and data processing produced by digital communication 
have been widely used in the integration process of distinct financial markets. This has 
dramatically lowered the cost and time of transmissions, revolutionising 
intercontinental communication and allowing instantaneous transactions of financial 
                                                 
24 This figure is based on data in Appendix 4. 
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flows.  Over time, networks of information throughout the world have redesigned 
borders, eliminating difficulties in the transport of assets and information. Accordingly, 
markets have been extended and investment opportunities have risen, mostly in 
advanced countries. 
In a nutshell, technological advances in telecommunications and computer-based 
information systems have played an important role allowing instantaneous 
communication and transactions all around the world.  That is to say, instant direct 24 
hour intercontinental connectivity has matched a larger variety of new tailor-made 
services. But high speed intercontinental communication is a double-edged sword. On 
the one hand, it has boosted closer connections amongst financial centres worldwide, 
but on the other hand it has increased the risk of crisis contagion. Therefore, like 
globalisation, financial globalisation also implies increasing interconnectedness, i.e. 
interdependence amongst local markets. The high level of integration allows investors 
to react immediately when disturbances occur in any market and, in consequence, the 
speed and volume of business are affected, spreading waves of pessimism that often 
lead to nontrivial consequences for the system as a whole. The financial crises in Asia 
and Latin America during the 1990s prove the fact that the contagion effect is fast and 
expensive not only for the countries in crisis, but for the world economy in general. 
Technological progress as applied to innovative products has also been an important 
incentive for the globalisation of finance since the transaction costs of financial services 
have been reduced, thereby encouraging new developments in portfolio diversification.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, advanced communication technology is not a 
panacea. Despite its effectiveness in terms of cost-cutting and technological 
improvements, disappointments and frustration have occurred because the global 
financial game is too complicated to be solved solely by technological apparatus.  
Many other instruments must be taken into account, such as adequate disclosure 
practices, corporate governance, restrictive norms defined locally by nation-states or by 
global institutions, and the development of institutions that fight against corruption and 
money laundering.   
In the wake of this process of technological interconnection of financial systems 
worldwide, changes have also emerged in the nature of the intermediaries and market 
instruments. Institutional investors (pension funds and mutual funds) have played a 
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relevant role as banks have in terms of financial intermediation.  As mentioned above,   
especially after the 1970s, a wide variety of financial innovations such as derivative 
markets was introduced into the system.  This represented a significant difference in 
relation to the previous financial globalisation period since not only did it allow agents 
to manage a larger volume of capital in a much broader range of securities, but it also 
permitted the simultaneous management of financial transactions with different 
maturities.  
Although all the changes mentioned have facilitated capital mobility, some authors 
have emphasised the flip side of the coin, which is that, freed from the limitations of 
national controls or regulations, and under the impacts of modern communications, 
capital has become more vulnerable to financial crises.  Thereby it has affecting 
especially economies that were not adequately adapted to the new policy scenario of 
financial liberalisation and deregulation.  On this account, Eichengreen (2000:1113) 
correctly asserts: 
Changes in information and communications technologies similarly make it [the 
international capital transactions] more difficult to operate effective controls.  
Securitization and the proliferation of derivative instruments undermine any 
effort to impose selective controls meant to apply to some types of capital flows 
but not others.  Consequently, any attempt to halt flows at the border must 
become increasingly comprehensive, onerous and, one fears, distortionary. 
 
In brief, non-mainstream authors are sceptical about the efficiency of free markets in 
achieving convergence of products and income as predicted by mainstream economists.  
In general, they define financial globalisation as a process which evolves gradually 
until financial markets become integrated as one.  They assert that legal procedures, the 
electronic communication apparatus and some degree of convergence in terms of 
economic policy have been occurring but it is not enough to argue that free markets are 
the core of the system. Markets are not entirely efficient but failed, and institutional 
arrangements have played a key role in the process of global integration.  
Consequently, they have expressed many concerns about the net results of this alleged 
effectiveness. While recognising a trend towards a growing interconnection amongst 
national economies during the Gold Standard and over the last quarter of the 20th 
century, they assert that it does not necessarily lead to a rapid growth of economic 
convergence worldwide.  On the contrary, for many countries, output growth rates have 
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slowed down and income levels have diverged (Baldwin & Martin 1999; Nayyar 2006).  
Unconventional economists agree that the removal of barriers to international capital 
mobility is one of the key reasons for the increased cross-border capital flows in both 
eras.  However, they argue that financial liberalisation is not a sufficient condition to 
constitute financial globalisation (Arestis & Basu 2003, 2004; Arestis & Basu & 
Mallick 2005; Davidson 2003). According to them, it is merely one step towards 
empowering globalised markets, and even so it is not free from market inconsistencies.    
Another important source of disagreement between these scholars and the mainstream 
theoretical perspective is the one regarding the role played by nation-states. According 
to non-mainstream scholars, the pressure coming from international financial markets 
has changed the scope of the domestic political economy but it has not eliminated the 
autonomy of nation-states. Even agreeing that governments have lost some degree of 
manoeuvrability to manage their economic policies during periods of high capital 
integration (past and present), the aforementioned authors sustain that this does not 
mean the end of nation-states and the absence of political alternatives against the 
process of economic policy homogenisation (see also Chang & Grabel 2004). In other 
words, domestic financial systems are still regulated and managed by public policies, 
although the political and economic power of nation-states may vary over time from 
country to country. 
Those scholars believe that the institutional role of nation-states is still relevant and 
they also emphasise the need for worldwide institutional coordination, which means 
that all markets should be under the coordination of a universal Central Bank, 
managing a single currency and a uniform credit system. On this account, Arestis, Basu 
& Mallick (2005:529) highlight the fact that the lack of full institutional coordination 
by an effective global central bank and the absence of a single international currency 
may put at risk what they call “true financial globalisation”.  
In a nutshell, financial globalisation is a transformation of national financial systems 
within a network of linkages closely connected by macro/microeconomic factors, 
institutional changes in policy terrain, legal multilateral agreements, regulations and 
norms, and technological breakthroughs. It is also a result of global political changes, 
all things considered together within its historical specificities. Therefore, the 
phenomenon is closely connected to geopolitics, international diplomacy, vested 
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interests and the ideological influence of hegemonic nations. In the current era, its 
development is heavily determined by the power and leadership of the US, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter.  
 
b) An interpretation proposal on financial globalisation  
 
In this thesis, financial globalisation is interpreted as a historical process resulting from 
economic, institutional, legal, political and technological changes occurring in the 
international scenario and influencing one another. As a response to these international 
tendencies, decisive changes follow in national economies, such as: a) financial 
liberalisation (disintegration of regulatory and/or monopolistic barriers); b) restrictions 
in the effectiveness of domestic economic policies due to the diminished role played by 
nation-states; c) financial diversification; d) institutional adaptations, especially in 
terms of the establishment of new institutions, new legal procedures and/or revision of 
the old ones; d) larger connectivity between most domestic financial markets; f) larger 
propensity to contagion and systemic crises.   
This historical process has not been homogeneous. Since the emergence of a world 
financial order during the classical Gold Standard, financial flows have been heavily 
concentrated in a small number of leading Western European countries. Most 
economies adjusted their economic policies to adapt themselves to the Gold Standard’s 
rules. Therefore, some nations have had privileged access to the international financial 
system and were thus able to develop more advanced markets of asset transactions. One 
might remember that global capital flows have been heavily concentrated in some areas 
of the globe, but it is worth noting that the high concentration of capital is an intrinsic 
characteristic of world capitalist development. Despite being heavily concentrated in 
developed countries, capital flows reached roughly all continents during this period, 
which means that capital markets are unevenly globalised.   In fact, neither industrial 
nor financial capitals were thoroughly or evenly disseminated resources in this initial 
stage of capitalism.  Historical specificities then and now have constrained most 
countries to be far apart from the benefits of global financial flows.  
The point made above is crucial to establishing my own interpretation of financial 
globalisation. Authors have questioned the concept of financial globalisation because of 
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the current geographical concentration of capital movements worldwide.  In my 
interpretation, this concentration does not invalidate the use of the term globalisation 
because in the first era, as well as in the second, the structural factors that allowed the 
establishment of financial contracts around the world were ready and working and thus 
the conditions for capital mobility (were) are achieved. The point is that all the key 
financial centres in most important countries were connected, so agents were able to 
make deals everywhere in the world.  As Scholte (2002) has asserted, globalisation is 
not a synonym of universalisation.   
The problem is that, under the capitalist system, capital does not necessarily go 
everywhere. If the country is not profitable, if there are enormous risks, no matter how 
globalised it may be, no matter what sort of technological facilities are there, capital 
will not go there.  Capital is choosy, so financial globalisation does not necessarily 
mean even distribution of financial flows.  But what financial globalisation means on 
the contrary is that capital can flow wherever is deemed profitable. Capital avoids 
places where macroeconomic instability is high, or where the policy, legal, social or 
political conditions are quite unstable.  Needless to say that globalisation (read global 
enmeshment and interconnectedness of finance) does not eliminate systemic risk. Risk 
exists in investment and the greater the risk the less motivation for capital to flow in 
certain areas.   
Following most scholars’ interpretations, it is recognised that economic history has 
experienced two remarkable eras of high financial integration, the Gold Standard and 
the last two decades of the 20th century.  However, unlike some viewpoints, this study 
also recognises that special characteristics have been in progress during the second era, 
which makes a clear distinction between both periods. The collapse of the Bretton 
Woods agreements marked the end of an international monetary order and the 
beginning of a dramatic increase in world financial instability.  The consequent 
economic scenario was characterised by a high level of uncertainty on the international 
monetary landscape, increased world inflation till the late 1980s and early 1990s and a 
growth in international interest rates throughout the entire period. Since then, a wide 
range of private reactions have triggered a significant development of the 
aforementioned financial globalisation linkages (financial liberalisation and 
deregulation, securitisation, OTC markets, institutional investors, universal banks, rapid 
development of computer science and communications technology).   
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These institutional and technological apparatus have allowed a larger flexibility of 
financial markets and contributed to a deeper and more pervasive financial integration. 
The statistics that characterise the financial markets during this period show that in 
certain markets, the degree of financial integration was surpassed in comparison with 
the pre-1914 financial globalisation.  This leads to a new perception of its secular 
movement, i.e. instead of the well-known U-shaped pattern, a new pattern is arguably 
more appropriate to represent the contemporary performance of globalised markets.  It 
is therefore imperative to briefly summarise below the well-known U-shaped pattern 
and to present the data that can support a new way of interpreting financial 
globalisation in a historical perspective.  
 
3. Contrasting the U-shaped pattern with the J-shaped proposition: some empirical 
evidence 
 
3.1 The U-shaped pattern 
 
Scholars such as Michel Bordo, Barry Eichengreen, Maurice Obstfeld, Alan Taylor, 
and Michael Twomey have been studying international market integration since the 
advent of the classical Gold Standard era. They have examined historical literature and 
data pertaining to global capital mobility and have identified that the degree of 
commercial and financial integration has oscillated in long waves since then. The 
empirical evidence of their investigation suggests a specific pattern of international 
market development, which corresponds to a U-shaped pattern. According to the U-
shaped pattern, financial markets presented high levels of integration during the forty 
years prior to WWI. This integration declined sharply in the years between the wars, 
recovering gradually after the Bretton Woods agreements until it reached again, in the 
1990s, the comparably high levels of financial integration attained before 1914.  
Therefore, scholars have concluded that, comparing the late 19th and the late 20th 
century, the recent high levels of trade and financial integration are not unprecedented.   
Obstfeld and Taylor (2002) have been explaining the U-shaped pattern in terms of the 
policy trilemma.  The trilemma arises because a macroeconomic policy regime for each 
country can include at most two elements of the three policy goals: 1. set free the cross-
border capital flows; 2. keep the exchange rate fixed; and 3. manage monetary policy 
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according to domestic objectives.  Policymakers cannot sustain all of these policies 
simultaneously.  Under these circumstances, the economic policy scope is especially 
limited, then antagonistic decisions of political economy must be taken causing an 
uneven tendency for capital mobility.  It means, capital flows have progressed and 
regressed over time according to decisions made under these policy constraints. The net 
result of this process accounts for a long term cyclical movement of the global capital 
market.  The authors aforementioned have applied statistical and/or econometric 
models to support their argumentation towards the U-curve.  Most commonly, they 
have used data on current accounts relative to GDP ratios, real and nominal interest rate 
differentials (1998) and on the relationship between domestic savings and investment 
(Taylor 1996). 
Although agreeing with the role played by the policy trilemma, Bordo & Eichengreen 
& Irwin (1999) and Bordo (2000) provide another approach to explain the ebb and flow 
of financial capital through time. According to them, this is a consequence of 
information asymmetries, contracting problems, and macroeconomic risks.  As a matter 
of fact, Bordo, Eichengreen & Kim (1998) reconsidered the U-shaped pattern as an 
suitable for of reflecting international market integration.  In their paper, they conclude 
that changes in operation in global financial markets induced by new information 
technologies and financial innovations reduced the “market-segmenting effects” of 
asymmetric information encouraging a wide range of financial securities, thus 
broadening the international financial linkages.  Nonetheless, they do not present 
statistical evidence showing the impacts of these broader global financial linkages on 
the level of current financial activities in comparison to the pre-1914 era.   
The U-shaped pattern has been considered a conventional wisdom on the evolution of 
international capital mobility since roughly half a century before WWI (Obstfeld & 
Taylor 2004:85).  The U-shaped trend line points out two key messages: 1) The first era 
of financial globalisation lasted from 1870 to 1914 and the second from the 1980s to 
the mid-1990s; and 2) The level of capital integration before 1914 was comparable to 
or even higher than that of the 1990s.  In short, contemporary financial globalisation is 
not unprecedented, therefore there is nothing new in the contemporary international 
financial scenario.  
The literature on the U-shaped pattern is widely known in academic circles, and for this 
reason this section presented only a short review of its main aspects. Before starting the 
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next section, it is worth emphasising that examining this literature, it can be seen that 
the data that has been used to outline the U-curve does not include all of the 1990s, i.e. 
scholars have been arriving at the U-shaped trend using data from the late 19th century 
up to 1995.  Expanding these figures to 2000 or more, certain measures that had held 
the U-trend line assumed a J-shape format.  Hence, the next section aims to present this 
statistical evidence that raises an argument for proposing an alternative interpretation of 
the historical course of global finance since the Gold Standard.  The empirical evidence 
I surveyed suggests that in some respects the financial integration of the contemporary 
financial markets is higher than in the past. Even in markets where scholars have 
achieved the U-shaped pattern, I propose that, updated to the end of the 1990s and into 
the early years of the 21st century, another shape would be found that is closely related 
to the so called J-curve.   
 
3.2 The J-shaped proposition 
 
The U-shaped pattern has not been represented in all financial indicators.  Maurice 
Obstfeld & Alan Taylor draw upon a range of indicators such as cross-border flows and 
stocks, saving-investment correlations, current account positions and asset price 
movements to describe financial globalisation as a phenomenon formed by multiple 
indicators.  But they did not assert that a U-curve is achieved in all these indicators.  
Conversely, Obstfeld & Taylor (2002) compiled the data on the stocks of foreign assets 
and liabilities concerning world GDP at benchmark years over the period of 1825 to 
1995, and found a U-shaped pattern for the period 1870-1995.  Moreover, Michael 
Twomey (2000) claimed a U-shaped pattern for the ratio stock of outward FDI/GDP 
between the 1913 and 1995.  
Several authors have agreed with the existence of the U-curve but not all of them have 
provided statistical evidence to demonstrate it (Eichengreen 1996). This way, apart 
from the stock of foreign assets and outward FDI, I did not find in the literature another 
statistical demonstration of the U-shaped pattern. This is understandable because 
accurate financial data for the period of the Gold Standard is quite scarce. Hence, this 
section aims to present quantitative evidence challenging the U-shaped pattern in those 
two markets where the U-curve was found, the stocks of foreign assets and liabilities 
and stock of outward FDI.  According to the data collected here, in those markets, 
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financial flows were bulkier during the 1990s and beyond than during the peak of the 
Gold Standard.  Therefore, instead of a U-curve, this new configuration resembles a J-
shaped pattern.  It is worth emphasising that in this thesis, the J-curve is also not 
represented in all financial markets, but in the two mentioned above.   
The J-shaped pattern proposal could be described as follows: these two financial 
markets were globally integrated during the classical Gold Standard era; their activities 
collapsed in the period between the wars; after a gradual post-war recovery they 
reached a higher level of activity starting from the 1960s, reaching a peak from the 
second half of the 1990s and onwards.  In contrast to the U-shaped pattern, the global 
financial flows during the contemporary era have been unprecedented and much more 
voluminous in these markets than they were in the classical Gold Standard era.  In this 
case, the J-curve draws attention to a uniqueness stage of financial integration in the 
late 20th and early 21st centuries.   
The appearance of the J-curve is closely related to the fact that the data presented by 
Obstfeld & Taylor (2002) and Twomey (2000) is outdated. Their calculations included 
data up to 1995, but I have updated these calculations to 2004 and 2005 (stocks of 
foreign assets and liabilities and stocks of outward FDI respectively).  Thus, the J-
shaped curve appears to be more robust to indicate the historical trajectory of these 
markets.  
There are two major reasons why it was not possible to search other indicators. Firstly, 
empirical tests to assess the performance of some markets are hindered because there is 
a scarcity of historical data to gauge the financial markets in the 19th century; and, 
secondly, some contemporary financial markets did not exist at that time.  These 
difficulties obstruct further statistical tests involving the two ages.   As a matter of fact, 
Rajan & Zingales (2003) suggest three main difficulties in obtaining reliable sources of 
historical information on financial markets:  1. primary sources are often lost or 
inaccessible; 2. secondary sources are contradictory or uncritically repeat the same 
primary sources; and 3. the type of statistical information changed from the late 
nineteenth to the late 20th century.   
In the following section, I shall present the statistical evidence collected in order to 
establish the alternative hypothesis proposed by this thesis.   
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a) Evidence of Foreign Assets and Liabilities 
 
The J-curve concerns a huge surge of financial activity during the 1990s and the early 
21st century, and this section presents an important piece of evidence towards the J-
shape proposition. Since the second half of the 1990s, Obstfeld and Taylor have 
published (in partnership and individually) books and articles on international capital 
mobility starting from the classical Gold Standard until 2000. Their 2002 piece 
examined the stocks foreign investment to GDP between 1825 and 1995 in an attempt 
to assess the historical extent of global capital mobility in this market.  Furthermore, in 
chapter two of their 2004 book, they presented the same model but updated the data to 
2000.  In the 2002 article they achieved the U-curve but in 2004 nothing was asserted 
about it.  
The results obtained by the calculations made in 2004 help to present a piece of 
empirical evidence for the J-curve.  However, some preliminary considerations about 
the methodology of their model are important beforehand in order to make clear in 
which sense their figures provide evidence for the J-curve. 
When they first presented the model, Obstfeld & Taylor (2004) intended to divide the 
stock of foreign-owned capital by the “seemingly ideal denominator”, which is the total 
stock of capital (financial or real) aiming to assess the size of global foreign investment.  
However, two major problems related to the denominator arose. First, the number of 
countries that have reliable data to estimate capital stocks is very limited. In addition 
Obstfeld & Taylor (2002:19) claim that: 
The problem with using financial capital measures is that they have greatly 
multiplied over the long run as financial development has expanded the number of 
balance sheets in the economy, thanks to the rise of numerous financial 
intermediaries.  This trend, in principle, could happen at any point in time without 
any underlying change in the extent of foreign asset holdings.   
 
Given these limitations, they chose a straightforward and available measure as a 
denominator, that is, the level of output calculated in current prices in US dollars.  As a 
result, their equation comprises a measure capable of evaluating the variations of 
capital-output ratio throughout time.  The nominal foreign data was classified into two 
categories: foreign assets and liabilities.  Their results relating to the ratio of foreign 
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assets and liabilities to the world GDP are especially noteworthy for the purpose of the 
J-curve and should be carefully examined.  The figure below is based on Obstfeld & 
Taylor (2004) and represents the foreign assets in the world economy between 1870 
and 2000.  It represents the best global indication for this kind of indicator achieved in 
the literature on financial globalisation until 2004.  As can be seen, the curve below 
resembles a “J” rather than a “U” curve.  
 
Figure 3. Foreign assets in world economy: 1870-200025 
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Source: Obstfeld & Taylor (2004:52, 53) 
 
Firstly, focusing on the asset side, during the classical Gold Standard era the ratio of 
foreign assets to world GDP rose from 7 per cent in 1870 to 18 per cent in 1914.  As 
expected, the ratio fell sharply during the interwar period, reaching a mere 5 per cent in 
1945, which was its lowest level during the interwar period. Only in 1980 did foreign 
assets regain a similar volume of transactions to that of 1914. In this year, 25 per cent 
of world output was invested in foreign assets, i.e. this mark is comparable to the 18 per 
cent achieved in 1914 and therefore a U-shaped pattern of foreign assets to world GDP 
is formed from 1870 to 1980.   
                                                 
25 This figure is based on data in Appendix 5. 
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However, from the mid-1980s until the end of the 1990s, the growth of this indicator 
was historically unprecedented.  As figure 3 shows, foreign assets in 1985 were twice 
as high as the 1914 figure.  In 1990, it was 49 per cent of world GDP, 62 per cent in 
1995 and 92 per cent in 2000, five times higher than in 1914.  This means that in 1990 
about half of world output was invested in foreign assets.  Only ten years later, an 
impressive figure of 92 per cent of world output was invested in these assets.  In 
comparison, this amount was only 18 per cent at the peak of the classical Gold 
Standard.  
The exponential growth presented above could be considered an unprecedented 
historical event, and thus provides evidence of a J-curve in the foreign assets to world 
GDP ratio but this evidence is not yet sufficiently robust.  Obstfeld & Taylor (2002, 
2004) recognise the existence of a problem in the numerator. According to them, for 
many countries there is no information about foreign investments, hence the authors 
add zero to the numerator but include their output in the denominator to compose the 
world GDP. Consequently, the estimation based on foreign assets to world output 
becomes underestimated.  For this reason, they call it the “lower bound” of the true 
ratio.   
An alternative to solve this problem is to include in the denominator the GDP of the 
same number of countries that have data for foreign investment. Thus, the sample from 
1870 to 1960 was considerably reduced, including only seven major economies (UK, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, US, Canada and Japan). After 1980, up to thirty 
countries that have both foreign investment and GDP data were included, based on IMF 
calculations. By the year 2000, the sample was expanded to over 60 countries.  It 
provides an alternative estimation called “foreign assets to sample GDP”.  Despite 
being more precise than the “lower bound” ratio, this measure is overestimated 
according to the authors because not many countries were included throughout the 
analysed time period.  This overestimation is higher between 1870 and 1960 because 
the sample includes only the seven “principal players”, i.e. countries that have more 
diversified foreign portfolios than the other economies of the world.   For this reason, 
they called this estimation the “upper bound” of the true ratio.   
As can be seen in Figure 3, the foreign assets to sample GDP (upper bound ratio) 
measure represents a higher but similar picture as that presented by the foreign assets to 
world GDP (lower bound ratio), also conforming more to the J-shape.  The ratios 
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presented are still much higher in the second globalisation era than during the first one.  
In 1870, the relative amount reached 47 per cent, rising to 55 in 1900 and falling 
slightly to 51 per cent in 1914. It collapsed to only 12 per cent in 1945, ascending 
gradually to 18 per cent in 1960, 36 per cent in 1980, and reached 60 per cent in 1990, 
similar to the circa 1914 figure.  Therefore, a U-curve is formed in terms of foreign 
assets to sample GDP for the period 1870-1990.   In 1995 this figure was 71 per cent, 
and in 2000 it reached 112 per cent.  Again, the same unprecedented level of financial 
integration can be observed since the 2000 figure is twice as big as the figure reached at 
the zenith of the first era (55 per cent in 1900).  This means an amount equivalent to 
more than the whole world output was invested in foreign assets in 2000 in comparison 
to 1900.   
The data collected for foreign liabilities is much more fragmented than for foreign 
assets, as can be seen in figure 4 below.  
 
Figure 4. Foreign liabilities in the world economy: 1870-200026 
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       Source: Obstfeld & Taylor (2004:52, 53) 
 
The foreign liabilities to world GDP in 1900 was 14 per cent, then reached its peak 
during the Gold Standard with 21 per cent in 1914, increasing slightly to 30 per cent in 
1980, but sharply in 1995 (79 per cent).  It reached the year 2000 presenting 95 per 
                                                 
26 This figure is based on data in Appendix 5. 
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cent, four times bigger than the 1900 figure.  In this case, a U-curve was formed from 
1900 to 1980, earlier than the pattern observed above in the assets side.  However, 
taking into account the period from 1900 to 2000, it can be seen that the picture 
resembles a J-curve.  During the 1990s, the growth of foreign liabilities by world GDP 
was particularly faster and again unprecedented.  Despite being fragmented, this could 
be another piece of evidence regarding the J-shape proposal. Conversely, secular 
comparisons are not possible regarding the ratio of liabilities to sample GDP since there 
are only four observations available.   
As mentioned above, Obstfeld & Taylor originally developed this model in their 2002 
article.  In their paper, their time series lasted from 1825 to 1995.  They interpret their 
results as providing further evidence for the U-shaped pattern for global financial 
markets.  On this account, Obstfeld & Taylor (2002:26) concluded that: 
Data on gross international asset positions seem broadly consistent with the  idea 
of a U-shape in the evolution of international capital mobility since the late 
nineteenth century, though it is less clear how we should compare the degree of 
diversification attained by some countries then with today’s apparently 
significant, albeit declining, home bias in foreign asset holdings.  Figuring 
whether too much or too little diversification existed at any point must remain 
conjectural, and conclusions would hinge on calibrated and estimated portfolio 
model applied historically.  This is certainly an object for future research. 
 
Observing the results up to 1995, this conclusion may be sound.  However, using the 
updated model, one realises that in any case the ratios of foreign capital stocks in 2000 
returned to levels comparable to the Gold Standard era.  Conversely, in 2000 all 
coefficients were much larger than those observed prior to WWI.  That is why these 
figures suggest an unprecedented level of global financial activity in the 1990s, 
resembling the J-pattern much more than the U-curve.   
In fact, comparing the conclusions presented in their 2002 article with their analysis 
displayed in chapter two of the 2004 book, they clearly change their interpretation 
regarding the applicability of the U-shape. As mentioned in the quotation above, using 
the data up to 1995, they asserted that the results are “broadly consistent” with the U-
shaped pattern.  However in the book there is no reference to the existence of the U-
curve related to foreign assets and liabilities.  Therefore, their latest calculations 
indicate that something different from the U-shaped pattern is happening in the 
international financial scenario in terms of foreign assets in the world economy.  The 
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quantitative survey pinpointed a time when a surge of foreign capital stocks occurred in 
the 1990s, and this discovery points to an alternative standard, referred to in this thesis 
as the J-curve.   
As noted above, Obstfeld & Taylor (2002, 2004) already recognised the shortcomings 
of their indicators basically regarding to the limited number of countries in their 
sample. However, they asserted that despite being fragmentary, their results were still a 
“potentially illuminating historical description” (2002:21, 2004:51). 
Indeed, as Obstfeld & Taylor recognised, both foreign assets and liabilities ratios (as a 
sample GDP and world GDP) are not truly global, especially for the 1870-1960 period. 
The “upper bound” is overestimation and the “lower bound” represents an 
underestimation of the true ratio.  Nonetheless, it is important to note that up to the 
present moment, no scholar had put together a reliable empirical estimation for foreign 
assets and liabilities for more countries than the seven economies included in Obstfeld 
& Taylor’s sample for 1870-1960. Therefore, this is the best sample and then the best 
indication available of this kind of cross-border transaction so far.   
Since it is not possible to overcome this problem at the present time, one can consider 
that the true ratio is certainly somewhere in between the “upper bound” and the “lower 
bound”, although it is not possible to define exactly at which point. Nevertheless, for 
the subsequent period to 1970, this problem is already solved. As will be presented in 
section 3.1.d, Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2006) calculated the external assets and liabilities 
for one hundred and forty-five countries (almost global coverage) for the 1970-2004 
period.  As can be seen in that figure, the level of international equity integration 
spanning these years increased significantly over the years analysed.   
Unfortunately, it is not possible to interpolate the Obstfeld & Taylor figures from 1870-
1960 to the Lane & Milesi-Ferretti calculation after the 1970s. But just for the sake of 
argument, let us suppose that the data on stock of foreign assets were available from 
1870 onwards, thereby providing a robust sample of 145 countries like the Lane & 
Milesi-Ferretti’s (2006) sample. In this supposition, the empirical problem in the 
numerator identified by Obstfeld & Taylor would be resolved. As a result, the value of 
the numerator will increase significantly, probably not as much as the value of the 
denominator, because the countries included certainly do not have as many external 
assets as the “principal players”, but the coefficient will be much more representative of 
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the true line.  The new ratios will promote an upward movement in the assets to the 
world GDP line. The precise magnitude of this growth is impossible to foresee without 
the data, but surely it will be traced in between the lower and upper bounds.  This 
supposition obviously cannot be considered as evidence but provides an illustrative 
picture of a J-curve for the entire period.  
There is a further indication suggesting that after the updated calculations the authors 
had indeed changed their mind.  Taylor (2004:29) replicated the same figure presented 
in this book for foreign assets and liabilities to 2000 and  affirmed that “we now know 
that trade has flourished ever since, as has finance, with both now flowing at volumes 
that, by some yardsticks, exceed the peak reached in 1913” (Italics added). The part of 
this sentence related to finance could be in fact an excellent short expression of the key 
message underlying the J-curve, as we present it at this stage of the thesis. In summary, 
the empirical result accrued is a piece of evidence pointing to an unprecedented surge 
in global foreign assets during the 1990s.  
This section satisfied one of the objectives proposed at the beginning of section 3.2 
concerning the establishment of the J-curve. The next and final step will be to 
investigate the historical behaviour of the FDI.  As mentioned before, Twomey (2000) 
achieved the U-curve through the stock of outward FDI using data from 1913 to 1995.  
Using the authoritative historical sources available, I have collected FDI data from 
1913 to 2005 and I have achieved a contrasting picture.  This picture is demonstrated in 
the next section. 
 
b) Evidence about Foreign Direct Investment 
 
The second main step in establishing the J-curve proposal is to demonstrate the J-shape 
through historical FDI data. Therefore, this section focuses on statistically presenting 
the J-curve based on FDI figures rather than discussing its dynamics, development and 
effects on home and recipient countries; neither is it the intention of this section to 
examine the FDI driving forces, nor to compare it with other sorts of investments such 
as portfolio investments.  Some of these aspects will be discussed in the appropriate 
historical context in the next chapter.  Nevertheless, some preliminary clarifications 
should be made to explain the central characteristics of FDI. 
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There are many definitions available for FDI.  Multilateral organisations such as the 
IMF, OECD, United Nations, and also scholars have defined FDI according to various 
criteria. The definition of FDI is based on balance-of-payments transactions between 
residents and non-residents. For the purpose of this section, it is enough to state that it 
is an investment made by a resident entity devoted to acquiring long-term interest in 
enterprises operating outside of the economy of the investor (its foreign affiliate).  The 
parent company and its affiliates form a Multinational Company (MNC). The resident 
must have control over the affiliate, i.e., 10 per cent or more of the ordinary shares or 
voting power of an incorporated firm, or its equivalent for an unincorporated firm. 
Lower ownership shares are known as foreign portfolio investments (FPI). In principle, 
as the main company obtains a lasting interest in a resident entity in another country, 
FDI can be considered an internalised investment flow, and includes capital and 
intangible assets. The investor keeps control of the subsidiary that it has established and 
derives benefits from its investment. There are two types of FDI according to its 
direction: inward FDI occurs when foreign capital is invested in local resources, and 
outward FDI when local capital is invested in foreign areas.  
In most of the specialised literature there is little doubt as to the importance of FDI to 
economic development and global capital integration during the 20th century.  The 
academic debate on FDI is very extensive and controversial.  Many of these aspects do 
not lie within the scope of this thesis, but there are some related to the focal point 
proposed by the J-format.   
Controversies also exist in terms of the choice of the more accurate historical FDI data. 
Scholars have debated what the more appropriate figures should be to describe the 
evolution of FDI during the Gold Standard and the interwar period.  So far, empirical 
evidence about stocks and flows during this period is scarce. Data collected by John 
Dunning, one of the most prominent scholars in this field, show that only ten percent of 
British overseas investments were direct investments on the eve of WWI.  This may be 
an indication that the global volume of FDI was not relevant at that time.  According to 
this author (and more recently to Nayyar 2006:147), there are no reliable statistics 
available for stocks of FDI before 1914.  Dunning (1988:71) states: 
We have still only a rough idea of the number of MNEs operating in 1914, or the 
value of their foreign investment at that time; and even today few countries 
publish the kind of information which scholars need to evaluate properly either 
the causes or the effects of international production. Thus the present statistical 
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portrait of the growth of MNE activity, which might enable us to test our new 
theories – or even the old ones – in any rigorous way, is not possible. 
 
This section assembles authoritative historical estimates of FDI stocks and flows 
spanning almost a hundred years, namely between 1914 and 2005.  Surveying the 
literature dealing with empirical evidence, one realises that the data organised by 
Dunning (1988) is a well-quoted reference for assessing the figures of the early 20th 
century. Dunning brought together estimates of inward and outward direct investment 
for developed and developing countries from 1914 to 1983 at benchmark years.  
Therefore, during this period, the thesis trusts in his data.  Since the 1970s, multilateral 
institutions have been providing reliable statistical information about it.  In this section, 
the data published by UNCTAD will be quoted.  
Table 7 shows the outward stock of FDI for the world economy and developed and 
developing countries provided by Dunning at benchmark years up to 1983.  UNCTAD 
data was added to complete the two subsequent decades. 
 
Table 7. Outward stock of foreign direct investment: 1914-2003 
(billions of dollars) 
  1914 1938 1960 1973 1983 1993 2003
World 14.48 26.35 66.10 210.50 572.80 2,241.84 8,196.86 
Developed  
Countries 14.30 26.35 62.90 204.40 555.20 2,033.61 7,272.32 
Developing 
countries neg neg 0.70 6.10 17.60 203.35 858.68 
Sources of Tables 3.1 and 3.2: The data contained in these tables have been derived from a large 
number of sources but the main ones have been as follows: 
1914: Allen and Donnithorne (China and Japan, 1954), Bagchi (India, 1972), Callis (South East Asia, 
1942), Frankel, S. H. (Africa, 1938), Hou (China, 1965), Houston and Dunning (UK, 1976), Lewis 
(various 1938, 1945), McKay (Russia, 1970), Pamuk (Ottomon Empire, 1981), Paterson (Canada, 
1976), Rippy (Latin America, 1959), Svedberg (various, 1978), Wilkins (various, 1988). 
1938: Allen and Donnithorne (China and Japan, 1954), Bagchi (India, 1972), Callis (South East Asia, 
1942), Conan (Sterling Area, 1960), Hou (China, 1965), Lewis (various 1938, 1945), Svedberg 
(various data collected by him, 1978), Teichova (East Europe, 1974), United Nations (1949). 
1960: Various government publications are cited in United Nations (UNCTC) (1981) and especially 
those of the United States (Department of Commerce), United Kingdom (Department of Trade), and 
Canada (Dominion Bureau of Statistics). See also Conan (Sterling Area, 1960) and Kidron (India, 
1965). 1971: OECD (various dates), United Nations (UNCTC) (1978), (1981) and various government 
publications as cited therein. 1938: US Department of Commerce (1986), Dunning and Cantwell 
(1987). (Dunning, 1988:75) 
Source: From 1914 to 1983: Dunning (1988:74). From 1993 onwards: UNCTAD, World Investment 
Report, online database.  
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From 1914 to 2003, the world stock of outward FDI presented two markedly different 
growth patterns.  The first lasted from 1914 to 1960, the second from 1973 to 2003.  
One can see that at each two-decade interval between the benchmark years of 1914, 
1938 and 1960, the outward stock of FDI doubled.  However, this growth accelerated 
considerably during the subsequent phase, especially after 1983.  Between 1973 and 
1983 it increased by 172 per cent, during the period 1983-1993 it grew by 291 per cent, 
and finally for 1993-2003 it increased by 265 per cent, i.e. the amount invested was 
much higher than in the interwar period, as is to be expected (table 10).  Considering 
the last thirty years, the world outward stock of FDI increased an incredible thirty-
seven fold.  Taking into account the paucity of data for the period before 1914 and 
Dunning’s estimations, this extraordinary increase denotes that activity in this market 
gained momentum after the 1980s.  
Table 7 also reveals that, up to 1960, the volume of investment in developing countries 
was negligible. However, from the 1970s to 2003, the accumulated growth rate for 
these economies was almost three times higher than for developed countries, and more 
than twice the rate of world growth. Whilst developing countries had little more than 10 
per cent of the world FDI in 2003, the figures in Table 10 show that they made 
significant progress throughout this period, even though a considerable part of this 
investment is concentrated in some emerging countries such as China, India and Brazil. 
  
Table 8. Rate of growth of outward stock of foreign direct investment: 1973-83. 
Year 
 
World Developed Developing  
Rate of growth 
% 
Accumulated rate  
% 
Rate of growth 
% 
Accumulated rate 
% 
Rate of growth  
% 
Accumulated rate 
% 
1973 - - - - - - 
1983 172.11 172.11 171.62 171.62 188.52 188.52 
1993 291.38 463.50 266.28 437.91 1,055.40 1,243.92 
2003 265.63 729.13 257.61 695.51 322.27 1,566.19 
 Source: Table 7.   
 
A similar pattern of two distinct phases occurred with the world inward stock of FDI 
from 1914 to 2003.  Table 9 reveals that in each of the intervals between the benchmark 
years up to 1960, the inward stock grew twofold but the rate of growth was much 
higher in the second phase.   From 1973 to 1983, world inward stock increased by 231 
per cent, 321 per cent and 254 per cent respectively (Table 10). Taking into account the 
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three decades, the growth of world inward stock of FDI was forty-eight fold, even more 
impressive than the outward growth figure.   
 
Table 9. Inward stock of foreign direct investment: 1914-2003 
(Billions of dollars) 
 1914 1938 1960 1973 1983 1993 2003 
World 14.09 24.32 54.50 166.70 552.60 2,329.05 8,245.07 
Developed 
Countries 5.24 8.35 36.70 121.30 416.90 1,595.68 5,701.63 
Developing 
Countries neg neg 17.60 45.20 135.60 715.64 2,280.17 
Source: From 1914 to 1983: Dunning (1988:74). From 1993 onwards: UNCTAD, World 
Investment Report, online database.  
 
Likewise, developing countries had a very small amount during the first phase.  
However, in the thirty years following 1973, the accumulated rate of growth was not as 
inclusive as the rate observed in outward stocks, although it was still much higher than 
the rate for developed economies and the world economy (Table 10).  
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to delve into explanations of this phenomenon.  
The central point to be highlighted here is that the tables above present another piece of 
evidence regarding a rapid rate of increase for both outward and inward stock of FDI 
from the 1980s to 2003.  The stock of FDI gradually became more important during the 
course of the 20th century, but it reached an unprecedented level of transaction by the 
end of the 1990s and beginning of the 21st century.  The 1914 amount was only 
surpassed in the late 1980s, and the stocks of outward and inward FDI became much 
higher (in absolute terms) at the end of the 1990s.  On account of the figures presented 
above, this could be considered another piece of evidence pointing to the J-curve. 
 
Table 10. Rate of growth of inward stock of foreign direct investment: 1973-83. 
Year 
 
World Developed Developing 
Rate of growth 
% 
Accumulated rate  
% 
Rate of growth 
% 
Accumulated rate 
% 
Rate of growth 
% 
Accumulated rate 
% 
1973 - - - - - - 
1983 231.49 231.49 243.69 243.69 200.00 200.00 
1993 321.47 552.96 282.75 526.44 427.76 627.76 
2003 254.01 806.97 257.32 783.76 218.62 846.38 
 Source: Table 7.   
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As a rule, comparisons made only in absolute values do not properly characterise the 
phenomenon in question. As can be seen in Table 7, Dunning (1988) pieced together a 
large number of sources to derive the outward and inward estimations of FDI.  He did 
not calculate the share of world FDI stock to world GDP, and his calculation in the 
1988 book stopped in 1983.  In order to avoid methodological problems, I decided to 
use only one source of data to plot Figure 5 below, which represents a J-curve for FDI 
stocks.  Therefore, the figure is based on the UNCTAD (1994) data on world stock of 
outward FDI relative to world GDP. UNCTAD calculations are based on its own 
databases and on the estimation of scholars such as Dunning and Bairoch.  The 1913 
figure is an estimate.  From 1960 to 1985, the statistics are based on UNCTAD 
(1994:130), but from 1990 onwards, the data were collected from online statistical 
databases. Despite the wide gap between 1913 and 1960, one can suppose that between 
the wars, the amount of world FDI should be much lower than the figures presented for 
1913 and 1960.  
  
Figure 5. FDI as a percentage of world economic activity: 1913-2005 (in 
percentage)27 
y = -0.0085x6 + 0.2335x5 - 2.4563x4 + 12.329x3 - 29.537x2 + 28.347x
R2 = 0.9924
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Source: UNCTAD (1994:130). From 1995 onwards extracted from UNCTAD, 
World Investment Report, online database 
 
                                                 
27 This figure is based on data in Appendix 6. The most significant R2 was found with a polynomial trend 
line of order 6.  
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According to UNCTAD data, the stock of FDI was 9 per cent of world GDP in 1913 
and dropped to 4.4 per cent in 1960.  UNCTAD did not provide any figure before this 
year but one can suppose that this percentage might be lower in between these two 
benchmark years due to the assertion in the quotation of Dunning (1988) at the 
beginning of this section.  The ratio of FDI by world GDP did not change from 1960 
until 1975.  It then climbed slowly to 4.8 per cent in 1980, rising to 6.4 per cent in 
1985.  In 1990, the share of FDI stock was around 9 per cent, the same figure as 1913.  
As a result, a U-curve could be traced from 1913 to 1990. Similarly to what happened 
in the foreign capital stocks discussed in the previous section, this share increased 
quickly during the 1990s, especially after the second half of the decade.  It reached 20 
per cent in 2000 and was at a peak of 24 per cent in 2005.  In summary, the 1914 ratio 
of FDI outward stock to world output was equalled in 1990 and is now roughly three 
times higher. The results indicate a J-shaped curve for the period in analysis.   
In conclusion, statistical comparisons between the two ages of financial globalisation 
cannot be made because of the absence of pre-1914 data.  On the other hand, the 1913 
and 1914 figures are based on the UNCTAD Division of Transnational Corporations 
and Investment and on the work of prominent scholars.  In the previous section, the 
data produced by Obstfeld & Taylor allowed comparisons between the 19th and the 20th 
centuries.  In the case of FDI, this is not possible, but on the other hand the sample of 
countries is much greater. Obstfeld & Taylor’s sample comprised seven developed 
countries for the 1870-1960 period.  
Dunning’s figures for the benchmark years 1914, 1938, 1960 and 1973 are not only 
higher than the sample provided by Obstfeld & Taylor for this era, but also encompass 
developing economies.  Dunning’s sample included in North America: the US and 
Canada; in Western Europe: the UK, Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Switzerland; and other developed countries such as Russia, Japan, 
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and others (not specified). Dunning’s sample 
therefore includes at least fifteen developed economies. The number of developing 
countries was not specified but consists of countries from Latin America, Africa, Asia 
(China, India and Ceylon, now Sri Lanka), Southern Europe and the Middle East. 
Altogether, his sample has a considerably higher international coverage. Additionally, 
not only his research but other studies such as Wilkins (1988) indicate that the value of 
FDI was modest for the world economy from 1870-1914.  
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All things considered, Figure 5 illustrates that while the ratio of FDI in world economic 
activity was less than 10 per cent in 1913, it is now more than 20 per cent, therefore 
providing another piece of evidence for the J-curve.   
 
3.3. New financial markets: additional indication of a huge surge of global financial 
activity after the 1970s 
 
A recurrent difficulty to all who research long historical series is the availability of 
consistent statistics.  The figures are frequently unavailable because the historical 
records were not compiled in the past or simply because they did not exist.  There are 
possible reasons for this, such as a lack of scientific techniques, the existence of few 
research institutes well prepared to collect, process and publish data reports, scant 
volume of transactions, difficulties in commuting reliable information from country to 
country, thereby exacerbating the constant problem of under-report or over-report, and 
missing information due to great disturbances such as wars, natural disasters, etc.   
Moreover, current methods of data gathering and classification are quite different from 
the past, which makes the data of the 1870-1914 period unrelated to the present data. 
The problem of data inconsistency occurs not only in statistics for international 
finances but also in all other measurable economic activities.  For these reasons, the 
dearth of historical data hinders comparisons between 19th and 20th century financial 
indicators.  
Recently, some international institutions such as the BIS, IMF, OECD, UNCTAD, 
World Bank and others headquartered in most countries have been making a great 
effort to provide a consistent source of historical statistical information. In addition, 
scholars (Dunning, Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, Obstfeld & Taylor, among others) have 
been developing interpolation techniques with a view to standardising 19th and 20th 
century data, as well as organising dispersed estimates and improving methods of data 
presentation in order to allow long-term comparisons. Nevertheless, the historical 
statistics that have been provided by those institutions date back to the 1970s or to the 
1980s, and therefore, the problem of historical comparability between the two eras of 
financial globalisation remains.  Likewise, despite the scientific endeavour made by 
scholars, the historical data series for the late 19th and early 20th centuries have not yet 
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been completed for various key financial markets.  In some cases, the data from that 
period is available only for some benchmark years, as noted in the two sections above.  
One of the characteristics of the 1970s was the emergence of international financial 
diversification. Financial diversification was one of the characteristics of the floating 
exchange regime that emerged after the demise of the Bretton Woods agreements. The 
sequence of crises occurring in the international scenario (oil crises in the 1970s, debt 
crises and stock exchange crash in the 1980s) encouraged private agents to develop 
techniques that reduced risk by allocating investments among various financial 
instruments. Financial diversification combines a wide variety of investments within a 
portfolio, although it is not a guarantee against loss. Investors have been spreading their 
portfolio among multiple investment vehicles such as foreign exchange, stocks, bonds, 
mutual funds, and many others. The institutions quoted above have developed 
indicators for measuring these new markets in vogue, meaning that there is plenty of 
evidence of the growth of the current global financial market. 
Throughout the last thirty years, many new financial contracts, intermediaries and 
markets have appeared and quickly developed.  This has contributed to an increase in 
the level of financial enmeshment over these decades. Accordingly, certain financial 
statistics that are based on new financial markets cannot show whether or not the world 
economy has currently returned to pre-1914 levels of financial integration because 
those markets did not exist in the first wave of financial globalisation.  Therefore, no 
historical comparisons are possible. Even so, these present data can reveal, in absolute 
and in relative numbers, the explosive growth in international finance since the demise 
of the Bretton Woods agreements.  For this reason, this section proposes to present 
additional evidence of a huge surge of financial activity from the 1990s onwards.  
Essentially, this is the main message underlying the J-shaped proposal.  
In the recent literature on finance it has become common to describe the last twenty 
years of the 20th century as the era of financialisation. The term has been used with 
increasing frequency over the past few years to describe the increasing importance of 
financial markets in the performance and prospective direction of the world economy. 
Financial markets have experienced a dramatic growth since the 1970s.  The resurgence 
of the international financial markets did not happen by accident, but has been shaped 
by a whole set of historically specific transformations that had already taken place 
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during the 1970s. These aspects will be discussed in the next chapter while this last 
section aims to present some of these indicators.  
The first indicator to be presented is the cross-broder transactions in bonds and equities.  
Figures for cross-border transactions in bonds and equities as a percentage of GDP are 
not available from a single source. Therefore, the table below combines IMF and BIS 
figures to show growth from 1970 until the end of the 1990s.  The BIS provided a 
provisory figure for 1999 then ceased publishing this information.  Nevertheless, Table 
11 presents the dramatically increasing performance of this market.    
 
Table 11. Cross-border transactions in bonds and equities* as a percentage of 
GDP 
 19701 1975 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
USA 2.8 4 9 35 89 96 107 129 131 135 159 213 230 
Japan - 2 8 62 119 92 72 78 60 65 79 96 91 
Germany 3.3 5 7 33 57 55 85 170 158 172 200 257 334 
France - n.a. 5 21 54 79 122 187 197 187 258 314 415 
Italy - 1 1 4 27 60 92 192 207 253 470 677 640 
Canada 5.7 3 9 27 65 83 114 153 206 187 251 355 331 
Average 3.9 3.0 6.5 30.3 68.5 77.5 98.7 151.5 159.8 166.5 236.2 318.7 340.2
*Gross purchases and sales of securities between residents and non-residents 
1 IMF, 1997:60. 
Source: BIS 1999:118. 
 
Cross-border transactions represented around 3 per cent of the GDP for these core 
countries during the early 1970s.  Ten years later, this ratio had crawled to 6.5 per cent 
but by the following decade it had risen to 68.5 per cent.  In 1992, these countries 
invested on average roughly 100 per cent of their GDP in bonds and equities. This 
accelerated growth was maintained until the end of this decade (especially from 1995 
onwards) when these economies were investing more than three times their GDP in 
financial cross-border transactions. The sample is limited but reveals a strong tendency 
in terms of strategic decisions in international finance taken in key countries in three 
continents.  In 1975, this ratio was an inexpressive 3 per cent but had reached 340 
percent of GDP in 1998, i.e., it had grown at a rate of 11,333 per cent.  During the same 
period, their GDP rose by 196 per cent and their gross fixed capital formation increased 
by only 193 per cent.28     
                                                 
28 Cf. UNCTAD, World Investment Report, online database. 
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Another key indicator that has been progressing significantly since the last quarter of 
the 20th century is the net international bank loans. The amount of bank lending is a 
chief international macroeconomic indicator to present the level of activities in current 
financial markets. Nayyar (2006:142) searched for the performance of the banking 
activity from the 1960s to 2000.  The results once more confirm the trend of 
extraordinary activity in this market.  
As a proportion of world output, net international bank loans rose from 0.7% in 
1964 to 8.0% in 1980 and 13.5% in 2000. As a proportion of world trade, net 
international bank loans rose from 7.5% in 1964 to 42.6% in 1980 and 66.9% in 
2000. As a proportion of world gross fixed capital formation, net international 
bank loans rose from 6.2% in 1964 to 51.1% in 1980 and 62.8% in 2000. It is 
worth noting that the gross size of the international banking market, which 
includes claims on (or liabilities to) banks, was more than double that of net 
international bank lending. Cross-border inter-bank liabilities rose from a modest 
$455bn in 1970 to $5,560bn in 1990 and $8,998bn in 2000.  
 
Additionally, the growth of FDI and portfolio investment (PI) have marked the 
contemporary era.  The chart below represents the flows of FDI and PI relative to the 
GDP for some developed countries.   The rate of growth for each period grew slowly up 
to 1985. Starting from the second half of the 1980s, this growth became more 
accelerated and achieved its highest point in 2000. In 2002, it fell significantly before 
recovering again the following year.     
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Figure 6. Portfolio investment plus FDI: selected developed economies 1980-200329 
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Source: UNCTAD database online.  
 
As a consequence of the macroeconomic instability and substantial degree of 
uncertainty embedded in the world economy after the 1970s, the international financial 
scenario of the late 20th century was marked by the introduction of an enormous amount 
of financial innovations such as derivatives (futures, swaps and options). As noted 
above, derivative markets are negotiated in two different ways: exchange traded 
derivatives and over-the-counter derivatives. The former are futures, options and swaps. 
In contrast, tailor-made derivatives are traded on over-the-counter (OTC) markets. 
Corporations, investment and commercial banks, hedge funds, government agencies, 
etc have been the main clients of those markets.  They have been using derivatives as a 
tool to transfer risk due to the multiple possibilities of contracting and re-contracting 
payments in the future against commodities or even other assets.30  
The OTC market is assessed in notional amounts. The table describes its evolution from 
1987 to 2005 and contrasts its annual growth rate with the performance of the world 
GDP. The rate of world GDP growth was placed as a parameter to measure the 
acceleration of the activity in the OTC market over the past two decades.  The 
                                                 
29 This figure is based on data in Appendix 7. 
30 The characteristics and the repercussions of this market will be discussed in the next chapter.  The 
present chapter concentrates on providing statistical evidence of the great surge of this activity over the 
last two decades. 
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difference between them is substantial. While the OTC market grew by 37 per cent on 
average, world GDP grew by only 5 per cent. 
 
Table 12. Notional amounts of OTC derivative transactions at year-end and world 
GDP: 1987-2005 
 OTC billion  $ OTC in percentage World GDP in percentage 
Year Total 
Annual 
growth Accumulated 
Annual 
growth Accumulated 
1987 865.60 - - - - 
1988 1,654.30 91 91 -  
1989 2,474.80 50 141 12 12 
1990 3,450.37 39 180 5 17 
1991 4,449.97 29 209 7 24 
1992 5,345.70 20 229 5 29 
1993 8,474.57 59 288 7 36 
1994 11,303.21 33 321 2 37 
1995 17,712.63 57 378 7 44 
1996 24,953.15 41 419 10 54 
1997 29,035.06 16 435 2 56 
1998 50,997.00 76 511 (1) 56 
1999 58,265.00 14 525 (1) 55 
2000 63,009.00 8 533 4 59 
2001 69,207.30 10 543 3 61 
2002 101,318.49 46 589 (1) 61 
2003 142,306.92 40 630 4 65 
2004 183,583.27 29 659 12 77 
2005 213,195.58 16 675 12 89 
Source: OTC figures are based on ISDA – available at: http://www.isda.org/statistics/pdf/ISDA-
Market-Survey-annual-data.pdf.  GDP is based on UNCTAD database online. 
 
One of the indicators frequently quoted as demonstrative of the impressive growth of 
international financial activity is the global foreign exchange market turnover.  It was 
only in 1989 that the BIS began reporting data for this indicator with a global coverage 
of countries.  Every three years since then, the institution provides a figure that 
represents an average day of the year for the global foreign exchange market, with 
April as the benchmark month.  
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Table 13. Foreign exchange market turnover¹ daily averages in April: 1989-2007 
(in billions of US dollars) 
Global foreign exchange market turnover 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 
Spot transactions  317   394      494     568     386      621   1,005 
Outright forwards    27     58        97     128     130      208      362 
Foreign exchange swaps  190   324      546     734     656      944   1,714 
Estimated gaps in reporting    56     44        53       61       28      107      129 
Total “traditional” turnover  590   820   1,190  1,490  1,200   1,880   3,210 
Memo: Turnover at April 2007 exchange rates²  650   880   1,150  1,650  1,420   1,950   3,210 
Source: BIS (2005:5) and (2007:5). 
1 Adjusted for local and cross-border double counting 
2 Non-US dollar legs of foreign currency transactions were converted into original currency amounts at 
average exchange rates for April of each survey year and then reconverted into US dollar amounts at 
average April 2007 exchange rates. 
 
Once more, the figures presented in Table 13 show an impressive increase in exchange 
markets since 1989.  Average daily turnover rose steadily from 1989 to 1998.  In 2001, 
it experienced a slight fall but increased dramatically until 2007, reaching the 
impressive amount of $3.2 trillion.  Giddens (2002:9) made an intriguing illustration 
that can be used to illustrate how dramatic this figure is. According to him, measured in 
terms of a pile of hundred-dollar notes, a trillion dollars would be over 120 miles high – 
an impressive 20 times higher than Mount Everest. The data collected by Giddens 
however, needs to be updated for present-day readers.  Therefore, taking the 2007 
turnover, the dollar stack will reach a staggering 60 times higher than Mount Everest on 
a daily basis.  This shows a volume of external transactions without precedent. To a 
large extent this reflects a number of mergers, acquisitions, exports, hedges contracts 
and an unrestrained variety of financial activities in general that marked the world 
economy during the post-1970s era. 
On top of the indicators presented above, this section will consider another dimension 
of the international financial integration measured by gross holdings of foreign assets 
and foreign liabilities. The development of the empirical research on statistical 
measures to evaluate financial integration can be perceived by the study of Lane & 
Milesi-Ferreti (2006).  They constructed a comprehensive and up-to-date dataset of 
external assets and liabilities for 145 countries for the 1970-2004 period, providing new 
evidence on global financial integration.   The external assets and liabilities are divided 
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in 4 categories: portfolio equity; FDI; debt (portfolio debt plus other investment); and 
financial derivatives. 
In the globalisation literature, one well-accepted way to measure the level of financial 
integration is adding the foreign assets and liabilities.  In this section, I made this 
calculation using a sample of 24 developed countries and 36 emerging economies 
divided by the total amount of GDP of those countries (see footnote 61).  The results 
are plotted in the figure below. 
 
Figure 7. International equity integration, advanced countries and emerging 
markets: 1970-200431 (in percentage) 
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                      Source: Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2006) 
 
The results express the degree of importance of overseas financial transactions in these 
economies.  The figure shows a strong tendency towards increased growth in financial 
integration amongst those countries.  This movement began in the second half of the 
1980s, but sped up in the following decade. The tendency of globalisation is much 
stronger in the developed countries than in emerging markets: across industrialized 
countries, foreign assets and liabilities have increased sevenfold as a share of GDP, 
                                                 
31 This figure is based on data in Appendix 8. The sample of countries was selected according to the 
classification provided by Choi et all (2007:32). They classifiy as emerging Market Group the following 
36 countries: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt, 
Estonia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay and Venezuela. Likewise, they classify as advanced 
country group the following 24 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. 
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while emerging markets, despite having a smaller global share of privately-held assets, 
nearly doubled their economic internationalisation throughout the period.  Overall, 
Figure 7 shows clearly that over the past quarter of century, both foreign assets and 
liabilities to GDP ratio have increased significantly, and this growth accelerated since 
the mid-1990s, being even higher for advanced economies.   
This section has considered several salient dimensions of contemporary international 
financial integration. The evidence provided here suggests that the relative pace of 
international financial integration has lagged behind the expansion in trade integration 
and the growth of world GDP.  They point out linking patterns to strengthen the 
argument to describe financial globalisation in a historical perspective proposed by the 
J-curve. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This chapter began with a discussion about the core conceptual and historical aspects in 
the debate on financial globalisation.  After that, the mainstream empirical 
interpretation of the phenomenon in a historical perspective, namely the U-shaped 
pattern, was briefly presented.  Empirically, authors have arrived at the U-curve for 
stocks of foreign assets and liabilities and stocks of outward FDI using data from the 
late 19th early 20th centuries up to 1995 (Obstfeld & Taylor 2002; Twomey 2000). 
Qualitative explanations on these indicators were avoided because the main purpose of 
this chapter is provides statistical evidence to establish the alternative proposal of the J-
curve.  
The chapter then continued by presenting available historical empirical evidence on the 
same two indicators that the above authors found the U-curve.  The historical scope was 
expanded up to 2000 (for foreign investment) and up to 2005 (for FDI), and the results 
contrasted with the U-shaped pattern.  Instead of a “U”, I found a J-shaped pattern. 
Despite the statistical limitations, the information already existing represents years of 
research of prominent scholars and institutions.  Accordingly, based on it, the J-shaped 
trend line could be traced by the stocks of foreign assets and liabilities from 1870 to 
2000, and for outward stocks of FDI from 1913 to 2005.  This evidence is sufficient to 
establish the J-curve as a research hypothesis.  Thus, the evidence provided reveals a 
  120
huge and unprecedented surge in financial activities after the 1990s.  That is to say, 
regarding the markets surveyed the level of global financial integration in the late 20th 
century/early 21st century differs radically from the past.  The U-shaped trend suggests 
that the contemporary level of integration replays earlier historical scenarios, whereas 
the J-curve invites us to rethink the underpinnings of recent developments in financial 
globalisation. 
Furthermore, some additional indications of the contemporary financial upsurge were 
presented through the performance of a variety of novel and conventional markets from 
the 1970s onwards, such as portfolio investment, international banking loans, notional 
amount of OTC market and foreign assets and liabilities.  The growth of these markets 
was found to be exponential over the past two decades. 
As for the U-curve, the J-curve does not purport to be a general standard that includes 
all financial markets and establish a unique historical pattern for all of them. However, 
the J-curve launches a different proposal from the U-curve.  The J-curve proposes that 
the degree of financial market integration by the end of the 1990s did not repeat the 
same level achieved during the Gold Standard at least in the two indicators researched.  
This is an indication that a different that highlight further investigation about the 
financial framework of contemporary markets. Accordingly, the J-curve certainly leads 
to an additional inquiry about the factors that have triggered the changes in its 
performance.  This qualitative analysis will be made in the next chapter. For now, it is 
important to emphasise the key message extracted from the empirical finding, which is 
that the magnitude of foreign assets and FDI stocks did not match the “back to the 
future” scenario proposed by the U-shaped pattern.   
Additional evidence regarding the historical context complements the message 
underlying the J-shape and provides further support to its view. Therefore, the next 
chapter will provide a historical assessment between the first and the second eras of 
financial globalisation in order to raise the necessary qualitative indications to 
corroborate the J-shape proposal.    
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IV. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE BETWEEN THE TWO ERAS OF FINANCIAL 
GLOBALISATION 
 
  122
1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter established empirically that a J-shaped pattern is more appropriate 
than a U-curve to describe the process of financial globalisation in certain key financial 
markets.  The left arm of the J identifies the Gold Standard as the first era of financial 
globalisation and the longer upward stroke on the right corresponds to the second age 
which occurred in the 1990s to the present day. The evidence presented reveals that this 
latter period was unprecedented in terms of stocks of foreign assets and outward FDI. 
Nevertheless, the J-curve proposal is not only supported by empirical evidence but also 
by historical analysis which takes into account the role played by institutions and other 
factors outside economics in the process of international financial development.   
Behind this J-curve lie key institutional changes that require more detailed examination. 
This chapter aims to scrutinise how these different institutional frameworks contribute 
to the explanation of the J-curve by examining the characteristics of the institutional 
arrangements underlying these two eras. The institutional interpretation underlying this 
analysis was discussed in chapter one. In the next section, some clarifications are made 
related to the use of the term “rules of the game” and the institutional interpretation 
adopted in this thesis.  After that, section 2.2 is dedicated to surveying the distinctive 
institutional characteristics of the Gold Standard. For comparative purposes, the 
narrative then takes a huge leap to the 1980s, then, section 2.3 aims to evaluate the 
financial institutional structure set up from the 1980s onwards.32   Section 3 concludes 
the chapter.  
 
 
 
                                                 
32 There is an extensive literature concerning the interwar era.  Just to mention some influential studies, 
one can consult: Block (1977), Clarke (1973), Eichengreen (1992, 19996), Friedman (1953), Keynes 
(1930, 1931a, 1931b), Lewis (1949), Nurske (1944), Pollard (1970), Soule (1947), Triffin (1947, 1967), 
and Wolfe (1950). 
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2. Building a dense network of historically specific global financial institutions: from 
the era of British dominance to Pax Americana33 
 
2.1. Institutional prerequisites to investigate the J-curve 
 
Financial activities are formal and/or informal contracts that are undertaken in the 
present but most of the time end in the future, thus they are subject to some degree of 
payoff uncertainty.  As a result, contracts and instruments involved should be carefully 
organised, ruled and managed in order to guarantee that the system continues operating 
in normal conditions. That is why financial activities depend on a framework of 
institutional arrangements, such as: markets, money (including international monetary 
standards and monetary instruments), habits, traditions, rules and regulations (both de 
jure and de facto regulations), legal proceedings and policy schemes. Financial flows 
have flourished and evolved throughout history encouraged by the development, 
adaptation and interaction of those institutional aspects.    
Besides the economic characteristics discussed in this thesis, institutional and political 
factors deeply marked the two ages of financial globalisation. In the first phase, the 
exuberance of the British economy determined the pace of international capital flows, 
as well as the increased degree of financial integration. In the recent period, the 
hegemonic power of the US has been exerting an essential role on the shape of the 
contemporary global financial structure. The economic and political power of these 
nations strongly influenced both the international financial performance and the 
                                                 
33 In academic circles, the word Pax has been used to describe a period in history marked by the absence 
of major wars, usually imposed by a predominant nation. Accordingly, this term has frequently been 
associated with the concept of “hegemony” derived from Sociology. The term Pax Britannica was coined 
to describe a peace imposed by Great Britain upon hostile nations, especially in the 19th century.  Patrick 
K. O’Brein (2003) argued against the adequacy of this customary use.  The starting point of his argument 
is the Gramsci concept of hegemony described as a combination of both coercion (read: domination by 
force) and consent (read: leadership by consent). Examining the history of the two main superpowers (the 
UK and the US) since the eighteenth century, he concluded that the role played by Britain in 1793-1914 
and the US after WWII in the global economic order have been similar, however only the US developed 
both aspects of hegemony defined by Gramsci. Then, he considered that since Rome, only the US 
exercised a global hegemonic role, and it happened between 1941 and 2001. In this sense, throughout the 
period researched by O’Brien, history has registered only two periods of relative peace imposed by 
hegemonic nations, the Pax Romana and the Pax Americana. According to him, the common 
representation of the Pax Britannica as a hegemonic global power in the Gramscian sense is both a 
“theory without history” and a myth.  
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development of institutions to tackle the repercussions of the ebbs and flows of market 
volatility, euphoria and crises. 
Institutions progressed and regressed throughout time.  Their historical changes provide 
an important insight into understanding why the recent financial globalisation 
framework has been capable of dealing with an unprecedented volume of capital 
inasmuch as it leads to a deeper study of the underlying historical specificities of each 
period. In fact, this is the key proposition underlying the J-curve, i.e. the process of 
capital mobility and market integration has evolved during the second wave of financial 
globalisation.  A way to investigate this development is through the study of the 
historical institutional framework of the two eras. 
Institutional characteristics are specific in different moments of history and confer 
idiosyncrasy to each international financial system. The first and the second wave of 
financial globalisation have their specific institutional characteristics related to the 
historical period in which they took place. Examining the two historical experiences, it 
is clear that there have been a “dense network of financial institutions” (Baldwin & 
Martin 1999:8) underlying the development of both periods. As discussed in chapter 
one, Hodgson (1998, 2002a:53) brings to attention for the importance of placing the 
economic analysis on the grounds of historically specific economic institutions. His 
purpose is to encourage the analyst to take into account the historical specificity of 
institutions in order to establish their conclusions about the subject in debate.  
Considering these two suggestions, the analysis proposed in this chapter is focused on 
an examination of the “dense network of historically specific financial institutions” to 
characterise each financial globalisation era and to provide a description of their salient 
aspects.   
The J-shaped proposition represents a sharp contrast of international capital mobility 
between the Gold Standard period and the post-Bretton Woods era.  The J-curve 
acknowledges that the pre-WWI financial market integration was huge and 
unprecedented in the context of the turn of the 20th century, but as demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, that level of financial integration was overcome from the 1990s to 
2005.  Then an unparalleled age of financial globalisation arrived. Both the old and the 
new episodes were benchmarks of financial globalisation and demand further 
investigation of its institutional underpinnings.   
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Despite there being contrasts, these experiences have in common the fact that one 
nation played a decisive role in the drawing of the international financial architecture.  
Britain was the dominant nation during the Gold Standard while the US has been the 
economic and political hegemonic superpower since the 1970s, especially after the 
collapse of the Soviet block in 1989.  However, the institutional nature of these 
financial regimes is quite different. Examining past and current institutional 
frameworks should be a step towards understanding these differences, and then to 
reveal key points in favour of the J-pattern proposition. By doing so, the message 
proposed by the J-curve is not only reinforced but also more precisely understood. 
In this chapter, the expression “rules of the game” will be frequently used in discussing 
the institutional characteristics of the two financial globalisation eras. In order to avoid 
any inconsistency between the institutionalist approach adopted in this thesis and the 
subsequent analysis, a previous clarification is necessary. There is an academic issue 
between the “old” and the “new” institutionalism on the definition of institution as 
“rules of the game”. Several authors have been discussing this subject but for the 
purpose of this section, it suffices to mention Hodgson (1997, 1998, 2001) and North 
(1990, 1991, 1994).34 Both recognise the importance of institutions for the development 
of the economic activity, and believe that history matters in economics, but both also 
diverge in terms of the definition of institution.  
Hodgson’s definition of institution was already presented in chapter one, and it is 
related to an “old” North American institutionalism. In contrast, North’s definition is 
closer to the game theory since his description links institutions to rules of the game 
(see also Nelson 1995). Both definitions are opposed and support quite different 
theoretical underpinnings. As stated in chapter one, not only the definition of 
institutions but the methodological approach invoked in this thesis is related to the 
“old” institutionalist tradition, hence the use of the “rules of the game” term does not 
mean an agreement with the mainstream game theory. There are a couple of reasons 
why this is so.    
                                                 
34 Just to refresh mind, one of the key North’s (1994:360) definition of institutions is this one: 
“Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up of 
formal constraints (e.g., rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (e.g., norms of behaviour, 
conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics. Together they define 
the incentive structure of societies and specially economies. (...) Institutions form the incentive structure 
of a society, and the political and economic institutions, in consequence, are the underlying, determinants 
of economic performance. Time as it relates to economic and societal change is the dimension in which 
the learning process of human beings shapes the way institutions evolve.” 
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The expression “rules of the game” was presumably coined by Keynes (1932:220) 
immediately after the return to gold by Britain in 1925.  In that context, Keynes was 
referring to the rules that forced the Bank of England to reduce its supply of credit. 
However, authors have been using the expression the “rules of the game” not to 
describe such a specific situation, but to describe the general relationship between 
central banks (or national banks) during the Gold Standard.  Scholars such as 
McKinnon (1993) consider the “rules of the game” as the general set of arrangements 
that characterised the Gold Standard including the absence of capital controls, price and 
wage flexibility, and pegged exchange rates.  Other scholars have extended the term to 
other historical eras and have used the term the “new rules of the game” to describe the 
arrangements designed to rule the world economy, such as the process of liberalisation 
which occurred during the late 20th century (Drache 1999:10).   
Taking the case of the classical Gold Standard (1871-1913), it is worth to remembering 
that humankind has carried financial transactions through precious metals standards 
from ancient times.  Since then, several standards of metallic coins (i.e. commodity-
money) have emerged35. Examining this evolutionary process starting in the capitalist 
era, scholars have described the historical details underlying the context under which 
such standards emerged.  This section intends to focus on the institutional nature of the 
financial regime structured during the classical Gold Standard.   
The classical Gold Standard was not the first monetary standard regime based on 
commodity-money that had been set up.  A Gold Standard system began to be built in 
Britain from the beginning of the 18th century when the overvaluation of gold in 1717 
by Sir Isaac Newton drove out silver coins from circulation.  There is little consensus 
on when exactly it was effectively structured, but scholars believe that Britain managed 
her monetary practices through gold fetters in this century, circa 1774.36  Apart from 
academic controversies, the key point to be highlighted is the principle that led the 
nation to choose such a regime.  On this account, according to Keynes (1930:258) “the 
                                                 
35 According to Keynes (1930:258) gold, silver and other “precious” metals had been chosen as store of 
value or command of purchasing power since time immemorial.  “Some four or five thousand years ago 
the civilised world settled down to the use of gold, silver and copper for pounds, shillings and pence.” 
36 This date is not consensual amongst scholars.  Eichengreen (1996:12) asserted that “England had 
effectively gone onto the gold standard … in 1774 when silver’s legal-tender status for transactions in 
excess of £25 was abolished, and in 1821, when its legal-tender status for small transactions was 
revoked”.  On the other hand, Redish (1990:789) disagreed affirming that the Gold Standard was 
incomplete before 1816 since “in 1816 England ended its official policy of bimetallism and adopted a 
single gold standard with a gold coinage complemented by a token silver coinage”.   
  127
choice of gold as a standard of value is chiefly based on tradition”.  Therefore, it was 
clearly an institutional choice, in accordance with Hodgson’s definition of institution. 
What tradition was Keynes referring to? Basically, he was drawing attention to the 
long-established human convention of building a monetary standard which is embodied 
in a precious metal whose value varies little throughout time.  The essential purpose of 
this “incarnation” of value was to maintain the stability of the purchasing power of 
money and then the stability of a huge number of contracts assigned in this money, 
present and future, productive or speculative.  It was evidence of the importance played 
by institutional aspects over policy decisions. Therefore, one can conclude that 
currency stability was the most important institutional aspect of that monetary regime.  
It was too important to fail. Accordingly, the “rules of the game” of the Gold Standard 
reflected this priority and that is why the policy instruments were strongly concentrated 
to sustain the monetary stability, leaving social demands of another nature unassisted.  
All things considered, the driving force of the Gold Standard system must be 
understood in the context of 19th century capitalism.  This is the purpose of the next 
section.    
  
2.2. The rules of the Gold Standard game: the institutional framework of the first 
financial globalisation period 
 
a) Building global money and market integration: the rules of the game 
 
The major economic and geopolitical feature of the emergence of the classical Gold 
Standard was that Britain, as the seat of the industrial revolution, emerged as an 
economic and financial superpower.  Therefore, many countries quickly took advantage 
of the opportunity of being able to link their own currencies to the British monetary 
system.  In fact Portugal had already adhered to the British Gold Standard from 1854, 
due to its long commercial relationship with the country. In 1871, Germany won the 
Franco-Prussian War and used the indemnity received by France to accumulate gold 
and establish the mark as its new gold-based unit.   In practice, it represented an 
adherence to the regime.  The German adherence played an important role in the 
transition of the system from being only a localised arrangement of payment between 
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some countries to an international monetary regime. Germany was the most 
industrialised European nation after Britain, and consequently the role played by its 
economy in the continent was quite influential. Geographically located at the heart of 
Europe, the performance of the German economy directly affected the economy of its 
neighbours such as Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway. As a result, the Deutsch 
adherence stimulated them to peg their own currencies into gold, encouraging the Gold 
Standard to spread around continental Europe. 
Voluntarily and motivated by commercial and financial interests, almost all Western 
European countries committed themselves to practise the monetary gold parities 
defined by Britain.  Austria-Hungary and Italy joined the standard by the end of 19th 
century, and the US joined in 1879.  The adherence of these core countries in Western 
Europe and America immediately ignited and set off a chain reaction in other nations in 
Asia and Latin America. They realised the importance of adhering to the system not 
only because of the commercial interests involved but also because of the possibility to 
have access to loans and to the capital market from these countries.   Some of them 
were not successful over the years but the fact is they made a great effort in terms of 
domestic policy arrangements to attach to gold standard convertibility, establishing the 
exchange rate of their currencies into a fixed weight of gold.  As argued in Bordo & 
Rogoff (1996), the adherence of the Gold Standard was “a good housekeeping seal of 
approval” to have access to this more advanced financial market. Respectively, Russia, 
Japan, India, Ceylon, Siam, Argentina, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay also adopted gold 
standards at that time.  As a consequence, by 1900 the Gold Standard had evolved into 
an international regime, which is why most authors have labelled it as the classical 
Gold Standard experience.   
The classical Gold Standard was a monetary system in which the value of national 
currencies was fixed at a definite weight of gold.  Therefore, one of the chief 
characteristics of the regime was the commitment assumed by governments to maintain 
fixed exchange rates with gold. Consequently, Central Banks (or National Banks) were 
supposed to freely convert the currency of each participating country into gold at any 
time through a fixed exchange rate.  The monetary stability was the priority of the 
economic policy of the country participants. By creating a stable monetary parity to 
gold, this system stabilised the exchange rate of many countries within narrow limits of 
variation. As a consequence, all international debts were settled in gold.   
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As early as 1752, David Hume wrote an influential explanation of the Gold Standard 
mechanism. He proposed his famous price-specie-flow model based on two hypotheses: 
first, only gold coins circulated internally, and second, the role played by banks (both 
central and commercial) was unimportant.  In his model, international transactions were 
paid in gold.  When receiving their payment, exporters coined the gold received into 
their national mint, and similarly, importers paid for their merchandises by exporting 
gold.   As a result, commercial banks did not play an important role in the development 
of cross-border activities. 
This could be explained by means of a hypothetical example depicting the commerce 
between two countries α and ω. Suppose α has a trade deficit.   As imports are paid for 
in gold, country α has an outflow of gold. This outflow reduces the money supply in α 
and raises it in ω, as ω increases its stock of gold. Consequently, prices are reduced in 
α and increased in ω. Because prices in α are lower than in ω, ω increases their imports 
from α, sending gold to α. Then, as α receives gold, its trade deficit is re-established, its 
gold coin stock increases and so their prices return to stability. Similarly, the stock of 
gold coins decreases in ω, its trade surplus returns to a balance and their prices become 
stable again. Therefore, the balance-of-payment equilibrium is restored.  
As Hume’s model was developed in the middle of the 18th century, it did not comprise 
the (nature of) capital flows that characterised the international Gold Standard at the 
end of the 19th century.  More than a hundred years after Hume’s model, the exports of 
capital from Europe developed significantly.  Therefore, the role played by central and 
commercial banks, as well as the fluctuation of interest rates, should be taken into 
account in the economic analysis. That analysis was made in 1919 by a committee 
organised to debate the return to gold by Britain after the wartime.  This committee 
prepared the Cunliffe Report.   
According to the Cunliffe Report, commercial transactions amongst countries were 
identified as being paid off in its banknotes, not in gold. According to the Report, 
central banks have compromised themselves to converting currency into gold at any 
time of demand.  When α runs a trade deficit against ω, α should pay the difference 
with banknotes.  Entrepreneurs in ω presented this amount to α’s central bank for 
conversion into its currency provoking an outflow of gold, leading to a consequent 
decrease in its money supply, while at the same time raising the money supply in ω.  
As the payments were in money, central banks had a relevant role since they converted 
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gold into banknotes and vice-versa. Apart from this difference, the process of 
adjustment was very similar to Hume’s model described above, so much so that at the 
end the exports in α rise and its imports fall until the trade imbalance between these 
countries is eradicated. 
In fact, “the rules of the game” were much more complex (and not always obeyed) than 
described by Hume or by the Cunliffe report.37  Central banks usually tried to avoid an 
outflow of gold in order to preserve the stability of their currency.  The central banks’ 
decisions were focused mainly on maintaining gold reserves compatible with the 
golden points and internal price stability. Then, they applied their discount rate to avoid 
the erosion of their gold reserves up to the point in which international markets decided 
to increase their exports.  To be clear, they put interest rates up at least during the time 
needed while other countries increased their imports from the country where prices 
went down due to the central bank’s restrictive policy. 
The results attained by the operation of the discount rate were usually successful.  This 
policy procedure involved the management of loans and interest rates which in turn 
aimed to control the country’s gold reserves and consequently the supply of money. For 
instance, if there was the expectation of a gold outflow, the central bank increased the 
discount rate withdrawing money from the market in order to make exports more 
competitive. In doing so, the trade deficit would be eliminated avoiding the loss of gold 
reserves.  Similarly, interest rates could be increased also to reduce credit (and then 
increasing the cost of investment), keeping the entrepreneurs under strict market 
discipline.    
Alternatively, there were another two ways to reduce the money supply in order to 
avoid an outflow of gold. However, open market operations were sometimes employed 
in Britain and (by the end of the 19th century) in Germany but not regularly because it 
required a developed financial market to be able to negotiate a number of bonds 
efficiently.  Foreign exchange market operations with the same purpose occurred 
between London and New York but were also not so significant. They occurred 
                                                 
37 Some scholars question the adequacy of this term to express the Gold Standard mechanism.  For 
example, Ragnar Nurske (1944), Arthur Bloomfield (1959), McCloskey & Zecher (1976) and 
Eichengreen (1996) maintain that central banks developed many ways of violating the “rules of the 
game”, putting at risk the stability of the system.   Therefore, many writers on the subject use the 
expression between quotation marks.   
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because these two alternative ways did not reflect the reality of the European and 
American financial system during the Gold Standard.   
Up to this point, one can imagine that the international transactions under the Gold 
Standard were a consequence of the operation of a set of rules, formally written and 
strictly obeyed, but this is not true.  A couple of reasons for this could be pointed out. 
First, apart from the commitment of the central banks in maintaining the convertibility 
of their currencies into gold, there was not a statute to prescribe laws or codes to be 
followed.  Then over time there were many deviations from the mechanisms of 
adjustment described above.  The two quotations below could enlighten this point. 
McCloskey & Zecher (1976:362) reasoned that: 
Central banks often did not play the rules: the Bank of France and the National 
Bank of Belgium, for example, kept their discount rates low regardless of gold 
flows.  An alternative indicator of the extent to which central bankers played the 
rules is the extent to which the relationship between inflows of gold and increases 
in domestic credit was positive.  Once again, the indicators are that in the late 
nineteenth century the monetary authorities, in the case American and British, 
cheated: the correlation between gold flows and annual changes in domestic credit 
was -0.07 in the United States and -0.74 in the United Kingdom. 
 
In agreement, Eichengreen (1996:29; 32) presents some more evidence collected from 
the research of other eminent scholars: 
Ragnar Nurkse tabulated by country and year the number of times between 1922 
and 1938 that the domestic and foreign assets of central banks moved together, as 
if the authorities had adhered to the ‘rules of the game’, and the number of times 
did not.  Finding that domestic and foreign assets moved in opposite directions in 
the majority of years, Nurkse attributed the instability of the interwar gold 
standard to widespread violations of the rules and, by implication, the stability of 
the classical gold standard to their preservation.  But when in 1959 Arthur 
Bloomfield replicated Nurske’s exercise using pre-war data, he found to his 
surprise that violations of the rules were equally prevalent before 1913. … Central 
banks possessed the capacity to violate the rules in the short run because there 
was no question about obeying them in the long run. 
 
The so-called “rules of the game” of the Gold Standard were the mechanisms of 
balance-of-payment adjustment managed by central banks and (to a minor extent) by 
commercial banks to guarantee the defence of gold convertibility.  However, as quoted 
above, these rules were not fully respected at all. So the “rules of the game” cannot be 
considered a central pillar for the maintenance of the Gold Standard, at least in the short 
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run, but also they cannot be discarded as if they were unimportant.  It is worth 
emphasising that the violation of these rules in the short term was tolerated as long as 
agents believed that inconsistent policies relating to the monetary stability would not 
happen indefinitely. That is to say, in the long run they should be maintained, otherwise 
the system would not survive. Considering this, its institutional maintenance in the 
short run should be found in other more robust and credible foundations. 
Interestingly, despite the fact that the rules were defied many times, the system 
continued in operation up to the occurrence of a world war.38 Then, how did the Gold 
Standard regime operate for so long without a written code and without having its 
informal commitments strictly obeyed? Most authors have answered this puzzle, 
affirming that it was sited in two crucial pillars: the long term commitment to gold 
convertibility and international solidarity.  This is another piece of evidence to show the 
importance played by institutional aspects in the development of the regime.  Inspired 
by Keynes’s (1930:258) assertiveness regarding the choice of gold as a standard of 
value to establish a monetary standard, I consider that among other reasons, the long 
term commitment to gold convertibility was motivated by tradition, an institutional 
aspect as discussed beforehand.  Furthermore, this tradition was kept for governments 
of member countries, that is, the nation-states played an important role as institutions of 
global economic governance.  
Governments (especially in the core countries) were committed to maintaining the long 
term convertibility into gold, overcoming the problems caused by short term deviations.  
This commitment was measured as a priority policy objective of each country member. 
Economic policy instruments were fully dedicated to maintaining the gold parities to 
get the “good housekeeping seal of approval”, and then investments in social security 
were virtually non-existent. As seen above, there was great concern with price stability 
and little concern with output level and its distribution. Political complaints in 
opposition to the side effects of high interest rates were still embryonic at that time: the 
right to vote was not universal, labour parties and labour unions were not yet structured, 
and wages and prices were relatively flexible.  Besides, private agents noticed that 
                                                 
38 McCloskey & Zecher (1976:363) affirm: “Yet, the gold standard, it is said, worked quickly and well.  
The exchange rate between sterling and dollars, among many other rates, remained virtually unchanged 
from January 1879, when the United States put itself back on gold, to August 1914, when the war put the 
United Kingdom effectively off it”.   
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governments would not hesitate to take unpopular measures to maintain domestic 
monetary stability.   
This commitment was not enough to maintain the stability of the Gold Standard system 
without international solidarity amongst the central banks.  An increase (reduction) in 
one country’s discount rate attracted (repelled) financial capital and gold reserves, 
damaging the balance-of-payments of the other countries.  These disturbances might 
ignite cumulative imbalances in international accounts for many economies.  Despite 
the influence of the Bank of England as the coordinator of the system, there were 
turbulent periods in which its reactions were not enough to prevent financial crises.  For 
instance, if a country lost a great part of its gold reserves, it would have to increase its 
discount rate to attract overseas gold and capital.  As usual, all economies wanted to 
increase their reserves, and without international cooperation the system would be 
ruined.  Then, if the other economies wanted to preserve their proper financial stability, 
they would have that to act cooperatively helping the one in distress to increase its gold 
reserves in order to guarantee the continuity of the system.  This meant that, in order to 
preserve its own interests the system had to be preserved and could not allow countries 
in crisis to influence the policy decisions of all others because it would eventually lead 
to the failure of the system.   
Although the steadfast long term government commitment to monetary stability, the 
Gold Standard could not prevail for more than forty years without international 
solidarity between central banks since as discussed above the discount rate was raised 
whenever there was risk of gold outflows.  This decision attracted international capital 
and gold to certain countries, promoting an opposite reaction in others.  Similarly, 
central banks decreased the discount rate when the gold stock was in excess.  Unilateral 
decisions similar to that provoked unexpected outflows or inflows of gold to some other 
countries, then problems to their balance-of-payments and domestic prices.  The 
opposite reaction was instantaneous and the final result had a harmful effect to all.  
Policy responses rebound over and over again creating an inconsistent policy scenario, 
ruining the credibility of the system. Central banks noticed that this non-cooperative 
game should be avoided in order to maintain the core rules. Thus, international 
cooperation was a very important aspect of the game helping countries to overcome the 
financial crises that eventually emerged.   
Eichengreen (1996:34) exemplify the importance and extension of these occurrences: 
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 The Bank of England borrowed £3 million of gold from the Bank of France and 
obtained a pledge of £1.5 million of gold coin from Russia.  This action was not 
unprecedented.  The Bank of England had borrowed gold from the Bank of 
France before, in 1839.  It had turned the favour in 1847.  The Swedish Riksbank 
had borrowed several million kroner from the Danish National Bank in 1882.  But 
1890 was the first time such action was needed to buttress the stability of the 
international gold standard and its key currency, sterling.  ‘The assistance thus 
given by foreign central banks [in 1890] marks an epoch’ was the way [the 
English economist Ralph] Hawtrey put it.  
  
International liquidity varied for many reasons, therefore central banks’ decisions were 
too harmful (or not) for the maintenance of monetary stability, damaging the credibility 
of the system as a whole.  For example, when the international liquidity was reduced, 
there was a need to increase the interest rate or vice-versa, and without an institution to 
coordinate this adjustment, central banks might have made inconsistent decisions.  For 
this reason, an effective leadership was important to coordinate these decisions. As the 
most powerful monetary authority, the Bank of England assumed this position in the 
1870s, leading the global market since its discount rate was the target for all other 
central banks.  The role played by the Bank of England and the other central banks 
likewise represents another key institutional aspect of the Gold Standard. 
Besides the aforementioned episodes of international cooperation, the Baring crisis in 
1890 became well-known due to the unprecedented amount of money negotiated 
between central banks. It is an outstanding example showing the importance of 
international cooperation during the Gold Standard.  The British bank Baring Brothers, 
lent money to the government of Argentina but it did not receive any payment in due 
time. It provoked an expectation that the Bank of England would not have enough gold 
to maintain the parity of the pound sterling.  The Bank of England bailed out the Baring 
Brothers to prevent a larger depression, and Lombard Street ended up receiving a loan 
of £3 million in gold from the Bank of France, and £1.5 million in gold coins from the 
Russian State Bank.  The Bank of England managed to recompose their reserves and 
the currency crisis was eventually resolved, but this experience almost ruined the Gold 
Standard.   
Since then, a new “rule” was introduced in the system.  Countries noticed that the 
commitment of sustaining the gold parity could not be accomplished without 
international cooperation amongst central banks.  Consequently, by the end of the 19th 
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century and the beginning of the 20th century, several similar crises were thwarted 
through the coordinated action of the monetary authorities from distinct countries. One 
more procedure was established which incorporated the rules of the game and then   
international solidarity became an institution to the gold regime.  
What does it mean in terms of global capital integration? 
Being played like this, the rules of the game created a favourable policy environment 
able to trade goods and capital, connecting all country-members through the common 
language of an international monetary standard.  As mentioned above, the adherence to 
the Gold Standard implied some basic commitments which were mutually related: 
governments should be prepared to take any policy measures to defend convertibility; 
they would be coordinated by a leader; and they would expect cooperation from the 
central banks.  This does not mean a perfectly coordinated world39 but one that 
encouraged the adherence of a variety of countries distant from the north Atlantic 
economy.   
All of these commitments and rules imply that foreign securities issued in countries off 
gold were considered riskier.  On the other hand, countries on gold were integrated into 
an extensive market and then had much more opportunities to buy or sell their assets. 
The “good housekeeping seal of approval” allowed the inclusion of peripheral countries 
to the European markets and favoured global economic integration since the adherence 
to the rules allowed access to a wide market free from capital controls.  Accordingly, 
the establishment of the classical Gold Standard played a crucial role in global capital 
integration. Protectionism to agricultural and industrial products was a common trend 
in developed countries (especially from the end of the 19th century to 1913) as noted by 
Bairoch & Kozul-Right (1996) and Chang (2002) but capital controls were scarce at 
that time. 
Before 1870, cross-border trade and financial flows were less connected, less structured 
and financial markets were roughly institutionalised.  An international network of asset 
trade was not put into operation due to unsolved problems in managing and expanding 
the bimetallist standard (Redish 1990; Eichengreen 1996).  It was confined to few areas 
                                                 
39 Despite playing a central role to the global market institutionalisation, this regime could not be 
considered perfectly integrated.  In fact, there were many crises and backlashes in various countries, 
especially in peripheral economies, due to inconsistencies in their economic policy (Bordo & Eichengreen 
& Irwin 1999; see also Eichengreen & Bordo 2002, p. 40). 
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of Europe, the US and a few Asian countries. As time passed, it did not have enough 
credibility to integrate countries from all continents in “the dense network of 
historically specific financial institutions.”  
During the period prior to the Gold Standard, international transactions were atomised 
due to the monetary chaos that prevailed within the richest countries. Therefore, there 
was not a global market, since the institutional instruments discussed above were absent 
in the international scenario.  British 18th century gold practices spread all around the 
world and re-emerged as the international (classical) Gold Standard. Over time, the 
classical Gold Standard regime was institutionally established.   A truly universal 
market was “built” based on these commitments, institutionalised by a historical 
convergence of economic, political and specific social circumstances.  The gold parity, 
the rules that oriented the relationship amongst central banks and the international 
coordination through cooperation represent the basic aspects of “the dense network of 
historically specific financial institutions” which made the operation of the system 
possible.  
Eichengreen (1996:30) noted that “it [the Gold Standard] was a socially constructed 
institution whose viability hinged on the context in which it operated”.  On this 
account, the key message to be emphasised in this section is the role played by the 
institutional arrangements in order to make possible the operation of a global capital 
market for almost half a century. Despite the crises and retreats that occurred 
throughout the 1870-1914 period, the expressive volume of capital traded and its wide 
geopolitical width marked the trade and financial international economic history.  The 
specialised literature has labelled this era as a benchmark in terms of global capital 
mobility and integration, thus this period is considered as the first wave of financial 
globalisation.  
In summary, the rules of the Gold Standard game shaped the institutional arrangements 
that were developed to sustain money stability. The Bank of England was the 
coordinator of the system and the message it preached was the Gospel of currency 
stability to allow the redemption of capital flows, and the Gospel of international 
cooperation amongst central banks to avoid severe problems in the balance-of-
payments of member countries. This means institutional arrangements were made to 
adapt the system to achieve these policy objectives, so that financial flow disturbances 
would be discouraged.  Helped by central banks worldwide, Lombard Street managed 
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discount rates in order to prevent outflows of gold, which would have caused more and 
more disruptive banking crises.  In so doing, capital flows emerged and cross-border 
transactions were encouraged worldwide.  
 
b) Building global markets through reduced transaction costs 
 
The expansion of cross-border financial flows from 1870 to 1914 was heavily 
influenced by the development of technological breakthroughs which sharply reduced 
the transaction costs of monetary and financial transactions. On this account, there were 
major innovations in two distinct areas, namely mechanical minting coinage and 
communication technology.  In the former, the most important breakthrough created 
was the steam-powered engines which were able to mint coins.  The introduction of 
stream-driven stamping presses by the government of Britain in the early 19th century 
brought lower money transactional costs, contributing to the organisation of a national 
monetary system in that country and in others, contributing then indirectly to the advent 
of the classical Gold Standard. In the latter, there were three key innovations: the 
domestic telegraph, the trans-Atlantic cable and the telephone.  These breakthroughs 
were very important since they provided direct and instant interconnection amongst a 
diversity of geographically distant financial centres.  They dramatically reduced the 
cost of long distance communication and allowed a lower cost of financial transactions 
which increased the efficiency of those markets.  Accordingly, financial centres became 
more integrated than they were during the first half of the 19th century.  
These technological developments played an important role, encouraging increasing 
levels of capital integration and promoting round-the-world financial affairs.  This does 
not mean that it was rapid or truly universal but by the beginning of the 20th century, 
key countries in all continents were connected through technological devices. Problems 
remained in terms of global coordination of financial operations since corporations and 
governments did not have the appropriate management skills, legal procedures and 
multilateral institutions to deal with the issues that were raised.  But those major 
technical instruments invented at that time were an important piece in the Gold 
Standard puzzle since they equipped central banks, private banks, investors and 
governments with the tools to play the game across national borders. This section aims 
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to explore how dispersed and geographically distant financial markets became part of a 
global marketplace through reduced transaction costs.40     
At first, it is worth balancing the importance of the mechanical coinage to the Gold 
Standard because its importance was in fact indirect.  It helped the establishment of 
national monetary coherence and identity in local economies, therefore the monetary 
identity facilitated the adherence of countries to a regime whose central aspect was the 
conversion of national currencies into a fixed exchange rate in gold.  Nevertheless, in 
terms of the process of global financial integration per se, it should be recognised that 
the advent and spread of the intercontinental communication breakthroughs were much 
more important.   
Technological improvements regarding the manufacture of token coinage in the early 
19th century were important in organising domestic monetary systems in major 
European countries. Yet, the Bank of England was the pioneer of minting coins 
mechanically through these machines, soon after Britain abandoned the bimetallism in 
1816 (Redish 1990). It was one key historical event which contributed to the emergence 
of the Gold Standard in England and, by contagion to the other countries worldwide. 
Before that, coins were minted employing manual labour. This had several 
disadvantages: coins were easily counterfeited, it was more difficult to mint small 
denomination coins, their weight and size could hardly be constant and homogeneous, 
and on top of that regional transactions were more costly.   
Helleiner (2003:63) put in historical context the problems caused by the inconvenience 
of conducting business and building a stable and coherent monetary regime without a 
uniform currency.  According to him the expansion of commerce in major countries 
during the second half of the 19th century was severely hindered by this problem. He 
quoted part of a speech delivered by Canada’s Minister of Finance in 1869 which 
describe quite well the shortcomings of counterfeited money, and the increase in 
transaction costs provoked by the absence of a uniform national monetary standard:  
Those who were engaged in business – from the largest merchant to the keeper of 
a corner grocery – had to keep on his desk a Bank Note Detector almost as large 
as a Family Bible, and had to be constantly getting new editions of it, in order to 
know what notes were counterfeit, what genuine, and as regarded even the 
                                                 
40 Scholarly literature regarding the contribution of reduced transaction costs in communications to 
financial market integration during the Gold Standard has been relatively modest in comparison with 
other topics discussed about the globalisation of markets in this period. For this reason, this section draws 
heavily on data collected by Garbade & Silber (1977) and Michie (1987). 
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genuine, to know what were worth par, and what rates of discount the others 
might be taken.  
 
The problems generated by the absence of mechanical coinage and a national common 
national currency in many major countries hindered national development and 
obstructed the cross-national transactions. Even simple transactions became very risky 
as seen in the quotation above.  Before unification in the early 19th century, important 
European countries such as Germany and Italy used several different coins. This 
significantly increased transaction costs for investors and merchants because whenever 
they wished to buy or sell their commodities or assets through countries they had to 
exchange money, even when moved to a certain province within the same country.41 
The “technological obstacle” to minting coins was overcome by the use of the steam-
powered mint machine.  
Instead of production being done by hand, steam-powered engines were used to mint 
coinage mechanically. They produced coinage with economy (of time and labour) and 
high precision. This resulted in many advantages: coins were produced in large scale 
and at low cost; nation-states had earnings of seigniorage and brassage; coins could not 
be easily imitated since it became simpler to detect false money; the counterfeiting 
became more costly; coins became perfectly uniform; and it allowed the minting of 
both lower and higher-denomination coins.  Taking into account the institutional 
endorsement of nation-states, the new technology permitted coins to maintain their 
value throughout time.42 As a result, the use of money became more practical and 
acceptable, thus allowing and encouraging a much wider range of daily transactions.  
In this sense, commercial transaction costs were reduced significantly. Transactions in 
general became safer and more reliable.  Their credibility avoided the additional cost of 
                                                 
41 Italy was a typical example of the inconveniences created by provincial coins.  Helleiner (2003:65) 
extracted a quotation from a Report ordered by the government of Italy in 1868 about the unification of 
its monetary system.  The author stated: “On the line from Milan to Ancona, you pass across four 
monetary zones; those, namely, of Lombardy, Parma, Modena, and Romagna; each of which has its 
coinage, its numerations, unknown on the other side of the frontier, which for any other purpose is 
already forgotten.” 
42 It is worth emphasising that technological development was not a panacea for domestic monetary 
stability. Mint machines made possible homogeneous coinage but it was not enough to guarantee the 
stability of its value throughout time. It was not enough in terms of money stability and general 
acceptance without the institutional guarantee given by nation-states. Redish (1990:799) correctly 
asserted that “the success of the tokens was due both to changes in minting technology that made 
counterfeiting more costly and the Mint’s willingness to guarantee the convertibility of the tokens”. 
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paying twice for the same transaction if forged money was used for the first time.  On 
the whole, transactions did not incur additional costs in comparison with the time 
before. It did not mean that before mechanical coinage, coins were not broadly used in 
commercial transactions, but it promoted a revolution in the volume of money 
transactions due to the reasons presented above.     
In summary, mechanical coinage allowed the creation of uniform coins and the 
unification of the national markets, discouraging the counterfeiting and favouring the 
development of unified national monetary markets.  Without a uniform currency, agents 
faced high transaction costs and equally importantly, without monetary unification, 
markets were reduced to their provinces.  In a country with different regional coins, 
daily transactions would certainly be more expensive because agents are forced to 
continuously exchange money, therefore variations in the exchange rates meant that 
purchases and sales would become more expensive.  Monetary unification was an 
important institutional aspect for the international affairs at that time, equivalent to a 
territorial or linguistic unification because agents could make transactions with each 
other without additional costs nationwide.  Money eventually became the common 
language amongst agents at least in its domestic frontiers.  That strengthened the 
nation-state’s key position as the institution that enforced the domestic currency and 
officially maintained the control of emission within national territory. 
As mentioned previously, the mechanical development of coinage was one of the 
factors that contributed to the advent of the Gold Standard regime.  On this account, 
Redish (1990:805) asserted: “The Gold Standard succeeded because the new 
technology employed by the Mint was able to make coins that counterfeiters could not 
copy cheaply and because the Mint accepted the responsibility of guaranteeing the 
convertibility of the tokens”.  Helleiner (2003:71) reached the same conclusion when he 
asserted that “concerns for the transaction costs faced by the poor and those who 
transacted with them were important not just in prompting reforms of copper coinage 
and private tokens.  They were also central in encouraging countries to introduce the 
gold standard with the fiduciary silver coinage system.” 
The benefits brought by the minting of coinage played a key role in the development of 
national and international monetary markets. However, it was not enough to integrate 
financial markets which were geographically distant. Intercontinental financial 
transactions were made with a large time delay due to the existent state-of-the-art 
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communication system.  Improvements in steamship travel did not eliminate 
significantly the time of transoceanic transport as well as developments in regional 
means of transportation such as railways or ferryboats, which were also not enough to 
communicate the daily change of prices among distant markets, mainly because those 
prices could change many times a day.  
By the mid-19th century, even between Britain and France, transport time was not 
sufficiently short to allow an exchange of security priced information within the same 
day, and consequently a wider and more active international financial market slowly 
evolved (Michie 1987:39).  Transport of information through physical means was a 
bottleneck for the progression of global finance.  Assuming that geographical distance 
could not be overcome through the existent means of transportation, it had to happen 
through technological development of new means of long distance communication. The 
foundations for large-scale electronic communications were laid during the 19th century 
through the invention of the telegraph, the trans-Atlantic cable and the telephone.     
Taking London as the world’s core financial centre at the time, one can realise that 
before the telegraph and the telephone, investors outside London had to keep in touch 
with the “City” by establishing contracts through correspondence enforced by attorneys 
(country clients), or through appointed specialised agents to act on their behalf (e.g. 
large investors, normally banks).   It meant that investors from within and outside The 
City had to keep in contact through the dispatch of letters. Communication within the 
London market, which was carried out directly through individual contact and regular 
correspondence, was sufficient to keep it operating normally.  However in the 
provincial markets, decisions had to be taken with a lack of knowledge, despite 
improvements in the railway system and in other modes of transport used by the Royal 
Mail (Michie 1987).  
Developments in scientific knowledge that gave birth to the telegraph, the trans-
Atlantic cable and the telephone during the second half of the 19th century significantly 
improved the speed of long distance information transfer. The growing integration 
amongst national security markets can be followed by examining the role played by 
these key breakthroughs in intercontinental market connection.  Their operation and 
development had dramatic impacts on the process of financial globalisation (read: 
global market integration) since they significantly reduced the transaction costs of 
operations.  This large fall in the cost of communications enhanced the efficiency of 
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financial dealings for both national and foreign transactions.  As a result, spatial and 
temporal barriers were reduced (or “virtually removed”)43, connecting many markets 
that were formerly separated. This transformation can be evaluated through the volume 
of telegraphic messages (and real time communication) between distant financial 
centres.   
The introduction of the telegraph and the telephone transformed the security market 
worldwide.  By the late 1840s public telegraph lines linked London and the major 
British cities, reducing the number of letters dispatched by the Royal Mail and 
shortening the communication time between distant markets from days to minutes.  
These instruments were not confined to Britain, but they spread firstly to Europe and 
North America, then to the countries in Australasia and Latin America.   
In 1851, a submarine cable was laid between Dover and Calais, establishing fast and 
direct communication between The London Stock Exchange (LSE) and The Paris 
Bourse. In addition, this allowed London to be linked not just to Paris but to the main 
European Bourses that were already interlinked by telegraph. From 1851 to the early 
20th century, more submarine cables were laid connecting other parts of Britain to 
continental Europe, particularly to France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. The 
figures illustrating this flow of information are quite impressive. According to Michie 
(1987:42):  
Altogether, of the 17,372 telegrams sent to and received from continental centres 
by the members of the London Stock Exchange between 12 and 17 July 1909, 
43.1 per cent were German, 19.7 per cent French, 17.8 per cent Dutch and 8.2 per 
cent Belgian, leaving only 11.1 per cent for the rest of Europe.  This volume of 
business represented an equivalent of one telegram being received or dispatched 
every second for an eight-hour working day during a six-day week.  
 
The data shows how well integrated in terms of communications the major European 
stock exchanges were in the early 20th century.  Investors were now able to conduct 
business much more quickly than they had been able to before. The good results 
encouraged the development of data transmission technologies promoting a dramatic 
fall in the transaction costs and allowed financial transactions to be accomplished much 
more efficiently.  As Michie (1987:44) observed “in 1851 it cost £1.4 (£1 8s) to send 
                                                 
43 According to Michie (1987:47): “The spatial and temporal barriers that had divided London from other 
securities markets had been virtually removed through the introduction of the telegraph and telephone 
and their progressive refinement.”  
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the minimum message between London and Paris, while by 1906 the charge had fallen 
to only £0.04 (10d) or a decline of 97 per cent.” In fifty five years, the cost of sending 
messages became negligible, and consequently financial transaction costs reduced and 
asymmetric information was sharply deflated, and the virtuous cycle went on spurring 
denser integration between the key financial centres in Western Europe. 
On 27th July 1866, the trans-Atlantic telegraph cable was put into operation connecting 
London and New York (Garbade & Silber 1977:826), and then to Melbourne in 1872, 
Buenos Aires in 1874 (Michie 1987:45), and Tokyo in 1900 (Bordo & Eichengreen & 
Irwin 1999:32).  Thereby, at the turn of the 20th century, the world’s major financial 
centres were integrated with each other through telegraphic communications.  Britain 
was linked to North America, to key countries in continental Europe, to South America, 
Asia, and Oceania. Despite the limitations of the technology available, these five 
continents were interlinked as never before, and then the world’s major national 
financial markets became globalised for the first time in history.  
Contemporary scholars have emphasised the key role played by the trans-Atlantic cable 
as a historical step towards global financial integration, but it is worth noting that the 
press at the time also highlighted the importance of this fact. The American local press 
underlined the importance of this historical event for the US economy and to solve the 
problems related to the low level of integration and high uncertainty in financial and 
commercial activities that were frequent before the cable. After that, because of the 
elimination of time delays and a decrease in uncertainty, agents from distant markets 
could take decisions with much more knowledge and confidence.  Garbade & Silber 
(1977:827) extracted this historical record from a New Yorker newspaper:  
The contemporary press immediately recognized the importance for enhancing 
the integration of American and European markets.  On July 30, 1866 the New 
York Evening Post wrote ‘The Atlantic Cable will tend to equalize prices and will 
eliminate from the transactions in bonds, in merchandise and in commodities, an 
element of uncertainty which has had the effect of … seriously damaging the 
commercial relations between this country and Europe.’ As if to foster these ends, 
the Post began to publish price quotations from the London market the next day.  
 
Before the transatlantic cable, financial integration was advancing amongst Western 
European countries, encouraged by telegraphic technological devices, geographical 
proximity and cultural affinity.  However, the US economy was too strong to remain 
  144
disconnected and the long distance between America and Europe hindered the 
development of a larger volume of financial transactions.  Prior to the cable, investors 
in London or New York received price information with three weeks delay on average 
(Garbade & Silber 1977:820). They continuously faced a dilemma: they had to decide 
if they would invest based on knowledge or based on their estimations and 
expectations.  After the cable the delay dropped to a day, thus their estimations became 
much more precise and price differentials reduced significantly.  Market participants 
were more sensitive to price changes on identical assets, so they were able to execute 
business faster than in the past, and arbitrage operations became more attractive. 
Garbade & Silber (1977) tested the impact of the submarine cable between London and 
New York focusing on the differentials in the prices of the same asset traded in these 
two centres.  They calculated the inter-market price differentials through the mean price 
- there was an absolute difference of prices in these two markets - and the standard 
deviation of these differences during the period of pre-cable and post-cable.  Their 
results are presented in these figures below.  
 
Figure 8. Effects of domestic telegraph and trans-Atlantic cable: Mean absolute 
and Standard deviation of the absolute difference of the United States 5-20 Bonds 
in New York and London44 
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       Source: Garbade & Silber (1977:825) 
 
                                                 
44 This figure is based on data in Appendix 9. 
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During the four months before the launch of the cable, the mean absolute difference of 
security prices between London and New York was $4.118 but this difference fell by 
half four months later.  As can be seen in figure 8, this fall was fast and consistent 
during the time interval analysed. On average, prices became closer and continued in 
this way in the following years analysed.  Similarly, the standard deviation of the 
absolute difference series had the same sharp fall after four months, which meant that 
the dispersion of prices reduced by more than fifty per cent.  These results indicate that 
these markets became more integrated. The price convergence between them is a piece 
of evidence of the positive impacts on the trans-Atlantic financial integration provided 
by the telegraph.   
These figures become more significant if they are compared to the results obtained 
between New York and New Orleans and Philadelphia.  Garbade & Silber made similar 
calculations to these regional markets using different asset prices before the telegraph 
and after the telegraph.  Their results were not much less significant. In fact, this was an 
expected result but it presented important evidence related to the relevant impact of 
trans-oceanic communication over these key centres.  This evidence indicates that 
similar results happened in other intercontinental connections.  
Table 14 displays the results of these communications between major countries a few 
years before WWI. 
 
Table 14. European and Anglo-American Stock Exchange telegraph traffic: 1908-
09 
  Anglo-Continental Telegraph Service,  5-7 July 1909 Anglo-American Telegraph Co. 
22-24 September 1908 
France 
 
Germany 
 
Time London 
out 
London 
in 
Total London 
out 
London 
in 
Total London 
out 
London 
in 
Total 
Entire 
day 
1,317 787 2,104 2,821 1,573 4,394 2,005 4,111 6,116 
Source: Post Office Memorandum, Anglo-Continental Telegraph Service, 11 August 1909; M. Carson, 
Manager, Anglo-American Telegraph Co., to F. J. Brown, General Post Office, London, 22 October 
1908, quoted in Michie (1987:44). 
 
 
The table shows a picture of the telegraph communications between the most important 
world financial centres, i.e. the LSE, key European countries and the US. As can be 
seen, there was a marked difference of communication between London and the main 
European countries and London and the US.  London sent more messages to France and 
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Germany than were received by them, conversely, the opposite happened between US 
and London due to the continental size of the American economy.  Overall, the table 
shows an intense exchange of information circulating amongst the stock exchange 
markets of these core countries.  
Based on the table above nothing can be concluded regarding the evolution of the 
volume of messages exchanged between Britain and America before 1908.  Michie 
(1987:45, 46) compared to the number of messages sent per minute between London 
and the US in the initial period of the transatlantic cable and 1908.  Thus, it became 
possible to evaluate both the increased intensity of this communication and the large 
fall in its cost.  He pointed out that:  
In 1908 an average of thirty-two telegrams a minute were being send and received 
over the Anglo-American Company’s wires, during the busy period between 3 
p.m. and 4 p.m., compared to a maximum of seven when the cable opened in 
1866.  At the same time, the cost of a one-word telegram fell from £20 in 1866 to 
£1 in 1902, or by 95 per cent; the cost continued to fall as competition grew, to 
£0.1 (2s) by 1906, or by a further 90 per cent.  … The volume of telegrams 
between London and New York using the Anglo-American cables can be 
estimated to have risen from about 42,000 a year in 1871 to 570,000 in 1908, or 
by 1,257 per cent.  
 
These dramatic reductions in transaction costs between the countries also happened 
within European economies. This means that, communications were as fast as possible 
and costs were dramatically falling which meant investors could operate as fast as 
possible in different countries. Their security markets no longer played a local role but 
they influenced and were influenced by quotations obtained in different centres. This 
increased communication developed until the verge of the WWI.  
In 1891, the telephone allowed two-way instantaneous communication turning the 
telegraph into an outdated device. It provided the technological conditions for the 
simultaneous operation of a wide range of markets.  This was important not just in 
allowing a very quick exchange of information, but it also changed the way financial 
cross-border transactions were conducted.  From the end of the 19th century onwards, 
the telephone hastened the process of financial integration even more. Initially this 
invention was confined to subscribers in London, but by the turn of the century it had 
spread throughout Britain, the major countries in continental Europe and to the US.   
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In 1891 London was linked to Paris by telephone.  In 1897 these interconnections 
increased considerably since two more cables were laid between these two cities.  
Phone communication was more expensive than telegraphic messages at that time but 
its vastly increased speed outweighed this concern and telephonic communication was 
therefore preferable.  This and the benefit of instantaneous communication overcame its 
high costs, and for this reason in the early 20th century the use of the telephone spread 
quickly amongst stock markets in developed countries. According to Michie (1987:45): 
A three-minute call from London to Paris cost £0.4 (8s) or ten times more than a 
telegram, but it did provide voice-to-voice contact.  As a result, there was a 
general switch away from the telegraph for those centres possessing direct 
London telephone connections, namely, Paris and Brussels, while the telegraph 
continued to be central for business with other continental centres, such as Berlin, 
Frankfurt and Amsterdam.  Thus, in European communications the arrival of the 
telephone represented the final stage on the removal of all communications 
barriers, which had been begun by the telegraph.  
 
All these devices considered so far played a key role in global integration during the 
Gold Standard era since investors could readily respond to deals in centres connected to 
each other, and additionally, countries and companies could issue securities 
internationally and so they became more marketable than before.  As mentioned in 
chapter two, Goodhart maintained that the transatlantic cable in 1866 marked the 
beginning of the first financial globalisation era (Eichengreen & Bordo 2002:3) instead 
of the emergence of the Gold Standard. Without mentioning the expression “financial 
globalisation” Michie (1987) also took into account the importance of the telephone 
and arrived at the same conclusion.45  
A perfect and complete integration was not achieved but at least the main countries in 
each continent were able to establish instant contact with each other. This included not 
only developed countries but key developing ones. Table 15 gives an example of this 
global integration.  
 
                                                 
45 Focusing on London as the core financial centre of that time, Michie (1987:47) pointed out: “The 
spatial and temporal barriers that had divided London from other securities markets had been virtually 
removed through the introduction of the telegraph and telephone and their progressive refinement. 
‘Communications between London, Paris, Shanghai, Johannesburg and other great cities is undertaken 
to-day with greater ease and rapidity than formerly attended the transmission of a message from London 
to Bath’” was one observer’s conclusion in 1908, echoed by many others.  The conditions for an 
international market in securities now existed” (emphasis added). 
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Table 15. London Stock Exchange: Government Securities Quoted, 31 December 
1910 (In pounds) 
Category Paid-up value 
Average size of 
individual issue 
% Total paid-
up value 
UK total 1,050,929,844 4,342,685 19 
Central government 765,787,050 76,578,705 14 
Local government 285,142,794 1,229,064 5 
Colonial total 824,695,955 2,561,168 15 
Canada 89,479,440 1,078,066 2 
Australia 194,506,177 2,778,660 3 
New Zealand 65,552,348 1,311,047 1 
South Africa 103,720,294 2,033,731 2 
Egypt 95,474,200 19,094,840 2 
India an Ceylon 250,477,442 8,637,153 4 
Others 25,486,054 749,590 0 
Foreign total 3,702,452,964 15,236,431 66 
France 1,022,274,418 611,137,209 18 
Germany 465,674,817 93,134,963 8. 
Italy 322,670,073 107,556,690 6 
Russia 305,067,293 19,066,705 5 
Spain and Portugal 192,357,839 38,471,567 3 
Scandinavia 37,745,378 1,509,815 1 
Netherlands, Belgium, 
Switzerland 229,987,948 22,908,795 4 
Austro-Hungary 482,018,906 40,168,242 9 
South-eastern Europe 26,456,650 3,307,081 0 
Greece and Turkey 101,904,500 5,661,361 2 
U.S. 40,697,997 2,713,200 1 
Mexico 39,288,263 9,822,066 1 
Brazil 93,118,240 3,448,824 2 
Argentina 111,496,856 3,596,673 2 
Chile 25,142,352 1,795,882 0 
Uruguay and Paraguay 27,148,197 4,524,700 0 
Other Latin American 17,657,495 1,765,750 0 
China 49,098,950 3,776,842 1 
Japan 135,849,772 10,449,982 2 
Others 4,153,670 1,038,418 0 
World total 5,578,078,763 6,912,117 100.00 
Sources: London Stock Exchange Official List, 31 December 1910; Stock 
Exchange Official Intelligence (London, 1910 and 1911); extracted from Michie 
(1987:51) 
 
Table 15 displays the paid-up capital from the UK government securities traded at the 
LSE in 1910. At first sight, this provides evidence of the high degree of LSE 
internationalisation because there were investments made and paid for by Britain to 
countries located in all continents.46 In fact, during the 19th century the LSE overcame 
                                                 
46 In 1903 Pratt, quoted in Michie (1987:34), asserted: “The bonds of every Government, the stocks of 
every country, are traded in London [while] Wall Street confines itself to the securities of the United 
  149
the Amsterdam Bourse, its stronger competitor at the time, and until WWI it became 
the world’s largest and most international stock market. Mainly due to the historical 
context of British imperialism, LSE activities were internationally oriented, thus a high 
proportion of British securities were held abroad.  This did not mean that only Britain 
was able to trade securities overseas because the system allowed a two way flow of 
communication, but yet there were open channels of communication, and consequently 
more visible opportunities for savers and borrowers to negotiate abroad in a wide 
diversity of countries. Essential information about financial assets such as their risk, 
maturity, and rate of return could be changed much more quickly in comparison to the 
period without intercontinental communiqués.  
The underwater communication interconnected central banks, commercial banks, 
public and private financial institutions in general and therefore a great variety of 
financial transactions that were too risky and of little potential profit in the past became 
negotiable.  This also promoted the development of financial instruments and made 
possible short and long-term transactions. This had the ability (institutionally and 
technologically managed) to conduct financial transactions between wide numbers of 
countries spread worldwide, and is understood in this thesis as the core characteristic of 
financial globalisation.  
This does not mean that the process of integration and/or financial development was 
free from irregularity or unevenness. The development of national financial markets 
depends on numerous historical circumstances that are far beyond being solved only 
through the establishment of advanced technological communication devices.  This 
topic is beyond the scope of this chapter but taking into account the world trends of 
economic growth, one can identify that they were quite different during the period 
considered (table 16) and so, the degree of financial development and investment in 
international security differed from country to country. 
                                                                                                                                              
States”.   Comparing the biggest Stock Exchange market in Europe with the biggest of the Americas, 
Michie (1986:184) confirmed the point established by Pratt: “there was a growing divergence between 
the London and New York exchanges in the matter of the securities quoted.  Increasingly London 
provided a market for securities from the whole world, while New York traded almost exclusively in 
American stocks and bonds.” 
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Table 16. Trends in economic growth, 1830-1913 (Annual growth rates of the 
volume of GNP per capita, based on three-year averages) 
Period Developed 
countries 
Developing 
countries World 
1830-1870  0.6  -0.2  0.1  
1870-1890  1.0  0.1  0.7  
1890-1913  1.7  0.6  1.4  
Source: Bairoch (1993) quoted by Bairoch & Kozul-Wright (1996:20). 
 
Domestic institutional arrangements in finance are subjected to the historical 
peculiarities of each country, i.e. some economies are more or less vulnerable than 
others. As with any other market, financial markets evolve idiosyncratically, and the 
total paid-up value in percentage showed in table 15 presents these differences. In 
Europe, only three countries (France, Germany and Italy), received a third of the value 
paid for by LSE in 1910.  All Latin American countries, China, Greece and Turkey 
received altogether little more than 8 percent.  
As stated in section 3.2.b, financial globalisation did not imply financial 
homogenisation. Instead it involved a system which was able to connect (even 
unevenly) different financial markets that spread worldwide, and that were able to play 
the financial game.  The huge amount of money invested to reduce asymmetric 
information did not result in perfect symmetry of economic and financial development. 
Those breakthroughs drastically reduced delays in exchange of information, allowing 
then national markets to attain a global scope.   
Despite the enormous progress obtained in transoceanic communication, Bordo & 
Eichengreen & Irwin (1999) pointed out that geographical ignorance created serious 
problems for investors to oversee their investment. According to them, the 
disproportionate share of railway bonds in foreign investment portfolios is evidence of 
this difficulty because it was relatively easier to monitor the actions of a railway 
company (such as how much track had been laid, where it had been laid, and how much 
traffic it carried) than other economic activities.  
In addition, according to those authors, the limitations of communication technology in 
acquiring reliable information from distant markets can explain the limited importance 
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of FDI prior to 1914 and consequently the importance of the free standing company as 
the vehicle for foreign direct investment. A great majority of foreign investment prior 
to 1914 took the form of portfolio investment.  FDI was undertaken mainly by free-
standing companies that had limited scope to operate abroad and that were poorly 
assessed quantitatively47.  Free standing companies became increasingly important as 
British investors gradually diversified its investments in railroads and government 
bonds into farming, ranching, mining and brewing because they were trying to avoid 
agency problems associated with the attempt to control distant American management. 
In summary, several obstacles that were blocking a worldwide flow of information 
were removed by the key 19th century technological breakthroughs in communications.  
As a result, the falling transaction costs were an important element in explaining global 
financial integration and the high level of cross-border capital mobility during the 
1870-1914 era. This process began in Britain, spread to continental Europe and, after 
the transatlantic cable, moved to the rest of the world, allowing capital markets to be 
more efficient, visible, and global.  
 
c) Building global markets through colonial ties 
 
During the Gold Standard, the core of the world economy in trade, investment and 
finance was centred in Europe.  At the turn of the 19th century the US economy became 
an important player in the industrial and financial scenario surpassing key European 
economies except Britain and France.  Table 17 presents the picture of global capital 
flows and its most important players worldwide. The leadership of Britain was far 
ahead of all other leading countries, but in 1920 the US reached the same ratio of 
capital flow to output as Britain and surpassed all other Western European nations.  
 
 
                                                 
47 According to Wilkins (1998:13 ) free-standing companies “were structured to solve the problem posed 
earlier; business abroad was risky; it was hard to obtain adequate and reliable information about firms in 
distant lands; returns were unpredictable; but there were clearly opportunities abroad; a company 
organized within the source-of-capital country, with a responsible board of directors, under source-of-
capital country law, to mobilize capital (and other assets) and to conduct the business in foreign countries 
could take advantage of the opportunities, while reducing the transaction costs by providing a familiar 
conduit.”   
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Table 17. International capital flows as a percent of Gross National Product, 
selected countries by decade: 1870-1920 (+ = outflow; - = inflow) 
Sending countries Receiving countries 
Year UKa France Germanyb Italy Swedenc USAd Canada Australia 
1870 5.62 - 0.56 0.4 -1.61 -2.68 -7.6 0.02 
1880 3.23 -0.41 1.92 0.68 -3.68 0.09 - -0.07 
1890 5.75 1.97 1.97 -0.35 -2.48 -0.05 -7 -0.09 
1900 1.76 3.81 1.26 2.23 -2.71 1.43 -4 -0.04 
1910 7.38 3.61 1.31 -0.07 0.39 -0.03 -12 0 
1920 2.58 - - -4.77 0.48 2.42 -4.9 -0.01 
a United Kingdom: Figures are three-year averages centered on dates shown. 
b Germany: Net flow is divided by net  national product.  Figures are three-year averages centered 
on 1870, 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910.  
c Sweden: Net flow is divided by gross domestic product. Figures are averages value over the 
following periods:  1866-75 (1870); 1876-85 (1880); 1886-95 (1890); 1896-1905 (1900); 1906-15 
(1910); and 1916-25 (1920). 
d US: Figures are five-year moving averages centered on the years 1871, 1881, etc. 
Source: Green & Urquhart (1976:244). 
 
Most of the capital invested was basically long-term, which took the form of direct 
investment and bank loans. The majority of long-term foreign investments were spent 
between developed countries in Western Europe and, mainly by the turn of the 19th 
century, between Europe and the US. Yet, it was also employed in overseas regions of 
recent settlements chiefly to construct port facilities, railroad networks and 
infrastructure in general.  The profitable opportunities abroad were too high to miss 
since those areas suffered from a huge lack of infrastructure, and investors from the 
core countries (especially Britain) were eager to attract new promising markets.   
An important factor to encourage financial integration was the cultural proximity 
amongst countries of Western Europe and their (ex)-colonies.  Colonial ties played an 
important role in the process of global financial integration because natural barriers 
such as language, legal and accounting systems facilitated the development of 
investments from the core countries to the colonies.  For instance, despite Britain 
having a long and strong commercial presence (and considerable political influence) in 
Argentina and Uruguay, her amount of investment was relatively much higher in her 
(ex)-colonies.  Profitable opportunities were high since the majority of those (ex)-
colonies did not have their own financial conditions to finance infrastructure 
investments, which required long-term investment.   
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Table 18 shows that British investment was concentrated in Europe and North America.  
In addition, despite Latin America being geographically closer to Britain than Oceania, 
Latin America received a third of the amount invested in Oceania. Cultural barriers 
hindered a riskier volume of investment in that area. France also directed its lending to 
countries where it had a strong political influence and close cultural ties, e.g. Italy, 
Spain, and Russia.   
 
Table 18. The distribution of British foreign investment by areas (in million 
dollars) 
Foreign Long-term Investments in Amount 
Africa 4,700 
Asia 6,000* 
Europe 12,000 
North America (north of Mexico) 10,500**
Latin America 850 
Oceania 2,300 
Source: North (1962:24) 
* Of which China, $1,600 million. 
** Of which the United States, $6,800 million. 
 
 
An important aspect of this debate highlighted by most economic historians is the close 
connection between migration and capital movements.  The reverse cycles of migratory 
movements represented an important source of information for European investors in 
the overseas areas of recent settlement but the phenomenon was stronger amongst 
Anglo-Saxon countries in general, especially between Britain and the US. Throughout 
the Gold Standard era, a large number of workers and investors left Britain go to 
America mainly.  Many of them became American residents, but some were investors 
who moved to that country to identify potential sources of investment and send 
valuable information about local conditions to their companies in Britain. Then the 
British company set up agreements to finance those investments.  Given the limitations 
of communication at the time, this was an alternative way of avoiding major investment 
loss.    
After those people left Britain, there was a tendency to raise the salaries in the US. Its 
domestic profit rate fell in some specific areas, and then investors sought new 
investment alternatives in areas where the labour price was cheaper due to the great 
contingent of workers available. Soon afterwards, there was the reverse cycle in 
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America but this migratory flow stopped when the US became a capital exporter by the 
early 20th century.  
Both emigration and foreign investment were cyclical phenomena, increasing during 
the boom and falling away in times of depression. These movements of labour had a 
considerable influence on investment in countries that were gaining in population, as 
well as in Britain.  This process happened until WWI, and subsequently that sort of 
migration flow was never repeated again, being as it was an exclusive characteristic of 
the Gold Standard.  The inflow of capital into those countries had great repercussions 
on the domestic and export sector, for instance the US, Canada, Australia and other 
British borrowers expanded considerably their commodity, industrial and capital export 
sectors.    
To sum up, colonial ties played an important role in global financial integration during 
the Victorian era, especially regarding the “Atlantic economy”. They established 
similar rules for juridical, financial, and property right systems, which favoured the 
investor’s decision on behalf of economies with the same system. Massive migration 
between English-speaking countries in response to profitable opportunities resulted, on 
the one hand, in a movement of long-run capital where they were relatively abundant to 
countries where they were relatively scarce.  On the other hand, it triggered a process of 
cyclical development concentrated in those world areas.48    
 
2.2 Post-Bretton Woods era: new institutions and the outbreak of the second wave of 
financial globalisation 
 
Having mentioned key institutional aspects surrounding the global financial integration 
of the 1870-1914 period, the thesis now jumps forward to the modern era to compare 
                                                 
48 This phenomenon of mass migration during the pre-1914 years was not exclusive to Anglo-Saxon 
countries.  Bordo & Eichengreen & Irwin (1999:16) show that a similar movement also happened in 
Italy.  However, this movement was not motivated by colonial ties at all. “The high level of migration, 
including reverse and seasonal migration, that characterized the late 19th century was an important 
channel for the flow of such information. Italian workers who travelled to the New World for a few 
years, or even just for the planting and harvest seasons, before returning to their home town in Italy 
formed an obvious network for information about supplies and demands in the Americas. Multinational 
corporations similarly established (in their case, proprietary) networks for conveying such information 
across borders.” Each one of the main European countries had a specific way to undertake their external 
long-term investments.  So, it is not possible to generalise a common pattern for all of them. The 
emphasis on the English-speaking countries above is justified by their relative importance in the 
economic and financial scenario of the time.   
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the institutional and technological underpinnings of contemporary globalisation. The 
rules of the game of this period are closely connected to the economic and political 
configuration that marked the historical context of this period.  In the same extent that 
Britain played a crucial role in the development of the first wave of financial 
globalisation, the US has been the key actor in the second wave.  Therefore, the 
historical characteristics of the American economy during the second advent of 
financial globalisation should now be examined in order to reveal the new dynamic 
rules of the game.   
In sharp contrast with the British experience, after the end of WWII, none of the US 
financial markets were as internationally oriented as financial markets in London. On 
the contrary, American financial markets were more domestically oriented, highly 
restrictive, and strictly regulated by the legal and institutional apparatus built after the 
Great Depression.  Despite these differences, the US became the core country in current 
global financial affairs.  In order to understand essential aspects underlying the second 
wave it is worth presenting a brief historical background to describe how the financial 
system that evolved in this country from the 1950s to the 1970s has enabled it to create 
the basis for current financial globalisation from the mid-1980s.   
As is widely known, the interwar era was the bottom line in terms of financial 
globalisation. Hence, it is beyond the scope of this section to discuss the wide range of 
agreements set up in Bretton Woods, but only to mention the institutional framework 
structured in the conference. What is important here is to focus on the institutions that 
appeared after the end of the Bretton Woods system, which were the cornerstones for 
the second financial globalisation occurrence.  
Bretton Woods agreements were in force until the beginning of the 1970s. In May 
1971, President Nixon unilaterally decreed the inconvertibility of the dollar into gold. 
In December 1971, the Smithsonian Agreement tried to reorganise the exchange rates 
of the main currencies by depreciating the dollar by 10 percent. However at the onset of 
1973 this agreement failed, the dollar was depreciated by more than 10 per cent and the 
exchange rates began to float freely.  
Since then, a new historical period in global finance has been set in motion. The post-
Bretton Woods period (1971 till now) has been marked by a variety of policy, 
institutional and technological changes. The key policy shift was the management of 
international exchange rates since there was a clear tendency towards more freely 
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fluctuating exchange rates worldwide. A variety of private institutions such as the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association (ISDA), etc. was created to deal with the international 
trade of assets. Parliamentary statutes, constitutional amendments, and regimes of 
coordinated intervention have been implemented to deal with an extraordinarily large 
rise in international capital mobility in industrialised and emerging markets. 
Meanwhile, massive advances in telecommunications and information processing 
technologies have played a very important role in terms of diminishing transaction 
costs and allowing for a huge volume of transactions.   
The second era of financial globalisation evolved more quickly during the 1980s49 and 
its development is ongoing. Once again, a “dense network of historically specific 
financial institutions” was developed to accommodate the huge weight of capital that 
has been transacted internationally. This “new network” flourished on account of a set 
of changes that occurred in economic, political, and intellectual thinking. More 
precisely, it was marked by political disputes between developed countries, by the 
operation of new policy regimes, by the creation of innovative institutional 
arrangements, and by striking technological changes.  
This new network also established new “rules of the game”.  Some players such as the 
nation-states, central banks, commercial banks and investors continue to be important 
actors in this game, albeit having assimilated new characteristics and lost others. In 
general, the role carried out by each one changed radically. For instance, the 
consequences of the financial liberalisation changed radically the role played by the 
nation-states. They lost autonomy and became entrapped by the resurgence and 
unprecedented growth of financial markets.  The changes the nation-states underwent 
were paradoxical in certain cases. The US government has been using its political, 
economic and military power, and diplomatic influence to consolidate liberal policies 
                                                 
49 There is no consensus about the exact chronology of the second wave of financial globalisation.  For 
instance, Chesnais (1994) affirms that in contemporary financial globalisation, three stages can be 
distinguished. The first stage lasted between 1960 and 1979 and was characterised by the advent and 
development of the Euromarket and off-shore banks. According to him, financial globalisation was 
limited and incomplete at that time since it was strongly linked to the internationalisation of American 
banks.  The second stage lasted from 1980 to 1985 and was marked by American hegemony, and by 
deregulation and liberalisation policies introduced by the United States and Britain. In this period, a 
global financial system emerged and was consolidated. The third phase began in 1986 and was 
characterised by Stock Exchange liberalisation, by the development of a variety of off-balance sheet 
financial innovations, and by the integration of the “emerging markets” at the beginning of the 1990s.  
So, according to this author, financial globalisation began in the 1960s.  This is not the proposition 
supported by this dissertation. 
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worldwide.  In the meantime, this country has been using public expenditure (civil and 
military) to confirm and sustain its hegemony.  
Central banks, commercial banks and non-banking institutions also had an important 
involvement in this new institutional scenario. The former have been key agents in 
implementing banking deregulation rules, and the other two agents have been dealing 
with an unprecedented volume of capital and trading a huge variety of financial 
instruments that have been created especially since the 1980s.   
The geopolitical aspects of contemporary financial globalisation heavily reflect the 
political power rivalry that was taking place amongst developed countries.  Headed by 
the American economy and their policy decisions, a wide range of new arrangements 
radically changed the scope, extent and mobility of international finance. Besides 
geopolitical considerations, macro and microeconomic changes have also been 
responsible for the emergence of this new era. From a macroeconomic viewpoint, 
financial deregulation and liberalisation has eliminated tariff barriers and enhanced 
greater capital integration worldwide. Along with this, a set of rules, legal procedures, 
and an open regulatory framework have all played an important role in the process of 
global financial integration.  
From the microeconomic viewpoint, technological developments in computer science, 
information technology and telecommunications have allowed 24 hour trading in real 
time amongst agents. Simultaneous communication is hindered only by time zone 
differences between countries.  Also, technological and scientific developments have 
played an important role in dramatically reducing transaction costs, and have allowed 
an increasing volume of transactions to take place in a growing number of markets.  At 
the same time, a wide range of financial innovations have had a key role in facilitating 
market integration and capital mobility. 
A significant distinction between the onset of this new era and the previous one was the 
lack of any international monetary agreement. The first era began soon after the early 
years of the Gold Standard, and ended when this system collapsed. In contrast, the 
second wave began when the Bretton Woods regime broke down. Since then, no 
metallic monetary agreements have been designed to stabilise international exchange 
rates or to manage global trade and financial transactions.  
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A monetary regime based on gold aimed to maintain monetary stability by establishing 
a limit to liquidity growth. Any currency would have international acceptance when the 
national central bank guaranteed full conversion of that currency into gold. This meant 
that countries agreed to manage their monetary policy according to the growth of the 
world’s gold reserves.50 Thus, growth in international liquidity was limited to the 
international supply of gold during the classical Gold Standard and Bretton Woods 
periods. 
The elimination of this “material anchor” (or of this “material obstacle”) after the 
Bretton Woods breakdown has allowed an exceptional growth of international liquidity, 
impelling the appearance of new markets and products, meaning that the monetary 
standard around which the global financial system has developed now became fiat, 
unlike the previous historical experience.  That is to say, the post-Bretton Woods era of 
financial globalisation has been evolving free from gold convertibility.  As will be 
discussed below, this fiat monetary regime and the absence of any international 
financial regulation has encouraged an outburst of financial transactions outside the 
control of national central banks.   
In brief, historical events involving economics, politics, institutions, law, technology, 
etc have all combined to deepen financial linkages across national boundaries, 
consequently shaping the second financial globalisation era.  The next section will 
focus on the combined effects of these developments, which provided a basis for 
institutional changes allowing a phenomenal expansion in financial flows after the 
1980s, as predicted by the J-curve.   
 
a) Tight springs: Rebuilding global money 
 
Financial globalisation is a historical process that developed gradually over time. The 
second episode was not an exception. It resulted from the combination of the decisions 
of various agents acting through an extensive historically specific network of 
institutions.  During the decades before the 1980s, key economic and political shifts 
took place. After WWII, Europe was no longer the main exporter of capital as it had 
                                                 
50 It should be mentioned that in doing so they were also able to trade globally, and have access to the 
international market for credit. 
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been for many years, and the US emerged as the hegemonic superpower. The American 
hegemony was heavily exercised in the monetary field.  At that time, the US was in 
possession of two thirds of the world’s gold reserves (Block 1977) and therefore the 
Federal Reserve (FED) was the only central bank in the world able to guarantee free 
convertibility into gold. This fact established the dollar as the international currency 
used in trade and financial transactions.  After the establishment of the dollar as the 
global currency, international economic affairs once more had a monetary standard of 
reference. As a result, other central banks (especially in Europe) began to accumulate 
dollars instead of gold as a strategic monetary policy measure aiming to challenge the 
American hegemony.  Meanwhile, international transactions gradually grew once more 
throughout the 1960s and the 1970s under the coordination of the IMF.    
The US played a crucial role in the economic recovery of the post-war period. Military 
expenses, the Marshall Plan and the US balance-of-payments deficits (1960s and 
1970s) all encouraged the emergence of a money market in dollars based outside its 
borders.  Two main reasons explain this phenomenon: first, the dollar was in demand in 
many countries because of its full convertibility; and second, the American financial 
legislation built soon after the Great Depression established a wide range of regulations 
for banking concentration and international expansion. The FED also established a 
maximum limit for the interest rate on long term deposits and loans offered by banks.   
Impelled by the external demand for dollars and overcoming internal restrictions 
through a variety of financial innovations, American banks deposited a great part of 
their monetary surpluses in overseas markets, especially in European banks.  
International banks that operated in these financial markets (centred in London) were 
stimulated by the opportunities for profit in recycling these dollars, so they traded other 
currencies into dollars, relending and redepositing them into banks and non-banking 
institutions worldwide.  These developments were responsible for the creation of the 
Euromarket. The Euromarket and the other offshore activities of American banks grew 
dramatically because their financial transactions were accomplished without any 
regulation or supervision by central banks. Chesnais (1994) called it the period of 
financial internationalisation, which means that the process of financial globalisation 
was not complete because the monetary and financial systems of most national markets 
worldwide were still closed by a myriad of domestic regulations.  
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In the early 1970s, the Bretton Woods agreements collapsed and the dollar-gold 
standard no longer ruled the international monetary regime. After the first oil shock in 
1973, leading oil exporters invested their large surpluses in money markets around the 
world, significantly increasing the global liquidity.  International banks invested this 
amount in OECD countries and by the end of the 1970s, in Latin American and East 
Asian economies. At the time, world inflation and interest rates were high and volatile, 
and exchange rates were floating. This macroeconomic scenario of instability 
accelerated the development of financial innovations51 such as derivative contracts, 
created in the US in the early 1970s aiming to protect agents against the risk of uneven 
changes in asset prices.52   
By the end of the 1970s, the US and the UK had adopted financial deregulation and 
capital account liberalisation policies. These policies encouraged aggressive bank 
competition between American/British banks and the banks of other developed 
countries, later influencing the other developed countries to adopt similar measures. In 
October 1979, an important event was to change the global financial scenario, which 
helped to propel national financial markets towards a deep stage of globalisation.  At 
that time, the strength of the American economy was damaged due to the occurrence of 
a repeated public deficit and current account deficit. As a result, the dollar was 
depreciating. This provoked a distrust of dollar stability and its capacity to continue 
being the international currency. Consequently, the FED pushed for a dramatic interest 
rate increase to stem the dollar’s fall. This policy was known as “dollar diplomacy”.  
This policy had an effective result - strengthening the dollar and establishing it again as 
the international currency.  In addition, the high interest rate attracted investors 
worldwide. American public debt grew substantially, triggering a sequence of 
institutional changes (domestically and internationally) and financial innovations that 
                                                 
51 On this account, Kregel (1996:55) pointed out: “It is the increased volatility in international costs and 
prices due to flexible exchange and interest rates that has been the driving force behind the financial 
innovations that currently dominate the globalization process.” 
52 According to Cintra (2000) the first transaction of those hedge instruments occurred in 1972, through 
the creation of future contracts of foreign currencies by the International Monetary Market (IMM), 
affiliated to the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. In 1973, the so-called contracts of options appeared in 
Chicago Board Options Exchange subordinated to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  In 
1975, the same Commission created future contracts of interest rates. In 1979, the IMM negotiated for 
the first time future contracts with securities of the American Treasury. In 1982 appeared future contracts 
of Stocks Exchange indexes based on the Standard and Poor’s 500 index, created through the Index and 
Options Market, a special division of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (FDIC Banking Review, 1998). 
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were a crucial step in setting in motion mass changes leading to the second wave of 
financial integration.   
In November 1989, another historical event took place and marked the beginning of an 
era in terms of an upsurge of global neo-liberal economic policies. The Institute for 
International Economics organised in Washington a conference called “Latin American 
Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?” Officials of American government, 
multilateral institutions established and headquartered in that city such as International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank (IBD), and 
several Latin American economists attended the conference to discuss key Latin-
American issues after experiencing a significant economic depression during the “lost 
decade” of the 1980s.  
The main purpose of that conference was to evaluate the economic reforms undertaken 
in Latin American countries throughout the 1980s. The results of this meeting were 
called afterwards the “Washington Consensus”, and it decisively influenced the rules of 
the game of the world economy after the 1990s.  
Neo-liberal policy proposals emerged from the conference, strongly influenced by the 
American government and the multilateral agencies involved. As a matter of fact, three 
years earlier, the Institute for International Economics published a book written by 
eminent mainstream scholars from the US, Mexico and Brazil (Bela Balassa, Gerardo 
M. Bueno, Peter-Pablo Kuczynski, and Mário Henrique Simonsen) entitled Towards 
Economic Growth in Latin America, in which they sketched neo-liberal policy 
propositions to Latin American countries. 
The Washington Consensus became the policy package for the stabilisation of Latin 
American nations supporting Washington political and technocratic circles. Its policy 
propositions strongly influenced policymakers and financial markets worldwide, 
creating the intellectual basis for financial liberalisation policies. Financial openness 
should not be seen as a threat to domestic markets but rather it should be taken as a 
stimulus to competition and efficiency.  José Miguel Albala-Bertrand (1991:471) 
summarised the core policy proposals in this way:  
This package amounts to macroeconomic prudence, outward-orientation and ‘free 
market’ capitalism. The policies are: fiscal discipline (i.e. zero or small deficits), 
public expenditure reduction (i.e. eliminating subsidies and reducing the public 
sector wage bill), tax reform (i.e. broad base, simple application rules and 
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moderate or absent marginal rates), financial liberalisation (i.e. interest rates 
should be both market-determined and positive in real terms, and foreign 
exchange should not be controlled), the exchange rate (i.e. it should be market-
determined and positive in real terms for outward-oriented recovery), trade 
liberalisation (i.e. import liberalisation by setting a small homogeneous tariff 
across the board and eliminating all other restrictions), foreign direct investment 
(i.e. unrestricted capital inflows, especially in debt-equity swaps), privatisation, 
deregulation and property rights (i.e. rules needed to secure the satisfactory 
operation of the capitalist system). 
 
Market friendly policymakers appear to have found a consensus about the content and 
the type of far-reaching liberal reforms.  Washington institutions (US government, IMF 
and World Bank) required from developing countries privatisations, tax reforms, public 
spending retrenchments, tight monetary policy, the dismantling of governmental gear of 
intervention, trade and financial liberalisation in order to plough the soil to restore the 
price mechanism in a free market system.  According to them, these measures were 
essential in order to allow an efficient world economy to flourish. 
The liberalisation of capital markets in Europe is part of this historical context.  The 
European Union (EU) is a political and economic community established in 1993 by 
the Maastricht Treaty that has developed a single market through a standardised system 
of laws applied in all member states, guaranteeing the freedom of movement of people, 
goods, services and capital.  The first stages of economic integration in Europe started 
in the 1960s and 1970s and dealt with barriers to trade in goods. From 1988 onwards 
the European Community’s Single Market Programme turned its attention to decrease 
barriers to competition and increase factor mobility in financial and other services. The 
removal of barriers in financial markets has allowed capital to become more mobile and 
move easily tradable throughout the region. 
To conclude this introductory part, the international financial scenario which led to the 
onset of financial globalisation after the 1980s was marked by another “dense network 
of historically specific financial institutions” formed by these events: the absence of a 
global system of financial regulation; a flexible exchange rate regime; high interest and 
exchange rates volatility; limited international cooperation to coordinate monetary 
parities; inadequate capacity to raise funds to rescue countries in trouble in their 
balance-of-payments; massive international liquidity and high capital mobility; 
development of institutional innovations; liberalisation policies in the US and UK; new 
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and deregulated financial markets (Euromarket and offshore banks); the emergence of 
the US as the industrial, financial, diplomatic and military hegemony; and a very high 
interest rate in the US.   
The dynamic interaction of all these factors created a “tight springs” effect. Step by 
step, the springs were compressed through a series of new policy and institutional 
arrangements. Once released by a collective convergence of political power led by 
developed nations, it spurred a unique historical combination of events, and liberated a 
sequence of procedures that over time changed the world of finance and brought about 
another historical episode of financial globalisation. Political pressure groups in society 
and coalitions between governments emerged and were crucial factors in setting off the 
process of global expansion of financial markets. 
 
b) The new “rules of the game”: Rebuilding global markets after the 1980s 
 
The second wave of financial globalisation is often associated with the 
internationalisation of financial markets that occurred between America, Europe and 
Japan during the 1960s and 1970s.  However, in order to grasp the root of the “dense 
network of historically specific financial institutions” underlying the phenomenon, this 
section starts with an examination of the American banking legislation since the 1930s. 
This approach is taken for two reasons: firstly, because the US is the hegemonic nation 
that has been leading the process of contemporary financial globalisation; and secondly 
because as has been affirmed since the beginning, this thesis proposes to understand the 
process of financial globalisation focusing on its institutional aspects.  This way, the 
legal perspective of modern financial globalisation reveals the depth of the institutional 
change undertaken by the American economy, the core countries and eventually the 
whole transformations that recently occurred in the worldwide financial scenario. After 
this analysis, the main economic and political aspects of the process will be considered.  
 Financial globalisation involves a process of extensive market integration between 
countries, which evolves gradually over time and requests legal procedures to allow 
deeper enmeshment between domestic and overseas markets. Therefore, an important 
aspect for a successful globalisation is a legal adaptation between local financial 
systems to international regulation. The legal adjustment between different judicial 
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regimes has allowed institutional investors, commercial and investment banks and a 
variety of new agents in the market to negotiate worldwide.   
Judicial differences should be taken into account to examine institutional aspects of 
modern financial globalisation. The financial systems of the two Western superpowers 
are governed by Common Law. This judicial system allows larger institutional freedom 
to financial institutions.  Therefore, in Anglo-Saxon countries, financial institutions 
have a wide degree of freedom and flexibility to alter restrictions imposed by the 
regulation in force. In practice, those restrictions stimulate the competition for the 
establishment of new markets and new practices, allowing the enlargement of their 
activities.  For this reason, banking and non-banking institutions constantly altered the 
limits imposed by the regulation (chiefly in the US) through the development of 
innovative financial instruments and the creation of new institutions.  
On the contrary, the judicial system adopted in continental Europe and Japan is based 
on Statutory Law that establishes significant government intervention and stricter limits 
to financial activities.  Accordingly, the innovative capacity of financial institutions in 
these countries is more limited. On the one hand, it limits the development of financial 
innovations, but on the other it allows more control by the monetary authority over 
monetary and fiscal policies.  In this case, public institutions have more responsibility 
for the creation and development of new instruments and financial procedures.  
On this account, institutional changes in the American financial system starting from 
the 1980s have been the cornerstone for modern financial globalisation. Along with 
these changes arose a set of rules, legal procedures and an open regulatory framework 
that played an important role in the process of global financial integration.53 
Examination of the main developments of this process reveals how this hegemonic 
country has not only changed the institutional framework in its finance sector, but also 
heavily influenced shifts in the world financial affairs in line with its political and 
economic perspective.  American domestic policies have been creating new “rules of 
the game” and then delineating the current international financial regime.  
In the early 1930s, the US financial system was set up by the Glass-Steagall Act of 
1933 and by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Besides establishing many 
regulations, it also instituted several forms of restrictions to the banking competition. 
                                                 
53 For more details on this open regulatory framework see FDIC Banking Review (1998), v. II, n.1, and 
OECD (2000). 
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For instance, Regulation Q instituted by the FED established a maximum limit for 
interest rates on long term deposits and loans granted by banks, and also prohibited the 
payment of interest on cash deposits.  The McFadden Act had already instituted in 1927 
rigorous restrictions to the enlargement of the existent interstate banking systems, and 
to the constitution of new interstate networks. In other words, bank institutions could 
only constitute branches in several states simultaneously through official authorisation. 
This institutional framework organised in the 1930s worked very well until the post-
war period, however a couple of decades later those limitations became an obstacle to 
the banking expansion and they were progressively removed after the 1980s. In 1980, 
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act extinguished 
Regulation Q, thus banks were authorised to offer money market deposit accounts, 
which were financial instruments similar to mutual funds, being guaranteed by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 
The elimination of Regulation Q stimulated the banks to intensify the process of 
banking concentration and international expansion. As a result, extensive mergers and 
bank acquisitions occurred in the 1990s. This demonstrates that the gradual removal of 
state and federal restrictions to geographical expansion was responsible for the 
consolidation of nationwide interstate banking. 
American states gradually changed the restrictions for the expansion of agencies and 
interstate banks by reciprocity agreements. The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act (1994) eliminated the geographical restrictions to the 
interstate branches established by the McFadden Act of 1927.  This allowed banks to 
form coast-to-coast branch banking, as well as to accept interstate deposits. The 
abolition of geographical restrictions to banking activity promoted huge concentration 
in this sector since it created a market for corporate control in banking.    
Furthermore, the Financial Gramm-Leach-Bliley Modernization Act (1999) allowed the 
expansion of the great commercial banks for activities related to investment banks 
(securities negotiation), asset management and operation in the insurance market by the 
formation of financial holding companies. Once more, this allowed the concentration 
and the centralisation of the bank capital through multibank holding companies. 
Consequently, big commercial banks became also investment banks and insurance 
companies.   
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Finally, due to the elimination of geographical barriers, big American banks expanded 
their activities beyond the traditional bank loans.  They became managers of mutual 
funds, providing services of asset management, and also overcame prudential rules 
through credit securitisation. Additionally, to face the increased domestic and 
international competition, banks demanded the separation between commercial banks 
and investment banks, imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act (1933). 
The emergence of several highly specialised markets aiming to provide products and 
services tailored to attend specific demands is a new historical institutional fact, in clear 
contrast with the institutional framework that characterised the first phase. In other 
words, the emergence of these markets (many of them derivative markets specialised in 
short term assets) had a decisive impact on the process of global financial enmeshment 
and on the formation of the J-curve, as will be presented below. 
The pressures, tensions and policy decisions resulting from the scenario summarised 
above encouraged changes in the institutional framework of the international financial 
system, being one of the causes of the second financial globalisation era.  Certainly, the 
repercussions of these transformations for the process of financial integration cannot be 
interpreted in isolation from the historical context where they occurred.  They are part 
of the contemporary “dense network of historically specific financial institutions” and 
so they influenced and have been influenced by a sea of transformations that happened 
simultaneously in economic and political terrains.  Given the space limitations of this 
chapter, the section will present only key aspects of these occurrences. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, international economic policy had changed sharply in 
comparison to the period after WWII.  Politically speaking, the second financial 
globalisation was marked by the change from British dominance to the American 
hegemony. As a result, the intellectual climate in which this outbreak of capital 
flourished was very different, also reflecting the broad changes listed above.  The end 
of the Bretton Woods agreements marked the end of the “Keynesian era” and the 
beginning of a neoliberal era in global finance.  Anglo-American neoliberal policies put 
into operation since the 1970s greatly influenced the worldwide financial scenario 
during the contemporary period. As Helleiner (1994:12) affirmed: 
When these two states [the US and the UK] supported growth of the Euromarket 
in the 1960s and then liberalized and deregulated their financial markets in the 
1970s and 1980s foreign financial centers increasingly witnessed their business 
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and capital migrating to these more attractive markets. To compete effectively for 
this mobile financial business and capital, they forced to follow the lead of Britain 
and United States, by liberalizing and deregulating their own financial systems. 
This ‘competitive deregulation’ in finance was a central reason for the flurry of 
liberalization activity throughout the advanced industrial world in the 1980s.  
 
The post-Bretton Woods period has been marked not by a revamped Gold Standard or 
Bretton Woods system but by deregulation and liberalisation policies, i.e. by the 
decrease/removal of government controls on monetary and financial markets.  Led by 
the US and Britain and followed by continental Europe and Japan, these policies have 
eliminated government controls on monetary and financial markets.  This occurred 
mainly in the following ways: privatisation; mergers and acquisitions; opening of 
capital in balance-of-payment; and openness of stock exchange markets, securities 
markets, and operations among banks’ commercial and depository institutions (Singh 
1997, 2003; Griffith-Jones 2003). The deregulation and liberalisation policies had 
eliminated barriers and allowed financial transactions to be accomplished globally.  
Nevertheless, there are pros and cons in this debate.  
The conventional theoretical argument behind the reduction of the government’s role 
by removing or reducing restrictions in controlling markets is an attempt to make them 
freer and presumably more efficient. Accordingly, economic liberalisation promotes 
growth and eventually reduces or alleviates poverty, improving the standard of living 
and helping to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor through convergence 
between developed and developing economies so that in the long run, liberalisation of 
capital accounts, trade and investment, and regimes of privatisation of national 
economies will attract more foreign direct and portfolio investment and thus create 
more employment opportunities for developing countries.  These represent the 
mainstream statement regarding the role played by liberal policy measures. They will 
be tested, but there is no room in the chapter to discuss their effectiveness, and as such, 
they will be discussed in the next chapter.    
In 1981, Ronald Reagan became President of the US. From the beginning of his 
mandate he implemented measures to hasten the process of industrial and financial 
deregulation. For example, he reduced the growth of government spending, tax rates on 
income from labour and capital; he also diminished financial regulation, and 
implemented tight control over the money supply aiming to reduce the rate of inflation. 
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The process of liberalisation that he promoted also reached stock exchange markets in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Then institutional investors (pension funds, investment 
funds, insurance companies and hedge funds) diversified their investment portfolios 
buying bonds and securities issued in most countries, including “emerging markets”. 
After this, the rules of the global financial game changed radically because these 
policies provoked deep institutional changes for the world economy.   
Reagan executed a restrictive monetary policy associated with an expansionist budget 
policy (supply side economics, also called Reaganomics) aiming to overcome the 
stagflation that characterised the late 1970s and early 1980s in the US. Then, the FED 
sold American treasury bonds offering positive real interest rates. The warranties given 
by the government increased international capital mobility, raised American public debt 
and absorbed a huge amount of money from foreign investors. Figure 9 depicts how 
foreign investors were attracted by financial assets issued in the US after the second 
half of the 1980s. 
 
Figure 9. US international transactions: 1960-2007 (Billions of dollars)54 
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54 This figure is based on data in Appendix 10. 
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The figure above shows that the American public debt assets became a safe refuge for 
international investors.  The US could finance its economy and its public deficit 
through an increase in its domestic interest rate since its securities issued were easily 
negotiated worldwide. The profitability of its bonds attracted resources worldwide like 
a magnet, meaning that the high attractiveness of American treasure bonds autonomised 
its monetary policy.  This fact gave great power to the US economy and transformed 
international affairs at the end of the 20th century. Due to its credibility, any changes in 
the American interest rate had a decisive influence on international capital flow. 
Besides being free from any balance-of-payment restriction, it strengthened its 
hegemony since the country had no need to foment the development of core and 
peripheral countries, as it had had to in the 1960s. Accordingly, the current account 
deficits that the US has had after 1982 have been financed by foreign capital. 
The Latin America debt crisis in August 1982 created great instability in the 
international financial scenario, especially in the US because their commercial banks 
had invested heavily in Latin America since the 1970s. Throughout the 1980s, the 
liberalisation of financial markets was underway in most developed countries under the 
influence of American and British economies.   This unstable policy scenario provoked 
important changes in the strategy of banks and great companies worldwide. 
The great impulse to financial markets provided by liberalisation policies has 
encouraged the appearance of higher liquidity assets. American banks intensified their 
operations in short-term activities developing varied financial instruments of hedge and 
derivatives contracts. These financial innovations have been used to reduce prospective 
financial risks underlying securities prices, interest rates, market indexes, or commodity 
prices, but have also allowed larger capital mobility and speculative movements. The 
financial diversification set up allowed lenders to transfer their operations from the 
conventional credit market to direct emission in securities markets. By transferring 
risks among agents, the derivative apparatus represents hedge instruments that allow 
the decline of assets’ risks. They reduce the risk of illiquidity, allowing faster 
adjustment of most asset prices before a potential crisis in the markets’ expectations. 
From this point of view, the use of derivatives, especially off-balance sheet operations, 
resulted in a process of intense financial integration among domestic markets. This was 
a remarkable institutional aspect of contemporary financial globalisation that differed 
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from the past episode and that has spurred higher interconnectedness and enmeshment 
of global financial markets. 
Multinational companies also became important agents in international capital markets. 
These companies retained a significant stock of convertible currencies, derivatives and 
overseas securities. The liquidity they managed in financial markets became strategic to 
their prospective investment plans, for example hedge operations were used to avoid 
conjunctural instability, and also for capital appreciation. Likewise, households became 
small investors as well.  Increasingly, they have been acquiring financial assets in 
primary and secondary securities markets mediated by institutional investors and 
investing part of their resources in bonds, securities, currencies, commodities, etc in 
order to obtain liquidity and protection against eventual risks.  
Eatwell & Taylor (1998:3) commented on this change with the following: 
Households transformed themselves from being depositors in banks to investors 
in pension and mutual funds. According to flow of funds data, over the 15 years 
between 1978 and 1993, the share of US financial sector assets held by 
institutional investors rose from 32% to 52%; the share of banks fell from 57% to 
34% over the same period. Similar increases in assets managed by institutional 
investors occurred in Britain, France and Germany. Pooled money funds moved 
aggressively toward investments abroad (including emerging markets) and toward 
short-term placements. [According to] Edwards, in 1993 it was reported that ‘the 
typical stock is now held for an average of a little over two years, compared to 
over four years 10 years ago and seven years in 1960. 
 
Table 19 provides an updated and wider picture on this subject considering the 
American case.  It shows that since the 1980s, the assets of institutional investors had a 
quick growth, and trebled his participation in American GDP. 
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Table 19. U.S. institutional investors: 1980-2005 (US$ billions stock end of period) 
Assets 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 2000 2002 2005 
Insurance Companies 646.3 1,094.7   1,884.9 2,803.9   3,940.6   3,997.7    4,274.8    5,646.1 
Life 464.2 796.1   1,351.4 2,063.6   3,067.9   3,135.7    3,335.0  4,380.7 
Others 182.1 298.6      533.5 740.3      872.7      862.0       939.8  1,265.4 
Investment Companies 146.1 496.6   1,154.6 2,730.5   6,270.2   6,389.3    6,013.1    8,322.8 
Open   138.2  488.3   1,101.7 2,594.1   6,118.1   6,247.4    5,862.3  8,052.0 
Closed       7.9  8.3        52.9 136.4      152.1      141.9       150.8  270.8 
Pension Funds 786.0 1,800.2 2,697.0 4,757.0 7,671.0 7,444.8 6,134.0 8,410.0 
Private    513.0  1,226.3 1,626.7 2,888.8 4,571.2 4,355.0 3,309.5 4,613.3 
Public    273.0  573.9 1,070.3 1,868.2 3,099.8 3,089.8 2,824.5 3,796.7 
Other 444.9 707.1 1,097.6 1,480.5 2,175.5 2,267.8 2,056.4 2,219.9 
Financial Companies   196.9  338.4 547.0 672.3 1,003.5 1,140.1 1,192.6 1,334.6 
REITs       3.2  10.4 28.5 33.3 69.0 66.4 102.3 354.6 
Total 2,023.3 4,098.6 6,834.1 11,771.9 20,057.3 20,099.6 18,478.3 24,598.8 
Memorandum 
Total Assets 4,675.1 8,927.70 13,779.8 21,791.0 35,127.1 36,926.7 38,564.6 44,160.8 
Total Assets/Institutional 
Investors 43.3 45.9 49.6 54.0 54.3 52.1 47.9 55.7 
GDP nominal 2,795.6 4,213.0 5,803.2 7,400.5 9,268.5 9,817.0 10,480.9 11,459.6 
Total Assets Institutional 
Investors/GDP 72.4 97.3 117.8 159.1 216.4 204.7 176.3 214.7 
Source: Federal Reserve, Flows of Fund Account of the United States, various issues. 
 
In a globalised capital market, private decisions are affected by numerous influences 
coming from a variety of markets and because of this the performance, sensibility and 
nature of national markets and domestic dealers has changed markedly.  The rapid 
development of risk management techniques and derivative contracts have proliferated 
in response to the interest and exchange rate volatility, changed the portfolio habits of 
agents, and brought a marked and unprecedented institutional change in finance.  
Portfolio decisions of companies and families had become tied closely to the behaviour 
of the financial system since changes in the prices of these assets had been influencing 
their incomes and affecting their decisions on investment and consumption. This is 
another remarkable institutional difference between the present and the former era of 
financial globalisation.  This institutional change is one of the aspects that characterises 
the J-curve. 
The development to the most common unlisted (OTC) derivatives, such as interest rate 
swaps, currency swaps and interest rate options is displayed in figure 10. Data 
regarding these markets are available only from 1988 onwards and were presented in 
table 12 in the previous chapter.  Nonetheless, in this chapter the figure below is plotted 
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to represent the extraordinary progress of these institutional innovations from 1987 
until 2005.  As can be seen, they rise almost eightfold in nineteen years, while the 
world GDP increased only 106 per cent during the same period. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Percentage accumulated growth of notional amounts of OTC derivative 
contracts and world GDP55 
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Source: International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), online 
database.  GDP: UNCTAD, online database.  
 
Gradually, national exchange and securities markets have become increasingly more 
integrated worldwide. As can be noticed, the process of financial deregulation and 
integration has been asymmetrical but global, and has reached quite important markets 
(exchange, credit, bonds, securities, etc.).  Impelled by American monetary policy, 
financial agents gained the ability to operate worldwide. The role carried out by Credit 
Rating Agencies has also been crucial in stimulating global financial development. 
These Agencies supply comparative indicators of risk relative to a group of securities. 
They do not offer warranties against losses but a comparative spectrum of risk 
evaluation, which investors can use to monitor potential losses of their investment 
portfolios. In addition, the risk classifications help investors to define the amount to be 
                                                 
55 This figure is based on data in Appendix 11. 
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invested since they establish the expected income and risk prize monitoring large 
corporations that have thousands of shareholders.  This is another key institutional 
innovation that differs greatly from the first financial globalisation.   
Furthermore, the process of securitisation has been stimulating the development of 
modern financial globalisation.  Securitisation is the technique used in the exchange of 
illiquid assets (such as long-term bank loans, mortgages) to marketable assets. As a 
reaction to growing instability surrounding medium and long-term assets that marked 
the international scenario after the 1970s, investors have been demanding safer 
positions that avoid bank liabilities. As a result, banks have transformed non-negotiated 
assets into negotiable marketable securities, which have been an important incentive to 
the off-balance sheet operations, as for instance, many financial derivative instruments.    
Another characteristic of this era was the occurrence of financial crises.  Starting with 
the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, a marked characteristic of the following 
years, especially during the 1990s, was a sequence of critical episodes.  The table below 
summarises the main events. 
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Table 20. International monetary, securities and banking crises after the 1970s 
 
International monetary and securities crises 
1971 Breakdown of Bretton Woods 
1970s OPEC inflation shock 
1980s International debt crises (Polish crisis, Mexican crisis, Brazilian crisis, etc.) 
1985-86 Fall of the overvalued dollar 
1987 World-wide stock market crash (followed by the aftershock of 1989) 
1994-95 Mexican crisis 
1997-98 East Asian crisis 
1998 Russian crisis 
1998-99 Brazilian Real crisis 
2000 Turkish crisis 
2001-02 Argentinean crisis 
2002 Attack on the Brazilian Real  
2002 Uruguayan collapse 
2007 American subprime mortgage crisis  
Banking crises 
1973-75 UK secondary banking crisis 
1989 US savings and loans crisis 
1987-92 Banking crises in Finland, Norway and Sweden  
1990 on Japenese banking crisis over real estate loans 
1997 on Asian banking crisis 
Significant individual failures 
1974 Herstaat Bank, Franklin National Bank 
1983 Continental Illinois Bank, Banco Ambrosiano SpA 
1991 BCCI 
1995 Barings 
1996 Sumimoto 
1998 Long-term Capital Management 
         Source: Elaborated from Braithwaite & Drahos (2000):135, and Dymski (2003:90). 
 
A current outstanding characteristic of the contemporary era is the relationship between 
FDI and PI, pointed out by Kregel (1994).  According to him, conventional wisdom has 
considered the flows of FDI “less dangerous” than PI since it is, by nature, a long-term 
investment responsible for the creation of job opportunities, and arguably it has been 
spreading technological progress to the host countries.  In addition, it is considered less 
unstable than PI because it rarely provokes balance-of-payments (BOP) problems (sic). 
However, according to the argument developed by Kregel, the recent development of 
financial markets had changed this scenario. When investors make an FDI they set up a 
hedge contract in foreign currency (the dollar in general) in the same amount as the 
investment.  FDI is counted in the BOP but the hedge operation is not since it is done 
between the company and a commercial bank or other financial institution.  
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Consequently, it also creates a problem for the BOP. That is to say, investors can 
review their positions at any time and flee from the countries leaving behind economies 
to face up to serious difficulties in financing their BOP.   
Due to the current global financial liberalisation, investors can easily transport their 
assets at any time and from any place, and quickly invest them in another market 
elsewhere in the world.  Therefore, from the point of view of the domestic exchange 
rate stability, FDI flows have been as volatile as PI flows.  In other words, Kregel is 
claiming that when speculative bubbles change the assets profile radically, the amount 
invested in FDI has sufficient liquidity to quickly flee the country, provoking 
depressive pressures on the BOP and on the money market.    
What do these arguments mean in terms of the J-curve debate? 
They mean that global financial integration goes further and runs deeper than ever 
before backed by the “dense network of historically specific financial institutions” 
described above.  The advent of highly integrated capital markets has been 
accompanied by tensions and increased financial instability. The development of future 
markets in which investors can hedge their exposure has allowed a higher volume of 
capital transactions but has also made it more volatile, as will be presented in the next 
chapter. The point to be emphasised here is that financial liberalisation and 
diversification have made financial activities much more complex and pervasive than in 
the past era.   
Despite being closely integrated for the time, financial markets in the Victorian era 
were relatively narrow in comparison to the present day.  Colonial ties are no longer 
important in current globalisation but the strong hegemonic power played by the US 
since the 1970s has enforced policy changes in the direction of a more liberal financial 
system.    
Technology has been a common influential element allowing huge development of the 
level of integration for the two eras.  The communication revolution that occurred in the 
past was prominent but the information problems on a global scale were far from being 
eliminated.  In comparison, recent developments in telecommunications and computer 
science have helped reduce the informational problems significantly, allowing a much 
larger volume of assets to be negotiated in a larger number of countries.  In his 
historical analysis of the globalisation of international financial markets from the 
  176
beginning of the 20th century, Bordo (2000:48) deduced that: “Financial market 
integration is broader and deeper today than pre-1914. This largely reflects financial 
innovations to overcome barriers to asymmetric information.” This does not mean that 
the markets became perfect.  On the contrary, the last two decades witnessed frequent 
and severe crises.  However, it indicates that the space for financial capital development 
has significantly enlarged throughout the world and over present time.  This is in a 
nutshell the message proposed by the J-curve. 
In summary, the key characteristics of the current financial globalisation have been: the 
reduction in (and sometimes the elimination of) government regulations for 
international capital flows; privatisation, mergers and acquisitions; the emergence of 
new institutions to manage a huge amount of short-term capital such as pension funds, 
mutual funds, institutional investors, etc.; the creation of a number of new financial 
services especially in off-balance-sheet operations; an increase in FDI flows; and the 
proliferation of stock exchanges in many emerging markets. On account of these 
developments, market participants have been developing institutions designed to 
attenuate information problems in financial transactions.  As a consequence, a much 
broader range of securities has been traded internationally.  The institutional framework 
developed in the second era of financial globalisation is more multifaceted, dense and 
extensive than in the first phase.  New markets, new products and services, and 
innovative forms of intermediation have been established.  This institutional structure 
has been decisive in supporting a historically unprecedented volume of capital trade in 
more pervasive financial markets. 
 
3. Conclusions 
 
This chapter examined the two historical eras of financial globalisation aiming to 
identify their main institutions and to evaluate the role of the institutional changes in 
the development of each experience. It was verified that pre-existent and new 
institutions both adapted themselves according to economic and political changes in the 
historical context. The chapter discussed the key transformations for the development 
of capital mobility during both experiences in a variety of institutions such as markets, 
central banks, banking and non-banking institutions, and legal regulations.  
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The main institutions that led to the first upsurge of financial globalisation emerged in 
the UK and in the core Western European countries. These countries were motivated to 
carry out great capital transactions due to their advanced industrial and technological 
development, and due to colonialist expansion. In other words, economic conditions, 
political organisation, technical progress and reliable institutions made possible the 
emergence and maintenance of markets, rules and international solidarity for close to 
forty years.  
New radical global institutional change was witnessed after the 1970s. The centre of the 
financial system moved from the UK and Western Europe to the US. The main 
characteristics of this phase were the neoliberal policies and the development of a wide 
range of financial innovations. A new institutional framework was established to handle 
a giant volume of short term and long term capital. The institutional adjustments 
handled mainly by the US gave birth to an international monetary system based on 
fiduciary money, and also inaugurated a highly speculative period.  A large variety of 
markets and financial innovations aimed to guide the agents’ expectations due to the 
high degree of policy instability.  As a result, the growth of the global financial system 
was intense and continuous.  The institutional and technological differences identified 
in this chapter are qualitative pieces of evidence to support the J-curve proposition. 
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V. EFFECTS OF THE SECOND WAVE OF FINANCIAL GLOBALISATION 
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1. Introduction 
 
This thesis has presented statistical evidence and provided a historical analysis of the 
two episodes of financial globalisation. An alternative interpretation to the mainstream 
U-shaped pattern has been established.  Accordingly, the J-shaped proposal has asserted 
that global financial activity in the current era is unprecedented in stocks of foreign 
assets and outward stocks of FDI markets. Broadly speaking, the development of 
financial interconnectedness in these markets has risen significantly in recent decades 
in comparison to the previous globalisation era. Mainly from the 1990s onwards, their 
development has surpassed the first episode in terms of scale, magnitude and speed. 
The J-curve implies that comparatively financial globalisation has been gaining 
momentum in recent years, but the new global financial anatomy has produced 
consequences for the world economy. This chapter aims to investigate the key 
arguments about the macroeconomic costs and benefits of financial globalisation 
throughout this second era.  
An impressive amount of literature on the subject has been produced in recent years, 
and it would therefore be impossible to provide a fully detailed review. The chapter 
seeks to present the scale of this issue and to highlight key array of views on the 
implications of contemporary financial globalisation, focuses on the following research 
questions: Are increased financial flows beneficial, problematic, or both? Are they 
stabilising or destabilising?  Which areas have benefited from financial globalisation, 
and which areas have suffered?   The answers depend on what kind of economic theory 
the authors use. For this reason, after this introduction, section 2 aims to answer an 
additional question, which is: What does economic theory have to say about the 
relationship of financial development and the economic performance? On this account, 
the section is going to present two key theoretical approaches.  Then section 3 presents 
the basic results found in the literature, and section 4 draws the conclusions.   
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2. Assessing the literature 
 
Scholars have discussed the effects of financial globalisation theoretically, empirically 
and (more usually) through a mixture of these approaches. The key issues running 
across much of this literature have been the impact of financial globalisation on both 
economic growth and capital volatility.  Researchers have reached a variety of results 
because they have used different theories, indicators, time series, country samples, 
econometric models and diverse ways to estimate volatility (Kose et al 2006).  A major 
reason for this divergence in opinions is because scholars have been grasping the 
meanings of their results based on different schools of economic thought.  They might 
use the same indicators, time series and sample of countries, but if their theoretical 
approach is different, their interpretations of the results may be subject to considerable 
variation.  The next section briefly reviews the arguments of two contrasting and 
influential bodies of theory on the relationship between financial markets and the 
performance of advanced capitalist economies.   
 
2.1 Identifying theoretical viewpoints: from efficient market to financial instability 
hypothesis 
 
Due to this close relationship between finance, economic growth and crises, economists 
(Akyus 1998; Arestis 2002b, Kregel 2007; Nissanke & Stein 2003; Singh 1997, 2003; 
Solimano 1999; Stiglitz 2000) have been debating a wide range of questions 
surrounding the consequences of financial market integration.  The development of the 
literature on finance cannot be exaggerated since it is correlated with key topics heavily 
debated in economics such as investment, income, economic growth, economic crises 
and the like. There is a colossal amount of literature on the subject, and it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to revise it all.  
Running across the literature on financial globalisation, two contrasting theoretical 
interpretations have inspired economists to interpret the effects of the phenomenon.  
One has been developed by mainstream economics, and the other by critical scholars.  
Consequently, they support opposite viewpoints on the functioning of financial 
markets. The former was developed by Eugene Fama in the 1960s and is called the 
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Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH),56 while the latter is based on Hyman Minsky’s 
theory developed in the 1970s under the label of the Financial Instability Hypothesis 
(FIH).   
The EMH relied on the rational behaviour of agents and on market discipline as a 
mechanism to efficiently allocate financial assets (Fama 1970:383).  The standard 
theory that he used emphasises the positive effects of free markets in terms of 
promoting better global allocation of capital, then helping to improve international risk-
sharing, and decreaseing consumption volatility. This leads, in turn, to increased GDP 
growth and price and consumption stability. Conversely, the FIH proposed that 
financial fragility and crises are endogenous in capitalist economies (Minsky 1985: 26), 
hence some degree of governmental market intervention is crucial in order to deal with 
the the inherent instability. In fact, governments are supposed to create adequate 
constraining institutions as agents that help to stabilise the economy. Minsky and 
critical economists have questioned the validity of these effects, and have highlighted 
their negative macroeconomic implications and high social costs.   
Mainstream economists are proponents of the free market thesis as a robust explanation 
for the development of financial markets.  Soon after the end of WWII, Jacob Viner 
was one of the first authoritative academic voices to support the importance of free 
international capital flows as a policy agenda for the post-war world order.  Viner 
(1947:98) ably addressed the mainstream stance on the role of global financial markets:   
The basic argument for international investment of capital is that under normal 
conditions it results in the movement of capital from countries in which its 
marginal value productivity is low to countries in which its marginal value 
productivity is high and that it thus tends toward an equalization of marginal 
value productivity of capital throughout the world and consequently toward a 
maximum contribution of the world’s capital resources to world production and 
income. 
 
Viner’s view was backed up by a substantial body of subsequent research. The EMH is 
one of the theoretical developments that was developed in the same mainstream 
tradition to describe the behaviour of financial markets in domestic economies. This 
                                                 
56 The dominant features of EMH are quite close to the mainstream approach developed by the hyper-
globalists discussed in chapter III, section 3.  However, the EMH is focused on describing the 
performance of financial markets in particular, moreover Fama’s principles have been used by 
contemporary authors to depict the effects of financial globalisation, whereas in the context of the 
literature review displayed in chapter III, the theoretical debate on globalisation was more general, and 
not focused on financial markets.   
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hypothesis is formed by three basic theoretical principles: free market, utility 
maximisation and rational expectations. EMH also predicts perfect information, i.e. all 
information needed by investors is available provided there is no market intervention 
by governments. In the context of free market, agents use all information rationally, and 
then asset prices will reflect the corrected market opinion.  The equilibrium price on 
securities is achieved in the free markets as a consequence of individual decisions from 
a large number of utility maximising agents (Fama 1970).    
Fama’s (1970:383) concept of efficient can clarify the backbone of his approach: 
The primary role of the capital market is allocation of ownership of the 
economy’s capital stock.  In general terms, the ideal is a market in which prices 
provide accurate signals for resource allocation: that is, a market in which firms 
can make product-investment decisions, and investors can choose among the 
securities that represents ownership of firm’s activities under the assumption that 
securities prices at any time ‘fully reflect’ all available information. A market in 
which prices always ‘fully reflect’ available information is called ‘efficient’.  
 
Based on this standard definition, it can be seen that rational agents can react promptly 
when new relevant information emerges. As a result, prices fully reflect all available 
(old and new) information. Individually, investors cannot make excess profits (“beat the 
market”) because, other things being equal, the assets are always traded at their market 
(fair) value.  There is no investor that outperforms the competition, except by a non-
rational manner, for example, by luck. In this way, markets are efficient in determining 
equilibrium asset prices and consequently in guiding the investors towards allocating 
their assets effectively.57  From country to country, differences in interest rates, in the 
value of assets and in the value of currencies would be eliminated by arbitrage. 
Contemporary authors have been extending the principles underlying the EMH and 
assessing the consequences of the recent phenomenon of global financial integration. 
One of the most frequent allegations is that, when the rate of return to capital differs in 
international capital markets, investors transfer their assets from the host country to the 
country that offers a higher return, and they are then able to evaluate the competitive 
                                                 
57 This general description corresponds in fact to the strong version of the EMH.  In his 1970 article, 
Fama describe three forms in which the EMH is commonly stated: weak form, semi-strong form and 
strong form efficiency. Briefly, the weak form asserts that no excess returns can be earned by using 
investment strategies based on historical share prices or other financial data.  According to the semi-
strong form of efficiency, share prices adjust within an arbitrarily small but finite amount of time; and 
finally, the strong form affirms that share prices reflect all information and that no one can earn excess 
returns (Fama 1970). 
  183
advantages of each country. As a result, capital flows where its productivity is highest, 
i.e., agents determine an advantageous allocation and efficient capital distribution for 
all nations.  Capital is allocated to its most productive use as long as financial markets 
are deregulated and free of state intervention.  Hence, assets are traded with smaller 
costs and greater productivity, encouraging an increased output and employment 
opportunities on a global scale.  
Following the inspiration provided by Viner and the EMH (among others), scholars 
have been advocating that greater financial openness increases efficiency and narrows 
the gap between developing and developed countries because the market knows how 
best to apply scarce resources to produce maximum economic growth.  On this account, 
financial liberalisation is the central pillar which helps to spread economic development 
worldwide.  
The existence of barriers to the trading of financial assets across countries causes 
friction and should be removed in order to maintain “normal” free market operation. 
Systematic economic interdependence of countries and markets, and the absence of 
domestic governance policies are encouraged since national political objectives are 
subordinated to global governance, i.e. financial activities are subject to international 
free market purposes. In doing so, financial globalisation has brought convergence of 
product and income, resulting in economic benefits for countries that are integrated in 
the system.   
On the other hand, authors from the critical school develop a conflicting theory of 
financial markets.  The term “critical school” is used by Singh (2003:197) to express 
the non-mainstream Keynesian theoretical approach to price formation in asset markets 
(see also Davidson 2001b:18).  This expression will be used here with the same 
meaning.  
The key point of the argumentation developed by the critical school is the claim that 
markets fails and reach multiple equilibria, frequently sub-optimal. Consequently, 
markets need extra-market coordination from national or international authorities in 
order to deliberately attempt to smooth the market deficiencies.  The ability of the free 
market to achieve a Pareto optimal equilibrium is a special case of the general unstable 
condition of international financial markets.  It is claimed to be an intrinsic 
characteristic of capitalist economies, and that is why markets are considered fragile 
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and destabilising (Davidson 2001b; Minsky 1985, 1986, 1992) rather than efficient. 
Unlike the theoretical position supported by the mainstream economists, critical 
scholars are oversceptical about the efficiency of international financial markets as an 
institution capable of creating a stable financial environment. 
In the non-mainstream tradition, Hyman P. Minsky developed the most influential 
Keynesian argumentation in direct contrast to the EMH. 58  The FIH is an interpretation 
of Keynes’ general theory of money and finance, which is focused on the importance of 
money, uncertainty, and on the role of monetary institutions in the development of 
investment and economic cycles (Minsky 1992). The basic argument proposed by FIH 
is that the financial instability is a result of internal mechanisms developed by the 
financial system, as an inherent part of its own nature (Minsky, 1986: 100). 
One of the fundamental attributes of contemporary capitalist economies is the use of 
debts to finance investments, and the purchase of assets to pay financial commitments. 
In addition, industries have been financed through debts, external capital funding and 
have developed capital-intensive techniques, hence their period of investment 
maturation lengthened. This encouraged an increase in the firms’ need for external 
finance, until it exceeded the income generated by their activities. The tendency of 
investments to surpass the companies’ internal funds gradually increased their level of 
indebtedness (Minsky, 1992: 6-7).  
Financial intermediaries (banks and non-banking institutions) have played an important 
part in Minsky’s approach. Banks do not need money in cash to finance the productive 
activity because when they authorise a demand for investment, they create money. In 
addition, banks developed new practices and innovative financial instruments to allow 
higher levels of financing.  According to Minsky, financial innovation is an essential 
attribute of modern capitalist economies that has created different types of money.  
Financial innovation is one of the key aspects of economic change because bank 
portfolios hold different monetary instruments, aiming to respond to different purposes 
according to the financing need demanded by agents. 
                                                 
58 According to Wray (2001:3): “Hyman Minsky, arguably the foremost twentieth century theorist on the 
topic of financial instability, extended Keynes’s analysis with two primary contributions. (Minsky 1975, 
1986) First, Minsky developed what he labelled ‘a financial theory of investment and an investment 
theory of the cycle’, attempting to join the approaches of those who emphasized financial factors and 
those who emphasized real factors as causes of the cycle by noting that the two are joined in a firm’s 
balance sheet.” 
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The complex net of financial arrangements developed by the banking system from the 
1970s provided better leverage to firms and investors and created financially instable 
positions. The maximising behaviour of economic agents induces investors to assume 
more aggressive and risky positions, mainly during periods of prosperity, generating 
fragile and unstable financial structures (Minsky, 1986, p. 173). Accordingly, agents 
gradually engaged in more fragile financing structures, from hedge and speculative to 
the insolvent Ponzi financing.  When firms reach the stage called Ponzi, they could not 
increase their finance structure or even manage their debts. Therefore the cycle of 
prosperity is reverted and the economy falls into a crisis. As a consequence, economic 
and financial instability produce uncertainty and hamper the progress of economic 
activity, especially long-term investments. As soon as profits went down and financial 
commitments went up, it became more difficult to accomplish current and prospective 
liabilities.  Their investments dropped off and that took the economy to a financially 
fragile position.  
Due to the increased uncertainty originating in financial markets but which spread 
quickly to the entire system, entrepreneurs and investors in general prefer financial 
gains than to risk their capital in productive investments. Speculation starts to prevail 
over entrepreneurial activity, worsening the economy’s instability and financial 
fragility. Capitalist economy endogenously evolves from being robust to being fragile 
as soon as the diffusion of riskier and more vulnerable ways of financing appear as an 
outcome of the market behaviour.  
The inherent instability of capitalism is due to the way profits depend upon 
investment, the validation of business debts depends upon profits, and investment 
depend upon the availability of external financing.  But the availability of    
financing presupposes that prior debits and the prices that were paid for capital 
assets are being validated by profits.  Capitalism is unstable because it is a 
financial and accumulating system with yesterdays, todays, and tomorrows.  
(Minsky 1986: 294) 
 
A relatively tranquil growth period is transformed into a speculative boom as part of the 
nature of a capitalist economy heavily dependent on “yesterdays, todays and 
tomorrows” financial decisions. This means that a capitalist regime is inherently 
unstable, endogenously financially fragile, and thus always subjected to periods of 
booms and crises.  Stability is only achieved through government intervention. Minsky 
& Ferri (1991:4) proposed that “institutions and interventions thwart the instability 
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breeding dynamics that are natural to market economies by interrupting the endogenous 
process and ‘starting’ the economy again with non-market determined values as ‘initial 
conditions’”. As can be seen, the rules of the game described by both theoretical 
interpretations are in sharp contrast to each other. 
Up to this moment, the following question can be raised: How can this theoretical 
interpretation be applied to scrutinise the effects of the current financial globalisation? 
Mainstream economists have been the arguments provided by the EMH to stress the 
importance of financial liberalisation policies to improve the resource allocation and 
reduce the cost of capital.  The international financial system should be flexible so that 
a large amount of capital can be allocated more efficiently worldwide.  This will 
encourage greater global market efficiency and then lead to a virtuous cycle of 
increased savings, investment, and economic growth. Accordingly, more jobs and 
higher incomes may be created and this would result in increased productivity and 
lower consumption volatility.  In summary, competitive markets, free international 
capital mobility and flexible exchange rates (helped by the efficiency of the 
technological means of communication) should improve the information required by 
the investor leading to better international capital allocation and relative economic 
development in diverse global areas.   
On the other hand, critical authors have been examining the current financial 
globalisation episode through the lenses provided by the FIH. For instance, applying 
Minsky’s theory, Kregel (2004) developed an argumentation that permitted the 
consequences of the increasingly frequent international financial crises of the 1990s to 
be investigated. He used Minsky’s analysis of financial fragility (originally elaborated 
to describe the financial performance of firms in their domestic markets) in an 
international context to describe the deleterious consequences in terms of financial 
instability for countries receiving large capital inflows. According to Kregel, 
conventional wisdom would suggest that governance of financial institutions and 
markets through the introduction of best practice norms is enough to solve financial 
market instability.  But through the Minsky approach, these prudential measures are not 
enough to cope with current financial instability because they become “endemic and 
endogenous” (see also Davidson 2001b:19 and 31).   
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Focusing on the current international scenario of financial integration, Kregel asserted 
that in addition to firms and private agents, governments also take loans to make 
investments, especially in developing countries.59  Their ability to issue money to 
finance their investments is limited by a required and desirable sound monetary policy. 
Then, when a government requires financing above and beyond its internal capacity, 
the more frequent alternative is to take loans from international banks or institutions.  
As a result, the process of indebtedness of a country and its consequences is similar to 
that which happens with firms and investors in Minsky’s model. If a country takes 
international loans to make investments, it can develop the same financial positions 
described by Minsky. If the loans they contracted are invested in tradable activity, or in 
any other profitable activity that helps maintain a high level of foreign currency stock, 
it will be possible to pay back the amount owed, and the interest rates required.  Should 
the global financial scenario be stable, the process of international financial fragility 
can be postponed. However, if there is a change in the psychology of markets, countries 
begin to lose their stock of foreign exchange reserves. Consequently, they begin to 
delay payments of their contracted loans, and they will be exposed to a risky financial 
situation, and be left with the same problems of financial fragility. When these 
problems reach the Ponzi position, they lose all access to the international capital 
market, decree moratorium and the crisis can spread worldwide through contagion. 
Waves of rumours and panic extend worldwide, and the financial crisis then spreads to 
other countries which are also financially fragile.  
 
3. Effects of financial globalisation in the 1990s 
 
One of the key characteristics of contemporary financial globalisation is the process of 
capital account liberalisation, and the liberalisation of the financial sector60 which has 
                                                 
59 Kregel (2004:575, 577) asserted that: “Minsky’s work was initially concerned with the relationship 
between business firms and the banks that lend to them. However, the different types of repayment 
profiles that Minsky sets out to classify the potential fragility of the system have general application. In 
particular, they can be applied to countries that borrow in international financial markets to supplement 
the resources necessary for their development. … Thus developing countries will be in the same position 
as a firm attempting to raise additional financing … This general framework has a ready application to 
sovereign borrowing by countries”. 
60 According to Bergstein quoted in Rogoff et al (2003:17), there is a clear conceptual and empirical 
distinction between liberalisation of financial sectors and liberalisation of the capital account. In his 
opinion, this distinction is important to discern the implications of financial liberalisation for growth and 
  188
been put into operation in advanced, emerging and developing economies.  According 
to Eatwell & Taylor (1998) the process of financial liberalisation began in the 1950s 
during the development of the Euro currency market. It spread throughout the 
developed economies during the 1960s and the 1970s (led by the US and the UK), and 
then it reached its peak by spreading worldwide in the 1980s and 1990s (Bekaert & 
Harvey & Lundblad 2001; Kose et al 2006).   
Financial liberalisation has increased the integration of a wide range of national 
markets, and this has consequently led to a gradual development in the global 
marketplace. This augmented integration has encouraged an upsurge in cross-border 
capital flows, largely since the 1980s. The resulting huge increase in global capital 
flows has brought macro and microeconomic benefits to some economies, but has not 
been helpful for others.  Generally speaking, increased capital flows have contributed to 
improving investment, growth, financial development, volume of trade, budget surplus, 
employment, etc for some countries, but on the other hand, the world economy has also 
been subject to a number of unexpected and unforeseeable influences. Current financial 
globalisation has often been associated with increased volatility in some 
macroeconomic aggregates61, and by an increased vulnerability to crises (Prasad et al 
2003:21, Eichengreen 2004).  These have damaged the effectiveness of domestic 
economic policies (especially in emerging economies), and has also impeded economic 
growth and increased the contagion of financial crises (Prasad et al 2003:3).  As 
Eichengreen (2004:20) affirms, financial liberalisation is a two-edged sword. 
One of the policy prescriptions proposed by the mainstream macroeconomics thought 
became a reality in the world economy from the 1970s. Most countries have been 
noticeably affected by this process of global liberalisation and deregulation. On the 
whole, the effects of the second wave of financial globalisation have not been uniform 
or straightforward.  In fact, the impact of financial globalisation has been unique for 
each country, contrary to what was predicted by the mainstream school. A particular 
description for each country would require specific models for each one which are able 
                                                                                                                                              
development.  In his words: “when I refer to liberalization of the financial sector, what of course I have 
in mind is the opening up of that sector to competitive forces internally and internationally; opening up 
the sector to foreign participation, especially banks, but insurance companies, money managers and 
others, without necessarily opening up the economy to movements of capital flow, including by those 
same foreign participants in the domestic financial sector liberalization process”.  
61 Kose et al (2006:21) conclude that “there is no evidence that financial globalization has delivered on 
the promised benefit of improved international risk sharing and reduced volatility of consumption.” 
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to take into account those specificities, however this is neither feasible nor the purpose 
of this chapter.  Instead, it aims to draw a broad picture through an assessment of the 
macroeconomic consequences presented on the recent specialised literature. 
One might identify as a methodological problem the fact that most articles on the 
subject are written by conventional authors. I tried to find non-mainstream papers, 
some of them are included in the next sections, but in fact there are not many of them. 
 
3.1 Effects of financial liberalisation on economic growth 
 
A burgeoning body of literature about the effects of global financial integration 
encouraged by liberalisation policies has recently been developed. The removal of 
restraints on international financial transactions has affected financially developed and 
underdeveloped countries in a variety of ways. For this reason, scholars have reached a 
number of different conclusions. Some of them have asserted that financial 
liberalisation has increased the growth rates in most countries.  Others, however, have 
reached a different conclusion, i.e. that liberalisation has increased the gap between rich 
and poor nations. These authors have been indicating that, in theory, financial 
integration can increase the growth rates in developing countries through both direct 
and indirect channels. The direct channels include increases in domestic savings, 
reductions in the cost of capital due to better risk allocation, transfers in technology, 
and financial sector developments. The indirect channels include a promotion of 
specialisation, inducements towards better macroeconomic and other policies, and an 
enhancement in capital flows. These channels can potentially increase the economic 
rates of growth within these countries.  
This is what the standard theory affirms, but the evidence presented below indicates 
that empirically it is difficult to identify a strong and robust causal relationship between 
greater financial integration and higher growth rates within these countries.  
In order to capture a general picture, this section is going to present a broader range of 
evidence from authors with different theoretical backgrounds.  Scholars have been 
reviewing the literature about the effects of capital account liberalisation and stock 
market liberalisation on growth (Edison et al 2002, Prasad et al 2003, Eichengreen 
2004, Kose et al 2006).  Amongst them, Kose et al (2006) have, so far, presented a 
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more complete research which focuses on the growing body of evidence in this subject. 
They surveyed three different strands of this literature: empirical studies relating GDP 
growth to capital account liberalisation; equity markets and FDI.   Most of the authors 
examined by Kose et al (2006) supported the mainstream approach. 
 
a) Capital account liberalisation 
 
Kose et al (2006) examined the main results of twenty-five econometric studies on 
financial integration and growth published throughout the period 1994-2006.  This 
literature surveyed by them is composed of articles that aimed to establish a causal 
relationship between financial openness62 and growth. Kose et al presented a table 
summarising the key aspects and the main conclusions of these studies. This table was 
reorganised in table 21 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 In their article, Kose et al use financial openness and financial integration interchangeably. 
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Table 21. Summary of recent research on financial integration and economic 
growth 
Study Number 
of 
countrie
s 
Time 
period 
Financial 
Openness 
Measure 
Main findings  
Alesina, Grilli, and 
Milesi-Ferretti 
(1994) 
20 1950-89 Binary NO EFFECT: No clear impact of capital controls on growth in the OECD countries.  
Quinn (1997) 64 1960-89 ∆Quinn POSITIVE: There is a robust positive association between capital account liberalization 
and growth. 
McKenzie (2001) 112 1960-89 Binary MIXED: No robust evidence of significant impact of capital controls on economic 
growth. 
 
Grilli, and Milesi-
Ferretti (1995) 
61 1966-89 Share NO EFFECT: No evidence of a robust correlation of capital account restrictions with 
growth. 
Rodrik (1998) 95 1975-89 Share NO EFFECT: No evidence of a significant effect on financial openness and growth.  
Edwards (2001) 62 1980-89 Share, Quinn, 
∆Quinn 
MIXED: Capital account openness positively affects growth only after a country has
 achieved a certain degree of economic development and financial development. 
 
Vlachos and 
Waldenström 
(2005) 
42 1980-90 Volume, 
Binary 
MIXED: Value added growth in sectors more dependent on external finance no higher 
post-
 
liberalization but positive effects on growth in output and number of firms 
Arteta,  
Eichengreen and 
Wyplosz (2001) 
61 1973-92 Quinn, ∆Quinn MIXED: Evidence on positive association between capital account liberalization and 
growth fragile but stronger correlation with growth when openness measures are 
interacted with trade openness and rule of law. 
O’Donnell (2001) 94 1971-94 Share, Volume MIXED: No evidence of capital controls on growth, but volume is sometimes 
significant.   
Bosworth and 
Collins (1999) 
58 1978-95 Volume MIXED: FDI is highly beneficial for domestic investment while portfolio flows have no 
discernible effect and loans lie in between. Insignificant impact of international flows on 
saving. 
Bailliu (2000) 40 1975-95 Volume MIXED: Capital inflows foster higher economic growth but only for economies where 
the banking sector has reached a certain level of development.  
Eichengreen and 
Leblang (2003) 
47 1975-95 Binary MIXED: An open capital accounts boosts growth in periods of financial stability in 
international markets with controls playing insulating role during instability.  Similar 
results for 27 economies, 1880-1997. 
Edison, Klein, 
Ricci, and Sløk 
(2004) 
73 1976-95 Share, Quinn MIXED: Capital account liberalization has positive growth effect in middle income 
countries 
Chanda (2005) 82 1976-95 Share MIXED: Capital account liberalization significantly raises growth in more ethnically 
homogeneous countries.  
Klein (2005) 71 1976-95 Share MIXED: Capital account openness has a statistically significant impact on growth in 
countries with better (not the best) institutions.  
Klein and Olivei 
(2006) 
70 1976-95 Share MIXED: Developed countries with open capital accounts enjoyed greater growth and 
financial deepening (with latter effect not present for development economics). 
Kraay (1998) 117 1985-97 Share, Quinn, 
∆Quinn 
MIXED: Change in financial openness is not significantly related to growth (coefficient 
on Volume significantly positive but result not robust). 
Reisen and Soto 
(2001) 
44 1986-97 Volume MIXED: Both FDI and portfolio equity flows have a significant positive impact on 
growth, but bank lending contributes to growth only if banking system is well 
capitalized. 
Vanassche (2004) 45 1980-97 Share, Quinn POSITIVE: Financial openness has a positive effect on sectoral value added growth but 
with greater relative impact on those sectors more reliant on external financing.  
Quinn, Inclan and 
Toyoda (2001) 
76 1960-98 Quinn, ∆Quinn POSITIVE/MIXED: Capital account liberalization has a robust positive impact on 
growth in most countries.  
Durham (2004) 80 1979-98 Volume MIXED: Growth effects of FDI and portfolio flows depend on the absorptive capacity of 
host countries, especially financial or institutional development. 
Bonfiglioli and 
Mendicino (2004) 
90 1975-99 Binary MIXED: Capital liberalization has positive effect on growth but mainly via indirect 
channels, e.g. mitigating effects of banking crises (whereas equity market liberalization 
has direct effect but no interaction with banking crises). 
Mody and Murshid 
(2005) 
60 1979-99 Volume, A Sum MIXED: FDI had strongest positive impact on domestic investment. Positive 
relationship between capital flows investment growth is more emphasized with stronger 
policies. 
Edison, Levine, 
Ricci, and Sløk 
(2002) 
57 1980-
2000 
Share, Volume NO EFFECT/MIXED: With isolated exceptions, unable to reject the null hypothesis that 
international financial integration does not accelerate growth even when controlling for 
particular economic, financial, institutional, and policy characteristics. 
Fratzscher and 
Bussiere (2004) 
45 1980-02 KS, Volume MIXED: Positive short-run growth impact of capital account liberalization but longer 
term effect depends on institutional quality, FDI flows, and liberalization sequencing.  
Source: Kose el al (2006:57-9) 
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Notes: 
Dependent variable: 
EBITDA: Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization; ∆GNPc: Growth rate of real 
per-capita GNP; I: Investment; I/Y: Investment over GDP; ∆Ic: Growth rate in investment per capita; 
∆IND: Growth rate of industry-level measures, e.g., real value added, output or number of firms;  ∆lnI: 
Growth rate of real private investment; S/Y: Saving over GDP;  ∆TFP: Growth rate of total factor 
productivity;  ∆Yc:  Growth rate of real per-capita GDP; ∆Y: Growth rate of real GDP.  
Regression methodology:   
Cross-section: Single observation for each country over entire period; FE: Country and/or industry fixed 
effects; GMM: Generalized Method of Moments; IV: Instrumental Variables; NLLS: Non-Linear Least 
Squares; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; Panel: Repeated observations on countries (or country 
industries) observed over multiple periods (which may be, for example, annual, five years or a decade); 
Pooled: Assumes no country-specific fixed effects; RE: Country random effects; SUR: Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions; WLS: Weighted Least Squares.  
Financial openness measure:   
A Sum: Sum of four binary AREAER liberalization indicators across the following categories – capital 
account; current account; export proceeds and multiple exchange rates; Binary: 0/1 dummy variable from 
AREAER taking the value of one when capital controls in place; KS: Measure based on Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (2003); Quinn: Measure based on Quinn (1997); ∆Quinn: Change in Quinn measure; Share: 
The proportion of years in which countries had liberalized capital accounts based on the binary variable 
from AREAER; SMLD: Official Date of Stock Market Liberalization; Volume: Variable based on actual 
flows/stocks of financial flows.  
Main findings: 
NO EFFECT: No evidence of a significant effect of greater financial integration on growth; MIXED: 
Evidence of positive effect of financial integration on growth is conditional upon other economic 
characteristics (for example, financial development or human capital) or otherwise non-robust (for 
example, conditional on different country samples); POSITIVE: Significant positive effect of greater 
financial integration on growth.  
 
As one can see, it provides ample country coverage since most of them have a large 
sample of countries encompassing developed and emerging economies. Another 
important fact is the time period covered by these different empirical analyses.  And 
finally, the table above encompasses different econometric methodologies since some 
authors use dynamic regression models, others use nonlinear interactions between 
financial integration and economic growth and so on. In order to grasp a broader picture 
of financial integration and economic growth, the results will be considered together.   
The top panel brings together research that covered the 1980s starting in previous 
decades.  Six in seven concluded that there is no or, at best, a mixed effect between 
financial liberalisation and economic growth. Only one indicated a positive effect. The 
lower panel shows the results covering the 1990s. Again, the overwhelming majority of 
these eighteen studies indicate no effect, or a mixed effect, except for one that found a 
positive impact on “sectoral value added growth” between 1980 and 1997.  It is worth 
noting that the research led by Dennis Quinn, Carla Inclan, and A. Maria Toyoda 
(2001) concluded that these results could be mixed for the period 1960-98, whilst the 
results of the 1997 Quinn’s article produced a positive outcome to the period 1960-89.  
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To sum up, only two of these studies concluded that there are growth benefits 
associated with international financial integration.   
On the whole, the results of this compilation present a clear-cut picture about the 
relationship between financial liberalisation and economic growth.  That is, it is hard to 
identify a strong and robust causal relationship between increased financial integration 
and higher growth rates for developing countries for the period analysed for those 
scholars above, most of them conventional economists.  There are positive effects on 
growth mainly for advanced countries but as the samples in general include much more 
countries than the industrial economies, the impact of financial integration does not 
systematically increase the growth rate.  
The econometric or statistical estimations made by non-mainstream scholars about the 
same topic discussed in this section are available in less quantity and not always 
covering the entire period of the second financial globalisation, which is mid-1980s 
onwards.   
Singh (2003) has carried out an econometric analysis of the effects of capital account 
liberalisation on economic growth for developing countries. Table 22 presents 
regression results of the effects of capital flows and their volatility on growth per capita 
for a large sample of developing covering the period 1970-1998.  
 
Table 22. Effects of capital flows and their volatility on growth per capita per 
decade 
  
Dependent variable: rate of GDP growth per 
capita  
Independent variable 1970-98 1970-80 1980-89 1990-98 
Capital flows        0.287b -0.149 0.133 0.275 b 
Capital flows volatility    -0.344 b -0.322 b -0.188 -0.124 
Initial GDP per capital      -0.508 b -0.345 -0.940 b 0.159 
Initial schooling        1.429 -1.749 3.640a -0.446 
Population growth rate     -0.513 b -0.438 -0.573 b 0.869 b 
Investment         0.182 b 0.309 b 0.164 b 0.094 b 
Policy         0.008 b  0.007 b 0.011 b 0.013 b 
Inflation rate     -0.002 b -0.008 -0.001 b  -0.004 b 
Openness of the  economy     0.001 0.006 0.001  -0.024 b 
Adjusted R2     0.75 0.59 0.57 0.38 
No. of Countries 72 56 74 100 
                            a denotes significance at the 10 per cent level, and b at the 5 per cent level.  
                 Source: World Bank (2001), extracted from Singh (2003). 
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Volatility of capital flow is measured by the standard deviation of the flow. The 
dependant variable is the rate of growth of GDP per capita. The table suggests an 
economically important and statistically significant negative relationship between 
capital flow volatility and GDP growth per capita for the period as a whole 1970-1998. 
It is however interesting that the negative relationship becomes weaker over time, with 
the value of the relevant co-efficient rising from a statistically significant minus 0.322 
during 1970-79 to minus 0.124 in 1990-98 when the co-efficient was also statistically 
insignificant. 
Other non-mainstream economists have been using econometric and statistical 
techniques to assess the impacts of financial liberalisation on development.  On this 
account, Arestis & Demetriades (1996) examined the question of causality between 
financial development and economic growth.  They conduct co-integration and 
causality tests between finance and growth using time series data for twelve 
representative countries. According to them, country specific factors are likely to 
influence the causal nature of the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth.  Their main findings were that growth rates vary across countries 
most probably because of institutional and policy differences adopted from country to 
country. 
Arestis, Demetriades & Luintel (2001) utilised time series methods and data from 
developed economies to examine the relationship between stock market development 
and economic growth.  Their results support the view that although banks and stock 
markets may be able to promote economic growth, the effects of the former are more 
powerful. 
Arestis, Demetriades, Fattouh & Mouratidis (2002) have found that the effects of 
liberalisation policies vary considerably from country to country.  Their econometric 
tests applied to six developing countries (Greece, Thailand, Philippines, Korea, India 
and Egypt) demonstrated that the effects of financial liberalisation on financial 
development of these countries are ambiguous. 
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b) Equity market liberalisation 
 
Kose et al (2006) also surveyed 7 studies relating the effects of financial liberalisation 
on the equity markets. The evidence summarised by them reveals an opposite scenario 
than demonstrated by table 22. The table below reproduced the results from the papers 
connecting equity market liberalisation and growth.   
 
Table 23. Summary of key empirical studies on equity market liberalisation and 
growth 
Study Number 
of 
countries 
Time 
period 
Financial 
Openness 
Measure 
Main findings  
Henry 
(2000) 
11 1977-94 SMLD POSITIVE: Positive growth of real private investment following 
stock market liberalisation. 
Bekaert, 
Harvey and 
Lundblad 
(2001) 
30 1980-97 SMLD POSITIVE: Positive effect on growth following equity market 
liberalization which is greater for
 
countries with above median 
education levels.  
Li (2003) 95 1975-
2000 
SMLD POSITIVE: Positive growth impact of opening equity markets 
due mainly to productivity channel in middle- and high-income 
countries and to capital accumulation (I/Y) in low-income.  
Bekaert, 
Harvey and 
Lundblad 
(2005) 
95 1980-97 SMLD POSITIVE: Equity liberalizations increased growth (controlling 
for policy endogeneity) with stronger effects in better legal and 
investment environment and financial development. 
Gupta and 
Yan (2005) 
31 1981-98 SMLD POSITIVE/MIXED: Stock market liberalization leads to higher 
real value added growth in sectors more dependent on external 
finance (but, controlling for liberalization endogeneity, not in those 
with higher growth opportunities). 
Milton 
(2006) 
28 1980-
2000 
SMLD POSITIVE: Significant improvement in sales performance 
associated with liberalization of a firm’s equity to foreign 
investors (controlling for growth opportunities). 
Hammel 
(2006) 
13 1982-95 SMLD MIXED: Real value added in sectors more dependent on external 
finance grows faster  following equity liberalization in countries 
with larger stock market capitalization to GDP.  
Source: Kose el al (2006:62) 
Notes: See notes table 21 
 
The rising importance of portfolio equity flows to emerging markets has motivated a 
number of researchers to examine the growth effects of equity market liberalisation. 
Most of the papers listed below suggest that portfolio equity flows have a significant 
positive impact on output growth. Some of these papers also document the empirical 
relevance of various theoretical channels, linking equity market liberalisation to 
economic growth, including increases in investment growth and firm-level positive 
growth impacts.   However, one can observe that the number of researches and the 
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sample of countries here are much smaller than the researches on financial 
liberalisation presented in table 21.  This may indicate that more research is needed in 
this field in order to provide a more robust indication for the impact of financial 
liberalisation on the equity markets. Also that the positive effects of equity market 
liberalisation are limited to a smaller number of countries in comparison to the large 
samples showed in table 21. 
 
c) FDI 
 
The relative importance of FDI flows has risen significantly in recent years, making it 
an important form of private international financing for emerging market economies. 
Standard theories have been agreed that FDI should yield more benefits than other 
types of financial flows for two reasons: it increases the domestic capital stock, and it 
has a positive impact on productivity through transfers of technology and managerial 
expertise. It has also been argued that FDI tends to be the least volatile of the various 
types of capital flows, making countries less vulnerable to sudden stops or reversals of 
flows.   
Nevertheless, studies using aggregate data have been unable to provide evidence about 
the positive impact of FDI on economic growth. In the list of 11 papers presented by 
Kose et al, while only one show that FDI enhances GDP growth, the others report that 
there is no direct evidence of such a relationship.  
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Table 24. Summary of Key Empirical Studies on FDI and Growth 
Study Number 
of 
countries 
Time 
period 
Financial 
Openness 
Measure 
Main findings  
Balasubramany
am, Salisu, and 
Sapsford 
(1996) 
46 1970-85 FDI/Y MIXED: FDI has a positive impact on economic growth in 
countries which have export-oriented rather than import 
substituting trade policies.  
Borensztein, 
De Gregorio 
and Lee 
69 1970-89 FDI/Y MIXED: FDI contributes to growth in countries with a higher 
level of human capital. 
De Mello 
(1999) 
31 1970-90 FDI MIXED: Growth effects of FDI depend on the FDI degree of 
complementarity and substitution between FDI and domestic 
investment.  
Haveman, Lei, 
and Netz 
(2001) 
74 1970-89 FDI/Y POSITIVE: FDI leads to increased growth.  
 
Lensink and 
Morrisey 
(2002) 
88 1970-98 FDI/Y MIXED: FDI has a positive impact on growth, but evidence is 
weak in developing countries. FDI volatility has a negative 
growth effect. 
Hermes and 
Lensink (2003) 
67 1970-95 FDI/Y MIXED: FDI has a positive growth impact if financial system 
sufficiently developed. 
Choe (2003) 80 1971-95 FDI/Y MIXED: FDI Granger-causes economic growth, vice versa, but 
effects are more emphasized from growth to FDI than from FDI 
to growth. 
Alfaro, 
Chanda, 
Kalemli-Ozcan 
and Sayek 
(2004) 
71 1975-95 FDI/Y MIXED: FDI has a significantly positive effect on growth in 
countries with well-developed financial markets. 
Carkovic and 
Levine (2005) 
72 1960-95 FDI/Y MIXED: FDI inflows do not exert an independent influence on 
economic growth 
Blonigen and 
Wang (2005) 
69 1970-89 FDI/Y MIXED: FDI has a positive impact on growth in less developed 
countries provided education levels are high enough, but not in 
developed countries.   
Aykut and 
Sayek (2005) 
37 1990-
2002 
FDI/Y MIXED: While manufacturing sector FDI has a FDI/Y positive 
impact on growth, primary or service sector FDI has no 
significant impact.  
Source: Kose el al (2006:62) 
 
Despite the theoretical presumption that FDI has the strongest benefits of the different 
types of inflow, it has not proven easy to document these benefits.  Again, the sample 
of countries is smaller than the evidence provided by financial liberalisation indicating 
that more research is needed in order to achieve more conclusive evidence. 
Up to this point, the mainstream propositions relating financial globalisation (read: 
liberalisation) to higher rate of economic growth and income convergence worldwide 
cannot be confirmed.  As seen above, most of the studies carried out for conventional 
scholars have shown that liberalisation has divergent impacts on economic growth.  
Moreover, there is another issue on this account that should mentioned, namely, 
liberalised financial markets can be volatile, promoting capital misallocations and 
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financial crises.  Hence, the consequences of financial globalisation on volatility shall 
be discussed in the next section.  
 
3.2 Effects of financial globalisation on macroeconomic volatility 
 
According to Kose et al (2006:20) there is little empirical evidence to support the view 
that capital account liberalisation by itself increases vulnerability to crises. In their 
opinion, financial crises are just particularly sharp manifestations of the more general 
phenomenon of macroeconomic volatility.  Therefore volatility is another important 
aspect regarding the effects of financial globalisation, which should be analysed more 
carefully. 
According to mainstream theory, international financial integration should reduce 
macroeconomic volatility because as discussed in the previous section, a globalised free 
capital market should provide better opportunities for capital allocation managed by 
rational agents.  As a consequence, it should reduce volatility by diversifying risk of 
capital allocation. These benefits are presumably even greater for developing countries 
that are intrinsically subject to higher volatility due to their production structures being 
less diversified than those of industrial economies.  
Irrespective of the effects on output volatility, mainstream theory suggests that financial 
integration should reduce consumption volatility. The ability to reduce fluctuations in 
consumption is regarded as an important determinant of economic welfare. Access to 
international financial markets provides better opportunities for countries to share 
macroeconomic risk and, thereby, smooth consumption.  The empirical evidence 
presented below does not confirm those theoretical propositions. 
Prasad et al (2003) calculated the volatility for what they called more financially 
integrated economies (MFI) and less financially integrated (LFI) countries, for a period 
between the 1960s and the 1990s.  It is worth noting that their data sample comprises of 
76 countries including 21 developed and 55 developing.  They were grouped in that 
way, the 21 richest world economies formed the industrial countries, the MFI is 
constituted by 22 key developing countries and the LFI is formed by other 33 
developing economies. They calculated volatility for different macroeconomic 
aggregates through the standard deviation. 
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Their results reveal roughly a similar pattern for volatility of output, income and 
consumption.  On average, industrial countries have had lower volatility than MFI and 
LFI economies.  Similarly, MFI had lower volatility than LFI countries.  However, 
there are some intriguing results which deserve more detailed analysis.  Their evidence 
shows the evolution of the average volatility in growth, income and consumption for 
these three different groups of countries.  In what follows, the evidence will be 
presented with distinction for the last two decades of the 20th century. 
In terms of volatility in output growth, the table below reveals that MFI and LFI 
economies had almost the same level of output volatility in the 1960s, but in the next 
two decades, the LFI were more volatile than MFI.  In the 1970s, the LFI reached their 
largest volatility level but they had a significant reduction during the two following 
decades.  Conversely, the MFI had their lowest level of volatility in the 1970s but they 
arrived in the 1990s with a higher percentage to LFI. As expected, during these three 
decades, the output volatility of industrial countries was not only more stable but it 
presented a much lower level than the MFI and LFI economies (it was smaller by about 
fifty percent on average).  Looking at the whole picture, volatility slightly declined for 
all these three groups, except for MFI. 
 
Table 25. Average volatility of output growth (percentage standard deviations for 
each group of countries) 
 1960-99 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Industrial countries 2.18 1.91 2.46 2.03 1.61 
MFI economies 3.84 3.31 3.22 4.05 3.59 
LFI economies 4.67 3.36 4.88 4.53 2.70 
                Source: Prasad et al (2003:23) 
 
Regarding volatility in income growth, the results showed below indicate that 
throughout the last four decades industrial countries have typically had the lowest 
volatility. During this period, volatility declined continuously for these countries, 
although only by a small margin.  Income volatility in MFI remained stable during 
1970s and 1980s. Their level of volatility reached the highest point over these two 
decades but declined significantly during the 1990s. LFI countries presented the largest 
volatility of all the three groups, although by the 1990s their income volatility was less 
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than MFI.  Again, during the 1990s, the MFI presented the highest figure for volatility 
amongst the three groups.  
 
Table 26. Average volatility of income growth (percentage standard deviations for 
each group of countries) 
 1960-99 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Industrial countries 2.73 2.18 2.99 2.54 1.91 
MFI economies 5.44 3.60 5.43 5.45 4.78 
LFI economies 7.25 4.42 9.64 7.56 4.59 
                Source: Prasad et al (2003:23) 
 
Total consumption volatility declined for all three groups of countries from the 1960s to 
the 1990s. The same pattern of lowest and continuously declining percentages repeated 
here regarding the industrial countries. For MFI economies, it slightly declines from the 
1980s to the 1990s.  LFI economies had the highest figures for the entire period but 
during the last two decades the consumption volatility fell substantially. 
 
Table 27. Average volatility of total consumption growth (percentage standard 
deviations for each group of countries) 
 1960-99 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Industrial countries 1.86 1.38 1.84 1.58 1.38 
MFI economies 4.34 3.95 4.19 3.43 4.10 
LFI economies 6.40 4.85 6.50 6.34 4.79 
                Source: Prasad et al (2003:23) 
 
Finally, the table below presents the ratio of consumption to income volatility.  In this, 
industrial countries have the lowest ratio throughout the entire period, and the volatility 
of consumption growth to income volatility is quite similar for MFI and LFI 
economies, increasing continuously between the 1970s and 1990s for both.    The ratio 
of consumption to income volatility for MFI not only increased after the 1970s but, 
during the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, it rose substantially.  It can be explained by 
the crises experienced in some of these economies.   
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According to Prasad et al (2003) this is a striking result not just because the volatility of 
consumption rose but also because it increased more than income volatility.  It is 
surprising since the conventional theory predicts that financial integration allows 
countries to share income risk and smooth consumption. 
 
Table 28. Ratio of total consumption volatility to income volatility (percentage 
standard deviations for each group of countries) 
 1960-99 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Industrial countries 0.67 0.75 0.56 0.61 0.58 
MFI economies 0.81 0.92 0.74 0.76 0.92 
LFI economies 0.80 0.95 0.68 0.82 0.84 
                   Source: Prasad et al (2003:23) 
 
Thus far, some key conclusions can be drawn, and as shown, the evidence suggests that 
output and income volatility have, on average, declined in the 1990s compared to the 
1980s for all groups of countries.  However, consumption volatility and the ratio of 
consumption to income volatility for MFI economies have increased. So, how did 
Prasad et al (2003) explain these paradoxical results? 
According to them, it reveals some evidence of a threshold effect, i.e. financial 
integration reduces volatility only beyond a certain level.  In other words, countries are 
able to receive benefits from lower consumption volatility only beyond a certain level 
of financial integration attained by industrial economies. Apparently, MFI economies 
are in the process of acquiring these threshold effects.  Most emerging market 
economies are below this threshold level of financial integration while most industrial 
economies are above it. 
To sum up, the empirical evidence presented regarding the effects of financial 
globalisation on growth and volatility reveals two outstanding results for the period 
1960s-90s: 1. There is no strong and robust evidence that financial integration has 
raised growth rates; and 2. Financial integration might have increased consumption 
volatility indistinctly for MFI and LFI countries but for industrial countries volatility 
remained flat for the aggregates in discussion. 
The picture about the volatility under the second financial globalisation scenario is 
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much better drawn by the research done by Kose et al (2006).  They calculate 
volatility using a different taxonomy and time horizon providing some further 
evidence to the debate on volatility discussed so far. Instead of defining more or less 
financially integrated countries, they proposed a general classification, dividing the 
groups of countries in advanced, emerging and other developing economies. Instead of 
being calculated in decades, volatility is calculated for the period which is at the centre 
of the second surge of financial globalisation, i.e. 1985 to 2004. And finally, they 
calculated volatility using cross-country averages of the standard deviations and 
coefficient of variation for the main current types of international capital inflows, i.e. 
FDI, equity and debt.  Their results look at the debate from a different perspective 
providing some new evidence; hence it plays an important role for accomplishing the 
purpose of this chapter.   
Table 29 presents their key results.  The top panel shows that, in all country groups, 
gross inflows of debt financing are substantially more volatile than FDI or equity 
inflows, or the sum of FDI and equity inflows.  The lower panel shows the coefficient 
of variation, which is the standard deviation divided by the mean. The results using this 
measure are less clear-cut. For emerging markets, FDI and the sum of FDI and equity 
are slightly less volatile than debt flows. Some of these results fail to be sensitive to the 
choice of sample as a few countries have very small shares of certain types of flows, 
which distorts some of the results (by blowing up the coefficients of variation). 
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Table 29. Volatility of different types of inflows: 1985-2004 
 FDI/GDP Equity/GDP Debt/GDP FDI+Equity/GDP
Standard deviation* 
All countries 1.90 1.42 4.42 2.78 
Advanced economies 2.43 2.36 6.18 4.38 
Emerging markets 1.45 0.84 3.38 1.87 
Other developing economies 1.76 0.11 3.36 1.76 
Coefficients of variation** 
All countries 0.85 0.98 0.76 0.80 
Advanced economies 0.92 0.99 0.64 0.84 
Emerging markets 0.75 1.07 0.85 0.71 
Other developing economies 0.89 0.65 0.80 0.87 
 Source: Kose et al (2006:56) 
 Notes: Data shown in this table are the cross-country means and medians for each group of countries of 
the standard deviation and coefficient of variation of the different categories of gross capital inflows over 
the period 1985–2004. The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation divided by the mean. 
* Mean of standard deviation. 
** Mean of coefficient of variation. 
 
Table 29 shows two different ways of representing volatility. Statistically speaking, the 
coefficient of variation is a finer indicator than the standard deviation because the latter 
is affected by the magnitude of the different types of investment. For the purpose of this 
chapter, the key results revealed by the table are the figures for advanced and emerging 
economies.  Having “all countries” as a parameter, one can realise that the FDI/GDP 
volatility is significantly larger in an advanced economy in comparison to the emerging 
markets.  It is another unexpected result for the conventional wisdom. As expected, 
emerging countries had the highest volatility in equity and debt markets amongst all 
groups most probably due to the spurt of crises during this period.    
Another important conclusion drawn from the table above is the short distance between 
FDI and equity volatilities, especially for advanced economies.  It means that during 
1985-2004, FDI was as volatile as equity flows for both groups of countries, confirming 
the Kregel’s (1994) approach summarised above. Again, this result does not fit with the 
proposition advocated by the conventional wisdom which tends to emphasise the 
stability of FDI since it encompass long term commitment with the recipient countries.  
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4. Conclusions 
 
The first part of the chapter examined two contrasting theoretical approaches which 
accounted for the dynamics of the international capital market, one belongs to the 
mainstream economics (EMH) and the other is related to critical Keynesian economists 
(FIH). According to the former, prices on traded assets reflect all known information 
since rational agents take decisions in freee markets.  Contemporary authors have been 
using the theoretical principles of this approach to emphasise the importance of 
liberalisation and deregulation policies to improve the world economy.  Conversely, 
critical authors claim that the instability is an endogenous feature of the system, hence 
capitalist economies always need a governmental or institutional intervention to tackle 
the vicissitudes of the system. 
The second section considered the empirical evidence of some key macroeconomic 
indicators related to global capital flows. The central message of this chapter is that 
according to the scholars surveyed the correlation between financial liberalisation and 
growth is not yet evidence, as proposed by the mainstream approach. As a whole, 
financial globalisation creates winners (in the north) and losers (in the south) in terms 
of volume of capital traded and volatility. This is not only a conclusion of this chapter. 
Likewise, in the last two chapters of their 2004 book, Obstfeld & Taylor presented a 
wide empirical study on the evolution in the international capital mobility since the 
Gold Standard. Chapter 7 has a suggestive name “Uneven integration” and chapter 8 is 
called “Uneven rewards and risks”. The evidence presented led them to conclude that 
contemporary financial integration is biased towards rich nations, and that the alleged 
benefits in terms of convergence and equality are far from being a reality.  Through a 
different theoretical and historical perspective, Chang (2002) achieved the same 
conclusion.   
It urges the implementation of strategies for political and economic development 
especially in those areas where the capital have not yet arrived in amount able to 
improve the living standard of the society. The majority of world capital has not flowed 
to poorer countries - instead it has concentrated on developed economies.   Overall, the 
instability of the international financial system seems to contradict the efficient market 
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theory, and so the predictions of this approach might not be realised, especially in low-
income countries. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
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The major purpose of this thesis is to provide quantitative and qualitative evidence to 
demonstrate the J-curve as an alternative depiction of financial globalisation since the 
classical Gold Standard period.  In contrast to the widely-known U-shaped pattern, the J-
shaped proposition elaborated here claims that the level of financial enmeshment since 
the mid-1990s has been higher and more pervasive than the highest level of financial 
integration achieved during the previous experience. Opposing to the “nothing new” 
scenario in global finances, this thesis provides a contrasting original perspective 
showing those markets in which scholars found the U-curve, today’s financial integration 
has surpassed the pre-1914 era. Thus the current financial globalisation is unprecedented. 
In order to reach this conclusion, certain steps were followed that gradually aimed at 
delineating the necessary arguments for the construction of the J-curve proposition.   
The first step was to understand the globalisation phenomenon in a theoretical and 
historical perspective.  The main features of this endeavour were developed in chapter 
two. This chapter departed from an economic standpoint to present a review of key 
aspects running across the globalisation literature, such as its definition, chronology, the 
debate about myth or reality, and measurements. At the end, it presented three theoretical 
interpretations of the phenomenon.   The chapter established core aspects surrounding 
globalisation, pointing to some focused issues on financial globalisation proposed by 
the subsequent chapters. 
The main features of the J-shaped proposition are developed in detail in chapters three 
and four. After a literature review on financial globalisation, chapter three demonstrates 
the empirical aspects of the J-curve. The starting point of the empirical study was to piece 
together historical estimates and data from prominent scholars and reliable institutions in 
order to assess the statistical performance of financial globalisation. This empirical 
research showed that a J-curve is traced for stock of foreign assets and liabilities during 
1870 to 2000 and for the outward stock of FDI from 1913 to 2005.  In those markets, the 
U-shaped pattern could not be confirmed, conversely a J-shaped pattern better represents 
the performance of those markets within the time frame in study.  Those findings together 
create the necessary conditions for the elaboration of the research hypothesis, which was 
referred to as the J-shaped curve. Additional illustration of the huge surge of financial 
activities was presented subsequently from the various financial markets from the 1970s 
onwards.  This study demonstrated that the level of activity in novel markets from this 
period has been remarkable. The evidence displayed led to another stage of the thesis.   
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Up to this point, the major result of the thesis is the achievement of a J-curve in those two 
markets.  This thesis does not aim to make empirical tests for a variety of financial 
markets since 1870. In fact, the authors who had studied the U-curve had not made this 
due to the scarcity of historical data for that period, which have hindered this type of 
research. I am not saying that the financial globalisation phenomenon is limited to just 
two indicators.  On the contrary, my interpretation presented displayed in chapter three, 
section 2.1.b recognises it as a wide-reaching process. Moreover, in section 3.4 of 
chapter two, I presented a range of indicators that have been using by scholars to assess 
financial globalisation.  The central argument of this research is clear: authors have 
found the U-curve in certain markets from the past until 1995.  I updated their figures 
and found another shape pointing to an unprecedented volume of cross-border 
transactions throughout the current era. It led me to further investigation on the 
historical and institutional characteristics of this period. The essential purpose and the 
key message of the J-curve is to promote a debate on the nature of the financial markets, 
highlight the uniqueness of the contemporary era, and invite a re-examination of the 
second episode of financial globalisation. 
Having established empirically the research hypothesis, the next step was to investigate 
the qualitative underpinnings underlying the J-curve. One of most frequent criticisms 
levelled at the historical literature on financial globalisation is that the debate covers a 
very long historical period in which economic, social and political circumstances are 
very different. For this reason, it is difficult to compare qualitatively the level of 
financial integration in those eras.  Scholars who study the U-shaped pattern present 
various ways to tackle this difficulty.  They normally opt for historical analysis 
combined with rigorous econometric treatment, but they do not always choose to 
scrutinise the phenomenon through the role played by institutions in both eras.  To deal 
with this issue, chapter four is devoted to investigating the institutional aspects of the 
two financial globalisation waves. The chapter underlines the centrality of the changes 
that occurred in the institutions (rules, traditions, regulations) for the development of 
cross-border financial activity in each era. Based on the work of Baldwin & Martin 
(1999) and Hodgson (2002a), the chapter focused on the examination of the “dense 
network of historically specific financial institutions” developed in each era. 
The chapter examines the “rules of the game” and the role played by the technological 
innovations to increase financial integration.  Although recognising that technological 
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breakthroughs put into operation in both eras were important factors in encouraging 
global integration, the focal point to explain the meaning of the J-curve is based on the 
analysis of the institutional arrangements that shaped the two experiences. On this 
account, especially after the 1980s, more robust and sustainable manifestations of 
financial globalisation have multiplied and were responsible for accommodating an 
unprecedentedly huge volume of cross-border financial flows.  In other words, the 
institutional framework developed in the second era was much more complex, 
extensive and pervasive than in the first.  This explains the longer upward stroke of the 
J-shape. 
Finally, chapter five analysed the consequences of financial globalisation during the 
current era.  The chapter first identified and presented the foundations of two contrasting 
theoretical interpretations that have currently been taken into account to assess the 
implications of financial globalisation. The conventional wisdom represented by the 
EMH supports the fact that neo-liberal measures should be the basis for the process of 
convergence and global prosperity.  Conversely, the FIH sustains the importance of 
additional measures taken for governments and multilateral institutions to support the 
achievement of higher levels of economic activity. Following this analysis, the chapter 
presents a variety of macroeconomic aggregates that have been scrutinised to assess the 
impacts of the phenomenon. Resorting to several distinct assessments, the main traits of 
that evaluation are that most of the benefits of financial globalisation have been 
concentrated in Triad countries.  In contrast to what is foreseen by the conventional 
theory, liberal policy regimes encouraged by North Atlantic countries have created 
neither worldwide prosperity nor sustainable development.  Therefore, one contribution 
of the J-shape analysis is to draw attention to the uneven pattern of current financial 
globalisation and hence to the urgency for an elaboration of new global financial 
architecture. 
The market by itself has not eliminated inequalities nor has it provided a better level of 
economic development to all nations. Developing countries in general, but Latin 
American in particular, have been characterised by very large inequalities in income 
and wealth distribution.  Hence, additional programmes and public policies are 
necessary in order to overcome those issues and push those economies in the direction 
of economic development. 
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One way to cope with this problem is to formulate institutionally development 
strategies for each developing country, including it as a central objective of domestic 
national policy. This development agenda should aim to create greater equity and/or 
alleviate inequality among nations. These policies should be applied while paying 
careful attention to specific objectives of each developing economies, rather than to 
apply similar programmes to all indistinctly.  To do so, it is necessary to scrutinise the 
historical aspects of their process of industrialisation and developing policies, trying to 
understand which are the conditions and possibilities to produce or improve domestic 
development strategies.   
Development policies in those countries have been extremely volatile and have been 
failing frequently. As a consequence, they have had a very negative impact both on the 
economic performance and on the countries’ ability to alleviate inequality.  Therefore, 
one important aspect to emphasise is to encourage the stability in terms of their policy 
agenda, i.e. to establish long-term policies which remain without being changed 
frequently.  Short-term programmes are also important but they are not able to 
overcome the structural problems that only long-term investment commitment could. 
In addition, developing countries can only influence the course of events and try to 
invert this tendency if they act united through pressures on leading global economies, 
such as the G7 group. These actions together with sustainable long-term policies 
provided by local governments and multilateral institutions are a key way to attain the 
changes necessary to reverse the uneven economic development and the unfortunate 
effects of (financial) globalisation. Not having a policy is also a policy and its outcomes 
are unlikely to be the best approach for those societies.  
Currently, the UN has been developing specific programmes with this purpose.  For 
example, the Millennium Development Goals is an attempt to reduce inequality, 
poverty and provide financing to improve the life of citizens of developing countries.  It 
was created as part of the Monterrey Consensus, an International Conference held in 
Monterrey, Mexico in 2002, in order to formulate developing policies to be applied in 
those countries.  
Yet, in these countries the difference between the rich and the poor is very high, and 
this is why they have a tremendous catching-up movement in front of them.  Echoing 
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Karl Marx, the distinctive characteristic of capitalism is the concentration of wealth in 
just a few hands. Chapter five illustrates this statement.  
Nevertheless the J-curve does not call attention only for the unequal and biased pattern 
of current financial globalisation. Moreover, there are also a couple of policy 
propositions can be extracted from the lessons underlying the J-curve since it was 
demonstrated that the higher degree of financial integration since the 1990s represented 
also an era of high instability and  new risks to the world economy.  
As the global economy shows growing signs of vulnerability, the early years of the 21st 
century have been characterised by generally worrying macroeconomic conditions.  
The occurrence of a series of financial crises since the 1980s created suspicion of 
truthful corporate accounting, and provoked deleterious consequences for a sound 
global financial regulation.  These problems, associated with a large range of 
macroeconomic imbalances examined throughout the last two chapters of the thesis, 
have indicated that on the financial side, the system is becoming out of control.  Most 
countries (especially the US) created a lot of defences against financial crises in the 
1930s, but the system has developed alternative ways of surpassing the mechanisms of 
regulation and has developed around those defences.  To put it another way, under the 
pressure of prudential regulation, financial institutions have moved offshore and go 
around the system to play the game more harshly and aggressively than ever.  Indeed, 
the safeguards are no longer effective, so that private agents and families around the 
world have loosing their savings, especially in reckless lending provided by 
unregulated bank-type institutions.  Needless to say that there is an issue nowadays on 
global financial control.  
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, created in 1974 by the Group of Ten 
(G10) has formulated broad supervisory standards, guidelines and recommends 
statements of best practice in banking supervision. However, those international 
banking regulation agreements are not applied to investment banking and to hedge 
funds.  In my opinion, it is not clear so far that the world economy needs a new 
regulatory institution, but it is clear to me that it needs a revamped international regime 
to regulate those short-term transactions. Then, one alternative in order to avoid other 
financial global crises is to build a new Basel agreement to tackle this issue.   
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Financial markets cannot discipline themselves since they cannot move quickly and 
decisively enough to rescue institutions under hazardous conditions. Historically, they 
have not been able to avoid the recurrent occurrence of financial crises, or even of 
moderating satisfactorily its harmful consequences. Past and present experiences teach 
us that financial crises have spread all over the world, and have been managed with 
help of some forms of government intervention. Historically, when it did not happen (as 
during the in the 1929 crisis), the consequences were extremely harmful. At that time, 
the worldwide economic downturn plunged the global economy into a period called 
The Great Depression. That does not mean that financial globalisation is coming to the 
end but it does mean that to avoid the occurrence of financial crises is always preferable 
(and more economically viable) than to manage governments bailout of corporations. 
Especially because there are a couple of major players concentrated in few countries 
that strongly influenced the performance of all global financial markets. Accordingly, 
the future of the contemporary financial regime might be a stage of more state 
regulatory agencies intervention.  
In summary, institutions are part of the “rules of the game” and also part of the 
solution.  There is no definitive final answer to the problem of inequality among nations 
under the capitalist system but there are ways to reduce the unfortunate consequences 
resulting from the capital will.  
Difficulties are ubiquitous in a research of a theme with such a large historical and 
geographical scope. The increasing popularity of financial globalisation has brought to 
light a variety of studies, methods and approaches.  The wide variety of approaches and 
the proliferation of many different econometric tests have shown more clearly how hard 
it is to enter and sustain a different interpretation. Moreover, many difficult 
arrangements had to be made to gather the historical data, especially with regard to the 
late 19th century.  
The thesis established the J-shaped pattern, highlighting the importance of institutions to 
the development of global financial activity, and presents the problematic consequences 
underlying the current experience. The results of this research invite enquiry on the 
sustainability of the current financial architecture and encourage new development 
strategies.  It is hoped therefore, that this study may expand research in that area. In fact, 
studies about a new financial architecture are an ongoing research programme and should 
be more inclusive in order to avoid a situation whereby “it” can happen again.  Possibly, 
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this is the appropriate moment to rethink the unfolding of the current financial 
globalisation. Without a new world financial design defined democratically in political 
terrain by representatives of global society, a new depression period can last for a long 
time, bringing disastrous consequences to most people. But, is anyone listening? 
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1. A diachronic study of the word globalisation63 
 
Globalisation had reached a wide audience after the 1990s within economics and in 
other social sciences (see appendix 2). The usage of the word is recent in economics, 
despite of the phenomenon and then the idea behind the word is old.64  As presented in 
figure 16 in appendix 2, between the 1970s and the 1980s scholars used different nouns 
(internationalisation, transnationalism, interdependence, etc) to address the issues 
related to the phenomenon of global market integration. Nevertheless, after the 1990s 
they seem to have agreed to use the word globalisation as an umbrella term to study the 
increased interconnectedness of markets worldwide. Many reasons could explain this 
fact.  There are elements to consider beyond the borders of economics since it involves 
some sociological aspects, which are outside the scope of this thesis.   Nevertheless, a 
diachronic analysis can demonstrate how the meanings and forms of this word have 
come into being.   But first, it is important to consider John Searle’s (1995) arguments 
about language, institutions and facts. 
Searle’s approach is quite influential to explain one possible reason for the prevalence 
of the term globalisation in the current era.  According to him, “institutional facts in 
general require language because the language is partly constitutive of the facts” (p. 
70). As an institution, language is the collective public and conventional representation 
of facts, and a way of representing something new that has been happening, and has 
shaped the world in the collective mind.   Searle’s assertion may be applied to the 
adherence of the word globalisation since the 1980s.  According to him (1995:69): 
The status exists only if people believe it exists, and the reasons function only if 
people accept them as reasons.  Therefore, the agent must have some way to 
represent the new status, he cannot do it in terms of prelinguistic brute features. 
… Because the new status exists only by convention, there must be some 
conventional way to represent the status or the system will not work. … We have 
to have words or other symbolic means to perform the shift from the X to the Y 
status.” 
 
                                                 
63 In a previous version of the thesis, this appendix was written as a part of a chapter. However, despite 
the importance of this material for a quantitative evaluation of globalisation and financial globalisation 
literature in social sciences over the last decades, the data presented here is not central to underpinning 
the subsequent work in the thesis. 
64 It can be traced back to the period of the Age of Discovery centuries ago or even before that (Held e t 
1999). This periodisation of globalisation was discussed in chapter 2, section 3.2. 
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Words themselves are nothing else but conventions and human language changes 
throughout time.  Humans are capable of abstract thinking, i.e. they are capable of 
using concepts, and their language ability allows them to employ words to express 
abstract notions.  The usage of the word globalisation is connected with the gradual but 
pregressive and thick development of the process of trade and financial market 
interconnectivity. In the following two decades after the 1960s, the word appears not to 
have been in common usage in English. Historical factors explain this gap. Due to the 
lack of more substantial and ongoing manifestations of globalisation, most English-
speakers, scholars and ordinary people, had little or no acquaintance with the meaning 
of globalisation as it is understood today. However, especially after the 1980s, the 
world was transformed by extensive changes in trade, production and finance, which 
created favourable circumstances for the labelling of the notion, then the word gained 
currency as it began to enter the mainstream in the 1990s.  This conclusion seems to be 
in accordance with what was discussed about the development of the globalisation 
literature in the first section of this chapter (figures 11 to 16 appendix 2).  
The prevalence of the word globalisation after the 1990s is strongly connected with its 
etymology. Referring to the global spread of the term recently, Anthony Giddens 
(2002:7) correctly asserted that during the late 1980s the term was hardly used in 
academia or in everyday language.  Then he stated that it “has come from nowhere to 
be almost everywhere.” The second part of his sentence is what this chapter (and the 
following one) is about, but the first part is not an accurate statement. The study on the 
origin of the term plays an important role in this chapter since it adds to the debate the 
importance of the language as an institution that evolves while general transformations 
in diverse areas and institutions have occurred. 
In its current meaning, globalisation evokes a myriad of changes and events that were 
allegedly involving the entire world.  At first, the noun globalisation appeared in 
English dictionaries as a derivative of global, which in turn has its origin in the Latin 
globus, initially “sphere” and later “earth”, “globe”, “world”. According to the sources 
researched, it is difficult to tell precisely when the word globalisation was coined in 
English.  However, it is possible to identify when the word was recorded in English 
dictionaries.   
The online edition of the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) states that globalization 
was defined for the first time in the 1961 edition of the Webster’s dictionary (spelled 
  217
with “z”).65  The OED online also asserts that it was the first published mention of the 
word too.  The 1961 edition of Webster’s also suggests that the noun globalization can 
be used interchangeably with the noun globalism, despite defining globalism slightly 
different:  globalisation is means the act of globalising while globalism is defined as a 
policy or system promoting globalisation.  
Despite of the fact that it appeared in The Oxford Dictionary in 1971, the OED online 
suggests that the first printed appearance on British soil was on 5th October 1962 in the 
Spectator magazine, which uses the word (spelled with s) as part of an intriguing 
prophetic statement: “globalisation is, indeed a staggering concept”. At that time the 
journalist could not imagine that not only the concept but also the causes and 
consequences of the phenomenon would be intensively studied in the coming years by a 
variety of scientists belonging to different disciplines. Furthermore, according to the 
OED online, some related forms of the word were used for related meanings in the US 
and the UK before globalisation was attested in printing. For instance, on 4th April 
1959 The Economist used the expression “globalised quota”, while the word 
globalism66 was mentioned in the 23rd January 1965 issue of the same periodical. On 
28th January 1962, the British newspaper The Sunday Times used the word globalising.  
In 1953 the term globalist was printed in The Book of Year of the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica.  Furthermore, in the early 1960s, the term global village was coined and 
popularised by the Canadian educator and philosopher Marshall McLuhan,67 and the 
expression global warming was used in The Economist on 4th June 1979.  
These are only few representative samples collected by the OED online that reveal how 
the word globalisation and correlated terms were used in the English language in their 
earliest printed mentions. Nevertheless, the concept may have appeared earlier and the 
word may have initially been restricted to particular types of verbal communication 
such as political speeches, parliamentary discourses, etc (Scholte 2001:613).   
                                                 
65 Here is the definition provided by the Webster’s 1961 edition: “Globalization n, -s: the act of 
globalizing or condition of being globalized.”  
66 Scholte (2002:4) found this word mentioned in: Reiser, O.L. & Davies, B. (1944) Planetary 
Democracy: An Introduction to Scientific Humanism, New York: Creative Age Press, pp. 212, 219.  
67 McLuhan emphasised the role played by high technology and international communications 
encouraging a planetary connection, and then forming one global community. He developed this concept 
in various books.  The key ones are: McLuhan, Marshall (1962). The Gutemberg Galaxy: the making of 
typographic man. Toronto: University of Toronto Press; McLuhan; and McLuhan, M. & Fiore, Q. (1968) 
War and peace in the Global Village, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
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In other languages, such as most European languages, and also some others outside 
Europe, the term apparently penetrated from English when the modern concept of 
globalisation was developed.  It is out of the scope of this section to scrutinise the 
origin of this word in many languages but judging by countries that have been less 
globalised than the US and the UK basically, one can conclude that the word may have 
penetrated into different languages under the influence of English. The following 
examples can illustrate it: French globalisation68 or mondialisation, Italian 
globalizzazione, Spanish globalización, Portuguese globalização, German 
globalisierung, Dutch globalisering, Danish globalisering, Swedish globalisering, 
Russian globalizatsia, Czech globalizace, Slovak globalizácia, Polish globalizacja, 
Latvian globalizácija, Malay globalisasi, and Indonesia globalisesion.   
Besides, many languages spoken in African and Asian countries (most of the 
Commonwealth Nations, and other Asian autonomous regions such as Tibet, etc), this 
word does not exist in their mother tongues or dialects, and then they simply adopted 
the English word.  It may be due to their colonial heritage or not since it also occurs in 
languages spoken in countries that have never been colonies but are currently 
influenced by English.  Moreover, in some languages, people also use derivates of other 
words to express global (world) integration.  
I have been searching for other scientific evidence on the origin of the term in other 
European languages.  Then, I found an article from the German linguist Rosemarie 
Schnerrer. According to Schnerrer (1998), while the word global has a long tradition in 
German (at least since 1882), the terms globalisation and globalise are fairly modern.  
They can only be traced in the index of the German Dictionary of Foreign Words, and 
in the Dictionary of German Contemporary Language69 since the 1950s. According to 
her, the earliest evidence found in the German Dictionary of Foreign Words of 1959 
relates to the subject area of economics. She quotes the FAZ newspaper, 24.12.1959 as 
follows: “The bilateral announcement following Spain’s entry into the OEEC and the 
concomitant partial liberalisation and globalisation of Spanish imports have been 
stopped almost completely despite the previous agreement”. After that time, the term 
spread fast in international trade and stock market. 
                                                 
68 According to the research done in this chapter, globalisation has been derived in French before 
English, which means that only the current meaning has been attached to it under English influence. 
69 Deutsches Fremdworterbuch, Worterbuch der Deutschen Gegenwartssprache. 
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The most distinguished controversy about the usage of the word globalisation within 
academia is this term in French. As discussed in section 2, the term globalisation was 
used in 1927 to denote a method of teaching developed by a psychologist.  However, 
French scholars have recently been using two terms to designate the phenomenon: 
globalisation (Aglietta 1995), and mondialisation (Chesnais 1994, 1997, 2001, Gerbier 
1997, Rogalski 1997).  
Mondialisation comes from the French word monde (world).  One of the first 
economists to acknowledge the concept of mondialisation was the French economist 
François Chesnais.  His books and articles (Chesnais 1994 and elsewhere) contrast the 
English term globalisation with the French mondialisation. As stated above, according 
to Chesnais (1994 and elsewhere), the term in English was popularised by the 
American Schools of Business and Management, and bear neoliberal principles. 
 Scholars and consultants belonging to those schools have developed corporative and 
marketing strategies in order to encourage the great corporations to penetrate the global 
markets, taking advantage of the technological apparatus of telecommunications and 
the liberal reforms that were in course during the early 1980s.   
In opposition to that notion, Chesnais develops a Marxian interpretation of the term 
based on the Marxist concept of capital valuation. Accordingly, he defines 
mondialisation as a historical process of capital valuation encompassing the productive 
and financial spheres worldwide and subjected to political and ideological 
interferences. Centring the definition on the cyclical and contradictory dynamics of the 
capital, he advances gloomy prognostications about the future of the world economy. 
He considers the concept of mondialisation in a more general way and accurately 
describes what has been happening in the world economy recently.  For this reason, did 
not use the words globalisation and mondialisation interchangeably.   
On the other hand, French economic scholars (even Chesnais) use the expression 
globalisation financière (financial globalisation) (Aglietta 1995; Chesnais 1997, 2001; 
Gerbier 1997; Rogalski 1997) to designate the globalisation of financial markets.  
In order to evaluate the first records of globalisation in British English, a small a 
questionnaire has been sent to the most authoritative dictionary publishers to collect 
information regarding the usage of the term globalisation. Two questions have been 
addressed: 1) When was the word globalisation (also spelt globalization) recorded in 
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that particular dictionary for the first time? And 2) When was it first used as a 
headword?  
In British English, the term appeared for the first time as a derivative in the Oxford 
English Dictionary Supplement in the early 1970s but only in the mid-1990s did the 
same dictionary separately defined it. Table 30 summarises the results, including the 
first appearance ever and the first appearance as an entry in its own right. 
 
Table 30. English dictionaries entries for the word globalisation 
 First 
appearance 
ever 
First explanation 
under global as a 
derivate 
First appearance 
as an entry in its 
own right 
Webster’s 1961 - 1961 
Oxford 19721 1972 1995 
Chambers 19832 1983 - 
Collins 1991 - 1991 
Cambridge 1995 1995 1995 
Penguin  2000 - - 
                         Source: Questionaire. 
1 OED Supplement.  
2 According to Vicky Aldus, Assistant Editor of Chambers Harrap 
Publishers Ltd, the term globalisation (z) remained recorded as a 
derivative of the word global from 1983 until the 2006 edition of the 
Chambers Dictionary and does not appear as a headword. The noun 
globalization and the verb globalize (s) belong to the same entry, the 
meaning of the latter being “to make global”.  
 
Globalisation was recorded as a derivative under global or globalize from 1961 to the 
early 1990s.  Dictionaries do not normally provide extensive definitions for every 
derivative but rather relate them to some or all the meanings of the headword under 
which they appear.  For example, the verb globalise may be explained as “to make 
global”, which refers the dictionary user to the definition of global.  Moreover, a word 
such as globalisation may appear with no explanation whatsoever, it’s meaning being 
conveyed by the suffix –tion.  In such a case, the user is expected to know the meaning 
of the suffix and based on that to understand the meaning of the word as “the action of 
making something global or worldwide”.  The user is again referred to global for a 
detailed definition.   
Dictionaries do provide a separate definition for some derivatives, and may even list 
them as separate headwords, but usually only when their meaning differs considerably 
from the meaning that may expected to relate to the headword or when they have 
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acquired a particular significance. If the word has acquired a specialised meaning, then 
it may be considered necessary to provide a separate entry.  However, since language 
change is a gradual phenomenon that happens over long periods of time (and that 
applies to the change in the meanings of words too), it is very difficult to say exactly 
when a derivative word “deserves” a dictionary entry of its own.   Most of the time, that 
is the editor’s choice, which differs from the publisher, as confirmed by the table above.  
Currently, some dictionaries list globalisation as a headword. This is obviously due to 
the increasing significance in economics, politics and other areas of the notion it 
denotes.  For that reason, the next section will discuss the term according to the 
interpretations of some scholars of economics and correlated disciplines.  
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2. Groundwork of globalisation and financial globalisation debate 
 
Globalisation is widely assumed as a major feature of contemporary society, however 
most studies on the subject have not investigated the groundwork literature on 
globalisation and financial globalisation. Despite a deluge of publications on the subject 
over the past decade or so, scholars have not argued when the subject was first studied, 
and how much has been written about it within academia.  
This appendix is structured in three parts.70 The next section presents the 
groundbreaking scholars who wrote the first books, articles, and PhD theses on 
globalisation.  Section 2.2 deals with the progression of the literature on globalisation 
during the 1970-2005 period, offering a concise survey of absolute and relative figures 
of the width and diversity of the academic literature.  Again, this section makes use of 
journal articles, books and doctorate theses, mostly written in English. At the end, 
section 2.3 presents a brief assessment of financial globalisation. 
 
2.1. Groundbreaking scholars 
 
Scientific knowledge is essentially disseminated through various publications, such as 
books, journal articles, an assortment of papers (for instance, working, discussion, 
policy, or staff papers), conference proceedings, unpublished doctoral theses, reports, 
bulletins, memos, and other materials, not to mention a variety of virtual resources 
available on the internet. It is virtually impossible to assess all these resources in order 
to present the groundbreaking scholars who have approached globalisation (displayed 
in this section), or to evaluate adherence to the subject in academic circles (presented in 
the next one).  However, both tasks can be dealt with if assessments are made through 
diverse databases specialised in providing key scientific information, such as 
bibliographic data about some of the publications mentioned above. Accordingly, seven 
different but mutually complementary authoritative databases have been researched to 
                                                 
70 In a previous version of the thesis, this appendix was written as a part of a chapter. However, despite 
the importance of this material for a quantitative evaluation of globalisation and financial globalisation 
literature in social sciences over the last decades, the data presented here is not central to underpinning 
the subsequent work in the thesis. 
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collect the information required for this section and the next one, as follows: EconLit, 
Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), JSTOR, PsycINFO, Bowker’s Global Books in 
Print, Index to Theses, and Dissertation Abstracts (DISS).  
Econ-lit, SSCI, JSTOR and PsycINFO are well-known journal articles databases widely 
used by researchers in their respective fields. The relevance of this search to present a 
broad picture of the globalisation literature can be inferred from Huáscar Pessali 
(2004:30) when he reasons that “since the inter-war period, academics have been 
conversing gradually more through shorter pieces of work – papers and articles – 
published in specialised journals. These journals have been growing in number and 
specialising further ever since. The subject of economics is no exception.”  
Furthermore, the investigation of the groundwork of the globalisation debate proposed 
here does not only cover journal articles, but also books and PhD theses. On this 
account, Bowker’s Global Books in Print, The Index to Theses, and the DISS will be 
researched. Bowker’s Global Books in Print is an English and (in some extent) 
Spanish-language database of books from the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. The Index to Theses and the DISS are databanks of doctorate thesis from the 
UK and Ireland, and American, Canadian and European Universities respectively. 
Altogether, they cover a great amount of journal articles, books and theses produced 
worldwide.71  Accordingly, albeit incomplete, the results reveal the groundwork of the 
globalisation debate within academia and provide a broad picture about the literature 
developed over last quarter of the 20th century. 
A search was made in all the databases mentioned above using the two alternate 
spellings globalisation and globalization in order to discover the first article, book or 
PhD thesis on the topic under discussion. PsycINFO presented the first publication that 
used the word globalisation amongst all the databases consulted. Searching through the 
period from 1806 to 2007, 2,115 hits appeared.72 As this word is written by the same 
spelling in both English and French, the database found two articles written in French 
in 1927 containing the word globalisation in the title.  One was published in a Journal 
of Psychology and the other in a Journal of Pedagogy.73 However, the term was used 
                                                 
71 Appendix 2A provides further methodological information about the databases. 
72 Accessed at The British Library on 19th April 2007. 
73 Decroly, O. (1927). “Le principle de la globalisation applique a l’education parle et ecrit.” [The 
principles of instruction by wholes applied to written and spoken language (suggested title translation)]. 
Archives de Psychologie, 20, pp. 324-346; and Herlin, A. (1927). “La methode Belge de demutisation; 
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with a completely different denotation from the one used in economics. One of the 
papers was the seminal article written by the Belgian Psychologist Ovide Decroly in 
which he developed his method for teaching reading and writing to deaf and mute 
children. The other one was an application of Decroly’s method.  
From 1927 to the early 1940s no records outside psychology or pedagogy were found 
of articles, PhD thesis or books searching the word globalisation (or globalization) in 
the title, abstract or as a keyword.  For that period, the databases listed only articles 
using the French word globalisation, published in psychological and pedagogical 
journals at random.  From 1927 to 1970, only 12 hits were found.  If the period is 
expanded up to 1994, only 61 papers appear, which means that 2,054 (97 percent) came 
out from the second half of the 1990s to 19th April 2007.  On the whole, the word is 
used with different meanings in different publications in these two areas, the latest ones 
including analyses of the numerous psychological effects of economic globalisation on 
human behaviour.   
Analysing the results of a search made using both PsycINFO and the multidisciplinary 
database JSTOR, one can see that Decroly’s method was very influential.  Many other 
articles published in journals of psychology, pedagogy and education quoted his 
seminal 1927 paper.  After all, from 1927 to the early 1940s, the term globalisation (-
zation) was used by these disciplines, in French, and concerned a method of teaching 
deaf mute children. There were no records of books and PhD theses during that period.   
However, in 1951, the American Sociologist Paul Meadows mentioned the word 
globalization (p. 11) within inverted commas, with the same meaning with which it is 
used currently.  In my opinion, his article could be considered a seminal paper which, 
on sociological grounds, reveals key insightful thoughts relating globalisation to the 
culture of the modern industrial society. For obvious reasons, he does not provide a 
scientific analysis of globalisation, nor does he develop the concept per se, but puts 
forward a basis of a debate about the tendency towards cultural universalisation in the 
context of the advent of modern industrial technological societies.  According to him, 
the tendency had been stronger than a cultural localisation.  In Meadows’s (1951:11) 
words: “with industrialism, a new culture system has evolved in one national society 
                                                                                                                                              
application de la function de globalisation du Dr. A. Decroly a l’enseignement des sourds-muets.” 
[Belgian method of demutization; application of Dr. A. Decroly’s total method to the teaching of deaf 
mutes]. Bulletin de la Societé Francais de Pedagogie, 26, pp. 36-41.     
  225
after another; its global spread is incipient and cuts across every local ethos.” As this 
tendency is supposed to evolve over time, he concludes that this new culture pattern is 
in the process of “globalization,” which is “replacing the central mythos of the 
medieval Church.”  As will be shown in section 2.3, Meadows grasped the 
globalisation concept ten years before the first dictionary definition in English. 
Likewise, in 1960, Pierre Leonard wrote an article in French, not directly related to 
globalisation but using the word in a way closely connected with today’s meaning.  The 
theme of his article is the cyclic fluctuations in maritime transport after WWII.  He 
establishes a causal relationship between the Treaty of Rome (signed on 25th March, 
1957 by France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg), 
globalisation and liberalism. According to him, the terms of the Treaty (which 
established the European Economic Community - EEC) encouraged progressive 
globalisation (meaning a global integration of most countries in terms of trade flows), 
and introduced a ferment of liberalism that should eventually spread to all 
Organisations for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) countries.74  
In order to present the evolution of globalisation literature during this early stage, Box 1 
displayed in appendix 2B represents the first 50 scholarly articles found in JSTOR 
searching in full-text. The results clearly show that globalisation was randomly and 
gradually used in publications concerning education, administration, law, politics, 
mathematics and later, by the late 1960s, economics. All things considered, it is evident 
that from the 1950s onwards, the word, initially restricted to psychology, pedagogy and 
education, came to be used by some other disciplines bearing different meanings.  In 
the late 1960s, this term timidly migrated from these areas to a wider variety of social 
and natural disciplines, including economics.  
The random walk tendency identified in Box 1 can be confirmed by the results found in 
doctoral dissertations, despite this figure being inferior to the number of articles 
published within the same period, for obvious reasons.  The first PhD thesis containing 
                                                 
74 Leonard (1960:25) asserted that “Les dispositions du traité de Rome, par la globalisation et 
l'accroissement progressifs des contingents qu'elles stipulent, ont introduit sans nul  doute un ferment de 
libéralisme qui devrait normalement s'étendre aussi - avec autres pays de l'O.E.C.E group d'Etats a, il 
faut le noter, depuis plusieurs annés admis pour la réparation des navires une totale libération 
contingentaire.” 
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the word was submitted at the University of Chicago in 1967.75  The subject code 
displayed by DISS presents this research as related to various subjects of social 
sciences, but not economics per se, such as: “business, administration, management, 
anthropology-cultural, education, bilingual and multicultural, education adult and 
continuing”.  The term took at least one more decade to appear in books. According to 
Bowker’s Global Books in Print, the first book that used the term as a keyword was 
published in 1978,76 and is related to economics.    
Another way of more precisely identifying a topic in any printing resource using 
databases is narrowing the search to publications that include the word globalisation 
(spelled with s or z) in the title. Having searched in all the mentioned databanks, the 
first article appears to have been published in 1968.  It was found through the JSTOR 
and its core argumentation is closer to politics than to economics.77  In SSCI the first 
article to include the word in its title was published in 1976 in a Journal of Sociology.78  
On the EconLit platform, the first two were published in 1984, both related to 
economics.79   
Similarly, the first PhD thesis containing the word, with the spelling globalization in its 
title, was submitted at the University of California (Los Angeles) in 1971.80  The 
subject code of this thesis presents it as a study in mathematics. In this list of “the 
firsts”, the first book with globalization in the title was published in 1983,81 and it is 
related to economics. 
                                                 
75 Edwin, D. L. E. (1967) Global training and education: an examination of context, cultural toughness, 
and minimum necessary change in international diverse organizational settings. PhD Dissertation, 
Loyola, University of Chicago, 506 p. 
76 Mankekar, D. R. (1978) One way free flow. Asia Book Corporation of America. 
77 Modelski, G. (1968) “Communism and the globalization of politics.” International Studies Quarterly, 
12 (4), December, pp. 380-93.  This search in the JSTOR database (http://www.jstor.org , accessed on 
11th May, 2007) for the term globalisation or globalization from 1665 to 11th May 2007 produced 868 
hits in the title and 16,736 hits in the full text. 
78 Lamy, P. (1976). Globalization of American Sociology: excellence or imperialism. American 
Sociologist, 11 (2) pp. 104-14. 
79 Lipietz, A. (1984) “The globalization of the general crisis of fordism.” CEPREMAP Working Papers, 
50 p., and Helmsing, A. H. J. (1984) “Economic structure, trade and regions.” Institute of social Studies 
Working Papers, 38 p. On this account, it is worth mentioning the suggestion of the external examiner of 
this thesis that the first article in a core economics journal explicitly addressing globalisation is: Harris, 
R. G. (1993) “Globalization, trade and income.” Canadian Journal of Economics, 26 (4) pp. 755-76. 
80 Chan, S. J. B. Y. (1971) Generalized convexity and globalization. PhD Dissertation, University of 
California, Los Angeles, 118 p.  
81 Levitt, T. (1983) Globalization of markets. Harvard Business School, reprint. This reference is 
classified as a book according to the Bowker’s Global Books.  Theodore Levitt published an article with 
the same name in the Harvard Business Review, for this reason it appears in the SSCI database as a 
journal article.  Apparently, the reprint edition of the Harvard Business Review was in the form of a 
booklet.  
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Up to this point, four important conclusions can be drawn based on this bird’s eye view 
of the earliest academic research on globalisation.  First, the word globalisation was 
used in academia for the first time in 1927, in French, by scholars of psychology and 
pedagogy, and its meaning was completely different from its connotation today.82  
Second, during the decades after the 1920s, the word was used by a variety of scholars 
of different disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, politics, economics, business, 
administration, geography, history, and law, bearing different meanings. Present-day 
students may suppose that this subject appeared for the first time in academic literature 
on economics due to two basic reasons: firstly, the striking amount of literature relating 
globalisation to its economic aspects in recent years; and secondly due to the increasing 
interest in economic globalisation shown by the media worldwide. In fact, economic 
globalisation has been a hotly debated aspect most recently due to its problematic and 
controversial repercussions in every corner of the world, nevertheless the evidence 
presented here has shown that the earliest thoughts on globalisation had been developed 
by other disciplines of social sciences, particularly sociology and political science. 
Economists started to investigate the subject systematically in the 1980s.  
The third conclusion is that the subject globalisation had an interdisciplinary character 
from the very beginning of the scientific investigation, i.e., it has been approached in 
several aspects and dimensions, and examined by many disciplines.  
Fourth, some sources have asserted that the term globalisation was coined by Theodore 
Levitt in his 1983 paper/book83 but the evidence presented here dismisses this 
conclusion. Levitt was a German-American economist at Harvard Business School and 
the editor of the Harvard Business Review (HBR) from 1985-89.   He wrote various 
books and articles on marketing, becoming a well-known expert in this area.  With his 
                                                 
82 Researching through the aforementioned databases, I found no academic record or any other mention 
of this term in English or in other language before 1927. However, as noticed beforehand, these 
databases are heavily concentrated in articles written in English, so one should take into account that the 
word may have been previously used in other languages, with or without the current meaning. It may be 
much older than we can imagine since the databanks did not search papers in languages that use a type of 
writing other than the Latin alphabet, e.g. Cyrillic alphabet or Chinese script.   
83 Sergey Kozmenko & Helen Chuyko (2003).  See also The New York Times on 6th June, 2006 
(available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/06/business/06levitt.html?ei=5088&en=959815b0e89ed1c2&ex=1309
838400&adxnnl=1&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&adxnnlx=1190329880-U2jnFL3dyq0huV8pD7m9Qw), 
Businessweek online on 29th June 2006 (available at: 
http://www.businessweek.com/bschools/content/jun2006/bs20060629_5211_bs001.htm), and 
NDTV.com online on  7th July 2006 (available at: 
http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/story.aspx?id=NEWEN20060006618).  
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1960 HBR article “Marketing Myopia” he became an author of international renown.  
Over the next decades, he published papers with various purposes applied to marketing, 
management, and business. Eventually, in 1983, he published “The globalization of 
markets,” examining the new international markets for standardised consumer products. 
“The globalization of markets” got complimentary remarks regarding the cutting-edge 
analysis of the burgeoned phenomenon.   
Levitt’s main achievement was to help popularised the term arguing that the new 
technologies in communication and transportation boosted the worldwide economic, 
commercial and productive connectivity. As a result, global markets for standardised 
consumer products emerged, dominated by what he called the “global corporation”. He 
also distinguished the term internationalisation from the term globalisation. According 
to him, internationalisation reflects the dominance of traditional actors such as 
multinational companies and national governments, while globalisation reflects a new 
relationship between global corporations and globalised markets.  In his opinion, these 
are the main driving forces spurring the global market’s integration, which encouraged 
him to assert that “the globalization of markets is at hand” (p. 92).  Some of his 
arguments and predictions failed (see Abdelal & Tedlow 2003) but, in fact, he was one 
of the first scholars in economics to address core aspects related to economic 
globalisation. 
As will be discussed in section 4, the word globalization was first printed and defined 
in the American English dictionary Webster’s in 1961.  The 1961 definition (presented 
in section 2.3) already explains globalisation as a phenomenon that is worldwide in 
scope. Therefore, Levitt did not coin the word and he was not the first to realise this 
possible level of planetary integration. He may have popularised the term and brought it 
into the mainstream business audience but, the evidence presented here dismisses the 
fact that he coined it, and also demonstrates that globalisation had been addressed in 
social sciences as early as 1951.   
Besides the aforementioned constellation of groundbreaking scholars such as Meadows 
(1951), Leonard (1960), Edwin (1967), Modelsk (1968), Chan (1971), Lamy (1976), 
Mankekar (1978), many others used the word before him or in the same year (according 
to the data collected, see Appendix 2), including Michael Porter, who was a professor at 
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Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration.84 Moreover, two books and three 
PhD theses appeared in that year (Appendix 2D) using the term. Therefore, it is less 
likely that globalisation started to be used in economics in 1983 through the 
groundbreaking work of Levitt.  His article provided useful insights, enabling a better 
understanding of the emergence of global markets for standardised consumer products, 
and helped globalisation to gain widespread recognition in economics. Nevertheless, it 
is more appropriate to recognise that the topic was of interest for economics as a 
collective, academic endeavour and was accomplished by more than one scholar during 
the 1980s. 
 
2.2. Assessing the relevance of globalisation as a subject in social sciences through 
key authoritative databases 
 
Globalisation has been a subject of extensive study in social sciences recently.  Unlike 
traditional key topics already well-established in both the domains of macro- and 
microeconomics, globalisation was barely studied two decades ago. However, as one 
can conclude from this section, it became the prominent “youngest member of the 
family” in economics in recent years.  In fact, since the mid-1990s, it has received a 
remarkable amount of attention, not only from economists but from social scientists in 
general, and even from scholars of other disciplines.  The proliferation of the literature 
on globalisation to many areas of scientific knowledge, as well as many of its correlated 
topics, is an indication of the relevance of this theme as an interdisciplinary research 
programme.  This section aims to present a brief survey of the adherence of the 
audience within academia from 1970 to 2005.  
The initial objective is to assess the scope and volume of academic articles including 
the word globalisation spelt either with an s or a z in the title, abstract, or as a keyword, 
or, in the case of the JSTOR, also in the text. The results of this search presented in 
Figure 11 are an indication of how much economists and other social scientists studied 
the theme during the above period.   
                                                 
84 Porter is one of the main scholars to develop concepts of competitive strategic planning applied to 
industrial corporations in the context of market globalisation. See for example Porter, M. (ed) (1986) 
Competition in global industries. Boston: Harvard Business School Press; Porter, M. (1992) Capital 
disadvantage: America’s failing capital investment system, Harvard Business School Review, 70 (5) pp. 
65-82.  
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Figure 11 shows two marked tendencies: from 1970 until the early 1990s, and between 
the mid-1990s and 2005.  During the first period, the number of articles increased only 
gradually. The growth rate was very slow (even negligible) until 1987. Only in 1988 
did the total of the three databases reach over one hundred articles.  This rate of 
increase was more or less the same until 1991 (see Appendix 2C). From this 
unpretentious start, it grew little during the first half of the 1990s and reached a 
sustainable and upward pattern from the mid-1990s to 2005, although two of the three 
indicators (EconLit and Jstor) presented a falling off tendency after 2001.  Since the 
researched database contained papers from many disciplines, the figure reveals a wider 
and growing interest in globalisation in various areas of study, and also professional 
recognition of this topic in more recent years.  
 
Figure 11. Number of articles that contain the term globalisationa in the article 
title, abstract or as a keyword: 1970-200585 
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 Source: EconLit; Institute for Scientific Information – Social Science Citation Index; JSTOR  
 a Includes the spelling of the word with either s or z 
 
This increased interest can also be assessed in a different way through books and 
doctoral theses.  These figures are shown in Figure 12, which shows the same two 
phases displayed in Figure 11: from the 1970s to the first half of the 1990s, the subject 
was scarcely discussed in academia in books and theses. In 1992, only 59 books and 
                                                 
85 This figure is based on data in Appendix 2C. 
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theses were published, in contrast with an impressive 5,374 in 2003, the highest score 
of the period.  
 
 
Figure 12. Number of books and theses that contain the term globalisation a as a 
keyword: 1970-200586 
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               Source: Dissertation Abstracts (DISS), Index to Theses; Bowker’s Global Books in Print. 
                         a Includes the spelling of the word with either s or z. 
 
 
Summing up the number of all these publications presented in Figures 1 and 2, one can 
see that scientific endeavour grew significantly during the second period: the number of 
these publications was just 5 in 1970, 9 in 1980, 182 in 1990, jumping from 860 in 
1995 to reach a staggering 9,018 in 2005.  
In fact, Figures 9 and 10 are complementary and together represent further supportive 
evidence concerning the academic adherence of this topic in recent years.  They were 
not plotted together because their dimensions are rather different from each other but, 
overall, the volume of journal articles, books, and doctoral theses soared very quickly 
in the mid-1990s and beyond.  Accordingly, this means that in the second phase 
globalisation acquired wide recognition by the social sciences, including economics, 
and has become a fashionable topic (Hirst & Thompson 1996:195; Grazia Ietto-Gilles 
1997:73; Keohane & Nye Jr. 2000:104; James 2001:1; Scholte 2001:613; Bordo 
2002:20; Stiglitz 2002:4; Perraton 2003:37).  
                                                 
86 This figure is based on data in Appendix 2D. 
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Nevertheless, if analysed separately, the above figures do not provide any conclusion 
concerning the relative evolution of the literature on globalisation over time. For this 
reason, Figure 13 compares the results concerning books, theses and articles on 
globalisation (G), with those for books that contain the term economics (B Economics) 
as a keyword. The data is quite different (especially the value of B Economics, which is 
very high), and thus they are incomparable in nominal terms.  For this reason, the figure 
has been plotted on a logarithmic scale. 
The B Economics line shows a slight tendency of growth from 1970 to the mid-1980s 
when G literature (books, theses and articles) was practically nonexistent.  After the 
mid-1980s, G literature figures increased sharply and continued to increase steadily in 
the 1990s.  They finally evened out by the end of the period.  Even on a logarithmic 
scale, the pattern is very similar to those displayed above.  The overall picture shows 
that G literature made substantial progress from 1990 onwards. There was a great 
distance between economics and globalisation from the 1970s to the early 1990s, but 
this changed considerably in more recent years. This is additional evidence of the 
outstanding and consistent progress of academic research in this discipline.  
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Figure 13. Number of books that use economics as a keyword, compared to books, 
theses, and articles that contain the word globalisationa amongst the listed 
keywords: 1970-200587 
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Sources:  B Booksand and Globalisation Books comes from the Bowker’s Global Books in 
Print, G PhD theses comes from the British Library Index to Theses and Dissertation 
Abstracts (DISS), G articles comes from the SSCI. 
 
Furthermore, another piece of evidence can be added to present the development of the 
literature on globalisation in relative terms after the 1970s.  Comparing globalisation 
with other topics that have been the subject of long-term discussions in economics, the 
evidence of its growth may be even more impressive. Therefore, in order to provide a 
better picture of the progress of the globalisation debate, one should also consider how 
this subject stands in comparison to other well-studied topics during the same period. 
Data collected from the SSCI was used for such an assessment.  
As shown in Figure 14 below, the number of articles on globalisation increased rapidly 
to outperform other selected subjects during the 2000-05 period. This period thus 
represents an outburst in academic interest in globalisation. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
87 This figure is based on data in Appendix 2E. 
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Figure 14. Number of articles that contain the terms economic development,  
economic policy, monetary policy, globalisationa, labour marketb, econometric 
general equilibrium, and economic history in their title, abstract, or as keywords: 
1970-200588 
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               Source: Institute for Scientific Information – Social Science Citation Index   
                    a Includes the spelling of the word with either s or z. 
                   b Includes the spelling of the word either with or without u.  
 
It is worth noting that globalisation started from ground zero in the 1970s while the 
other subjects are traditionally hot topics in economics. Nevertheless, globalisation 
achieved comparable levels in the 1990s, reaching its highest level in the early years of 
the 21st century.   
In short, the key message provided by these figures so far also asserts that globalisation 
has reached a prominent position in social sciences in only a few years. It does not 
mean that the debate related to international affairs is new or had been ignored in 
economic literature. On the contrary, Berthil Ohlin and James E. Meade shared the 
1977 Nobel Prize for their contribution to the theory of international trade and 
international capital movements. In addition, Robert Mundell was awarded the prize in 
1999 for his analysis of monetary and fiscal policy under different exchange rate 
regimes, and for his analysis of optimum currency areas.89 Accordingly, subjects such 
                                                 
88 This figure is based on data in Appendix 2F. 
89 It is worth noting that the scholars received their Nobel Prizes for work on international economics 
carried out decades before being made laureates. 
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as international trade and finance, and global institutions, among others, have been 
studied for a long time, as shown in Figure 15 below.  
 
Figure 15. Number of articles that contains the terms international trade, global 
institutions, open economy, and international finance and globalisationa in the title, 
abstract, or as keywords: 1970-200590 
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           Source: Institute for Scientific Information – Social Science Citation Index   
               a Includes the spelling of the word with either s or z. 
 
Papers on international trade, international finance and using the alternative term open 
economy were in vogue in the 1970s and 1980s.  Apparently, after the mid-1990s many 
of these themes were discussed under the umbrella of globalisation, since the figure 
shows a marked increase in globalisation articles and a proportional decrease in these 
themes.  From 2000 to 2005, the number of articles written under the label 
globalisation surpassed the sum of all the other selected topics plotted in figure 15. The 
ebb and flow of this literature in fact reinforces the importance of the subject because, 
in the end, all the words and terms researched are related to globalisation. Arguably, 
insofar as the term became popular within the academic circles from the 1990s 
onwards, researchers have agreed to use globalisation to describe the variety of issues 
that were addressed in international economics. In this case, the flood of articles on 
                                                 
90 This figure is based on data in Appendix 2G. 
  236
globalisation after the 1990s could be related also to the previous period if this word 
was disseminated within academia before.   
Up to this point, one can conclude that at least since the 1970s there has been general 
interest on the part of the academic community in studying subjects related to economic 
activity beyond national frontiers. As will be discussed in the next section, the usage of 
the term globalisation was not widespread at all at this time. Apart from the terms 
given in the above figure, scholars were using others with the same meaning at that 
time.  Figure 16 seems to ratify the point that the term globalisation itself apparently 
came into use as a substitute for correlated terms such as internationalisation, 
transnationalism and international economic integration and interdependence 
(Keohane & Nye 2000) in the academic literature of the 1990s.  The upward pattern 
that emerged contrasted sharply with the steadiness of the other themes. Again, from 
the mid-1990s to 2005, more articles were published under the label globalisation than 
those on the other three topics together. At face value, the result of this data shows 
further recognition of globalisation as an academic topic which is the focus of so much 
scientific effort.  
Figure 16. Number of articles that contain the terms globalisationa, 
internationalisationa, transnationalism, international economic integration and 
interdependence in the article title, abstract, or as keywords: 1970-200591 
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     Source: Institute for Scientific Information – Social Science Citation Index 
      a Includes the spelling of the word with either s or z. 
                                                 
91 This figure is based on data in Appendix 2H. 
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Other terms such as Americanisation, multilateralism, transnationalism, 
denationalisation were consulted, but the results were less significant than those plotted 
in the above figure. As a matter of fact, Figure 16 complements Figure 15 by adding 
some more possible topics related to the globalisation debate.  All the subjects quoted 
in these two figures together give an idea of how relevant globalisation as a research 
topic became.  They also show that it has been studied under several different labels, 
including in disciplines outside economics. It does not indicate that the increased use of 
the term globalisation actually corresponded to a new phenomenon but that 
globalisation became an omnibus subject and an umbrella term which comprises (but is 
not confined to) the subjects displayed in the last two figures.   
In addition to the terms mentioned above, one should take into account that there are 
many other ways of approaching this topic without using precisely the term 
globalisation or the others.  For example, American sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein 
wrote an article in 1974 expressing his concerns about the development of what he 
called “the capitalist world-economy”. He also used the term world capitalist system to 
express the same meaning for which scholars currently use globalisation.  Taking into 
account that some other writers may also have used this same nomenclature (or others) 
to express the current meaning of globalisation, the flood of academic studies should be 
larger than those demonstrated above.  
To sum up, several conclusions can be drawn from the results achieved in this section. 
Firstly, by the end of the 20th century, globalisation had become a widely recognized 
buzzword in the social sciences since its surge in the mid-1990s.  
Secondly, although the usage of this word in economics is relatively new, globalisation 
has already established an impressive research programme in economics, particularly in 
the international political economy (IPE).   
Thirdly, globalisation has become a wide-ranging debate, consequently an 
interdisciplinary topic.92 The overall picture presented here of implied and actual 
                                                 
92 Other authors have come to a similar conclusion based on different evidence.  For instance, Robert 
Reich (1998:1) suggests that “the substance of the subjects studied under the rubric of globalization 
varies dramatically.  This list includes, but was not confined to, the study of democratization, 
development, market deregulation, privatization, welfare reform, new security agendas (such as 
immigration and drugs), and the general retreat of all aspects of the state from policy intervention”.  
David Held (Hirst & Held, 2002:2) emphasizes the same point: “I think of globalisation as the increasing 
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audiences points to an increased interdisciplinary audience. As can be concluded, it has 
drawn the attention of many different academic disciplines, most notably economics, 
business management, sociology, history, political science, and law, among others. 
After years of intensive research, multiple facets of globalisation have emerged 
emphasising a wide range of issues worthy of being addressed.   
Another noteworthy piece of evidence of this interdisciplinarity is the recent sprouting 
of encyclopaedias on globalisation. Encyclopaedias are by definition a set of books 
containing articles on various topics, covering all or most branches of knowledge. It is 
less common when an encyclopaedia is edited covering all or most aspects of one 
subject. By the early the 21st century, globalisation had reached this exceptional status 
because it has evoked not one but a myriad of themes.  In 2006, David O’Connor 
published the Encyclopaedia of the global economy: a guide for students and 
researchers, in two volumes. In the same year, Globalization: encyclopaedia of trade, 
labor, and politics, also in two volumes, was published by Ashish K. Vaidya. More 
recently, Roland Robertson and Jan Aart Scholte published the 2007 Encyclopaedia of 
Globalisation, a massive brand-new, four-volume work consisting of over 400 entries 
covering key economic, historical, political, psychological, cultural, ecological, 
geographical, and social aspects of globalisation.  
Governments all over the world have been consulting scholars and experts on 
globalisation to obtain advice in key areas such as economic policy, international 
competitiveness, finance and development, research and development, regulations, 
national innovation systems, intellectual property rights, patents, etc.  Globalisation has 
been included as a discipline in the undergraduate curriculum in several areas of 
science, and has been influential in the creation of several postgraduate and research 
programmes all over the world. This not only includes universities, but also multilateral 
institutions which have been establishing a variety of programmes dedicated to the 
study of globalisation.   
                                                                                                                                              
extent, intensity, velocity and impact of world-wide interconnectedness. Such interconnectedness has 
existed for some hundreds of years. But if you trace its increase, I think you can argue that there is now 
an ongoing transformation, from economics, politics and migration to culture and law, which is creating 
a new kind of world order.”  Anthony Giddens (2002:10) asserts: “Both groups [the sceptics and the 
radicals] see the phenomenon almost solely in economic terms.  This is a mistake.  Globalisation is 
political, technological and cultural, as well as economic. It has been influenced above all by 
developments in systems of communication, dating back only to the late 1960s.” 
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Table 31 below presents a list of the programmes that have been developed worldwide 
with globalisation as their main subject.  Only programmes in English and those that 
were developed in universities or research institutions have been selected. Appendix 8 
provides details about the main characteristics of each of them. Checking the Appendix, 
one realises that the overwhelming majority of the programmes are interdisciplinary. 
Certainly there are many others with the same characteristics in other languages or even 
in English but it would be impracticable to search for all of them.  Therefore, the list 
given below is not exhaustive. However, it can provide a broad figure of the 
interdisciplinarity of globalisation as an academic topic, and the great intellectual effort 
that has been made by several institutions to tackle numerous issues and to prepare high 
standard professionals to deal with the complex configuration of this new world.  The 
table also reveals that these programmes are heavily concentrated in North America and 
Europe, and most of them have been developed after 2000.     
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Table 31. Sample collection of postgraduate programmes and research projects on 
globalisation worldwide93 
Country/Region No. of Programmes/Projects 
North America 
Canada 11 
United States 26 
Total 37 
Europe 
Austria 2 
Denmark 3 
Finland 3 
Germany 2 
Ireland 3 
Sweden 3 
United Kingdom 17 
Total 33 
Asia and the Pacific 
Australia 4 
Japan 4 
Pakistan 2 
Taiwan 1 
Turkey 1 
Total 12 
Middle East 
United Arab Emirates 1 
Overall total 83 
                            Source: Internet 
 
Indeed, the debate on globalisation became a kaleidoscope of images that has invited 
minds worldwide to comprehend its many complex faces.  It does not mean that the 
theme can only be understood by someone with a wide scientific background, but only 
that the topic is not confined to one particular field of research.  Conversely, it does 
mean that an extensive range of academic approaches has attempted to bridge the gaps 
that appear continuously as the process evolves.  Moreover, as globalisation 
encompasses a broad variety of themes, in certain studies the contributions of other 
disciplines are necessary. In the wake of this academic endeavour, new approaches and 
data with varied purposes have emerged, opening new possibilities for study across 
scientific fields.  
                                                 
93 This table is based on data in Appendix 2I.  The table includes the name of the institution, a basic 
description of the programme and the country in which it is located. 
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Practice makes perfect, and exercise creates a virtuous circle. Once scholars started a 
broad research programme years ago to investigate the ongoing transformations in the 
world economy, several multilateral institutions such as the IMF, UNCTAD, OECD, 
BIS, and ISDA  began providing accurate data and developed various measures 
concerning globalisation and its consequences. A worldwide audience has been feeling 
the benefits of the results achieved, i.e. institutions have been purposefully developing 
their own methodological ways of defining key aspects related to the matter, and 
academics have been using this information to produce a huge surge of scholarly 
interpretations of globalisation’s main issues.  As a result, the interdisciplinary 
contributions that the topic has received enable researchers to explore and understand 
the abundance of new subjects that have been raised recently.   
 
2.3. A brief evaluation of financial globalisation literature 
 
Thus far, the aforementioned databases have helped to assess various key aspects of the 
progress of the globalisation literature, in particular the level of resonance that it has 
achieved amongst social sciences. Nevertheless, a brief evaluation on the development 
of the financial globalisation literature is missing and is the central aspect of this 
research. Having the SSCI as the source of data, Figure 17 draws a comparison between 
the number of articles written on globalisation and financial globalisation.  
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Figure 17. Number of articles that contain the terms globalisationa and financial 
globalisationa, in the article title, abstract, or as keywords: 1970-200594 
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            Source: Institute for Scientific Information – Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) 
                a Includes the spelling of the word with either s or z.  
 
Although the volume of financial globalisation articles is relatively lower, the evolution 
of the literature of both topics is statistically very similar, i.e., the same growth pattern 
can be seen for the 1970-2005 period. The relatively low number of articles may paint a 
deceptive and incomplete picture. In order to show a more appropriate evaluation, it is 
important to assess the growth rate of the decade, which makes it clear that there was 
significant growth throughout the period.  The table below shows that the growth was 
concentrated in the 1990s and was rapid and significant. Note that in the biennium 
2005-06, the number of articles was almost the same as what had been written in the 
five previous years. From the first article published in 1989 that included the term 
financial globalisation in the article title, abstract or keyword till 2006, there was a 
staggering accumulated growth of 2,549 per cent.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
94 This figure is based on data in Appendix 2J. 
94 Other authors have come to a similar conclusion 
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Table 32. Quinquennium and accumulated rate of growth of articles on financial 
globalisation: 1970-2005 
  
1970-
1974 
1975-
1979 
1980-
1984 
1985-
1989 
1990-
1994 
1995-
1999 
2000-
04 
2005-
06 
Fin. globalisation a 0 0 0 1 21 102 271 261 
Quinq. Growth     2,000 386 166 - 4 
Accumulated (%)    1 2,001 2,387 2,552 2,549 
     Source: Institute for Scientific Information – Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) 
        a Includes the spelling of the word with either s or z.  
 
Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that financial globalisation has also been 
discussed in different strands, such as financial liberalisation, international finance, and 
international financial integration, among others. Hence, figure 18 shows how the term 
financial globalisation stands as a novel term before these other traditional ones. 
 
Figure 18. Number of articles that contain the terms financial globalisationa, 
financial liberalisationa, international finance, and international financial 
integration in the article title, abstract, or as keywords: 1970-200595 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-04 2005-06
fin. globalisation  financial liberalisation international finance intern. fin. integration
 
                   Source: Institute for Scientific Information – Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) 
                           a Includes the spelling of the word with either s or z. 
 
The most salient feature of the above figure is the dominance of the term “international 
finance” in the 1980s.  As expected, soon after the second half of the 1980s, financial 
liberalisation very quickly became as an expressive topic, encompassing part of the 
literature on international finance. Meanwhile, slowly but progressively, “financial 
                                                 
95 This figure is based on data in Appendix 2K. 
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globalisation” advanced and shaped a completely different picture by the end of the 
1990sj and early 2000s. Both the terms “international finance” and “financial 
liberalisation” reached the end of the period with a lower number of articles in relation 
to the volume of financial globalisation papers. In brief, the figure shows two different 
but inter-related tendencies. First, the asymmetrical and rapid growth of articles on 
financial globalisation; and second an apparent substitution of the other terms by the 
label “financial globalisation”. To put it another way, present-day scholars have done a 
great deal and are providing a challenge for a new generation of researchers to deal 
with this complex subject.  
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2A. Coverage description of the bibliographical databases. 
 
PsycINFO: 
“The American Psychological Association’s PsycINFO database is the 
comprehensive international bibliographic database of psychology. It contains 
citations and summaries of peer-reviewed journal articles, book chapters, books, 
dissertations, and technical reports, all in the field of psychology and the 
psychological aspects of related disciplines, such as medicine, psychiatry, nursing, 
sociology, education, pharmacology, physiology, linguistics, anthropology, business, 
and law. Journal coverage, spanning 1806 to present, includes international material 
selected from more than 1,900 periodicals written in over 35 languages. Current 
chapter and book coverage includes worldwide English-language material published 
from 1987 to present. Over 80,000 records are added annually through weekly 
updates. Approximately 7.7 million cited references are found in citations to 156,000 
journal articles, books, and book chapters.” 
(available at: 
http://www.ovid.com/site/catalog/DataBase/139.jsp?top=2&mid=3&bottom=7&subs
ection...) 
 
Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI): 
The Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) is a multidisciplinary index to the journal 
literature of the social sciences. It fully indexes more than 1,725 journals across 50 
social sciences disciplines, and it indexes individually selected, relevant items from 
over 3,300 of the world's leading scientific and technical journals. 
In addition, the Social Sciences Citation Index also provides access to current 
information and retrospective data from 1956 forward. Note that you may not have 
access to all data years. Averages 2,900 new records per week. Includes approximately 
60,000 new cited references per week. As of January 1992, contains searchable, full-
length, English-language author abstracts for approximately 60% of the articles in the 
index. 
  246
Some of the disciplines covered include: Anthropology   Political Science, History,  
Public Health, Industrial Relations   Social Issues, Information Science & Library 
Science, Social Work, Law   Sociology, Linguistics,  Substance Abuse, Philosophy   
Urban Studies, Psychology   Women's Studies Psychiatry. 
(available at: http://www.thomson.com/content/scientific/brand_overviews/ssci) 
 
JSTOR: 
JSTOR is a database that provides access of leading academic journals and scholarly 
literature from around the world. Currently, JSTOR archives 718 journals. A list of the 
disciplines of study that JSTOR covers includes: Anthropology, Aquatic Sciences, 
Archaeology, Architecture & Architectural History, Art & Art History, Asian Studies, 
Biological Sciences, Botany & Plant Sciences, Business, Classical Studies, 
Developmental & Cell Biology, Ecology & Evolutionary Biology, Economics, 
Education, Feminist & Women's Studies, Film Studies, Finance, Folklore, General 
Science, Geography, Health Policy, Health Sciences, History, History of Science & 
Technology, Jewish Studies, Language & Literature, Latin American Studies, Law, 
Linguistics, Mathematics, Middle East Studies, Music, Paleontology, Performing Arts, 
Philosophy, Political Science, Population Studies, Psychology, Public Policy & 
Administration, Religion, Slavic Studies, Sociology, Statistics, Zoology. 
(available at: http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/archives/newFeatures.jsp ) 
EconLit: 
“EconLit, the fundamental research tool in economics, provides bibliographic citations, 
with selected abstracts, to the international literature on economics since 1969. 
EconLit covers a broad range of document types published world-wide, including 
journal articles, books, and dissertations, as well as articles in collective works, such as 
conference proceedings and collected essay volumes. The database also includes 
Abstracts of Working Papers in Economics from the Cambridge University Press 
database, Index of Economic Articles in Journals & Collective Volumes and the full 
text of the Journal of Economic Literature book reviews.  
EconLit topics include economic development, forecasting, and history; fiscal theory; 
monetary theory and financial institutions; business finance; public finance; and 
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international, labour, health care, managerial, demographic, regional, agricultural, and 
urban economics; country studies, and government regulations.” 
(available at 
http://www.ovid.com/site/catalog/DataBase/52.jsp?top=2&mid=3&bottom=7&subsec
tion...) 
 
Index to Theses: 
“The Index to Theses new and enhanced service provides users with coverage dating 
from today right back to 1716, providing total bibliographic control of all theses ever 
produced by British and Irish Universities.  In addition, the expanded Index to Theses 
service benefits from the addition of a further 44,000 abstracts to the original collection 
covering the period 1970-1985”  
(available at http://www.bl.uk/britishthesis). 
 
Dissertation Abstracts (DISS): 
Dissertation Abstracts (DISS) is an index which “contains references and abstracts for 
doctoral dissertations from accredited American and Canadian, selected British and 
European universities, covering all academic subjects.  Masters theses are also included 
from accredited North American universities” (Dissertation Abstracts Field Guide, 
available at http://ovid.gwdg.de/ovidweb/fldguide/dissdb.htm).  “Dissertation Abstracts 
provides information from over 1,000 participating institutions.  This database contains 
the following ProQuest Information and Learning Company Publications: 
Comprehensive Dissertation Index; Diseertation Abstracts International; Masters 
Abstracts International; American Doctoral Dissertations.  The Dissertation Abstracts 
database includes coverage of the following topics: Literature, Education, Chemistry, 
Engineering, Psychology, Business, Economics, Philosophy, Sociology, and 
Information Science” (Database Guide Content, available at 
http://web5s.silverplatter.com/webspirs/changeGuideTopic.ws?topic=1).  
 
Bowker’s Global Books in Print: 
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Bowker’s Global Books in Print is “is the comprehensive online portal into the book 
industry, with articles on the latest industry news, access to literary journals and 
reviews, and an expansive directory of book sites around the world” (available at: 
http://globalbooksinprint.com/bip). 
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2B. Box 1.Fifty first journal articles containing the word globalisation according to 
the JSTOR 
Year Journal Article title 
1948 The Elementary School Journal Interrelationships among the Language Arts
1951 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Culture Theory and Industrial Analysis
1952 The University of Chicago Law Review The Corporation as a Technique of International 
1957 International Review of Education Problems and Trends in Dutch Education
1957 The Elementary School Journal New Methods for Old in Teaching Phonics
1960 Revue économique Les fluctuations cycliques dans les transports maritimes
1961 Revue économique Le marche international et la situation de l'industrie 
1962 Revue économique Sur quelques problemes poses par l'aide aux pays sous-
developpes 
1963 World Politics International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate 
State System of Southern Asia 
1964 The Journal of Risk and Insurance A General Risk Theory 
1965 International Organization Implications and Questions for the Future
1965 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of 
the United States of America 
Alexander-Spanier Cohomology and Rings of Continuous 
Functions 
1966 American Journal of Mathematics Categories of Functors and Adjoint Functors
1967 Transactions of the American Mathematical Society The Cotangent Complex of a Morphism
1967 The Annals of Mathematics A Lefschetz Fixed Point Formula for Elliptic Complexes: I
1968 Transactions of the American Mathematical Society Families of Finite Character and Essential Valuations
1968 Revue économique Qu'est-ce qu'un investissement?
1968 International Studies Quarterly Communism and the Globalization of Politics
1969 Transactions of the American Mathematical Society Pre-Self-Injective Rings 
1969 International Organization Further Notes on Operationalizing Some Variables Related 
1969 International Organization Soviet Foreign Policy at the Crossroads: Conflict and/or 
1970 International Review of Education Actualité des principes de Ovide Decroly dans les pays 
développés ou en développement 
1970 Revue Française de Sociologie La théorie générale des systèmes et ses perspectives de 
développement dans les sciences sociales 
1970 The Journal of Conflict Resolution The World's Foreign Ministers: A Political Elite
1970 Revue économique Les instruments d'execution du plan utilises par l'etat a 
l'egard des entreprises A la recherche des instruments d'une 
nouvelle politique industrielle 
1970 Midwest Journal of Political Science Distance in Foreign Policy Behavior: A Comparative Study 
1970 Revue économique Accumulation, Capital Financier, Monopolisme
1970 Transactions of the American Mathematical Society Flat Modules Over Commutative Noetherian Rings
1970 Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society Complete Ideals and Monoidal Transforms
1971 Canadian Journal of African Studies L'Anthropologie et l'histoire africaine
1971 The Journal of Politics Revolt and Revisionism in the Gaullist Global Vision: An 
Analysis of French Strategic Policy 
1971 International Organization Security and a Transnational System: The Case of Nuclear 
1971 Educational Studies in Mathematics Mathematics in the Decroly School
1972 Econometrica The Factor-Price Equalization Theorem
1972 Le Mouvement social Les grèves de la Régie Renault en 1947
1972 Transactions of the American Mathematical Society Localizations of HNP Rings 
1972 International Studies Quarterly Corporate Giants: Some Global Social Costs
1972 International Studies Quarterly Marx, Universalism, and Contemporary World Business
1972 International Studies Quarterly Multinational Business: A Global Perspective
1973 Journal of Peace Research Conflict Formations in Contemporary International Society
1973 Journal of Peace Research Industrial Cooperation, Consumption Patterns, and Division 
of Labor in the East-West Setting
1973 The Journal of American History Open Door Expansionism Reconsidered: The World War II 
1973 American Journal of Political Science Comparative Research on Eastern Europe: A Critique of 
Hughes and Volgv’s “Distance in Foreign Policy Behavior” 
  250
1973 Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society Descent of Projectivity for Locally Free Modules 
1974 Journal of Peace Research International Law, Dominance, and the Use of Force
1974 History and Theory Histoire Économique ou Économie Rétrospective?
1974 Political Theory Philosophy, Theory and Science of Politics 
1974 Transactions of the American Mathematical Society Pairs of Domains Where all Intermediate Domains are 
1974 SubStance Linguistics and Grammatology 
1974 Transactions of the American Mathematical Society The Unitary Representations of the Generalized Lorentz 
Groups 
Source: JSTOR (accessed in 19th April 2007). Note: Only articles have been counted, while reviews have 
been excluded. 
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2C. Number of articles that contains the word “globalisation” in the article title, 
keywords or abstract 
  EconLit SSCI Jstor 
1970 0 0 9 
1971 0 0 4 
1972 0 0 8 
1973 0 0 8 
1974 0 0 8 
1975 0 0 10 
1976 0 1 9 
1977 0 0 13 
1978 0 0 9 
1979 0 1 11 
1980 0 0 18 
1981 0 0 17 
1982 0 0 21 
1983 0 2 18 
1984 2 1 31 
1985 2 2 34 
1986 0 1 37 
1987 7 7 53 
1988 35 4 96 
1989 18 12 140 
1990 21 12 153 
1991 39 25 259 
1992 60 76 321 
1993 101 86 423 
1994 93 117 512 
1995       136     155     689 
1996       224     234     888 
1997       427     369  1,294 
1998       958     553  1,560 
1999    1,244     601  1,909 
2000    1,525     846  2,139 
2001    1,307     980  2,368 
2002    1,297  1,065  1,502 
2003    1,621  1,098  1,541 
2004    1,331  1,109  405a 
2005       927  1,236  106a 
                                                         a The JSTOR did not update the  
                                              articles.  
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2D. Number of books and PhD theses that contains the word “globalisation” in the 
keywords 
 Books PhD Theses 
1970 0 0 
1971 0 1 
1972 0 0 
1973 0 0 
1974 0 0 
1975 0 0 
1976 0 0 
1977 0 0 
1978 1 0 
1979 0 0 
1980 0 0 
1981 0 1 
1982 0 1 
1983 2 3 
1984 1 4 
1985 0 2 
1986 0 1 
1987 1 3 
1988 18 5 
1989 16 9 
1990 33 14 
1991 53 15 
1992 33 26 
1993 67 45 
1994 85 45 
1995 166 84 
1996 244 107 
1997 343 144 
1998 526 179 
1999 1,284 250 
2000 2,934 307 
2001 3,777 300 
2002 4,600 368 
2003 4,961 413 
2004 4,830 424 
2005 4,345 413 
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2E. Number of books that use Economics as keyword, compared to books, PhD and 
articles that contains the word “globalisation” in the keywords 
Year Economics books PhD theses
G 
articles 
1970 2,688 - - 0 
1971 4,004 - 1 0 
1972 3,957 - - 0 
1973 4,449 - - 0 
1974 4,667 - - 0 
1975 5,910 - - 0 
1976 6,045 - - 1 
1977 6,877 - - 0 
1978 7,260 1 - 0 
1979 7,825 - - 1 
1980 8,729 - - 0 
1981 9,442 - 1 0 
1982 10,175 - 1 0 
1983 11,462 2 3 2 
1984 12,499 1 4 1 
1985 13,995 - 2 2 
1986 15,734 - 1 1 
1987 16,867 1 3 7 
1988 18,563 18 5 4 
1989 21,151 16 9 12 
1990 23,297 33 14 12 
1991 26,750 53 15 25 
1992 29,959 33 26 76 
1993 32,306 67 45 86 
1994 40,656 85 45 117 
1995 42,961 166 84 155 
1996 45,251 244 107 234 
1997 47,855 343 144 369 
1998 47,661 526 179 553 
1999 51,446 1,284 250 601 
2000 96,149 2,934 307 846 
2001 76,957 3,777 300 980 
2002 58,785 4,600 368 1,065 
2003 58,305 4,961 413 1,098 
2004 56,682 4,830 424 1,109 
2005 59,179 4,345 413 1,236 
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2F. Number of articles that contains the word “economic development”  “economic 
policy”, “monetary policy”, “globalisation”, “labour market”, “econometric” 
“general equilibrium”, “economic history” and in the title, keywords, or abstract 
 
  eco. develop. eco. policy mon. policy globalisation labour market  econometric G.E. 
1970-79              2,030             688              402                    2                   591                856      275 
1980-89              1,917             943              534                  29                 1,477                902      386 
1990-99              3,784          1,290            1,443              2,193                 4,917             2,210   1,349 
2000-05              2,766             697            1,860              6,236                 4,617             1,967   1,233 
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2G. Number of articles that contains the word “international trade”, “global 
institutions”, “open economy”, and “international finance” and “globalisation” a in 
the title, keywords, or abstract 
  international trade international finance open economy global production globalization 
1970 72 5 12 0 0
1971 63 4 8 0 0
1972 55 3 14 0 0
1973 43 3 8 0 0
1974 52 2 9 0 0
1975 75 5 16 0 0
1976 97 13 19 0 1
1977 107 21 15 1 0
1978 76 10 22 0 0
1979 72 6 34 0 1
1980 68 11 31 1 0
1981 50 14 27 0 0
1982 88 9 45 1 0
1983 87 16 25 1 2
1984 77 11 35 1 1
1985 86 12 28 7 2
1986 99 5 44 2 1
1987 93 4 28 0 7
1988 80 3 27 2 4
1989 112 3 30 1 12
1990 92 9 41 0 12
1991 173 17 62 19 25
1992 221 27 80 45 76
1993 252 28 81 75 86
1994 277 35 92 84 117
1995 309 38 98 85 155
1996 277 43 88 88 234
1997 322 40 114 101 369
1998 333 53 112 108 553
1999 353 54 136 129 601
2000 386 62 101 128 846
2001 429 53 138 112 980
2002 401 63 142 139 1,065
2003 425 63 126 165 1,098
2004 490 48 124 156 1,109
2005 496 77 151 212 1,236
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2H. Number of articles that contains the word “globalisation”, 
“internationalisation”, “transnationalism”, “international economic integration”  in 
the article title, keywords, or abstract 
  globalisation internationalisation transnationalism internat. eco. integration 
1970 0 3 0 4
1971 0 1 2 0
1972 0 6 0 1
1973 0 2 0 4
1974 0 5 1 6
1975 0 8 0 8
1976 1 5 0 5
1977 0 10 0 4
1978 0 5 0 2
1979 1 7 0 9
1980 0 17 3 2
1981 0 18 1 2
1982 0 11 0 4
1983 2 21 0 2
1984 1 11 0 2
1985 2 14 0 4
1986 1 13 0 1
1987 7 24 1 2
1988 4 14 0 4
1989 12 20 0 0
1990 12 27 0 0
1991 25 33 2 2
1992 76 43 5 23
1993 86 75 2 26
1994 117 64 1 37
1995 155 101 4 31
1996 234 74 6 32
1997 369 85 11 37
1998 553 112 12 40
1999 601 88 29 45
2000 846 132 17 64
2001 978 97 26 50
2002             1,065  124 39 45
2003             1,098  115 57 58
2004             1,109  122 64 54
2005             1,236  125 71 66
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2I. Sample collection of programmes and projects on globalisation worldwide 
Research Institution Basic description/Mission Country 
 
North America 
McMaster University –  
Institute on 
Globalization and the 
Human Condition 
. Globalization and Autonomy 
.” To investigate the relationship between globalization and the 
processes of securing and building autonomy.  
To this end, we will seek to:  
[a] refine understanding of these concepts and of the historical 
evolution of the processes inherent in both of them, given the 
contested character of their content, meaning and symbolic status.  
Given that globalization is the term currently employed to describe 
the contemporary moment, we will:  
[b] determine the opportunities globalization might create and the 
constraints globalization might place on individuals and 
communities seeking to secure and build autonomy;  
[c] evaluate the extent to which individuals and communities might 
be able to exploit these opportunities and to overcome these 
constraints; and  
[d] assess the opportunities for empowerment that globalization 
might create for individuals and communities seeking to secure and 
to build autonomy.  
[e] determine how the autonomy available to individuals and 
communities might permit them to contest, reshape, or engage 
globalization.  
Focus Areas: production and exchange (including cultural 
production), environment, living in cultural plurality.”  
http://globalization.mcmaster.ca/ga/ga81.htm  
Canada 
International 
Development Research 
Centre 
. Globalization, Growth and Poverty (GGP) 
.“ The goal of the GGP program  is to support policy reforms in 
developing countries aimed at promoting inclusive growth and 
poverty reduction, and appropriate international integration 
strategies, by generating necessary evidence and analysis, and by 
strengthening the capacities for their production and use in 
democratic policy making.” 
http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-90935-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html 
Canada 
McGill University 
University of Montreal 
Concordia University 
. Globalization and the National Security State 
. “The Globalization and the National Security State project unites 
researchers from three Montreal Universities examining the effects 
of globalization on the traditional security functions of the nation-
state in different regions of the world.” 
http://gnss.mcgill.ca/index.htm 
Canada 
University of British 
Columbia –  
Departament of 
English 
. Nationalism and Globalization 
. “This focus group encourages inter-disciplinary research projects 
that engage contemporary theoretical debates about nationalism, 
globalization, and postcoloniality.” 
http://www.english.ubc.ca/grad/research/ntl_global.htm 
Canada 
University of 
Saskatchewan - Centre 
for the Study of Co-
operatives 
 
. Co-operative Membership and Globalization: Creating Social 
Cohesion through Market Relations 
. “The interdisciplinary research team included fifteen academic co-
investigators from universities across the country and more than 
twenty community partners from Nunavut to Halifax to Victoria. 
The project explored the extent to which co-operatives reflect or 
contribute to social cohesion, or a common sense of identity, in the 
communities where they are located. The project was arranged into 
four broad and overlapping clusters of research—urban consumers, 
rural regionalization and other changing definitions of community, 
Aboriginal cultures, and information technologies. The purpose of 
Canada 
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our project, through each of these four clusters, was to produce 
publications and practical ideas to meet the needs of academics, 
students, co-operatives, and governments. The research process 
relied on active collaboration between co-investigators and partner 
organizations. The research findings will enable co-operatives to be 
more responsive to members, more efficient in anticipating and 
meeting their needs, and in the process more effective at supporting 
change in Canadian communities in an era of globalization.” 
http://www.socialcohesion.coop/research/index.htm 
University of Victoria . Globalization, Rural Restructuring, and Local Welfare: A 
Comparative Analysis of Shrimp Aquaculture and the 
Transformation of Environment and Society in Thailand and India  
Project Completed (2000 – 2003) 
.“This project is examining how growing international demand and 
trade in cultured shrimp are affecting rural environments and 
impinging upon local livelihoods. This study follows from our 
previous research on shrimp farming in Thailand, expanding on it in 
three key ways. First, it situates shrimp culture within a broader 
context of globalization, so as to facilitate the development of 
conceptual linkages between local and macro factors that are shaping 
the production of export-oriented agricultural commodities 
generally, and shrimp in particular. Second, we are conducting 
intensive studies within four socially and ecologically distinct 
settings so as to achieve a deeper understanding of how the 
dynamics and structure of shrimp farming are shaped by local 
ecologies, politics, and social processes. Finally, the proposed 
research is cross-national, allowing a comparative analysis of how 
responses to globalization pressures vary between nation-states.” 
http://www.geog.uvic.ca/shrimp/Pages/Researchers/Flaherty/Flahert
y.htm 
Canada 
Université de Montréal 
-  in collaboration with 
Université Laval  
Universidad de Buenos 
Aires  Universidad 
Nacional de La Plata 
. Globalisation, bioethics and biotechnology in Canada and 
Argentina 
. “Our aim is to we will create an interdisciplinary collaborative 
research team of scholars and policy makers interested in the socio-
ethical and policy implications of biotechnology. This team will 
conduct research to understand the particular socio-cultural, 
historical and economic factors that influence public debate and 
policy while also reflecting on the challenges posed by the blurring 
of traditional biotechnology boundaries (i.e., health and agriculture). 
We will contribute to the mutual understanding of common and 
divergent views to enable ethically and socially nuanced policy 
recommendations for addressing biotechnology innovation in 
Canada and Argentina.” 
http://www.genethics.ca/Argentina/ 
Canada 
York University . Globalization of Protracted Refugee Situations (GPRS) Project 
. “The main objective of the GPRS project is to explore and define 
the extent of long-term refugee situations internationally with the 
purpose of determining the relationship between the persistence of 
the camps and other long-term refugee situations and the provision 
of specific forms of development aid.” 
http://www.atkinson.yorku.ca/~gprs/index.html 
Canada 
The University of 
British Columbia 
Centre for 
International Healthy 
. Developing a Research Program on Globalization, Social 
Organization and Health. 
. Project Period: 2003 - 2006 
. “This Canadian-Cuban-Mexican collaboration is investigating the 
effects on health that are attributable to the impact of globalization 
on the social organization within our communities. Specifically, 
the program of research seeks to develop greater clarity around 
conceptual frameworks and then build on this to develop 
methodologies and research protocols for conducting cross-country 
Canada 
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studies that in turn can provide insights into the forces at play, the 
health implications and policy options for mitigating the negative 
effects of globalization.” 
http://www.cih.ubc.ca/EN/associated_projects/developing_a_researc
h_program_on_globalization,_social_organization_and_health/ 
University of 
Manitoba 
. Centre for Globalization and Cultural Studies 
. "Through a number of its humanities and social sciences 
departments, the University has a long-standing interest and research 
strength in globalization and cultural studies. Newly developed 
educational program and research initiatives in this area, combined 
with the recent hiring of a number of promising young faculty, have 
led the University to identify globalization and cultural studies as a 
priority area for further development." 
http://umanitoba.ca/centres/gcs/ 
Canada 
University of Toronto - 
Centre for 
International Studies 
. Program on Globalization and Regional Innovation Systems 
(PROGRIS) 
. “…to study a key aspect of the emerging global economy - namely, 
how firms and institutions interact to foster the innovation process in 
a regional context … The goal of PROGRIS is to investigate how the 
interaction of firms and regional institutions in Canada and other 
countries facilitates, or impedes, the process of innovation and social 
learning that is critical for success in the new global economy.” 
http://www.utoronto.ca/progris/web_files/aboutus.htm 
Canada 
University of Colorado 
at Boulder 
. Globalization and Democracy (GAD): A National Science 
Foundation (NSF) Graduate Training Program. 
. It … “is an interdisciplinary training program … that provides an 
ideal context for studying the forces of change in the modern world.” 
“GAD training and research are organized around six themes:  
- Globalization of economic processes.  
- The possibilities for democracy in a globalizing economy.  
- Transformations of the meaning and practice of citizenship.  
- The legitimacy of political and governmental structures.  
- Accountability in the face of transnational economic forces.  
- Ethno-national conflict and accommodation.  
http://www.colorado.edu/IBS/GAD/gad.html 
United 
States 
Yale University . The Yale Center for the Study of Globalization (YCSG)  
. “The YCSG is devoted to examining the impact of our increasingly 
integrated world on individuals, communities, and nations. The 
Center's purpose is to support the creation and dissemination of ideas 
for seizing the opportunities and overcoming the challenges 
presented by globalization. It is focused on producing practical 
policies to enable the world's poorest and weakest citizens to share in 
the benefits brought by globalization. YCSG also explores solutions 
to problems that, even if they do not result directly from integration, 
are global in nature and can therefore be effectively addressed only 
through international cooperation. The Center draws on the rich 
intellectual resources of the Yale community, scholars from other 
universities, and experts from around the world.” 
http://www.yale.edu/bulletin/html2004/grad/research.html#ISPS 
United 
States 
Columbia University . Center on Globalization and Sustainable Development (CGSD) of 
the Earth Institute at Columbia University.  
. “Our mission is to augment the intellectual community using social 
sciences approaches to address the most pressing international 
development problems of our time. This mission overlaps with those 
of social science departments across the university, with whose 
faculty we collaborate. The hallmark of CGSD is interdisciplinary 
research and policy application. We operate on the underlying 
principle that because development problems cross disciplines - from 
the environment to disaster preparedness to public health to 
economic planning - so must the solutions.” 
United 
States 
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http://www.earth.columbia.edu/cgsd/ 
Columbia University .The Program in International Development and Globalization.  
. “The program examines issues in international economic 
development and analyzes global institutions, multilateral treaties, 
non-governmental organizations, and mobilizations of public protest. 
 It looks at the interplay among state, politics, and civil society.” 
http://globaldevphd.columbia.edu/Home.asp 
United 
States 
Indiana University . International and Comparative Law, and Globalization 
. “Globalization is changing the world politically, economically, 
culturally, and legally. Our Global Legal Studies Program has been 
created to prepare students for lawyering in the global era.” 
http://law.indiana.edu/curriculum/programs/specialties/global.shtml 
United 
States 
Princeton University - 
Niehaus Center for 
Globalization and 
Governance 
. Center for Globalization & Governance (CGG) 
. “Our mission is three-fold. First, we seek to create a large and 
dynamic community of scholars and students interested in both the 
academic and policy dimensions of globalization and international 
governance. To do this, the Center will run a visiting fellows 
program in which the most promising young scholars working on 
globalization and governance issues will spend a year at Princeton. 
The Center will strive to create an intellectual community that serves 
the main goals of the Woodrow Wilson School: to tackle the most 
serious issues of the present day and prepare the leaders who will 
shape the public policies of the future.” 
http://www.princeton.edu/~pcglobal/about.html 
United 
States 
International Food 
Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) 
 
. Globalization and Markets 
. “This globalization and markets research program is designed to 
help national policy makers, researchers, international organizations 
and agriculture-sector stakeholders in developing and developed 
countries to better evaluate the implications of different scenarios of 
trade liberalization and globalization. It is also designed to help 
decision makers develop adequate related policies and societal 
responses for rural development, poverty alleviation, and food 
security, including alleviation of the economic barriers that prevent 
smallholder farmers in developing countries from benefiting from 
greater market-based opportunities. Policy changes supported by this 
research are expected to accelerate income growth through increased 
access to both domestic markets and international trade.” 
http://www.ifpri.org/themes/grp02/grp02research.asp 
 
United 
States 
Emory University . Program in Globalization, Global Migration, and Health 
. “The Emory Global Health Institute has provided seed funding to 
establish a research program that will address the impact 
globalization and global migration have on the health of specific 
populations. The program will focus on globalization’s and global 
migration’s effect on the cardio-metabolic risk factors of the targeted 
populations. Seed funding is being used to develop and implement a 
scientific workshop, publish the proceedings of this workshop, and 
publish a literature review on the current state of research regarding 
the cardio-metabolic risk factors of the United States’ culturally and 
ethnically diverse population. Additionally, Emory researchers are 
using these seed funds to establish a network of global collaborators 
as well as develop a plan to secure external funding that will sustain 
the research program.” 
http://www.globalhealth.emory.edu/programs/facultyPrograms/globa
lMigration.php 
United 
States 
University of 
California, Los 
Angeles – The 
Globalization Research 
Centre - Africa 
. The UCLA Globalization Research Center  
. “The overall aim of the UCLA Globalization Research Center-
Africa (GRC-A) is to research the ways global forces impact upon 
African societies, investigate the ways in which African societies 
impact upon the globalization process, and conduct cross-national 
United 
States 
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Member Institution of 
Globalization Research 
Network (GRN) 
and cross-cultural comparisons of global processes as they relate to 
Africa. GRC-A currently supports projects focused on: conflict, 
conflict management and democracy; HIV/AIDS in Africa; and 
curriculum development.” 
http://www.globalgrn.org/directors.htm#UCLA 
The George 
Washington University 
– Centre for the Study 
of Globalization 
 
Member Institution of 
Globalization Research 
Network (GRN) 
. The GW Center for the Study of Globalization  
. “The GW Center for the Study of Globalization (GWCSG) was 
established to promote research into and public education about the 
various forces driving globalization, the implications of globalization 
for business strategy and government policy, and the effects of 
globalization on people's day-to-day lives. In doing so, GWCSG 
conducts research in three broad areas; Globalization and 
Convergence, Global Financing and Investment, and Globalization 
and Information Technology. The GWCSG supports a number of 
initiatives, including studies with emphases on globalization's effects 
in Europe and the Middle East.” 
http://www.globalgrn.org/directors.htm#GW 
United 
States 
The George 
Washington University 
– Center for Economic 
Research 
. Research Program in Poverty, Development, and Globalization 
. “Current research of Development Program members include the 
following fields of study: 
- Poverty Alleviation. 
- Health and economic development  
- Trade policy and development strategy 
- Development Public Economics  
- Underdevelopment traps 
- Development issues in Transition  
- Institutions and Organizations.” 
http://www.gwu.edu/~cer1/Development%20Program.htm 
United 
States 
University of Hawaii-
Manoa – Globalization 
Research Center 
 
Member Institution of 
Globalization Research 
Network (GRN) 
. The Globalization Research Center at the University of Hawaii at 
Manoa  
. “The goal of the Globalization Research Center (GRC) at Hawaii is 
to identify and analyze the social, political, economic, and cultural 
transformations that characterize globalization, paying particular 
attention to their impact on Asia and the Pacific. GRC has developed 
projects focusing on human rights and trafficking of persons, global 
public health, urbanization and water, livable cities and global 
governance.” 
http://www.globalgrn.org/directors.htm#UH 
United 
States 
University of South 
Florida – Dr. Kiran C. 
Patel Center for Global 
Solutions  
 
Member Institution of 
Globalization Research 
Network (GRN) 
. Dr. Kiran C. Patel Center for Global Solutions at the University of 
South Florida  
. “The Dr. Kiran C. Patel Center for Global Solutions at the 
University of South Florida was established in May 2005, 
incorporating the USF Globalization Research Center as its research 
arm. The Patel Center studies the dynamics and effects of 
globalization worldwide, building on the Center's experience in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. The Center's research focuses on: 
economics, trade, and development; health; safety and human 
security; sustainable environments; and culture and the arts. Given 
that the phenomenon of globalization manifests itself in local 
contexts, the Center also sponsors several projects that deal directly 
with the Tampa Bay region.” 
http://www.globalgrn.org/directors.htm#USF 
United 
States 
Harvard University –  
Belfer Center for 
Science and 
International Affairs 
. Science, Technology and Globalization Project (STG) 
. “The aim of the Science, Technology and Globalization Project 
(STG) is to undertake research, conduct training, provide policy 
advice and disseminate information on interactions between 
technological innovation and globalization, with particular emphasis 
on implications for developing countries.” 
http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/research.cfm?program=STPP&project=
STG&ln=About&pb_id=255&gma=27&gmi=45 
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Harvard University –  
Center for 
International 
Development 
. Globalization and Development 
. “Globalization is the defining event of the last three decades. This 
research program focuses on the causes and consequences of 
globalization and its impact on the prospects for development. What 
do governments, international organizations, and non-governmental 
actors need to do to ensure that poor countries can take advantage of 
world markets while avoiding the whiplash that often accompanies 
insertion in the world economy? What are the implications of 
globalization for strategies of institutional reform in developing 
nations? How can the rules of international trade and finance be 
made more supportive of the goals of sustainable development and 
poverty alleviation? What is the appropriate balance between 
national autonomy and international discipline for countries at 
different levels of development?” 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/archive/res/cidglobal.html 
United 
States 
University of 
Massachusetts 
Amherst -   
Political Economy 
Research Institute 
(PERI) 
. Globalization and Macroeconomics 
.“ PERI's Globalization and Macroeconomics program provides 
research to promote sustained full employment and widespread 
prosperity for advanced and developing countries.” 
http://www.peri.umass.edu/Globalization.198.0.html 
United 
States 
Tufts University –  
Global Development 
and Environment 
Institute 
. Globalization and Sustainable Development 
.“ Since 1999, GDAE’s Globalization and Sustainable Development 
Program has been developing an empirically-based understanding of 
the economic integration process in order to draw out lessons for the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and other pending trade 
agreements, most notably the new round of World Trade 
Organization negotiations.” 
http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/policy_research/globalization.html#relatedp
rojects 
United 
States 
Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT) -  
Industrial Performance 
Center 
. Industrial Performance Center Globalization Project 
. The MIT Industrial Performance Center is engaged in a major new 
research program on the process of globalization and its implications 
for productivity growth, innovation and the creation of good jobs… 
The IPC Globalization Project focuses on one aspect of these 
developments: the fragmentation of the production systems of firms 
in the advanced economies, and the relocation of parts of these 
enterprises to other societies. Using the opportunities provided by 
new communication and transportation technologies, as well as the 
internationalization of capital markets, many firms are breaking off 
parts of their productive activities and relocating them in foreign 
countries…While the basic process of globalization has been much 
studied, its effects on individual firms and on their home societies 
have not. To investigate these questions, the IPC research team is 
tracking the course and consequences of globalization in several 
industries, including: 
• electronics, including semiconductors 
• software 
• financial services, including venture capital 
• motor vehicles 
• textiles and apparel. “ 
http://ipc-lis.mit.edu/globalization/main.html 
United 
States 
Woodrow Wilson 
International Center 
for Scholars 
. Science, Technology, America, and the Global Economy 
.“ The Woodrow Wilson Center has created a new program to 
explore paths for long-term growth in the United States and around 
the world. STAGE targets policies that foster sustained, sustainable, 
and equitable growth.” 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.home&to
pic_id=1408 
United 
States 
Stanford University –  . Center for Global Business and the Economy United 
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Stanford Graduate 
School of Business 
. “We encourage partnerships between the School and global 
managers and support rigorous and relevant research, teaching, and 
course development resources. The Global Center provides a focus 
for investigating the inherent complexity of international business: 
running operations across dispersed geographies, in a variety of 
cultures simultaneously, and under different legal, economic and 
political institutions.” 
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/cgbe/ 
States 
University of 
California, Berkeley 
. The Religion, Politics and Globalization Program  
. “The Religion, Politics and Globalization Program (RPGP) 
promotes multidisciplinary research and provides programming on 
the themes of religion, politics and globalization.” 
http://ias.berkeley.edu/rpgp/rpg-about.htm 
United 
States 
University of 
California, Berkeley 
 
Institute of 
Governmental Studies 
. Berkeley Center For Globalization and Information Technology 
. “Established in 2000, the Berkeley Center For Globalization and 
Information Technology comprises an interdisciplinary group of 
faculty and students that seeks to promote the study of the social 
ramifications of the globalization process and information 
technology. The Center is involved in issues related to global 
governance; telecommunication systems; and "internet studies", 
including cyberspace, virtual communities, e-commerce, and e-
politics with a special focus on Silicon Valley and the wired world.” 
http://igs.berkeley.edu/research_programs/ 
United 
States 
East-West Center . Islands of Globalization 
. The project seeks to enhance understanding of globalization from 
the perspective of small island societies, and changing notions of 
"islandness." 
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/research/research-
projects/?class_call=view&resproj_ID=193&mode=view 
United 
States 
University of Chicago .The Globalization Project 
. Project Period: 1996 - 2002 
. “At its most general, globalization involves increasingly rapid 
movements of commodities, images and persons across national and 
regional systems. The Project aimed to stimulate inquiry into the 
logic of these movements by drawing together scholars trained in 
these social and cultural sciences.” 
http://globalizationproject.uchicago.edu/aims.html 
United 
States 
Yale University – Yale 
School of Forest and 
Environmental Studies 
. Globalization, Transnational Networks and Legitimate Authority 
. “This research path seeks to understand better the emergence of 
international and transnational networks in terms of their legitimacy, 
authority, and accountability in shaping environmental policy.” 
http://environment.yale.edu/cashore/research-program/globalization-
transnational-networks-and-legitimate-authority/ 
United 
States 
University of 
California, Irvine - the 
Center for Research on 
Information 
Technology and 
Organizations 
(CRITO) 
. Globalization of E-commerce - Impacts of Electronic Commerce in 
the Global Networked Economy: A Multi-Country Study  
.“The Internet and electronic commerce are bringing countries 
together to create a global networked economy.  Internet technology 
is said to have no regard for national borders, but the people and 
companies that use the technology function within very different 
national environments.  This research program examines the global 
diffusion of Internet-based e-commerce, how national environments 
and policies influence e-commerce use within countries, and the 
economic and social impacts of e-commerce.” 
http://www.crito.uci.edu/GIT/project3.asp 
United 
States 
 
Europe 
Internet Union of 
Forest Research 
Organization (IUFRO) 
. Forest Research Management in an Era of Globalization 
. “The ultimate goal of research is to improve the wellbeing of 
society. However, globalization has changed the framework 
conditions and nature of forest research. Societal questions around 
Austria 
(IUFRO 
Headquart
ers) 
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forests and forestry are increasingly complex. At the same time 
budgets are declining. This condition is requiring research  
organizations to use their financial and human capital resources 
more efficiently. Consequently, the role of managers in forest 
research has become even more important as they will have 
to make sound policy choices for the future of forest research.” 
http://www.iufro.org/download/file/1913/77/news07-6.doc 
 
International Research 
Center for Cultural 
Studies 
. The Cultural Paradoxes of Globalization 
. “This research program focuses on the cultural dimensions of 
globalization and seeks to analyze its dynamism and paradoxes, its 
symbolic articulations and transformations, and its public and 
academic expressions and negotiation. Possible fields of research for 
fellowship applications could be:  
Case studies in the cultural history of globalization  
Cultural preconditions of transnational economic practices and 
processes  
European cultures and the challenge of globalization  
Global cities and the transformation of urban culture  
The impact of migrating knowledge and material culture on 
collective self-definition  
Contemporary art and art production between global aspirations and 
local self-assertion  
Civic laboratory or site of a global market of tastes? The changing 
social and cultural role of art museums  
Media, music, and film between local audiences and international 
modes of consumption  
Literary production and literary genres beyond national and cultural 
boundaries  
Political discourses confronting the cultural dilemmas of 
globalization  
The culture of global organizations and anti-global movements  
Religion at the crossroads of secularization, rationalization, and 
radicalization. “ 
http://www.ifk.ac.at/about__research_foci--4-en.html 
Austria 
Aalborg University –  
Research Centre for 
Development and 
International 
Relations (DIR) 
. Globalization and Social Change - Interdisciplinary Critical 
Perspectives (PhD Program) 
.  “The PhD Researcher Program is characterized by basic research, 
which tries to connect different levels in analyzing the combined 
process of globalization and social change. This is done by focusing 
on definitions and frameworks to enable an understanding of the 
causes and effects of geopolitical and geoeconomic processes and 
the socio-political forces at global, regional and local levels. 
Through the use of critical development theories and international 
political economy as well as the evolution of these concepts it is 
sought to understand the challenge which globalization exposes local 
communities to and their possible responses. Through different 
projects, an understanding of the conditions for peace and security, 
crisis and change in the international political economy and at the 
societal levels is formed, which includes the gender problematic, 
ethnicity and civil society.” 
http://www2.ihis.aau.dk/development/phd_program.html 
Denmark 
Aalborg University –  
Research Centre for 
Development and 
International 
Relations (DIR) 
. Beyond Globalization and Development: In Search of Alternative 
Futures (Research Program) 
. Research Period: 2005-2008 
. “This research programme will dig deeper, excavate and unearth 
the reasons why world poverty increases rather than decreasing, why 
nature continues to scream rather than settling. It will relate issues, 
problems and puzzles beyond globalization and development in 
search of alternative futures.” (p.8) PDF 
http://www2.ihis.aau.dk/development/pdf/research_program_2005-
Denmark 
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2008_til_nettet.pdf 
Aalborg University –  
Research Centre for 
Development and 
International 
Relations (DIR) 
. Globalization, Inequality and Human Security  
Research period: 2001-2003 
. “The features and objectives of the research program are related to 
the following thematics:  
- Generating new knowledge on the basis of interdisciplinary 
theoretical and empirical scrutiny of the changing relationships and 
processes of globalization and development.;  
- Explicitly introducing questions of power and agency to structures 
and processes of globalization and development;  
- Mounting critical and reflexive analyses of issues, problems, cases, 
areas and challenges from the meta to the micro-levels related to the 
specific context and dynamics of globalization and development;  
- Identifying asymmetric relations, additions and subtractions to 
human security, inclusions and exclusions of various categories of 
social strata as related to processes of unilateral liberalization by the 
nation-state, multilateral liberalization by the IFIs and the WTO, 
voluntary and involuntary regionalizations and different forms of 
interactions by global and local actors;  
- Identifying various forms of resistance to globalization and 
searching for alternatives to conventional approaches to 
globalization and development at the levels of conceptual, empirical 
and social practices.” 
http://www2.ihis.aau.dk/development/pdf/Research_program.pdf  
Denmark 
United Nations 
University 
. Various ongoing projects related to globalisation and its economics, 
social and policy impacts  
. “To undertake multidisciplinary research and policy analysis on 
structural changes affecting the living conditions of the world's 
poorest people.” 
. “To provide a forum for professional interaction and the advocacy 
of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally 
sustainable growth.” 
. “To promote capacity strengthening and training for scholars and 
government officials in the field of economic and social policy 
making.” 
http://www.unu.edu/globalization/ 
 
Finland 
Helsinki School of 
Economics 
. Globalization and Competitiveness 
.“The ‘globalization and competitiveness’ programme examines how 
the increasing mobility of labour and capital affects Finnish 
companies and their competitiveness. The following questions are 
significant for the programme: For what and how companies 
compete under globalization, and what kind of rules are applied? 
How changes in consumer cultures and multiculturalism affect 
Finnish society, companies and their competitiveness?” 
http://www.hse.fi/EN/research/programs/globalization/ 
Finland 
University of Tampere . LIIKE - Research Programme on Finnish Companies and the 
Challenges of Globalization 
. “LIIKE is the first national research programme funded in 
collaboration with the Academy of Finland and the National 
Technology Agency Tekes in the field of business studies. The 
programme focuses on the changes of Finnish companies and their 
management under the pressure of knowledge-based competition 
and finance-driven economy.” 
http://www.uta.fi/tutkimus/liike/index.html 
Finland 
DIW Berlin (German 
Institute for Economic 
Research) and Dresden 
University of 
Technology / Chair of 
Energy Economics 
. The Globalization of Natural Gas Markets - A Joint Research 
Program on Supply Issues and Regulation in 
European and International Gas Markets (2004-2008) 
. “The Globalization of Natural Gas Markets” (“Global Gas”) is a 
research program by DIW Berlin and the DREWAG Chair for 
Energy Economics at Dresden University of Technology. Its 
Germany 
  266
objective is to carry out research on the evolving governance 
structures in the European and the international gas markets.” 
http://globalgas.ee2.biz/ 
University of 
Mannheim 
. Graduate Program "Globalization and Cultural Studies" 
. “The graduate program "Globalization and Cultural Studies" offers 
doctoral students the opportunity to study globalization processes 
within a uniquely transdisciplinary context.” 
http://amerikanistik.uni-mannheim.de/promoengl.htm 
Germany 
Research Institute of 
Industrial Economics 
. Globalization and Corporate Restructuring  
. “Due to these very important changes for the Swedish economy, 
the Research Institute of Industrial Economics has initiated a 
research program where research with this aim can be accumulated. 
The main aim of the research program is to increase our 
understanding of what economic prerequisites, forms of ownership 
of corporations and general institutions can ensure an efficient 
structural change in an international perspective and thus make use 
of the possibilities for growth entailed by the globalization process.” 
http://www.industrialeconomics.se/Templates/ResearchProgramme1
.aspx?PageID=3e394d02-c963-45ab-aa11-e1c9ddf38361 
Sweden 
Research Institute of 
Industrial Economics 
. Labor Market Consequences of the Globalization of Firms (On-
going research project part of the “Globalization and Corporate 
Restructuring”) 
. “The effects of globalization on labor market are regarded as one of 
the largest structural problems in Swedish economy. The objective 
of this project is to analyze the consequences of firms’ location 
decisions for outcomes in the labor market.” 
http://www.naringslivsforskning.se/Templates/ResearchProject1.asp
x?PageID=cda4d64d-9a5b-463b-a674-836320de5300 
Sweden 
Research Institute of 
Industrial Economics 
. Globalization and ownership policy in post-war Sweden (Research 
project part of the “Research Program Economics of  
Entrepreneurship”) 
. “This project studies the dramatic turn in Swedish ownership policy 
on ownership structure in the Swedish economy in the post-war 
period.” 
http://www.naringslivsforskning.se/Templates/ResearchProject1.asp
x?PageID=cf4ff603-970d-48b6-b52d-9f7c337cc499 
Sweden 
University of Sussex . Economic Geographies of Globalisation and Development 
. “The research of this cluster focuses on global value chains, 
developing country industrialisation, industrial change and regional 
economic performance, the nature and impact of the emergence of 
China and spatial price formation. Current research on regional 
inequality and regional economic performance (Mick Dunford) has 
been mainly confined to Europe (including an ESRC funded project 
with the universities of Durham and Hertfordshire) on Regional 
economic performance, governance and cohesion in an enlarged 
Europe that was graded as outstanding by the ESRC and generated a 
number of valuable datasets). Most recent research activity has 
concentrated on the Three Italies and on the comparative 
performance of continental, Nordic, Mediterranean, east European 
and 'neo-American' economies. This research is underpinned by an 
interest in the relationships between globalization, integration, 
transition, convergence, inequality and social cohesion (including 
analyses of the structural and cohesion policies of the EU). 
Theoretically it draws upon theories of regulation in which the group 
has a strong interest. Current plans centre on an extension of this 
research to a comparative study of the EU and China…” 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/geography/1-4-1.html 
UK 
University of Sussex . The Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and 
Poverty 
. ‘The Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation 
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and Poverty aims "to promote new policy approaches that will help 
to maximize the potential benefits of migration for poor people, 
whilst minimizing its risks and costs". It undertakes a programme of 
research, capacity-building, training and promotion of dialogue to 
provide the strong evidential and conceptual base needed for such 
new policy approaches. This knowledge base is also being shared 
directly with poor migrants, contributing both directly and indirectly 
to the elimination of poverty.’ 
http://www.migrationdrc.org/about/index.html 
University of Warwick . Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation  
. “CSGR is a multidisciplinary project. Its staff and associates are 
drawn from the fields of Anthropology, Business, Economics, Law, 
Politics and Sociology. Likewise, the Centre’s seminars, conferences 
and other projects generally draw participants from several 
disciplines. 
The research agenda of CSGR highlights issues of the definition, 
measurement, impacts, and policy implications of globalisation and 
regionalisation. More specifically, much of the Centre’s research 
concentrates on questions such as comparative regionalisms, the 
political economy of global and regional finance and trade, civil 
society in globalisation and regionalisation, and security issues in 
globalisation and regionalisation. CSGR research spans all regions 
of the world, as well as relations between them.” 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/about/ 
UK 
London School of 
Economics (LSE), 
University of London 
. The Centre for the Study of Global Governance 
. “The Centre for the Study of Global Governance is a leading 
international institution dedicated to research, analysis and 
dissemination about global governance. Based at the London School 
of Economics, the Centre aims to increase understanding and 
knowledge of global issues, to encourage interaction between 
academics, policy makers, journalists and activists, and to propose 
solutions.” 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/aboutus.htm 
UK 
King's College, 
University of London 
. MA/MSc Environment, Politics and Globalization, Department of 
Geography 
. “The MA/MSc Environment, Politics and Globalisation programme 
is aimed at providing students with an in-depth and critical 
awareness of the politics and geographies shaping environments at a 
range of interrelated and ever shifting scales. In this context the 
programme involves a broad and reflexive interpretation of the terms 
‘environment’, ‘politics’, and ‘globalization’. It aims to enable 
students to develop the skills required to engage with both cutting 
edge academic literatures and grounded policy scenarios so that they 
can participate in the dynamic and contested environmental arena. 
These aims are achieved by the unique combination of theoretical 
and practical modules that draw on the environmental expertise of 
the staff and internships with participating environmental 
organisations.” 
. http://postgraduatestudentships.co.uk/node/1909 
UK 
Queen Mary, 
University of London 
. MSc Globalisation and Development – Departament of Geography 
. “MSc Globalisation and Development examines the economic, 
political, social and institutional bases and consequences of uneven 
power relations within contemporary processes of global 
development. Not restricted merely to economic dimensions of 
globalisation, the programme also examines the moral, ideological, 
gender and race relations that shape processes of, and institutional 
responses to, globalisation and development. It does so at a range of 
scales and in different spaces within an increasingly transnational 
world.  
MSc Globalisation and Development is an innovative programme 
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that combines the theoretical and empirical study of globalisation 
with a detailed examination of the activities of a range of 
organisations concerned with the practice of development. Whilst 
the programme aims to develop an advanced and critical 
understanding of the geographies of globalisation and development 
and to engage with questions of power and resistance, it also offers 
the skills necessary to engage directly with practitioners working in 
the field of development.  
Taught through an innovative range of seminars, workshops, 
presentations and site visits, and delivered by members of the 
Department's internationally renowned Spaces of Politics, Inequality 
and Development Research Group, the programme engages with the 
latest thinking and practice around globalisation and development.” 
.http://www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/postgraduate/programmes/globalisatio
n/index.html 
School of Oriental and 
African Studies 
(SOAS), University of 
London 
. MSc Globalisation and Development 
. “The programme offers a critical examination of the contemporary 
process of globalisation and how it has influenced the developing 
world, both before and after 9/11.The MSc Globalisation and 
Development blends critical analysis of mainstream thinking, 
alternative theories and practices, and cases studies of political, 
social and cultural aspects of globalisation and development. The 
degree draws its strength from the unrivalled expertise in 
development problems and processes at SOAS.” 
http:// www.soas.ac.uk/programmes/prog13999.php  
UK 
University College 
London (UCL) 
. MSc in Globalisation  
. “The MSc in Globalisation is an interdisciplinary programme that 
examines the economic, political, institutional and social processes 
shaped by increasing interdependence, integration and interaction 
between people in distant places. The thematic scope is broad-
ranging, and seeks to balance a critical interrogation of conceptual 
debates around the nature of globalisation with an examination of the 
diverse geopolitical, economic, and social manifestations of the 
globalisation process itself. 
The MSc is strongly interdisciplinary in scope, and thus is 
appropriate for students from a diverse set of backgrounds. This 
would include students with undergraduate degrees in the social 
sciences—such as human geography, politics and international 
relations, economics, sociology, and anthropology—as well as a 
range of other disciplinary and professional backgrounds. By 
offering students considerable flexibility in their choice of modules 
and, especially, in the framing and design of their dissertation 
projects, the course seeks to accommodate individual research 
interests and needs. 
Students completing the MSc in Globalisation will be able to 
develop expertise in key theoretical discourses and debates around 
globalisation, develop expertise in advanced social science research 
skills, gain experience in the design and execution of a major 
research project and prepare for careers in fields where an advanced 
understanding of the subjects covered in the programme are 
valuable. These include development agencies, international 
business, consultancy, government, social services and academia.” 
http://www.geog.ucl.ac.uk/prospstudents/pg/msc/geoglobal/ 
UK 
Institute for the Study 
of the Americas – 
School of Avanced 
Study – University of 
London 
. MSc in Globalisation and Latin American Development 
. “The MSc in Globalisation and Latin American Development 
examines both the theoretical issues raised by globalisation and the 
variant ways in which different Latin American societies have 
reacted to it. The programme also examines the degree to which 
contemporary indices of globalisation are continuous with earlier 
forms of Latin America’s global incorporation, and it takes as its 
UK 
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central concern the ways in which Latin American development is 
bound up with global processes The flexibility of either part-time or 
full-time study is offered. A number of fieldwork grants are offered 
to enable students to carry out fieldwork for the dissertation. 
Alongside the development of techniques, skills and knowledge 
relevant to the interests and research needs of individual students, 
the programme aims to equip students for both independent research 
and analysis in primary and secondary material, and writing at an 
advanced level, thus fostering students’ intellectual development and 
the independent learning ability required for continuing professional 
and personal development. 
Outcomes can be broadly defined as either knowledge-based or skill-
based and are usually realised in combination. Thus the categories of 
outcomes below are not mutually exclusive; knowledge and 
understanding, skills of various kinds and other attributes are 
complementary attainments gained in reciprocal relationship with 
one another. The programme draws substantially on the active 
research of teaching staff in the specialist areas of study.” 
 
http://www.americas.sas.ac.uk/postgraduate_study/MSc_Globalisati
onLatinAmDev.htm 
Loughborough 
University 
. Globalization and World Cities Research Network 
. “Centred in the Geography Department at Loughborough 
University, this research network focuses upon the external relations 
of world cities. Although the world/global city literature is premised 
upon the existence of world-wide transactions, most of the research 
effort has gone into studying the internal structures of individual 
cities and comparative analyses of the same. Relations between cities 
have been neglected by world cities researchers; the Globalization 
and World Cities (GaWC) Research Network has been formed to aid 
in rectifying this situation (see Multiple GaWCs - a brief 
introduction to the multi-facetted nature of GaWC - and Formative 
Missions for GaWC).” 
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc 
UK 
University of Bath . MSc Globalisation and International Policy Analysis (MGIPA) 
. “Provides a multidisciplinary social science based understanding of 
globalisation and international policy analysis and examines the 
vertical links between national, supra-national and global levels, as 
well as the horizontal links between policy making by governments, 
business and other actors.” 
http://www.bath.ac.uk/prospectus/postgrad/soc-
pol/progs/mgipa.shtml 
UK 
University of 
Glasglow 
. MSc Global Movements, Social Justice & Sustainability 
. “This programme offers you the chance to examine the social, 
political and cultural aspects of the global movements that are 
shaping the contemporary world, and to assess ongoing debates 
about social justice and sustainability, through the analysis of a wide 
range of ethnographic studies. 
When do processes and practices of globalisation, participation and 
sustainability strengthen injustice? When are they emancipatory? 
This programme draws on detailed ethnographic studies from both 
the 'north' and the 'south' to analyse global movements, examining 
for example how and when 'participatory governance' and 
'sustainable development' are used to support or to exploit social and 
ecological systems. 
Through developing the hands-on critical skills of participatory, 
investigative and action research - grounded in the emerging field of 
global ethnography - you will be encouraged to examine and assess 
strategies used to resist and redirect those processes of globalisation, 
sustainable development and participatory governance which have 
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the potential to produce and reproduce inequalities.” 
http://www.findamasters.com/search/showcourse.asp?cour_id=9960 
University of 
Nottingham 
. The Leverhulme Centre for Research on Globalisation and 
Economic Policy 
. “GEP - the Globalisation and Economic Policy Centre - is the 
major centre in Europe studying the impacts of globalisation and 
economic policy and one of the biggest of its kind in the world.  The 
Centre has an impressive international reputation; its academics have 
advised the Treasury, the World Bank and WTO.” 
http://www.gep.org.uk 
UK 
University of 
Aberdeen  
. Masters (MLitt) program in Muslims, Globalisation, and the West, 
Al-Maktoum Institute, Dundee, Scotland 
. “This is a new one year taught masters programme which provides 
an introduction and exploration of the complex issues and 
relationships between Muslims and what is referred to as the ‘West’. 
The programme mainly focuses on the analysis of issues related to 
the contexts in which globalisation, dialogue and clash of 
civilisations emerged. Key issues for students taking the programme 
include the emergence of globalisation and its overriding impact on 
politics and international relations issues relating to Islam and 
Muslims across the world.  
Within the programme, we also look into the debate of dialogue or 
non-dialogue and ongoing concepts and discussions on the perceived 
threats of Islam to ‘Western’ values, reinforcing the claim made by 
proponents of clash of civilisations. The programme also highlights 
the Quranic discourse on peace, dialogue, understanding, the concept 
of humanity (insaniyyah) and universalism. Thus, globalisation in its 
political but also sociological underpinnings is examined by 
identifying areas of similarity and difference between the two. In 
addition, the programme discusses issues about the concept of 
political Islam, understandings and misunderstanding about it and 
whether or not Muslim political thought is incompatible with 
principles of governance in the ‘West’.  
This innovative and unique programme is aimed to enable students 
to contribute in an informed and intelligent way to current debates 
on how Muslims (and more broadly Islam) can be seen to be 
engaging with the contemporary issues of globalisation and 
international relations.  
One important element of this programme is its uniqueness within 
the field of Islamic Studies, with the focus on the combination of 
approaches including both studies of Islamic sources and concepts 
(in particular the Qur’an and other core sources) and contemporary 
social/political studies of issues relating to international relations. 
This makes the programme distinct from any other programmes in 
either Islamic Studies and politics or sociology.” 
. http://www.h-net.org/announce/show.cgi?ID=157034 
UK 
Manchester 
Metropolitan 
University 
. MA in Globalisation, Societies & Cultures – Departament of 
Sociology 
. “This new MA programme will run alongside our existing MA in 
Sociology and provides the same range of methodological insights 
and skills. However, the MA in Globalisation focuses specifically on 
the many ways in which global forces - often working alongside 
parallel transformations - are changing the ways in which we are 
experiencing everyday life.  
Among the key themes tackled are :  
- the development of transnational communities and cultures 
including emergent new forms of worldwide political protest,  
- the possibilities for a future global society or culture,  
the inter-meshing of local-global interests and identities  
- the inequalities and social exclusion generated by economic 
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globalisation.  
A wide range of further topics can be explored through the option 
courses available including the impact and the repercussions of 
globalisation for the following:  
- women's lives and work,  
- gender issues and international movements,  
- cities and urban cultures,  
- the media and technology,  
- consumption practices,  
- crime connections,  
- issues surrounding race and racism and contemporary world crises.  
A central theme running through all the courses concerns whether 
and to what extent sociology - like other disciplines - needs to re-
think many of its central concepts, debates and theoretical 
approaches in the light of globalisation processes.” 
http://www.sociology.mmu.ac.uk/courses_maglob.php 
University of Brighton . MA Cultural and Critical Theory (Globalisation: Politics and 
Culture) 
. “Commencing with current debates concerning the appropriate 
conceptualisation and historical location of the process of 
globalisation, the first unit, 
The Political Economy of Globalisation, addresses the central 
approaches to understanding the development of the world system 
from within the disciplines of international relations. It will consider 
the key contemporary arguments concerning some of the 
institutional, economic and political transformations of the last two 
decades: the role of the World Trade Organisation, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Services, the development of regional 
blocs, and the changing status and role of the United Nations. It will 
also address the issues of the relationships between globalisation, 
bio-technology, militarism and the nation state.” 
http://www.brighton.ac.uk/art/programmes/humanities/pdf/ma-
global-poli-cult.pdf 
UK 
Swansea University – 
School of Law - Wales 
. MA in Global Orders and Law 
. “In its first part, the module will explore the interconnections 
between law, trade, politics, and economics in a global context. The 
second part of the module will allow students to apply the theoretical 
insights thus gained to various topics of globalization such as the 
global economy, environment, human rights, and international 
criminal law.” 
http://www.swansea.ac.uk/law/postgraduate/MADegree/MAinGloga
lOrdersandLaw/ 
UK 
The School of Law 
and Government  
Dublin City University  
. MA in Globalisation  
. “The MA in Globalisation provides students with the skills and 
abilities to understand the pressures giving rise to and created by 
globalisation. For students with some years’ work experience in the 
field, the programme also provides a basis for further professional 
development within their chosen career.  
. The principal objectives of the programme are:  
·      to develop in students a detailed understanding of the key 
concepts underpinning contemporary globalisation.  
·      to provide an in-depth knowledge of the manner in which 
contemporary world politics and the international regulatory 
environment shapes the role and character of the principal actors on 
the world stage, including international institutions, non-
governmental organisations and the growing anti-global capitalism 
movement.  
·      to develop in students a critical perspective concerning the 
range of issues arising on the contemporary international world 
stage, including international political economy, global governance, 
Ireland 
  272
international law, regional conflict, national and international 
security policies, Third World solidarity and international human 
rights.  
·      To provide students with strong research skills in the area of 
globalisation and international relations more generally.” 
 
http://www.internationaleducationmedia.com/ireland/law_and_gover
nment_dublin_city_university.htm 
University College 
Cork - College of Arts, 
Celtic Studies and 
Social Sciences 
. MA Sociology of Develoment & Globalisation 
. “The Department offers an innovative MA in the Sociology of 
Development and Globalisation (CKE56). This programme was 
launched in 1990 and grew out of a long standing interest in 
development issues within the Department. The importance and 
continuing relevance of an analysis of the global nature of our 
current world, at both the structural and cultural levels, is illustrated 
by the street confrontations over the World Trade Organisation's 
meetings and by the less volatile, but pervasive 'McDonaldisation' of 
culture and consumerism. However, at the same time, examples of 
resistance and conflict exemplified by events in Chechnya, East 
Timor, Kosovo, Rwanda, and Palestine remind us of the importance 
of the local and the specific in understanding regional developments 
as they articulate with the wider global trends. In our teaching and 
research, we draw on both sociological and anthropological 
perspectives. The programme attempts to analyse critically the 
processes of the globalisation of poverty and inequality and explores 
alternative strategies of development by which people can liberate 
themselves from the structures and ideologies of domination. In the 
programme we recognise that poverty and inequality are not only 
about access to resources, but are based on ways of knowing, 
thinking, and feeling The Department is offering a range of courses 
in the field of sociology, focusing on sociological theory (including 
Weber, Foucault, Habermas and critical sociology, Elias and process 
sociology), the sociology of contemporary Ireland (including the 
conflict in Northern Ireland, crime and deviance, women and gender 
in Ireland, environment and environmental movements), and the 
sociology of culture and media.” 
. http://www.ucc.ie/en/CKE56/ 
Ireland 
University of Limerick . MA in Language, Culture & Globalisation 
http://www.postgradireland.com/Courses/CourseView.asp?intPGCo
urseID=3530&strKeyword=globalisation#courseDetails 
Ireland 
 
Asia and the Pacific 
RMIT University . The Globalism Institute – An RMIT Research Center 
. “The Globalism Institute specialises in engaged and principled 
research that develops socially sustainable and culturally sensitive 
responses to the demands of globalization.” 
http://globalism.rmit.edu.au/research/research.html 
Australia 
Centre for Asia Pacific 
Social Transformation 
Studies 
(CAPSTRANS) –  
University of 
Wollongong and the 
University of 
Newcastle 
. Globalisation and development: impact on Indian women workers 
(Research Program: Mobility and Exclusion) 
. “This project will examine sectors that have opened up to the 
global economy directly and indirectly: call centres and women 
working as out-workers and in the informal sector in the garment 
industry in Tirupur in the Coimbatore district of Tamil Nadu. Some 
of the main areas, which will be discussed in the interviews and 
subsequently analyzed, include: occupational mobility, wages, 
empowerment of women in the workplace, attitudes of women 
towards work and the attitude of the employers towards the women 
employees, education, caste and social constraints and family life.” 
http://www.capstrans.edu.au/about/projects/global-dev.html 
Australia 
Centre for Asia Pacific . Globalisation and Education  Australia 
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Social Transformation 
Studies 
(CAPSTRANS) - 
University of 
Wollongong and the 
University of 
Newcastle 
. “A new and emerging program that examines the intersection 
between globalisation and education, including work on 
transnational education, international markets in education, the 
internationalisation of vocational education, and language and 
literacy policy in South East Asia.” 
http://www.capstrans.edu.au/about/education.html 
 
Centre for Asia Pacific 
Social Transformation 
Studies 
(CAPSTRANS) - 
University of 
Wollongong and the 
University of 
Newcastle 
. Globalisation and International Development  
. “This research program examines the impact of globalisation on 
development at the local, national, and regional levels. Research 
projects are currently organised into two major themes.  
International Agencies and Development NGOs  
Social Impact Analysis  
http://www.capstrans.edu.au/about/int-dev.html 
Australia 
Hokkaido University - 
Slavic Research Center 
. Making a Discipline of Slavic Eurasian Studies: Meso-areas and 
Globalization 
. This research program was created “…in order to make 
contributions to rejuvenating and advancing international Slavic 
Eurasian area studies in accordance with the new historical 
environments of regional integrations and globalization.” 
http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/coe-e.html 
Japan 
Institute of Developing 
Economies 
Japan External Trade 
Organization (IDE – 
JETRO)  
. Globalization in South Asia: Its Impact on Employment and Labor 
Issues 
Research Period: April 2005 - March 2007 
. “In South Asia, as in other regions, globalization has given rise to 
new industries and created new employment opportunities in sectors 
such as the IT industry in India and readymade garment industries in 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. At the same time, globalization has 
brought changes in employment practices both in the public and 
private sectors, resulting in a shrinking of formal employment and an 
expansion of non-standard work arrangements. In this two-year 
research project, we have been investigating the issue first through 
an analysis of employment-related policies and institutions and the 
structure of labor markets and employment, and secondly by 
conducting several empirical surveys jointly with South Asian 
organizations. In the second and final year, following the field 
studies conducted in India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in the first 
year, the impact of the withdrawal of the Multi-Fiber Agreement 
(MFA) on the employment situation will be analyzed intensively 
through sample surveys in India and Pakistan.” 
http://ideaix03.ide.go.jp/English/Research/Project/2006/402.html 
Japan 
Institute of Developing 
Economies 
Japan External Trade 
Organization (IDE – 
JETRO) 
. Climbing up the Global Value Chain: Possibilities and Limitations 
for East Asian Manufacturers 
. Research Period: April 2007 - March 2009 
. “This research project studies the growth mechanisms of East 
Asian latecomer firms that participate in the global division of labor, 
cutting across both the different stages of value-adding activities and 
country borders. With special reference to empirical studies based on 
the “global value chain” (GVC) perspective, this study attempts to 
elucidate the possibilities and limitations associated with the growth 
of latecomer firms for powerful brand-carrying companies from the 
developed economies.” 
http://ideaix03.ide.go.jp/English/Research/Project/2007/109.html 
Japan 
Institute of Developing 
Economies 
Japan External Trade 
Organization (IDE – 
JETRO) 
. Reconstruction and Development of Rural Cambodia: From Krom 
Samakki to Globalization 
. Research Period: April 2007 - March 2008 
. How have Cambodian peasants rebuilt their social relations, which 
were totally destroyed by the Khmer Rouge regime? The objective 
of this study is to elucidate the process of reconstruction and 
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development in rural households after 1979, when the Khmer Rouge 
regime collapsed, and to publish it in English. 
http://ideaix03.ide.go.jp/English/Research/Project/2007/406.html 
Sustainable 
Development Policy 
Institute 
. Globalization and Rural Livelihoods 
. This research program aims to promote sustainable development by 
collaborating with existing organisations on current agricultural 
practices and their consequences for the environment, and the 
efficient utilisation of scarce natural resources, especially water. .. 
The program focuses on issues affecting the indigenous farming 
community. This program is actively involved in a campaign on 
food security and biodiversity. Agreement on agriculture, Trade 
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), bio-patenting and 
increased influence of multinational companies in agricultural input 
supply has threatened the region’s food security.” 
http://www.sdpi.org/research_Programme/environment/globalization
_and_rural_livelihood.htm#1 
Pakistan 
Sustainable 
Development Policy 
Institute 
. Gender and Globalization 
. “Program Objectives … 
- to find out how processes of economic globalisation influence 
gender(in-) equality in Pakistan;  
- to raise awareness about this interaction amongst stakeholders, and  
- to develop strategies how to make sure globalisation does not 
widen gender inequality but rather supports women’s 
empowerment.”  
http://www.sdpi.org/research_Programme/human_development/gend
er_and_globalization.htm 
Pakistan 
National Taiwan 
University – Institute 
for Advanced Studies 
in Humanities and 
Social Science  
. Program for Globalization Studies 
. “Goals of the globalization program 
1. Integrating the research resource of the National Taiwan 
Universities, promoting cross-disciplinary cooperation, combining 
the top-grade scholar in our school to constitute a research team with 
international competition ability.  
2. Stirring more cross-disciplinary cooperation, handling new 
research issues, and arousing academic communities in East Asia 
and scholars in related research field to develop neo-theory.  
3. Having the research ability that can show an important topic of 
Taiwan or East Asia, and the globalization developments. Regarding 
the researches of the realms, such as economics, psychology and 
geography...etc. as the principle that first to do. Integrating the social 
science such as sociology, management, politics, mass 
communications, jurisprudence.  
4. Bringing the advantage of National Taiwan University in the 
social science domain to a full play and combining the outstanding 
issue related research team, and through the practice to train a new 
research talented person.  
5. Communicating with international communities and exercising 
international influence.” 
http://www.psy.ntu.edu.tw/glob/en01.asp 
Taiwan 
Koç University . Center for Research on Globalization and Democratic Governance 
(GLODEM)  
. “Undertake high-quality research, foster public discussion, and 
enhance local and international linkages within and beyond Turkey;” 
. “Advance and apply knowledge about globalization and democratic 
governance;”  
. “Build Koç's reputation for expertise and advice pertaining to 
globalization and democratic governance based on its academic 
strength, independence and impartiality;” 
. “Serve broader audience by dealing with questions of long term 
strategy and policy about the various dimensions of globalization 
and democratic governance through research publications, 
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conferences, seminars, and workshops.”  
http://portal.ku.edu.tr/~glodem/ 
 
Middle East 
Zayed University . Globalization and Transnational Flows  
.“Research in this area is interdisciplinary and may address any 
aspect of the character and processes of contemporary globalization 
and the transnational flows which lie at its heart. The aim is to make 
a contribution to the understanding of the processes, dynamics, and 
consequences of globalization and the ways that it is reshaping the 
nature of contemporary social, cultural and political life, 
relationships, boundaries and networks at the interpersonal, 
collective, national and international levels.” 
http://www.zu.ac.ae/research/aspx/culturesociety.aspx 
United 
Arab 
Emirates 
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2J. Number of articles that contain the terms globalisation and financial 
globalisation, in the article title, abstract, or as keywords: 1970-2005 
 
Years Globalization Fin. globalization 
1970 0 0 
1971 0 0 
1972 0 0 
1973 0 0 
1974 0 0 
1975 0 0 
1976 1 0 
1977 0 0 
1978 0 0 
1979 1 0 
1980 0 0 
1981 0 0 
1982 0 0 
1983 2 0 
1984 1 0 
1985 2 0 
1986 1 0 
1987 7 0 
1988 4 0 
1989 12 1 
1990 12 2 
1991 25 2 
1992 76 5 
1993 86 3 
1994 117 9 
1995 155 9 
1996 234 13 
1997 369 21 
1998 553 28 
1999 601 31 
2000 846 69 
2001 980 49 
2002 1065 49 
2003 1098 52 
2004 1109 52 
2005 1236 59 
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2K. Number of articles that contain the terms financial globalisation, financial 
liberalisation, international finance, and international financial integration in the 
article title, abstract, or as keywords: 1970-2005 
Years/terms 
1970-
1974 
1975-
1979 
1980-
1984 
1985-
1989 
1990-
1994 
1995-
1999 
2000-
04 
2005-
06 
financial 
globalisation 0 0 0 1 21 102 271 261 
 financial 
liberalisation 0 0 2 19 107 215 247 100 
international 
finance 0 0 50 27 116 228 289 137 
intern. fin. 
integration 0 0 5 5 21 62 106 52 
total 0 0 57 52 265 607 913 550 
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3. OECD key ICT indicators 
 
 
Total communication access 
paths* 
Standard analogue access 
lines 
1991 437.4 422.1 
1992 459.0 437.3 
1993 485.2 455.3 
1994 518.9 471.2 
1995 562.5 485.5 
1996 590.8 465.3 
1997 655.3 508.5 
1998 737.0 477.4 
1999 858.8 475.9 
2000 1016.9 469.7 
2001 1129.2 461.2 
2002 1214.4 446.8 
2003 1291.5 436.7 
2004 1408.5 428.3 
2005 1529.9 417.3 
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4. Standard rate for 3-minute call from New York City to London 
 
Year US Dollar 
1927 75 
1928 45 
1930 30 
1936 21 
1944 21 
1945 12 
1949 12 
1970 9.6 
1974 5.4 
1980 4.8 
1986 4.83 
1991 3.32 
1995 2.4 
1999 0.3 
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5. Foreign capital stocks 1825-2000 
 
  1825 1855 1870 1900 1914 1930 1938 1945 1960 1971 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Assets                
United Kingdom 0.5a 0.7a 4.9a 12.1a 19.5a 18.2a 22.9c 14.2a 26.4a - 551d 857d 1,760d 2,490d 4,450.00 
France 0.1a - 2.5a 5.2a 8.6a 3.5a 3.9c - - - 168d 428d 736d 1,100d 2,430.00 
Germany - - - 4.8a 6.7a 1.1a 0.7c - 1.2a - 257d 342d 1,100d 1,670d 2,600.00 
Netherlands 0.3a 0.2a 0.3a 1.1a 1.2a 2.3a 4.8c 3.7a 27.6a - 99d 178d 418d 712d 1,140.00 
United States 0.0a 0.0a 0.0a 0.5a 2.5a 14.7a 11.5c 15.3a 63.6a - 775d 1,300d 2,180d 3,350d 7,350.00 
Canada - - - 0.1a 0.2a 1.3a 1.9a - - - 92d 129d 227d 302d 546.00 
Japan - - - - - - 1.2c - - - 160d 437d 1,860d 2,720d 2,970.00 
Other Europe - - - - - - 4.6c - - - 503d 715d 1,777d 2,855d 4,999.00 
Other - - - - - - 6.0c 2.0a 5.9a - 94d 123d 214d 337d 2,499.00 
All 0.9a 0.9a 7.7a 23.8a 38.7a 41.1a 52.8a 35.2a 124.7a - 2,800d 4,508d 10,272d 15,536d 28,984.00 
World GDP - - 111b 128b 221b 491b 491b 722b 1,942b 5,733b 11,118e 12,455e 21,141e 25,110e 31,499.00 
Sample GDP - - 16f 43f 76f 149f 182f 273f 671f - 7,806d 9,705d 17,250d 21,956d 25,785.00 
Sample size - - 4f 7f 7f 7f 7f 7f 7f - 25d 25d 25d 25d 63.00 
Assets/Sample GDP - - 0.47 0.55 0.51 0.28 0.26 0.12 0.18  0.36 0.46 0.60 0.71 1.12 
Assets/World GDP - - 0.07 0.19 0.18 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.06  0.25 0.36 0.49 0.62 0.92 
UK/All 0.56 0.78 0.64 0.51 0.5 0.44 0.43 0.4 0.21 - 0.2 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.15 
US/All 0 0 0 0.02 0.06 0.36 0.22 0.43 0.51 - 0.28 0.29 0.21 0.22 0.25 
Liabilities                
Europe - - - 5.4a 12.0a - 10.3a - 7.6a - 1,457d 2,248d 5,406d 8,592d 14,509.00 
North America - - - 2.6a 11.1a - 13.7a - 12.5a - 684d 1,412d 2,830d 4,681d 9,611.00 
Australia & N.Z. - - - 1.6a 2.0a - 4.5a - 2.2a - 71d 118d 216d 318d 494.00 
Japan - - - 0.1a 1.0a - 0.6a - 0.3a - 147d 307d 1,530d 1,970d 1,810.00 
Latin America - - - 2.9g 8.9g - 11.3g - 9.2a  250g - 505g 768g 490.00 
Asia (excl. Japan) - - - 2.4g 6.8g - 10.6g - 2.7a  129g - 524g 960g 132.00 
Africa - - - 3.0g 4.1g - 4.0g - 2.2a  124g - 306g 353g 155.00 
Developing Countries - - - 6.0g 13.0g - 25.9g - 14.1a  506g - 1,338g 2,086g 3,595.00 
All - - - 18.0a 45.5a - 55.0a - 39.9a - 3.368dg - 12,655dg 19,728dg 30,020.00 
World GDP - - 111b 128b 221b 491b 491b 722b 1,942b 4,733b 11,118e 12,455e 21,141e 25,110e 31,499.00 
Sample GDP - - - - - - - - - - 9,508d - 19,294d 25,043d 25,785.00 
Sample size - - - - - - - - - - 65dg - 65dg 65dg 63.00 
Liabilities/Sample GDP - - -        0.35  0.66 0.79 1.16 
Liabilities/World GDP - - - 0.14 0.21  0.11  0.02  0.30  0.60 0.79 0.95 
Developing Countries/All - - - 0.33 0.29 - 0.47 - 0.35 - 0.15 - 0.11 0.11 0.12 
Notes: 
Units for foreign investment and GDP are billions of current U.S. dollars. 
a= from Woodruff (1967, 150-159). 
b= from Maddison (1995); sample of 199 countries; 1990 US dollars converted to current dollars using 
US GDP deflator; some interpolation. 
c= from Lewis (1945, 292-97). 
d= from IFS (9/97).  Up to 26 countries, fixed sample, trend interpolation on missing data. 
e= from World Bank (1994). 
f= excludes “Other Europe” and “Other”; GDP data from appendix. 
g= from Twomey (1998; unpublished worksheets). 
Source: Obstfeld & Taylor (2004:22, 23) 
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6. FDI in world economic activity: 1913-2005 
  
Item 1913 1960 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
World FDI stock as a share 
of world output 9 4.4 4.5 4.8 6.4 8.12 9.98 20.43 23.99
World FDI inflows as a 
share of world output - 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 1.04 1.22 3.92 1.75
World FDI inflows as a 
share of gfcf - 1.1 1.4 2 1.8 4.5 5.4 19.8 7.5
World sales of foreign 
affiliates as a share of 
world exports - 84 b 97 c 99 d 99 d 122   
Source: UNCTAD, Division on Transnational Corporation and Investment, based on UNCTAD-DTCI, 
FDI data base, UN-DESIPA data base; Dunning 1993a and Bairoch, 1994. 
a Estimate. 
b 1967 based on United States figures. 
c Based on United States and Japanese figures. 
d 1982 based on German, Japanese and United States data. 
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7. FDI + PI Selected developed economies 1980-2003 
 
Year 
FDI 
outward 
FDI 
inward PI outward 
PI 
inward GDP 
FDI+PI/GD
P (outflow) 
FDI+PI/GD
P (inflow) 
1980 50,676.02 47,574.75 32,306.15 50,350.67 6,073,075.81 1.37 1.61 
1981 51,349.88 45,322.01 42,780.64 56,412.47 6,447,075.82 1.46 1.58 
1982 25,048.63 32,927.33 51,801.64 50,357.60 6,446,604.46 1.19 1.29 
1983 34,833.89 33,011.75 48,456.35 46,830.52 6,823,727.46 1.22 1.17 
1984 48,037.11 41,225.86 67,878.95 62,344.80 7,288,486.55 1.59 1.42 
1985 58,692.57 43,745.54 105,326.04 136,195.72 7,691,432.58 2.13 2.34 
1986 92,349.78 72,936.04 176,870.99 177,768.14 9,120,797.80 2.95 2.75 
1987 134,684.45 119,279.11 120,241.29 157,449.19 10,435,644.03 2.44 2.65 
1988 168,233.53 134,628.89 184,575.63 225,827.73 11,837,962.85 2.98 3.04 
1989 210,705.33 162,264.29 248,021.76 299,002.16 12,388,674.06 3.70 3.72 
1990 217,668.78 165,637.32 153,754.02 159,329.80 13,486,225.99 2.75 2.41 
1991 182,028.27 114,572.94 266,465.07 308,926.00 14,296,041.35 3.14 2.96 
1992 167,423.13 115,545.69 295,150.86 181,777.78 15,146,440.06 3.05 1.96 
1993 197,228.53 143,280.96 317,327.78 337,885.26 15,563,513.56 3.31 3.09 
1994 227,317.40 148,224.27 272,184.16 331,185.18 16,748,480.86 2.98 2.86 
1995 304,893.56 219,672.25 365,239.91 460,166.68 18,255,678.96 3.67 3.72 
1996 333,284.08 239,383.64 450,272.64 652,452.53 18,442,066.96 4.25 4.84 
1997 404,690.08 287,185.58 439,693.60 627,224.17 18,482,235.96 4.57 4.95 
1998 642,572.48 511,903.18 596,852.56 536,095.24 18,467,041.96 6.71 5.67 
1999 1,036,768.91 861,732.96 774,574.32 960,156.96 19,739,283.96 9.18 9.23 
2000 1,107,815.37 1,145,913.12 670,920.17 1,046,385.22 20,485,860.96 8.68 10.70 
2001 681,682.90 610,181.24 603,680.28 867,478.35 20,142,152.96 6.38 7.34 
2002 489,440.51 442,765.86 474,249.52 723,979.24 20,862,409.96 4.62 5.59 
2003 510,630.59 360,830.79 632,160.24 1,170,104.90 22,918,975.96 4.99 6.68 
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8. Foreign Assets and Liabilities: advanced and emerging countries, 1970-2004  
 
Year Total Advanced country Group (24 countries) Total Emerging Market Group (36 
countries) 
Total 
assets 
Total 
liabilities 
GDP 
(US$) 
Total 
assets + 
Total 
liabilities/ 
GDP  (%) 
Total 
assets 
Total 
liabilities 
GDP 
(US$) 
Total 
assets + 
Total 
liabilities/ 
GDP (%) 
1970 522532 446847 2162754 45 24790 90211 330226 35 
1971 639555 541521 2400152 49 28203 99417 366102 35 
1972 773674 648429 2798798 51 37280 113657 409205 37 
1973 883796 782270 3395832 49 49196 132883 510389 36 
1974 943120 891676 3764693 49 57896 163337 648106 34 
1975 1088766 1009261 4223902 50 62557 203380 682550 39 
1976 1280157 1204067 4585249 54 80699 244987 744181 44 
1977 1497483 1428476 5175455 57 106812 309163 846995 49 
1978 1906226 1788850 6234806 59 131019 365035 1001362 50 
1979 2300763 2199108 7167245 63 160778 432737 1211422 49 
1980 2690128 2598285 7961389 66 184027 527286 1467683 48 
1981 2934421 2894687 8067745 72 215206 616603 1862570 45 
1982 3139101 3101716 8001824 78 214720 700247 1743706 52 
1983 3440625 3362670 8300092 82 253708 756799 1750478 58 
1984 3612200 3558738 8689603 83 288573 783270 1795995 60 
1985 4425518 4368402 9159844 96 315082 840825 1855641 62 
1986 5808757 5689225 11177952 103 341614 913969 1931406 65 
1987 7321485 7159455 12946730 112 410100 1017566 2148467 66 
1988 8316341 8138661 14559422 113 444324 1032367 2491001 59 
1989 9820746 9732515 15133628 129 507921 1083582 2786777 57 
1990 11067497 11160069 16982441 131 628084 1181248 3037753 60 
1991 11815734 12060966 18068321 132 735793 1305339 3173436 64 
1992 11982638 12284920 19432266 125 804389 1440249 3492511 64 
1993 13628800 13729952 19568497 140 1024983 1858874 4090101 71 
1994 15053370 14928270 20981778 143 1180239 2115984 4509302 73 
1995 17426275 17454113 23060868 151 1383751 2429284 5183822 74 
1996 19249204 19295406 23151863 166 1574730 2741930 5702590 76 
1997 21476352 21496661 22735427 189 1748710 2991426 5970699 79 
1998 24744281 25047507 22991203 217 1961265 3233118 5520122 94 
1999 27870904 28292516 24112496 233 2213451 3633162 5442381 107 
2000 30813057 31378249 24357144 255 2387803 3608065 5943946 101 
2001 30787395 31594132 24079308 259 2534642 3730518 5927873 106 
2002 33858935 35024296 25093948 275 2858136 3868451 6020957 112 
2003 42780849 43859771 28150601 308 3474519 4610664 6778628 119 
2004 50968545 52302880 31152952 331 4191729 5323003 7877397 121 
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9. Effects of domestic telegraph and trans-Atlantic cable: Mean absolute and 
Standard deviation of the absolute difference of the United States 5-20 Bonds in New 
York and London 
 
  Mean absolute Standard deviation 
April-July 1866 4.118 2.265 
August-November 1866 1.272 0.762 
October-November 1867 1.097 1.221 
October-November 1868 1.419 1.399 
October-November 1871 1.208 0.973 
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10. US international transactions: 1960-2003 (Millions of dollars) 
 
 
Year 
US-owned assets 
abroad, net 
increase/financial 
outflow (-) 
Foreign-owned assets in 
the US, net 
(increase/financial 
inflow (+) 
Balance on current account 
(lines 1, 18, and 35 or lines 
73, 74, and 75)/13 
1960 (4,099) 2,294 2,824 
1961 (5,538) 2,705 3,822 
1962 (4,174) 1,911 3,387 
1963 (7,270) 3,217 4,414 
1964 (9,560) 3,643 6,823 
1965 (5,716) 742 5,431 
1966 (7,321) 3,661 3,031 
1967 (9,757) 7,379 2,583 
1968 (10,977) 9,928 611 
1969 (11,585) 12,702 399 
1970 (8,470) 6,359 2,331 
1971 (11,758) 22,970 (1,433) 
1972 (13,787) 21,461 (5,795) 
1973 (22,874) 18,388 7,140 
1974 (34,745) 35,341 1,962 
1975 (39,703) 17,170 18,116 
1976 (51,269) 38,018 4,295 
1977 (34,785) 53,219 (14,335) 
1978 (61,130) 67,036 (15,143) 
1979 (64,915) 40,852 (285) 
1980 (85,815) 62,612 2,317 
1981 (113,054) 86,232 5,030 
1982 (127,882) 96,589 (5,536) 
1983 (66,373) 88,694 (38,691) 
1984 (40,376) 117,752 (94,344) 
1985 (44,752) 146,115 (118,155) 
1986 (111,723) 230,009 (147,177) 
1987 (79,296) 248,634 (160,655) 
1988 (106,573) 246,522 (121,153) 
1989 (175,383) 224,928 (99,486) 
1990 (81,234) 141,571 (78,968) 
1991 (64,388) 110,808 3,747 
1992 (74,410) 170,663 (47,991) 
1993 (200,552) 282,040 (81,987) 
1994 (178,937) 305,989 (118,032) 
1995 (352,264) 438,562 (109,478) 
1996 (413,409) 551,096 (120,207) 
1997 (485,475) 706,809 (135,979) 
1998 (347,829) 423,569 (209,557) 
1999 (503,640) 740,210 (296,822) 
2000 (569,798) 1,046,896 (413,443) 
2001 (366,768) 782,859 (385,701) 
2002 (198,014) 768,246 (473,944) 
2003 (283,414) 829,173 (530,668) 
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11. Accumulated growth of notional amounts of OTC derivative contracts and world 
GDP (In percentage) 
 
Year 
OTC Notional 
value 
(billion dollars) 
OTC 
Accumulated 
(%) 
World GDP 
Notional value 
(billion dollars) 
World GDP 
Accumulated 
(%) 
1988 1,654.30 91.12 17,952.27 11.69 
1989 2,474.80 140.71 18,827.27 16.57 
1990 3,450.37 180.13 21,663.61 31.63 
1991 4,449.97 209.10 22,663.88 36.25 
1992 5,345.70 229.23 25,263.85 47.72 
1993 8,474.57 287.76 24,483.20 44.63 
1994 11,303.21 321.14 26,322.46 52.14 
1995 17,712.63 377.85 29,229.46 63.19 
1996 24,953.15 418.72 29,963.60 65.70 
1997 29,035.06 435.08 29,824.98 65.24 
1998 50,997.00 510.72 29,596.03 64.47 
1999 58,265.00 524.97 30,693.76 68.18 
2000 63,009.00 533.12 31,508.59 70.83 
2001 69,207.30 542.95 31,207.84 69.88 
2002 101,318.49 589.35 32,356.89 73.56 
2003 142,306.92 629.81 36,252.63 85.60 
2004 183,583.27 658.81 40,960.43 98.59 
2005 213,195.58 674.94 44,000.00 106.01 
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